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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertion is concerned with Indian defence policy 
and posture beyween 1947 and the present. It seeks to analyse and 
explain the array of push and pull factors which have shaped and 
given forward momentum to Indian defence policy. This includes, 
for example, bureaucratic politics, technological momentum, 
external threats from regional adversaries and the superpowers, 
corruption/rent seeking and the structure of the decision making 
process. Thus, the dissertation attempts to answer the question 
as to why the Republic of India has developed a specific set of 
defence postures and what motivates behind the key actors in the 
process.
The dissertation is also intended as a means to understand better 
the complex nature of the armament process in the Third World. It 
is argued that the prevailing approach to this subject is 
inadequate and, therefore, a new methodology is required to 
explain better and more comprehensively how the armament process 
functions in the Third World.
The armament process in the Third World spans two key subject 
areas of the social sciences; development studies and 
international relations. The introductory, theoretical section of 
the thesis deals with how successive development paradigms and, to 
a lesser extent, those of international relations have interpreted 
the role and impact of military institutions and military 
technology on the Third World. It is argued that a new conceptual 
framework is required due to the inherent inadequacy of the 
modernising and dependency schools in development studies; a 
preliminary framework is outlined in Chapter Two.
The thesis concludes that the driving forces of the Indian 
armament process are several and cannot be explained by one factor 
alone, such as external threat or technological dependency. 
However, defence procurement in India is extremely unweildly and 
is in part responsible for India's current fiscal crisis.
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Note for Readers
1) In the following dissertation a particular style has been 
used for footnotes. Where footnote appears inside the full 
stop (eg ...India1.) the reference relates to data and 
sources which have been used in that particular sentence. 
Where a footnote appears outside the full stop (eg 
...India.2) the reference relates to data in that and other 
preceding sentences in the paragraph.
2) The research for this PhD has been undertaken over 
several years, including the period 1983-1989, when the value 
of the India Rupee has dropped significantly. In 1983 the 
Rupee-Dollar exchange rate was approxiamtely Rs.lO:US$l. By 
1989 the value of the Rupee had fallen against the dollar 
considerably to Rs.15.5:US$1. Therefore, care should be 
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years it has become commonplace to question and 
criticise countries which spend large percentages of their Gross 
National Product (GNP) on defence allocations. Economists, peace 
researchers, international relations scholars and liberal opinion 
shapers have all warned at various times of the dangers of rising 
defence expenditure and the assumed links between armament on the 
one hand and militarisation/economic decline/armed 
conflict/anarchic world order on the other.
Many developing countries spend considerable sums of public 
finance on defence, even though several do not face immediate 
threats of armed conflict. Nevertheless, there is a well- 
recognised need for defence preparedness, particularly in Third 
World regions where there exist numerous sources of tension and 
imbalance which have all too often spilled over into armed 
conflict. All countries, whether rich or poor, must guard against 
invasion or attack. However, it is the manner and degree of Third 
World arms procurement and the conflict between defence 
expenditure and development needs and potential which has become 
an area of considerable concern in recent years.
At the same time, however, the frameworks for analysis which have 
emerged to understand the armament process in the Third World have 
not provided a sufficiently useful means of approaching the 
problem. Still less has there been any attempt to construct a 
framework which is capable of coming to terms with the problems on 
the one hand and the potential solutions on the other. Or, put
another way, the intellectual framework for the development of 
implementing policies which could break the links between armament 
and underdevelopment have been totally ignored.
To date, most of the concern has focused upon the necessary but 
limited exercise of mapping and measuring the extent of overall 
defence and military activities in the Third World. As a result, 
the ability to understand why individual countries choose to 
acquire the types and quantity of weapons systems they do is very 
limited; the driving forces behind the armament process within the 
Third World are barely understood.
In the following essay, two inter-related tasks will be attempted. 
First, the state-of-the-art concerning the academic approach to 
the armament process in the Third World will be reviewed, 
discussed, criticised and taken one step further to facilitate the 
development of a more realistic conceptual framework. In this 
instance, a traditional literature review is of limited 
usefulness, the subject area is too diverse and the academic 
rigour too weak. Instead, the opening chapters will concentrate 
upon a review of the development paradigms which have shaped the 
debate concerning the importance of defence and military 
institutions in the political and economic development of the 
Third World. In addition, reference will be made to the 
importance of international relations theory, for two reasons. 
First, the evolution of development theory parallels that of 
international relations. Second, the two disciplines are more 
inter-linked in terms of the subject areas they seek to understand 
than is usually understood. The key differences are to be found 
in the exogenous and endogenous approaches to problems areas which
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are the concern of both. However, whereas development studies is 
in sharp decline, international relations appears more robust and 
useful on account of recent theoretical developments. Can, 
therefore, the development and direction of international 
relations theory offer some guidelines and inspiration for the 
faltering and increasingly inadequate direction of development 
studies, and, at the same time, envigorate research on Third World 
armament and underdevelopment? Is this the way forward to 
constructing a more relevant and comprehensive conceptual 
frar.iework through which the armament process in the Third World 
might be better understood?
Another key weakness in the research tradition is the lack of 
empirical detail on a country-by-country basis, which stems from 
the failure to involve researchers from the Third World in the 
debate and the subtle ethnocentric bias of the prevailing 
paradigms. As a result any attempt to understand the dynamics of 
the armament process in the Third World is severely hampered by a 
lack of information, which can only be acquired by regional and 
national case studies.
Over the past decade the Republic of India has increased 
considerably its defence and military capability. After the re- 
election of Indira Gandhi in 1980, a far reaching defence 
modernisation programme was introduced which through the decade 
took defence expenditure per annum from Rs.3,877.77 crore in 1980- 
81, to Rs.7,688 crore in 1985, and to Rs.13,000 crore in 1988-891. 
With the exception of the OPEC countries of the Middle East, few 
Third World countries have sanctioned such large increases in
1 Gupta and Thakurta [1989], p.43.
defence expenditure in the absence of overt conflict, even during 
the 1970s when the demand for arms from the Third World was 
particularly high.
Since 1980, all three services have received substantial increases 
in their respective procurement budgets. As a result, India has 
been particularly active on the international arms market, but 
thus far only as an importer2. Over the past decade, large scale 
imports have come from the country's traditional supplier since 
the early-1970s, the Soviet Union. In addition, deals have been 
made with several Western arms exporters, including Britain, 
France, Sweden and, lately, the United States.
India's massive rearmament programme lias been justified on the 
basis of increased security threats throughout South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean since 1980; regional tensions have risen in South 
Asia over the past decade, and this too against a backdrop of 
increased global tension, until recently. On the one hand, 
relations between India and Pakistan have rarely been cordial 
since 1947 and became particularly fractious during the early- 
1980s. Pakistan fears the increasing conventional military 
strength of India and, also, the latter's intensifying hegemony in 
the region; since 1971 India has maintained a powerful 3:1 
conventional superiority against Pakistan.
2 India does export small quantities of defence equipment. At 
present the Government is poised to attempt to increase 
defence exports. However, their efforts are unlikely to 
succeed because of the quality of Indian defence exports, the 
low level of demand worldwide and the restrictive export 
policy which India must surely operate as a leading member of 
the non-aligned movement.
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Despite the fact that India was instrumental in the partition of 
Pakistan in 1971, there is considerable concern in New Delhi over 
the military threat from Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh in 
1971, it could be argued, actually increased Pakistan's security 
because Islamabad no longer has a povery stricken and politically 
fissile Eastern wing to both contend with and protect. After the 
1971 war, Islamabad was able to consolidate and concentrate on the 
threat from India on one, not two flanks. Although relations 
between Pakistan and the United States have rarely been smooth 
since the 1950s, since 1980 Pakistan has received considerable 
quantities of military and economic aid from the United States. 
This was one element of the former Reagan Administration's policy 
of deterring the Soviet Union and, at the same time, persuading 
the Kremlin that continued involvement in Afghanistan was too 
expensive, both politically and economically. Pakistan's evident 
progress in the covert development of nuclear weapons and the 
failure of the US Congress to make military and economic aid 
conditional upon an inspection of nuclear facilities has caused 
further concern in New Delhi, however much it was India not 
Pakistan which started the nuclear arms race in South Asia. 
Finally, India is concerned about links between Islamabad and Sikh 
extremists. The latter are intent upon forcing the Indian 
Government to create a separate Sikh state, Khalistan, in the area 
which is now the Punjab (India). In addition, New Delhi is 
worried about the threat from China to the East and a less 
tangible threat from the Indian Ocean.
It can be argued, as Indian decision makers have done throughout 
the 1980s, that Pakistan, China, the superpower presence in the 
Indian Ocean and, further afield, some of the rising middle powers
in the Middle East, together provide India with a significant set 
of security problems which must be offset by a level of defence 
preparedness. However, whether or not the scale of defence 
activity requested by Indian Governments since the late-1970s is 
really justified in its own right or, indeed, meets India's 
defence requirements, is open to question.
In addition to the considerable rises in defence expenditure, 
which adds little to the country's development efforts overall, 
the defence modernisation programme has seriously depleted 
country's foreign reserves. This has compounded the foreign 
exchange problems which already exist due to the recent 
liberalisation of the economy. During the late-1980s India's 
foreign exchange resources have dipped to a precariously low 
level; in February 1989 India recorded the largest decline in 
foreign exchange reserves this decade, when levels dropped by 
Rs.17.2 billion ($1.02 billion)3.
Several important questions arise from the scale of India's recent 
defence build-up. First, in the relatively secret area of 
defence, how much is actually known about the programme; what 
exactly has Indian bought on the open market, secured from the 
Soviet Union or prduced indigenously? Second, is there a 
reasonable fit between defence policy and posture on the one hand, 
and the articulated security threats on the other - do the 
purchases match the threats or does a lack of fit suggest that the 
defence modernisation programme fulfils other ambitions? Third, 
why has India engaged in such a diversified arms procurement 
programme? Fourth, how many of the decisions, justified in the
3 Housego [27 February 1989].
7
name of the new security threats, were taken after 1980 and how 
many came before the onset of the new Cold War, when East-West 
relations soured so badly and when Pakistan began to rearm on the 
basis of military aid from the United States? If some were taken 
before 1980, can the momentum behind the defence build-up be 
traced back to something else, such as bureaucratic in-fighting, 
corruption, well-construed foresight or pressure from India's 
major ally, the Soviet Union, to consolidate regional hegemony and 
counter-balance the relationship between Pakistan, China and the 
US? Taken together, there is a need to know exactly what has 
taken place in recent years, for what reasons and to what effect.
The importance of understanding what has happened within India 
cannot be underestimated. It has frequently been argued that high 
defence expenditures and arms imports adversely affect developing 
economies. Resources channeled into the defence sector may 
provide a public good in the form of security but otherwise amount 
to opportunity costs, particularly in relation to the state1s 
obligations to educate and care for members of the community, for 
example.
In the years between independence and the 1962 Sino-Indian war, 
India spent on average less than 2% of its GNP on defence. This 
figure rose -to over 4% in the mid-1980s, well in excess of the 
3.0% level which is generally considered within the country to be 
the uppermost limit during periods when the country is not at war. 
Calibrating the effect on India's economy is both extremely 
difficult and outside the remit of this study. Data are very 
difficult to obtain, particularly with regard to foreign exchange 
disbursements for defence purposes. Furthermore, there is no
established methodology for approaching this question, although 
several researchers have attempted co assess the impact of defence 
expenditure upon development in the Indian context4 .
Nevertheless, high defence costs will affect developing economies 
in different ways and there can be no set level above which 
defence will impact negatively upon development. The scale and 
rate of defence activity in India since 1980 suggests that if the 
development process is not being directly affected now, then it 
will be in the future if defence expenditure stays at or rises 
above 4% of GNP per annum and the present Government's fiscal 
crsis continues. Moreover, recent reports from India suggest that 
the defence build-up has developed serious problems in recent 
months. Despite detailed planning and lavish expenditure, India 
may be no less well armed or secure than it was in 1980.
Increased activity in both the conventional and the nuclear 
defence fields has caused increased regional problems in South 
Asia in the past and will continue to do so in the future. In 
recent years relations between India and its neighbours, Pakistan 
and China, have not been good. Attempts on the part of New Delhi 
to normalise relations with regional adversaries have been few and 
far between. Obversely, the tremendous defence build-up has 
clearly worried decision makers in Pakistan, if for no other 
reason than it is their country which appears to be the main 
source of perceived concern in New Delhi. Recently, New Delhi has 
appeared willing enough to rattle its new found sabres in the 
direction of Pakistan and military operations in 1988, codenamed 
Operation Bluestar, brought the two countries very close to war.
4 Deger [1986]; Terhal [1982].
Key Indian decision makers and members of the armed forces seem 
keen on occaisions to threaten Pakistan and seem also to have the 
political will to go to war.
Understanding how and why India has arrived at the defence posture 
it now possesses requires a step by step analysis of how the 
posture has evolved and what appear to be the motivating forces. 
First, therefore, it is necessary to consider from which direction 
and to what extent India considers itself to be under threat. 
Second, it is important to go back to 1947 to consider how India's 
defence policy evolved and to understand the dynamics involved.
Third, it is appropriate to trace through the evolution of defence 
policy up until the present. Thus, in addition to the early 
period, the history of defence policy since the 1962 Sino-Indian 
war up until the late-1980s is a required section of the picture. 
Fourth, given the stress placed by successive Indian Governments 
on import-substituting industrialisation policies, it is also 
appropriate to examine the country's ability to produce its own 
defence equipment. Finally, the decision making structure will be 
examined in the light of the data presented on the evolution of 
defence policy, arms imports and indigenous defence production.
From this level of detail and analysis it will be possible to 
uncover the dynamics which underpin Indian defence policy. This 
will provide the means to understand why the country's leaders 
have been profligate in the defence sector and what lies behind 
the tremendous defence buid-up of the 1980s. This is rapidly 
becoming a question of considerable concern both within and 
outside India. The following essay attempts to offer the most
thorough explanation possible as to what this process has involved 
and how it can be understood. Not only will this be enlightening 
in the case of India but it will also assist further research and 
analysis of the defence sectors of other Third World countries.
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CHAPTER ONE
/ARMAMENT, DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD
1.1 Modernising the Military and the Military as Modernisers
Over the past three decades a considerable number of academics from 
the social sciences have turned their attention to the various 
problems associated with the armament process in the Third World, 
particularly the North-South arms trade and military expenditures in 
developing countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, the initial thrust 
came from within the United States. Very little interest could be
seen in either Western Europe or the Third World during this period.
This geographical concentration of effort was important. For the 
United States there were geo-political and economic problems to be 
weighed with care when considering the military aspects of the North- 
South, East-West interface. At the North-South and the South-South 
level it was an extraordinary period as the political formations of 
the first half of the twentieth century began to disappear to be 
replaced by a completely new range of global actors ranging from the 
United Nations to the urban guerilla. Amongst the many 
considerations for US foreign policy makers, the role of the military
in new nations was considered to be crucial. On the logical premise
that governments might come and go and that the rate and direction of 
political change would be controlled or condoned by the military, 
successive American governments used wherever possible military 
institutions in the Third World as a bridgehead to acquiring and 
consolidating influence.
Within the Third World, the confused and often violent passage to 
independence in the wake of a rapid collapse of formal empire gave 
rise to new demands from governments. In the inevitable, recurring
attempts to affirm progress in nation building and social, political j
:
and economic development, a primary focus centred upon the 
development of national institutions such as bureaucracy,
universities, development agencies and the military. The military in j
iparticular was a powerful symbol of nationhood and independence. In 1 
addition, the importance of the military turned on its control of 
organised force in relation to the chaotic, uncertain and 
unpredictable characteristics of the era and the military's potential 
for either assuming responsibility for, or, influencing significantly 
the process of nation-building. Thus, military institutions had a 
special place in the development process. The international 
environment in general and both regional and intranational tensions 
in particular placed them in an important if not definitive position; 
the complications and contradictions inherent in the very process of 
nation building set the military apart from other institutions. In 
addition, and sometimes as a result, the political systems in the 
developing countries were often weak and unstable. The military were 
both guardians and symbols of national sovereignty and capable as 
well of making or unmaking governments or, at the very least, 
influencing significantly the affairs of state.
To this end, two aspects of US foreign policy became extremely
important. The first was arms transfers (as distinct from sales),
the second was military aid1. Given the level of armament stockpiles
1 The term arms transfers refers to orthodox, commercial arms 
sales and in addition arms sales which are agreed under very
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which existed between the end of the Second World War and the 
beginning of the Korean War, arms transfers and military aid 
represented affordable carrots to sway the emerging Third World in 
the unequivocal choice established by the Truman Doctrine, that in 
'the present moment of world history nearly every nation must choose 
between alternative ways of life1. The policy framework was the 
doctrine of containment. American policy makers asserted that the 
main concern of the Soviet Union was to fill 'every nook and cranny 
available to it in the basin of world power1.2 On this assumption 
the United States sought to contain the Soviet Union and insulate the 
rest of the world from the effects of direct and indirect Soviet 
influence3 .
In practice this required a double-edged policy for what American
policy makers termed the 'free world'. Those states which shared a
border with the Soviet Union, such as Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, were
offered large quantities of military aid and assistance to set in
motion conventional military build-ups in the Forward Defence Areas
(FDAs). In turn these states were linked by interlocking treaties
(NATO, CENTO, SEATO) to form a ring around the outer edge of the
Soviet bloc (including China)"1. The rest of the world became the
favourable terms which include credits, low interest rates, long 
periods for repayment sometimes with grace periods and 
rescheduling options.
2 'X' (George Kennan) [1947].
3 These aspects of US foreign policy have been most
comprehensively reviewed and researched by the US 'revisionist' 
school of historians, particularly William Appleman Williams, 
D.F. Fleming, Stephen Ambrose and Richard Barnett. For a useful 
bibliography see Gardner [1973], pp.518-9.
4 NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
CENTO: Central Treaty Organisation
SEATO: South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty Organisation.
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Free World Orientation Area in which the United States attempted to 
manoeuvre, bribe or cajole individual states in the anti-Soviet 
bloc5.
Complete with ample stocks of obsolete military hardware, and a 
guarantee of equally large stocks of more advanced equipment to 
underpin the emerging defence policy and posture based primarily upon 
the forward defence of Western Europe, the United States transferred 
large quantities of military aid and hardware to prospective and 
proclaimed allies in the Third World (see Table 1.1).
The response of the academic/research community in the United States 
was interesting. Academics and 'think-tank* researchers filled a 
niche as commentators, evaluators and distanced advisers to the 
wishes of US policy makers impatient to understand and assess the 
evolution of the Third World against a backdrop of Cold War politics. 
The primary concern in international relations, the most obvious 
locale for research on Third World related issues, was, however, the 1 
fluid and unpredictable relationship between the superpowers. This j
was, after all, the period when strategic studies became a discipline |
$of particular importance and when realism was dominant within the 
field. Apart from the ethnocentric bias of the subject, few 
commentators were prepared to extend their level of analysis beyond . 
the nation state6 . At the start of the 1950s, the emerging Third 
World was considered primarily in relation to the balance between 
East and West. The result was considerable ignorance and confusion
5 SIPRI [1971], pp.157-169.
6 For a critique of ethnocentrism see Booth [1979].
Table 1.1: US Military Assistance to Third World Countries", by region
Region
Far Indian Sub- Middle Greece and North Sub-Saharan Latin Third
East Continent East Turkey Africa Africa America World
Total
u s  $mn
US fiscal 
years
1949-52 160.7 - 16.6 559.4 - _ 0.2 736.9
1953-57 2,403.7 160.4 163.6 1,350.2 - 14.6 151.8 4,244.3
1958 627.8 92.9 151.4 392.8 1.1 8.8 47.9 1,322.7
1959 606.6 102.7 113.5 290.8 1.6 5.3 54.0 1,174.6
1960 501.6 79.1 95.2 217.2 2.7 7.3 53.7 956.8
1961 495.4 56.7 60.6 128.7 5.1 6.4 11.4 864.3
1962 523.3 29.7 44.1 191.3 5.0 18.6 132.8 944.8
1963 651.8 108.4 91.3 258.0 12.2 14.0 82.3 1,218.0
1964 563.7 64.2 44.8 184.8 11.6 16.7 75.7 961.5
1965 648.9 64.0 77.9 222.4 5.8 11.8 67.3 1,098.1
1966 535.6 7.6 108.3 179.2 5.1 16.8 82.0 934.6
1967 673.0 6.0 164.9 162.5 13.8 18.0 76.5 1,114.7
1968 1,026.9 5.6 116.9 175.9 10.8 22.7 99.2 1,458.0
1969l> 1>064.2 1.6 83.4 165.0 6.9 14.4 37.9 1,373.4
1949-69 10,483.3 778.9 1,332.5 4,478.2 81.7 175.4 1,072.7 18,402.7
“Includes Military Assistance Program, Greek-Turkish Aid, China Naval Aid, PL-454 Philippines aid, Vessel 
Loans, aid to Viet-Nan, 1967-69, and Thailand and Laos, 1968-69, in Department of Defense Budget. Excludes 
deliveries of excess stocks.
'"’Excludes credit assistance.
'"Excludes undistributed assistance to Indo-China.
Source: SIPRI [1971, Table 3.5, p.146-147.
in both the State Department and successive administrations over how 
to respond tc political events within the Third World.
Following the election of Dwight Eisenhower in the US, John Foster 
Dulles became the new Secretary of State and he arrived in government 
with a firm view that the Truman-Acheson policy of 'containment1 was 
too weak. Apart from the need to 'liberate' Eastern Europe by 
peaceful means, it was also necessary to consider the emerging Third 
World, the more so as many US policy makers recalled the prophesies 
of both Lenin and Stalin that 'the shortest route to Paris is via 
Peking'. If, therefore, the Third World was to be 'saved from 
communism', individual countries had to be integrated completely into 
the political and economic system of the West. However, in the Third 
World, the strength and basis of ethnicity, nationalism and 
opportunism as key determinants of foreign and domestic policy were 
often misunderstood and led over time to involvements in Central 
America, the Middle East and, eventually, to Vietnam. It seems that 
few US policy makers recognised fully the scale of change occurring; 
as Geoffrey Barroclough has pointed out, the emergence of the Third 
World was one of the most politically notable events in world 
history7 .
Those who did consider questions relating to the defence sector and 
military institutions in the developing world did so at two levels 
and both drew heavily upon sociological methods to explain, or 
justify in part, the ramifications of American military aid 
programmes. In both cases the academic location for this research 
was not international relations but other areas of the social
7 Barroclough [1967], p.153.
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sciences, such as political science, sociology and development 
studies. In August 1959, the RAND Corporation (a US Air Force think- 
tank) sponsored a conference designed to provide a forum for the 
exchange of ideas and information on militarism. The papers written 
for the conference focused upon military-political developments in 
underdeveloped countries and the main contributors were primarily 
political scientists and historians with an interest in military 
affairs and a knowledge of a particular area of the world. The 
resultant book, edited by J.J. Johnson, became something of a 
landmark in thinking on the role of the military in the Third World8 . 
The aim of the conference and the subsequent research inputs was to 
examine the 'software' element of the equation linking developing 
countries to the Cold War environment.
The results of this research programme suggested that there existed a 
general consensus on a 'tutelage' role for military elites in the 
Third World. These elites often behaved in a fashion which placed 
them head and shoulders above their civilian counterparts. Through 
their acquaintance with modern military technology they possessed 
modernising skills. The structure of the armed forces downplayed 
parochialism and encouraged a cosmopolitan outlook. Competition 
between the military elites of different countries placed a premium 
upon various aspects of development and nation building. An advanced 
level of awareness, technical and administrative skills, the 
acceptance of ordered, structured development, benign nationalism, 
anti-communism and the monopoly of force were considered the 
qualities which enabled military elites to play a key role in the 
modernisation process. Furthermore, the combination of strong
8 Johnson [1962].
institutions and modernising perspectives would also encourage
foreign aid and investment which we:e considered fundamental to the 
development process involving a transformation from rural poverty to 
urban wealth9 . Consequently, for American policy makers, the 
military elites offered a potentially stable and productive point of 
interaction,
"... the army is often the most developed public 
organisation in an underdeveloped country, and as a 
consequence its leaders feel more self-confident and are 
more able to deal frankly and cordially with 
representatives of industrialised countries. Military 
leaders are often far less suspicious of the West than 
civilian leaders because they themselves are more 
emotionally secure. This sense of security makes it 
possible for army leaders to look more realistically at 
their countries. All these considerations make it easier 
for the military leaders to accept the fact that their 
countries are weak and the West is strong without 
becoming emotionally disturbed or hostile toward the 
West. Since these leaders seem to have less need to 
avoid realities, they are in fact easier people with whom 
to deal and to carry on straightforward relations."10
Much of the academic work undertaken over this period was conceptual
and schematic, as befits the birth of a new area of research.
However, the message from the RAND Corporation and their associates
was extremely clear; in the search for stability in the Third World a
strong, pro-Western military elite, close to the political process
could deliver according to the criteria established by US foreign
policy makers.
If opinion shapers close to the policy making apparatus provided 
those responsible for apportioning and sanctioning military aid with 
an intellectual justification for a political strategy, the same 
cannot be said for the second line of approach taken by university-
9 Johnson [1962].
10 Pye [1962], pp.87-88.
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based political sociologists also working in the same area. In
contrast to the oft-quoted idea that the 'modernising school'
represented a concerted approach, there were equivocations11. Morris
Janowitz, who subsequently became one of America's leading military
sociologists, developed a less sanguine view of the military's
potential for providing the cutting edge of development and
modernisation. Janowitz recognised that the military could perform
an adequate role as guardian to weak political institutions due to
their sense of public service12. This view was echoed by Manfred
Halpern who argued that the military in developing countries,
particularly the Middle East, were a new middle class,
individualistic not family orientated, meritocratic and positive
towards technology and the ways of the modern world13. However,
Janowitz stopped short of a blanket endorsement of the prevailing
trend in American foreign policy but did so from a position which, in
essence, upheld the ideology which condoned the supply of military
aid and assistance. His primary concern was that the policy might
backfire and produce the wrong results with catastrophic results for
both the political development of the new nations and for the foreign
policy of the United States,
"As yet, no new nation has fallen to an outright 
Communist mass political movement which would neutralise 
the political power of the military ... More likely, the 
disruptive consequences of internal factionalism within 
the military oligarchy will first destroy its ability to 
rule and pave the way for the rise of militant 
-authoritarian movements, left-wing and right-wing. The 
process of military intervention is not irreversible, but 
if political change must wait for the breakdown of a
11 For an example of those who saw a concerted if not 
conspiratorial approach see, Ball [1981], p.2, and, Kaldor 
[1986], pp.73-75.
12 Janowitz [1964], p.100-106.
13 Halpern [1963].
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military oligarchy, its outcome will not be conducive to 
an orderly and humane process of modernisation."14
It was, therefore, these two groups which defined indirectly the
parameters of the initial debate relating to the transfer of military
technology to the Third World and its effect upon the (political)
development process. To a large extent they were uninterested in the
transfer of armaments and military technology from North to South.
The arms trade was seen as a means to an end and not as a serious
problem in itself. With the benefit of hindsight it is not difficult
to see why this happened. Most of the commentators worked from
awithin the uncontested development paradigm of the period based upon ]
5jthe concept of modernisation. Essentially, the modernisation
iIparadigm was rooted in a social scientific and historic j
ethnocentricity. Development was not seen to be the contradictory ]
it
and awkward process as we now know it. Instead, development theory 
was alluringly simplistic and based upon a basic faith that pulling \
the right levers would activate development and put an end to 
'backwardness1. Economically, this involved passing through various 
stages of growth. Politically, the emphasis lay in the attainment of 
political order rather than in an understanding of political change. 
Sociologically, the problem turned on the transition from 'tradition' 
to 'modernity'. As far as defence was concerned, it was a necessary 
item of government expenditure with both positive and negative 
ramifications for the development process.
Thus, the attention of the modernisers focused primarily upon 
institutions in the Third World and their potential ability to either 
retard or advance the process of economic and political growth. As
14 Janowitz [1964], p.106.
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such they were the intellectually influential exponents of the 
dominant development paradigm. Inherent in this view was that 
underdevelopment in the Third World was fundamentally due to an 
absence rather than a misallocation of resources and that suitable 
conditions could mobilise resources, induce growth and aid 
development. As political scientists/sociologists, these 
commentators were primarily interested in the role, purpose and 
effectiveness of the disaggregated components of the state, namely 
institutions. Here, Samuel Huntingdon's observation that 'the most 
important political distinction among countries concerns not their 
form of government, but their degree of government' was of critical 
importance15. Due to the emergence of new social classes in the 
twentieth century, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and a series 
of crises amongst colonial powers and the dominant social classes, 
the new nations, (particularly those in Latin America), faced a 
series of crises of identity and political order. The building of 
institutions and the sharing of power arrested the movement of 
political elites towards hyper-autonomy and laid the foundations for 
modernisation, which in turn held the potential for stabilising the 
tendency towards economic and political crisis16.
However, the modernisers were working in a difficult academic area 
and, initially, they lacked the empirical evidence to prove or 
disprove their central thesis. If the military in Latin America had 
been disposed to intervene to assist the process of stabilisation and 
thereby allow the modernisation process to continue, it was also 
capable of behaving in a reactionary and authoritarian fashion.
15 Huntington [1968], p.l.
16 Roxborough [1979], p.112.
Thus, whether or not the military acted as the instigators of 
breakthrough or veto coups was extremely important17. Moreover, the 
military institutions in other parts of the Third World were, to a 
degree, an unknown quantity and their development was 
unpredictable18. And it was in precisely these areas that American 
policy makers required a greater level of certainty given the geo­
political proximity of the former to the Soviet Union and the number 
of areas contested by Cold Warriors.
By the mid-1960s, the modernising school had been overshadowed by a 
series of more 1policy-related1 programmes. During the early 1960s, 
the increasing involvement of the United States in Vietnam and the 
concomitant concern to both understand and counter the effectiveness 
of insurgency led analysts to consider the political nature of 
counter-insurgency. In mid-1964 the Office of the Chief of Research 
and Development of the Department of the US Army sanctioned a multi­
million dollar study of insurgent behaviour in underdeveloped 
countries which subsequently became known as Camelot. The remit of 
this programme was to determine the feasibility of developing a 
general social systems model which would make it possible to predict 
and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the 
Third World19. Project Camelot was a failure. Thereafter, however, 
in the face of Vietnam the requirements of the policy makers were too 
specific to involve the 'modernisers' in mainstream, policy related 
research.
17 Huntington [1968]. Versions of this theory are also held by 
Jose Nun and J.J. Johnson.
18 Ball [1982], p.42.
19 Klare [1972], pp.76-77.
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It was, therefore, an analytically untidy picture which emerged out 
of the US during the two decades following the Second World War. 
Between the fields of international relations and development studies 
there was a strict division of labour between the endogenous analysis 
of militarism and the exogenous concerns of the Cold War with little 
apparent communication between the two. Moreover, ’the methodologies 
employed were overwhelmingly static - the dynamics of change and the 
contradictions thrown up by the very process of development were 
barely considered either in their national context or in relation to 
their international or regional impact.
1.2 Attacks Upon the Modernisers and Modernisation - Ideology, 
Technology and a New Paradigm
It has already been noted that the modernising school grew out of a 
particular paradigm which understood development in a specific and 
limited fashion. In this instance, the research tradition stressed 
the role of institutions in the process of nation-building. As such, 
they analysed the jailitary with close regard to their potential for 
moving developing countries from a traditional state of 
'backwardness1 to a position of economic dynamism and reduced 
political unpredictability. Thus, on the basis of a close analysis 
of the motivating forces of the West European transition from 
traditional/feudal to modern/capitalist principles of organisation, 
it was uniformly accepted that developing countries could do the
same.
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However, two major problems emerged with this paradigm and 
contributed to its demise. The first concerned the growing 
divergence between the prognoses of early development theorists and 
the actual level of development progress which could be discerned 
over the course of the two decades following the end of the Second 
World War. Quite apart from the debate over whether or not the 
military could perform the role of a key actor in the development 
process, it was becoming generally clear that whilst developing 
countries may have been enriching themselves in aggregate terms, the 
gap between rich and poor was becoming wider. The poorest people 
were remaining well below the poverty line and the international 
system as a whole was showing itself to be singularly unable to 
encourage even a modestly egalitarian allocation of both previously 
existing or newly created resources.
The second problem encountered by early development theory was 
analytic. Throughout the early period of conceptualisation over how 
development could and would occur, the solutions and the problems 
were considered to be endogenous. Under no circumstances were 
external conditions seen to be the cause of underdevelopment. In 
time, theories of development based upon modernisation became much 
less credible on the basis that the concept of replicating the 
industrialisation of Europe in the Third World through stages of 
growth and the nurturing of essential institutions was untenable in 
so far as it ignored the influence of-the world system on individual 
countries.
Nevertheless, the critiques which emerged from outside the prevailing 
paradigm did not influence the policies of the developed countries in
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relation to trade, aid, technology transfer or foreign policy. 
However, they were more successful with non-state actors such as 
United Nations' bodies where, indeed, some of the new architects were 
either themselves employed or at the very least enjoyed a sympathetic 
ear.
The founding father of what became known as the dependency school was 
Paul Prebisch, under whose direction the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) attempted to show that the 
dynamics of the international system were in many ways responsible 
for the developmental failures of the Third World. In the specific 
case of Latin America, ECLA argued that it was only during periods of 
war and world economic recession that Latin America's externally 
orientated development was interrupted and this led to pronounced 
bouts of economic development until such a time that the links 
between centre and periphery were reestablished. The mainstream 
approach of ECLA economists was eventually criticised on account of 
their simplified growth theories and an undue faith in the role of 
foreign trade in the development process. From out of this process 
grew the mainstream dependency school, established initially in Latin 
America but spreading quickly to other regions of the Third World and 
certain academic development centres in Europe.
Although the key tenets of dependency theory emerged rapidly during
the late-1960s, the internal debates were complex and highly charged.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s, the range of dependency theories
could be collectively identified as a school and a whole new approach
to the problem of underdevelopment became established.20 Duly, from
20 It is impossible here to outline the contours of the internal 
debates amongst dependency theorists or the critiques of neo-
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within the dependency school an intellectual niche was created which 
stressed the deleterious effects of armament upon the overall 
development process in sharp contrast to the orthodox view which 
condoned arms transfers as a means to security, stability and, even, 
development. Throughout the late-1960s and 1970s the bulk of effort 
dedicated to understanding the cause and effect of armament in the 
Third World stemmed from mainstream dependency theory.
In addition, whilst a number of dependency theorists concentrated 
upon their analysis of the relationship between armament and j
underdevelopment, a parallel debate evolved in the West over the 
political economy of military expenditure. A connection between 
these two areas was established in Paul Baran's book, The Political 
Economy of Growth, a precursor to his work with Paul Sweezy, and a 
seminal influence upon the emergence of neo-Marxism which, in turn,
I
provided the intellectual bedrock for dependency theory. In Monopoly 
Capital, Baran and Sweezy argued that military expenditure in Western , 
countries played a fundamental role in stabilising capitalism through j 
the absorption of surpluses. In addition, the creation of a more |
powerful war machine offered positive benefits in relation to foreign 
policy21.
A connecting link between emerging neo-Marxist theory, Third World 
issues and what became known as the 'arms economy1 was provided by 
Kidron. Hitherto, theories of imperialism had assumed a net outflow 
of capital from the centre to the periphery. However, empirical
classical economists. This has been done before; see the 
excellent analysis by Blomstrom and Hettne [1984].
21 Baran and Sweezy [1968], pp.178-214.
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studies began to show this not to be the case and the data revealed a 
net flow of capital from the periphery to the centre rather than vice 
versa22. Thus, imperialism appeared not to be the mechanism for 
coping with the problem of overaccumulation. According to Kidron, 
the problem of overaccumulation had been solved, not by exporting 
capital to the periphery, but instead by the absorption in the form 
of waste, specifically the development of a permanent arms economy23. 
Kaldor took the argument a stage further with her observation that 
arms exports represent a particular stage of imperialism. In the 
early phase of imperialism, when Third World economies were 
penetrated primarily through trade, a limited transfer of arms was 
necessary for repression to ensure the imperialist feedback. 
Exploitation was delegated to load rulers. With the beginnings of 
economic decline, it became necessary to establish a monopoly 
political position in order to maintain or penetrate a dependent 
economy. The political function of arms exports and direct military 
intervention became more important. However, the costs incurred 
reduce the funds available for accumulation, offset the economic 
advantages of spheres of influence and exacerbate the process of 
decline. This leads to a dependence upon arms exports which soon 
becomes incompatible with the political function of arms transfers 
and sales as the luxury of selectivity is lost.24
Initially, there was a concerted attempt to attack and discredit the 
modernising paradigm. Janowitz, et al, were briefly criticised and 




theoretical and intellectual elements of American foreign policy
defined on the basis of the open door,
"Their interest was spurred in part because militaries 
were coming to power in many third world countries and in 
part because of the interest of Western governments in 
the question. Among the major powers, the United States 
government was the most interested in promoting the 
growth of a body of evidence that would justify the 
expansion of military aid to the Third World."25
In general, armament-dependency theorists mounted their attacks at a
personal and disaggregated level. Of particular note was the furious
diatribe against the American economist, Emile Benoit, whose
tentative study on the potential positive correlation between defence
expenditure and economic growth drew a disproportionately strong
critique from the left26.
On another tack, neo-Marxists responded incisively to the discernible 
trends in both military expenditures in, and arms transfers to, the 
Third World. In 1965 military expenditure in the Third World 
amounted to US$41 billion. By 1973 it had doubled to US$82 billion 
and by 1976 it had risen again to US$107 billion. Arms imports 
reflected a similar trend. For the same years arms imports went from 
US$2.1 billion (1965), to US$9.6 billion (1973) to US$11.1 billion 
(1976). In part this was due to the marked decline in military aid 
and assistance from the United States, a result of the Nixon Doctrine 
and the declining economic strength of the United States. However, 
it was also due to the onset of defence modernisation programmes in 
many Third World countries throughout the late-1970s and beyond; arms
25 Ball [1981], p.2.
26 The debate has been a long and cutting one. For the original 
thesis see Benoit [1973]. For a definitive critique of the 
Benoit study see, Ball [1983].
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imports rose very steeply around the turn of the decade to reach 
US$30.6 billion by 1982 (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2).27
In conjunction with a growing acceptance that military institutions 
in the Third World were showing more signs of incompetence, 
corruption and instability than had been anticipated, the level of 
analysis centred upon the adverse development effects of military 
expenditure and armament. Luckham identified four basic patterns or 
forms of development underpined by military spending:
1) Military spending aids a state project based upon forced and 
rapid development. If rapid growth is to be achieved the state 
must avoid directing government spending towards welfare in 
favour of production and/or subsidies for capital. Government 
must also hold down wages and rural incomes thus requiring the 
military to suppress labour unions, strikes and peasant 
protest. Rewarding the military requires high military 
expenditure which in turn requires additional forced saving, 
inflationary pressure and leads to public unrest. Military 
force is effective in resolving through violence and inequality 
the crises to which peripheral economies are prone.
2) The military is capable of strengthening the state structure 
and its control over the process of economic growth. Military 
spending permits a larger concentration of military force in 
the hands of the state than would otherwise be possible. If 
the state is powerful and centralised the military can extract 
infinite resources for its own expansion.
27 All statistics taken from, Sivard [1986], Table I, p.32.
30
F i g u r e  1 . 1  F i g u r e  1 . 2
Arms imports of developing 
countries, 1972-1982
USS btlhcns














S o u r c e :  S m i t h ,  C.  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  p . 1 8 8 .
31
3) The "3 is a built-in alliance between armament and the 
international expansion of capital into peripheral countries. 
Large and powerful military establishments can guarantee the 
conditions under which profits can be repatriated to the 
centre.
4) The military has a vested interest in the alliance with 
foreign capital. Arms spending adds to the pressure to 
increase or conserve hard currency earnings and attract foreign 
investment. Thus, the well documented alliance between the 
Third World state and international capital created through 
central planning, licensing and import control, joint ventures 
and management agreements can be of direct benefit to the 
military whose interests also lie in increased procurement.28
Through these and, other, similar perspectives a small group of neo- 
Marxists based primarily in Britain, Scandinavia and West Germany 
drew the question of armament, defence expenditure and militarism 
into the mainstream dependency debate. By 1980 Andrd Gunder Frank, a 
major but controversial figure in the dependency school, had become a 
contributor to the debate and was arguing that the progressive 
militarisation of society and the steady trend towards arms economies 
in the Third World was a key factor in the process of world capital 
accumulation,
"... the militarisation of state and society in the 
Third World are the derivatives and instruments of the 
economic exigencies of capital accumulation on the 
national level in the Third World, which in turn is an 
essential part of - and is essentially determined by -
28 Luckham [1986], pp.52-53.
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the process of world capital accumulation, especially 
during its present period of crisis."29
The next stage in the debate, which subsequently became known as the
militarisation of the Third World, was an attempt to consider the
facilitating mechanisms by which the transfer of military technology
from North to South could proceed apace and thereby contribute to the
process of underdevelopment. One starting point was the observation
by Locke and Wulf that,
"It is part of history that the military as an 
institution have always been involved in the process of 
subjugation, dominance, exploitation and dependence of 
some social formation by others."30
In the colonial era, the success of the colonial states in their
efforts to overcome local resistance depended upon superior military
technology; advances in the technology of infantry weapons were
particularly important. According to Jack Goody military systems in
pre-colonial Africa characterised different societies; production
systems differed less than might have been expected31. Similarly,
Kaldor has noted, as others have done before, that military
institutions have their time and place - feudalism discovered the
stirrup, capitalism emerged with the gun32.
What emerged from these perspectives is the challenging notion that 
military technology in pre-colonial and colonial times has had a 
greater role that hitherto acknowledged in shaping social formations. ! 
And, critical to an understanding of how states organise themselves,
29 Frank [1980].
30 Locke and Wulf [1976], p.l.
31 Goody [1971].
32 Albrecht and Kaldor [1979], pp.1-16.
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is an understanding of the role of force in society. To explain the 
role of force, Kaldor differentiates between the relations of force 
and the technique of force which together comprise the form of force, 
which is the specific allocation and organisation of resources for 
military purposes in any given society. The relations of force - or 
force structure - comprise the organisation and hierarchy of the 
armed forces. This is essentially a microcosmic reproduction of the 
dominant relationships within society as a whole. Thus, feudal 
armies assumed a very different organisational structure from the 
modern professional army. The technique of force is armament. The 
technique of force reflects a combination of available technology and 
the relations of force. Available technology, such as gunpowder or 
guidance systems, offer the potential for assimilation into the force 
structure. But only if appropriate. Some techniques of force may be 
totally inappropriate for a particular military organisation. Others 
may take a long time to assimilate either because the military 
organisation is conservative and/or the technology is 
revolutionary.33
Although the transfer of military technology is conditioned in part 
by the recipient societies, Kaldor argues that the introduction of 
the weapons system limits the possibilities for variation in the 
relations of force. Thus, to an extent, the form of force becomes a 
reflection of the form of force prevailing in the metropolis. The 
transfer of military technology is, therefore, a phenomenon of much 
greater import than hitherto accepted by social scientists. Further, 
Kaldor argues that the significance is primarily political, that 
armed forces become ideologically orientated towards the urban elite.
33 Albrecht and Kaldor [1979], pp.7-15.
Military personnel come to favour and support goals of 
industrialisation and growth. Moreover, if armament in the West is a 
product or a reflection of a decaying industrial structure this may 
mean that the armed forces support the build-up of an industrial 
structure which is essentially decadent. In terms of underpinning 
the prevailing economic order, armament ensures the continuation of 
accumulation in the rich countries and exploitation in poor 
countries. The answer, argues Kaldor, is a change in policy.
However, such a change presupposes far-reaching changes in social 
structure. The conclusion is pessimistic: current elites, including 
the armed forces, owe their existence to the present system. Poor 
peasants, who constitute the majority of the world population, would 
benefit primarily from a transformation of the system, but they have 
no power.34
The armament and underdevelopment thesis was most comprehensively 
reviewed in 1979 in a collection of essays pertaining to the impact 
of military technology on the Third World35. The combination of 
theoretical and analytic chapters with case studies on Iran, South 
Africa, France and Algeria, Indochina and the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1971 provide the definitive work to date on the issue of armament and 
underdevelopment. Of particular interest to this area is the 
contribution by Locke and Wulf on the economic consequences of the 
transfer of military-orientated technology. Although the authors are
hampered by the traditional problems of data scarcity and lack of
disaggregation, they set out to add substance to the thesis that 
armament - arms imports (both aid and sales) and indigenous
34 Kaldor [1977], 339-340.
35 Kaldor and Eide [1979].
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production - contributes to the process of underdevelopment. They
point out that in the discussion on the transfer of technology, the
transfer of arms, military advisers and equipment to manufacture arms
has been largely neglected. In arguing the point, they put forward
the hypothesis that,
... in fact, military-orientated transfers of technology 
are of critical importance in structuring the whole 
system of technology transfer and, hence, the pattern of 
technological development.3e
In their attempt to prove the point, Locke and Wulf put forward four
basic points:
First, the import of military technologies reduces the capacity 
of a developing country to import what is needed for 
development and industrialisation. Armament constitutes a 
direct opportunity cost for development. Although global scale 
armaments constitute a very small, single figure percentage of 
the commodities entering the world market, when military 
imports are measured as a percentage of the commodities 
essential for large scale industrialisation (category #7 of the 
Standard International Trade Classification) the results are 
very significant. And since armament cannot contribute to the 
expansion of industrial capacity, the authors consider the 
results revealing with regard to development strategies. 
Furthermore, the import of modern weapons systems leads to an 
endless chain of demands with a high import content.
Second, those Third World countries which engage in domestic 
arms production may take an orthodox approach of import, 
assembly and licensed production culminating in decreasing
36 Locke and Wulf [1979], p.211.
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dependence upon imported know-how and components. However, the 
specific characteristics of arms production coupled with a 
limited domestic demand create immediate and inherent problems.
Third, the indigenous production of defence equipment (which 
extends beyond weapons systems alone) conflicts with the 
relative factor endowment between industrialised countries and 
the Third World in general.
Fourth, the introduction of advanced military technology, 
particularly in the developing countries, is associated with 
changes in consumption patterns. Military infrastructures 
disturb traditional sectors, destroy traditional 
infrastructures and function as a superimposed network.37
Locke and Wulf conclude that armament is causally related to 
underdevelopment. The import of sophisticated capital-intensive 
technology and, in particular, the establishment of complex arms 
production programmes, increases the dependence on suppliers from 
industrialised countries and distorts the pattern of development. To 
put it more strongly, armaments should be treated as a determining 
factor in the continuation of uneven development and 
underdevelopment.38
The achievements of these researchers were considerable. They took 
the relevance of armament to dependency theory to a significant stage 
by arguing persuasively that military institutions and the technology
37 Locke and Wulf [1979], p.224.
38 Locke and Wulf [1979], p.226.
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they absorb are responsible for underpinning not just the 
relationship between centre and periphery but also the very 
configuration of world order. To a much greater extent than the 
modernising school, they looked at the problems of militarism and 
militarisation in the Third World from less ethnocentric and 
endogenous positions. More correctly, they held a less passive view 
of military technology and the military as an institution and their 
normative stance was rooted in the desire to see the Third World 
become not just materially richer but also more equal and less 
violent.
However, intellectually and morally compelling though these arguments 
may have been, the hypotheses they threw up proved impossible to 
test. Particularly in relation to the question of armament and 
disarmament, the utility of dependency theory is open to question.
At the outset, West European armament-dependency writers failed to 
substantiate fully their theoretical position. The incisive quality 
of their comments on the theoretical relationship between armament 
and underdevelopment/dependency notwithstanding, it becomes difficult 
to ascertain from their writings exactly how the problem of the world 
military order is to be redressed, particularly given the exposure 
and consequent insecurity of underdeveloped countries. At one level 
the solution is axiomatic; disarmament will solve the problem of 
armament. However, at some point it is necessary to disaggregate 
this equation and discover how and indeed when this will be possible 
- an essential part of the paradigmatic jigsaw which was never paid 
much attention and which perhaps in a wider sense prevented the 
definitive Khunian assault on the prevailing modernising paradigm39.
39 Khun [1962].
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Inherent in the writings of the armament-dependency school is a self­
assumed sense of theoretical coherence; a theory of dependency. In 
fact, the existence of a coherent theory of dependency is an 
illusion; it never existed,
Some writers within the dependency school argue that it 
is misleading to look at dependency as a formal theory, 
and that no general implications for development can be 
abstracted from its analyses. Some of those that argue 
that there is such a theory flatly assert that it leads 
inescapably to the conclusion that development is 
impossible within the world capitalist system, thus 
making development strategies irrelevant, at least within 
that system. Others, on the other hand, who speak in 
terms of a theory of dependency, argue that it can be 
operationalized into a practical development strategy for 
dependent countries."40
Armament-dependency writers proceed with a tacit understanding that a
theory of dependency, rather than a school of dependency, exists.
The difference is an important one because it begs very basic
questions concerning the quest for disarmament. If there is no
formal dependency theory then it will follow that there is no formal
theory for disarmament in the Third World, in this instance. If
development is impossible within the world capitalist system and
Third World armament is a product of this system it must follow that
>
disarmament must wait for the collapse of the system. If, however, 
dependency and disarmament can co-exist, then why should the problem 
of armament be defined by the dependency school?
In the absence of cogent explanations concerning the passage from 
armament and underdevelopment to disarmament and development, the 
alternative is to look for signposts. When found, these prove to be 
confusing. At one point Kaldor, as quoted above, refers to the
40 Palma [1981], p.383.
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majority of the poor and powerless population who would benefit from
a transformation of the system (p34). Elsewhere she talks about how
the struggle for disarmament can become institutionalised,
"The more that public investigation and international 
diplomacy is diverted into the statistics of the arms 
trade and the minutiae of calculations about military- 
technical capabilities, the more difficult it becomes to 
pursue meaningful disarmament policies and the more 
likely it is that well-intentioned politicians, peace 
researchers or disarmament lobbyists will be caught up in 
the prevailing ideology of military technology.1,41
Taken together, these statements seem to be an attempt to quietly
sidestep the critical stage of the debate, namely, a direct move from
theorising to practical suggestions for policy makers, the inherent
structuralism of the author notwithstanding. What, for example,
should or could these authors have been saying to the revolutionary
government in Nicaragua in 1980?
The work of Robin Luckham and the Hamburg research group (primarily
Locke and Wulf) is somewhat similar. Luckham talks of international
anarchy, in the negative rather than in the positive sense of a
decentralised system, and presupposes that order can only be obtained
through a very different form of international organisation42.
Elsewhere, he talks about a major global transformation as a
fundamental necessity for disarmament,
"Weapons and military organizations - the means of force 
- are in the international domain, in that their 
deployment and/or use is a matter of common danger and 
common social concern for all mankind. Yet they are 
still appropriated and controlled by national ruling 
classes which use or threaten to use them to reproduce 
their national power and international interests. This 
makes social control over their use and conditions of 
lasting peace almost impossible to bring about without
41 Kaldor and Eide [1979], p.274.
42 Luckham [1984].
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major transformation in the structures of international 
production, power and force." (emphasis added).443
The Hamburg group highlights the fact that the average Third World
army was instituted along conventional patterns which introduced into
society a structural variable which by its very nature impedes a
self-reliant, development strategy4*44.
Commensurate with their perspective on the need for transformation,
armament-dependency writers came to stress the need for alternative
defence/security regimes. The need to link defence policies to
appropriate development is a recurring theme, particularly in the
work of Locke and Wulf,
"The pursuit of legitimate defence by alternative 
appropriate means corresponding to the available factor 
endowment of a developing country and compatible with a 
self-reliant development strategy requires an 
emancipation from existing military doctrines."445
Kaldor and Eide have taken the argument one stage further,
"An alternative approach would recognise the limited 
value of most types of sophisticated technology in the 
third world context and would seek alternative approaches 
to defence based on alternative forms of force more 
appropriate to the prevailing social relations ... This 
would not necessarily involve the rejection of all arms 
imports ... The point would be ... to organise relations 
of force around indigenous social conditions, combined 
with a development strategy aimed at the fulfilment of 
basic needs rather than the rapid achievement of 
industrialisation; for, as we have seen, the relations of 
force which characterise the industrial army are inimical 
to those objectives."446
The authors conclude with the comment that alternative approaches to
defence are the subject of future research. However, important
43 Luckham [1978], p.179.
44 Locke and Wulf [1979], p.228.
45 Locke and Wulf [1979], p.228.
46 Kaldor and Eide [1979], p.274.
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though this undoubtedly was at the time, the future research did not 
materialise anywhere in the world. Thus, to lay persons and experts 
alike there a few clues as to where developing countries should look 
for appropriate defence - non-violent civil resistance, the 
potentially cost effective nuclear option, chemical deterrence, 
conventional force reductions, a high-low technology mix defence 
posture? Or would the consideration of questions such as this 
constitute becoming caught up in the 'prevailing ideology of military 
technology'?
Taken as a whole there is much to recommend in the work of the 
armament-dependency school. The late-1970s remains the most 
intellectually stimulating and productive period for research into 
the problems of the militarisation of the Third World. During this 
period the limitations of the modernising school's understanding of 
military institutions and the defence dilemma facing underdeveloped 
countries was brought to the fore with considerable clarity. Without 
doubt, the armament-dependency school has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of the forces which work against demilitarisation in 
the Third World.
However, their model for demilitarisation and disarmament in the 
Third World is sufficiently rigid as to render it deterministic and 
extremely tenuous. It suggests that international capital is wholly 
responsible for the militarisation of the Third World and that only 
international socialism, or its component parts, can be wholly 
responsible for the demilitarisation of the Third World. Certainly, 
the quality of the writings under review were sufficiently erudite to 
avoid the trap of dogma. However, the armament-dependency school
could not avoid ossification. Without policy prescriptions of any 
hue, lacking in sufficient empirical research to substantiate more 
fully the claim to paradigmatic status, racked by internal and 
sometimes petty squabbles over moot points of detail and, often, 
unpopular within the countries the theories were intended to 'save1, 
mainstream dependency theory slipped quietly from centre stage, 
ignominiously sidelined by a the resurgent liberalism of the 1980s. 
Now, ten years on, calls for a New International Economic Order are 
rarely heard. General and Complete Disarmament is far from the 
agenda, even within the United Nations. Efforts to persuade the UN 
member countries that a linkage between disarmament and development 
would be a net benefit to both North and South have been greeted with 
a tacit derision. And these positions have been adopted not just 
because the international community has been infused with a new and 
much sharper sense of realism, which often appears to border on 
triage*-7. It has also been due to the intellectual shortcomings of 
the political left's approach to development, its myopia and its 
inertia*®.
At the same time, the Third World is no less militarised than it was 
in the late-1970s, despite statistics which indicate a marked decline 
in the flow of arms to and military expenditures in the Third World, 
a standard litmus test for the dependency school. However, before 
moving on to an analysis of the contemporary situation and the need 
for a new conceptual framework which will permit a better 
understanding of the armament process in the Third World, it is
47 The concept of triage connotes the action of choosing according 
to quality or power.
48 For a useful discussion of this problem see Toye [1985], Chapter 
5.
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necessary to complete the picture by considering the role of the 
United Nations in the debate, together with the contributions of 
liberal opinion shapers and the impact of arms control intiatives.
The reasons for a discussion of the UN initiatives are twofold.
First, since the 1960s, the United Nations has maintained a 
consistent stance in favour of disarmament and development and its 
level of activity on this issue has been considerable. Second, the 
United Nations has been responsible for commissioning much of the 
research in this area, particularly during the 1970s. As such, the 
overall framework for the research tradition described above has in 
part been structured by what the United Nations has considered to be 
the salient issues which, as will be seen, is largely determined by 
institutional output rather than intellectual reason.
The liberal opinion shaping perspective is included in part to 
complete the picture but also because of its importance. During the 
late-1970s and early-1980s it was the work of international figures 
such as Brandt and Palme which provided the basis for the Keynesian 
defence against the resurgence of the modernisation paradigm in the 
form of the global Reagonomics, unleashed on the Third World at the 
CANCUN meeting in October 198149. Finally, it would seem appropriate 
to review the actually existing arms control measures which are 
currently on the agenda within the Third World, as both the form 
these initiatives have taken and the weakness of their appeal reflect 
how far in this instance the real world is from the conceptual 
framework on offer and, indeed, the resolution of a series of 
compelling problems.
49 Blomstrom and Hettne [1984], p.166.
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1.3 Third World Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament within the 
United Nations
The linking of disarmament and development within the United Nations 
was preceded by several attempts to control the international trade 
in arms. During the interwar period, efforts by the League of 
Nations to quantify the arms trade as a prelude to negotiations 
concerning restraint and control proved abortive once Europe began to 
rearm and the system of collective security broke down in the 1930's. 
After the Second World War, the arms trade gathered momentum and 
involved to a much greater degree Latin America and the emerging 
states of Africa and Asia. The arms trade and the rise in national 
defence expenditures throughout the world became a major source of 
concern for the infant United Nations. There evolved a double edged 
approach to armament and disarmament issues relating to the Third 
World; the control of arms transfers and, somewhat later, the linking 
of disarmament and development.
The urgent need to quantify and control arms transfers was frustrated 
by the uncooperative attitude of both exporters and importers, ergo a 
large proportion of UN members states. Consequently, it was not 
until 1965 that Malta, a country involved in neither the import nor 
export of arms, invited the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
(now the Conference on Disarmament) to consider the arms trade. In 
the event the superpowers were disinterested and non-producers 
demanded the gathering of information on arms production as well as 
imports. Further proposals in 1967 by Denmark and in 1970 by Sweden
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and Britain were attempts to gain a consensus on arms trade 
registration as a limited, first step towards control. However, the 
non-producing countries took the view that the proposals were 
discriminatory.50
Interest from within the United Nations on the linkage between 
disarmament and development dates from 1950 when the General Assembly 
stated its intentions under Resolution 380(V) to 'reduce to a minimum 
the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources for 
the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under­
developed areas of the world'. In the same year India submitted a 
draft resolution to the General Assembly calling for the 
establishment of a Peace Fund with a remit to finance development 
projects from the resources saved through disarmament. Similar 
proposals were put forward by France in 1955, the USSR in 1956 and 
Brazil in 196451.
Against the backdrop of an emerging nuclear parity between the 
superpowers, limited success in arms control in the form of the 
Antarctic Treaty (1959), reopened negotiations on a nuclear test ban 
and the formation of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee52, the UN 
commissioned the first of several reports on the Economic and Social 
Consequences of the Arms Race to examine the consequences for 
disarmament. The General Assembly requested an examination of the 
effects at a national level, within different economic systems and in
50 SIPRI [1971], pp.100, 107.
51 United Nations [1982], pp.136-138.
52 For a history of the Conference on Disarmament see Graham, M. 
[1984].
countries at differing levels of development, including the likely 
effects upon demand, world trade and the possible structural 
imbalances which would be caused within and between nations following 
disarmament. In other words it was intended as a form of planning 
for disarmament; at one level it was a policy related document in 
spite of its utopianism. The purpose was to facilitate 'the 
utilization of resources released by disarmament for the purpose of 
economic development, in particular of the underdeveloped countries'. 
This was based upon a common sense equation; the high and rising 
level of military expenditures constitutes a waste of resources and 
would be better spent on development efforts.
The report, prepared by a distinguished panel of experts including
Wassily Leontif and J.K. Galbraith as a consultant, stated the issues
and the problems with particular clarity. The sense of urgency
underpinning the mood in favour of disarmament stemmed mainly from
the threat of mass destruction. However, in addition,
"... it comes from the consciousness that the resources 
that make this threat possible, and many more resources 
devoted to less spectacularly military uses, are being 
diverted from the tasks of lightening the burdens and 
enriching the lives of individuals and society ... there 
is no doubt that it [the burden] is substantial."53
In conjunction with this report two empirical studies were carried
out on the conversion of military industries to civilian production
and both concluded that disarmament would have a major, positive
impact upon international economic relations, particularly in
relation to trade, aid and investment.
53 United Nations [1962], pp.1-4.
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This report laid the foundations for what became known as the 
'disarmament dividend1 which subsequently became the central theme 
for all other UN reports on this subject. The 1970s and the early 
1980s were particularly productive periods during which a series of 
expert groups prepared three reports on the Economic and Social 
Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures54, on the 
Reduction of Military Budgets55, and on Disarmament and 
Development55.
The disarmament dividend has remained the motive for establishing an 
institutional link between disarmament and development efforts within 
the United Nations. The moral and political framework has been made 
all the more robust by the tacit acknowledgement that making the case 
for one strengthens the appeal of the other. Thus, the attempt to 
canonise the 'disarmament dividend' - the resources released by the 
disarmament process - and thereby ensure the potential at least for 
increased social and economic development became a cause celebre 
within the United Nations. The most recent report, chaired by Inga 
Thorsson, echoes the same sentiments. It has developed a far more 
sophisticated analysis of the ways in which resources might be 
transferred, but it presents essentially the same thesis. 
Understandably, many were arrested by the logic of the linkage.
Rooted in the familiar rhetoric of the United Nations, it appealed to 
international civil servants; many of the aims and ideals of the 
United Nations were enshrined in a single concept. World leaders 
found a broad and moralistic theme for their speeches. Campaign
54 United Nations [1972].
55 United Nations [1983].
56 United Nations [1982]
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groups and activists in both disarmament and development spotted 
fertile ground and academics identified a springboard into an 
entirely new area - the relationship between armament and 
underdevelopment.
However, unseen or misunderstood by many, the establishment of a 
disarmament-development link performed a specific function within the 
United Nations - almost a hidden agenda. This related to the move 
away by the most powerful states, notably the superpowers, from a 
declared policy of disarmament to one of arms limitation and control 
during the 1960s. The concept of a disarmament dividend was closely 
associated with attempts within the United Nations to keep alive the 
ultimate goal of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD). To many in 
the field of international relations and strategic studies, GCD is at 
best a diversion, if not an irrelevance - an idealist notion which 
would be inpossible to realise. Within the machinery of the United 
Nations, however, it remains a powerful symbol. This relates to the 
intended function of the United Nations to play the role of broker in 
a common security system. During the days of the League of Nations, 
the aim of GCD was a fundamental tenet. The United Nations has 
placed rather less emphasis upon it, focusing instead upon the need 
to establish a measure of common security which does not 
fundamentally alter the system through which that security was 
guaranteed. Nevertheless, it implies that, at some future date, it 
will be possible to maintain the security of nations without resort 
to either the need for arms or war. Only then can the vast resources 
presently assigned to armament be transferred to economic and social 
development. Seen in this light, the UN-based disarmament and 
development approach was a powerful metaphor in the struggle to alter
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perceptions which have, over time, institutionalised a realpolitik 
approach to global problems in general and arms control/disarmament 
in particular.
After a decade of fervent activity in this area, the 1980s witnessed 
near total inertia in this subject area. At the most superficial 
level the reason was the collapse of detente and the crisis in East- 
West relations. The sudden and unsuspected level of attention which 
focused upon defence issues and the brief possibility of a change in 
the configuration of the Atlantic Alliance demanded a sustained 
response and input from peace researchers. In this milieu the 
question and relevance of the militarisation of the Third World 
suddenly became less topical and almost inconsequential, overshadowed 
by other possibilities for disarmament in the North. However, there 
were other, more subtle reasons for this rapid relocation of 
perspectives and priorities. The armament/disarmament and 
underdevelopment/development debate had also worked itself into an 
intellectual cul de sac. There were three inter-related reasons for 
this decline. First, the debate was Eurocentric; the centre of 
gravity remained too much in Western Europe. The process of 
researching the dynamics of Third World militarisation from the West 
alone is inherently unsatisfactory. The lack of data on the 
political economy of militarisation has proved to be an enormous 
stumbling block. Economists and econometricians in particular have 
had considerable difficulty in applying their skills to the problem. 
Governments in the Third World and the Socialist bloc have 
consistently refused to release useful statistics and information on 
military expenditure, arms imports, indigenous production and defence 
policy. This is a problem firmly rooted in the notion that at any
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level of defence the release of information confers an advantage upon 
potential aggressors. Consequently, from the peace research 
perspective at least, few regional or individual case studies have 
been attempted and the cross-national studies which have been 
completed have failed to make substantive cases in either 
direction57.
These problems would have been alleviated had there been a more 
significant input from within the Third World. This is the second 
reason for the decline. The majority of intellectuals and 
researchers from within the Third World have barely accepted the 
argument that military expenditure and arms imports have been too 
high and should be cut back in the interests of disarmament and 
development. Certainly it can be argued that potential contributions 
from within the Third World were hampered by a more severe dearth of 
information than exists in the West. Even more problematic, however, 
is the fact that advanced military technology is inextricably bound 
up with images of nation building; a multi-option, advanced defence 
posture is considered a definitive hallmark of modernity and 
development. Consequently, defence procurement is rarely viewed with 
alarm, particularly if the rationale is external rather than internal 
security. In addition, the opinion shaping and research community 
has never successfully comes to terms with the fact that, broadly 
speaking, advanced military technology is generally popular within 
most Third World countries and, often, the costs incurred are thought 
to be worthwhile.
57 See for example Smith and Smith, [1983].
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The third and more ambiguous reason concerns the reactive element of 
the debate and the concomitant failure to develop a prescriptive 
element. The preoccupation of the West European research community 
with the perceived failures of the liberal/conservative approach to 
the problem of militarism and militarisation has already been noted, 
as have the former's theoretical shortcomings. To this may be added 
the political nature of the original debate on disarmament and 
development within the United Nations and the intentional aversion to 
detail and case study. As a result of both these factors the debate 
tended towards the proscriptive; a failing legitimised by the lack of 
data available. Inherent in the disarmament and development debate 
of the 1970s was an unstated and stark separation; disarmament came 
to connote an outright rejection of armament and the problem of 
security before, during and after the disarmament process was 
ignored. Thus, armament became linked to underdevelopment, security 
to power and disarmament to positive peace. It was an attempt to 
refute the realpolitik approach to international politics and profer 
an alternative system based more upon idealism. However, in so 
doing, the baby was thrown out with the bathwater. The armament- 
security-power framework, the realist paradigm, was totally abandoned 
on the basis of a cause and effect relationship to war, 
underdevelopment and centre-periphery dependency. There was a 
negligible consideration of how the armament process in the Third 
World could.be reversed. Nor was there any consideration of 
alternative concepts of defence and security, in stark contrast to 
the growing trend towards 'another' development.
1.4 Arms Control and Disarmament Outside the United Nations:
Controlling the Horizontal Spread of Conventional Military 
Technology
Given the conspicuous absence of any agreement in principle within 
the United Nations on the need to quantify arms transfers prior to 
any discussion of control, it is hardly surprising that efforts 
outside the United Nations have also failed. Soviet proposals in the
$|
1950's to limit the flow of arms to the Middle East were rejected by I
the United States. Proposals by the United States on the same issue f
ii
after the 1967 war were rejected on the basis of the Israeli j
occupation of Arab territory. Superpower efforts to reach agreement 1
j
on the destruction of obsolete weapons systems which began with Dean 
Rusk's proposal in 1964 for 'bonfires of bombers' failed due to 
conceptual weakness. A major study published in 1964 by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology which advocated supplier 
agreements was virtually ignored, as was the 1965 report on 
international co-operation prepared by the committee on Arms Control 
and Disarmament of the National Citizen's Committee58. A proposal in 
1969 by the Western European Union's (WEU)59 Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments to investigate further the control of the 
arms trade was rejected by the WEU Council on the grounds of 
complexity and remit; unable to decide upon appealing for a 
limitation upon arms sales or armament limitation in general the 
proposal received little support from the WEU Council and eventually
58 SIPRI [1971], pp.114, 115.
59 Members of the WEU are Belgium, France, Luxembour, the 
Netherlands, UK, FRG and Italy.
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opted for the traditional non-starter - a trade registration 
proposal.60
The early 1970's witnessed a nadir in concern over the military 
build-up and arms imports of Third World countries. There were both 
positive and negative reasons for this. On the one hand, it was a 
period of detente, strategic arms limitation agreements, nuclear non­
proliferation and biological disarmament. Moreover, during the same 
period, the development agenda was particularly expansive, 
encompassing as it did items such as a New International Economic 
Order and the linking of disarmament, development and human rights. 
Arms transfer control was tacitly acknowledged to be a part of this 
process of change involving both sustainable development and 
demilitarisation.
Obversely, it was also a period of economic crisis in the West during 
which time the United States experienced an unprecedented balance of 
payments crisis (1971) and, later, when massive amounts of 
petrodollars flowed into the OPEC countries in the Middle East.
During this period the divide between hegemonic and industrial 
patterns of arms supply became blurred. These changed conditions, 
coupled with the particular political environment which enabled the 
election of Jimmy Carter as President, permitted the major arms trade 
control initiative of the 1970s - the bilateral superpower 
Conventional Arms Transfer talks initiated by the Americans in 1977. 
However, the optimism which defined Carter's personal approach to the 
pressing international issues of the time was overshadowed and 
eventually destroyed by a mix of bureaucratic obstruction, double
60 SIPRI [1971], pp.108-109.
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standards, naivety on Carter's part and, finally, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, problems within the Soviet bloc centred on Poland, 
the disintegration of detente and the revolution in Iran which led to 
the taking of American hostages61.
The failure to control the flow of arms from North to South is rooted 
in the inescapable fact that restraint is generally seen to be 
against the interests of both suppliers and recipients. By and 
large, the several attempts at restraint have been reactive measures 
animated by the effects, rather than the causes of violent breakdowns 
in the international system. Thus, it was the inordinate 
bloodletting of the First World War and the partial responsibility of 
the 'merchants of death' which prompted concern within the League of 
Nations. The embargoes enforced during the Indo-Pakistan war of 
1965, and the Six Day War of 1967, were reactive measures which 
followed the mutual recognition on the part of both the superpowers 
and their allies that wars in sensitive geo-political areas of the 
Third World could ramify into direct superpower confrontation. The 
CAT talks initiated by President Carter were a consequence of the new 
President's resolve to raise the moral standard of American foreign 
policy above the prevailing level of crude economic gain and 
political advantage. And Carter himself was elected to office partly 
as a result of America's existential crisis following Vietnam and 
Watergate.
The lessons of the 1970's may have introduced more checks and 
controls into how and when the major suppliers sell arms to the Third
61 For a review and analysis of the CAT talks see, Blechman, Nolan 
and Platt [1982].
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World; witness the continuing tension between the American 
legislature and the executive over arms sales to the Middle East and 
Pakistan and the retention of elements of restrictiveness in most 
national arms export policies. However, at no point were the major 
exporters ever committed as a body to the negotiation of a policy of 
control or restraint. The reasons for this apathy are unequivocally 
the driving forces of the arms trade.
1.5 Common Security, Arms Control and the Third World
The problem facing those who argue the need for arms control and 
disarmament in the Third World is that radical changes in defence 
policies are not yet seen to be in line with national interests. In 
so far as security and defence are locked together at the conceptual 
level, all countries seem to perceive a direct relationship between 
national security and advanced military technology, although there 
are exceptions to this rule, such as Mao Zedong's China.
Within the Third World, security considerations are both visible and 
paramount. Whilst it may be argued that other countries place no 
less emphasis upon national and collective security arrangements, it 
is also the case that the emphasis and concern is less sharp. For 
the past four decades Europe has been able to avoid war. However, 
during the same period the Third World has experienced over sixty- 
three conflicts involving the death of over sixteen million people. 
U.S., Soviet, British and French forces have intervened in disputes 
and conflicts in the Third World, as and when their interests appear 
sufficiently threatened. US forces alone were used in 262 incidents
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between 1946 and 1982, most of which were located in the Third 
World&2. Unlike Europe, territorial disputes are common and 
widespread ranging from frequent border skirmishes to irredentist 
claims and sub-imperialism. Third World states generally perceive 
themselves to be more vulnerable than developed countries. Over the 
late-1980s, there have been a series of positive moves towards 
terminating some of the more intractable conflicts in the Third 
World, such as the Gulf War and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 
However, at the same time, ethnic disturbances are on the increase, 
as are the accompanying levels of violence, bloodshed and 
international anarchy.
In their approach to external security issues Third World, states 
place great store on defence as a means of safeguarding political 
independence and territorial integrity. Often overlooked by 
contemporary historians is the magnitude of change which occurred in 
Africa and Asia between 1945 and 1960. No less than forty countries 
and one quarter of the world's population revolted against 
colonialism and won independence. Once change had been achieved the 
problem of defending the new status quo became paramount. Given the 
degree of tension within the Third World, between North and South and 
East and West, and the interface between the three, defence became of 
the upmost concern. Certainly, there were attempts to reduce the 
taxing demands of defence. For example, Jawaharlal Nehru tried 
between 1947 and 1962 to construct a new foreign policy for India 
based upon non-alignment. He also attempted to design a defence 
policy commensurate with his ambitions for foreign policy. Both 
failed, in part because of the Sino-Indian war but also because Nehru
62 Blechman and Kaplan [1978].
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and his advisers could not translate their political ambitions into 
military strategy and doctrine. Another casualty of the Sino-Indian 
war was the powerful spirit of Bandung. The ensuing loss of dynamism 
greatly affected the future of the non-aligned movement and the 
potential for a new form of collective security.
The unavoidable fact of contemporary life in the Third World is that 
regional security moves and initiatives have largely failed to 
guarantee security. Instead, in the face of failures on the 
diplomatic and foreign policy fronts, states have relied upon 
gradually increasing defence expenditure and modernising defence 
capabilities - in policy making spheres at least realism remains in 
the ascendancy. Of late, there has been a refreshing acknowledgement 
of this dilemma in several quarters. Whilst the arms race in the 
Third World is universally recognised as deleterious for development 
progress, equally, there is a growing acceptance that new approaches 
are required which would effectively redefine security and offer new 
alternatives to the defence-security dilemma in the Third World.
During the early 1980s, when East-West relations were at a low ebb 
and when deep seated structural problems in the global system became 
evident, a series of reports from West European liberal opinion 
shapers advocated far reaching and wide ranging reforms to the 
international system. The Report of the Independent Commission on 
Disarmament and Security Issues, the so-called Palme Report, is one 
such example63. Although the bulk of intellectual effort was 
directed towards the pressing need for arms control and disarmament
63 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
[1982].
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in Europe, the report also projected a particular perspective on the 
negative effects of armament and military expenditure in the Third 
World.
Where the report differed from previous intiatives was in its 
outspoken condemnation of the attainment of security through the 
pursuit of relative power. The intellectual direction of the report 
was a thinly veiled attack upon realism from the interdependency 
perspective. Instead, the Commission advocated an approach to 
security based upon co-operation, hence the development of the common 
security concept. Although the tenets of common security apply to 
countries in both North and South, the Commission saw an increase in 
collective security measures as particularly important. In addition 
to a proposal to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations, 
the Commission advocated other, specific proposals - nuclear weapon 
free zones, conferences on security and cooperation, regional zones 
of peace, increased control over the nuclear fuel cycle, wider 
adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and control over arms 
transfers64.
The report has been followed by several other attempts to broaden the 
parameters of the security debate pertaining to the Third World.
Those who once advocated a linkage between disarmament and 
development now advocate a dynamic relationship between disarmament, 
development and security, witness the outcome of the most recent UN 
conference on Disarmament and Development. Influential 
environmentalists have entered the debate bringing with them a new
64 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 
[1982], p.157-172.
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perspective on the relationship between militarisation and the 
environment. The Socialist International has made a similar point, 
but in a different way, arguing that armament and conflict are 
inseparable from the battle against poverty and underdevelopment, 
which is rapidly being lost65. In a recent Worldwatch Report, Lester 
Brown has argued that the extensive deterioration of natural support 
systems and the declining conditions evident in many parts of the 
Third World pose dire threats to national and international security 
that now rival the traditional military threats. Consequently, there 
is an urgent need to redefine national security to encompass economic 
and environmental factors66. Given the recent events in, for 
example, the American continent and South Asia regarding the causal 
relationship between environmental abuse and 'natural' disasters, 
environmentalists may soon be warning of 'environmental wars' as a 
last-ditch means of preventing national development projects in one 
country or region reversing the same or similar in another. Or, put 
another way, what could the USA do if, beyond reasonable doubt, a 
clear link could be established between the destruction of the 
Amazonian rain forests and the severe drought which brought such 
hardship to the mid-West in 1988?
These influential opinion-shapers have rendered both a service and a 
diservice to our understanding of armament and disarmament issues in 
the Third World. Without doubt, there are undeniable benefits in 
looking at the security problem through 'green tinted' spectacles. A 
broader perspective raises the highly relevant question of the
65 The Report of the Socialist International Committee on Economic 
Policy [1985], p.196.
66 Worldwatch Institute [1986], pp.195-211.
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relationship between national security and people's security*57 and 
the role of the state in national development. It alerts decision­
makers and the public to the severity of environmental crisis and the 
impotence of the national security framework; common security offers 
a conceptual alternative to an overburdened international system in 
which the question of survival rather than progress is becoming 
increasingly more germane. Of particular importance for the Third 
World, it highlights one essential paradox; arms imports and high 
levels of military expenditure are seen by states as fulfilling 
security demands and underpinning sovereignty but in practice they 
may do neither.
Obversely, the common security debate contains within it a degree of 
confusion which diminishes its appeal and credibility. At the 
prescriptive level, common security amounts to little more than a 
shopping list of global reforms; the attempts to design or outline 
implementing policies are either weak or non-existent&s.
Furthermore, the current debate fails to grasp the tallest nettle, 
namely, it does nothing to suggest that, at present, an alternative 
(or much reformed) international security regime would appeal to the 
interests of Third World governments, which is an essential 
precondition for change. For example, a prevailing, underlying 
assumption is that the East-West conflict in general and the Cold War 
in particular has continued to the disadvantage of the Third World. 
High levels of military expenditure are often considered 
inappropriate and damaging for Third World countries and underpin the 




elites do not accept the linkage between armament and 
underdevelopment. Instead, Thence is considered essential and a 
means of complimenting, stimulating and protecting development.
Above all, those who advocate new security regimes often overlook 
just how popular advanced military technology is in the Third World. 
In both the policy-making and the public domain, it is seen as 
essential. Finally, there is little consideration of how the 
obstacles to a less imperfect world might be overcome. What, for 
example, can be said of the myriad vested interests which will 
inevitably need to be confronted, including those of bureaucrats 
protecting their turf? What too can be done to arrest the momentum 
gathered by both advanced technology and the action-reaction cycle 
which inevitably accompanies any form of arms racing? What policies 
are necessary to put the armament process into reverse?
The prospects for controlling the armament process in the Third World 
begin to appear very confusing. On the one hand, the spiralling 
price of arms and the declining fortunes of Third World countries, 
both inside and outside OPEC, suggest that any regional or global 
initiatives aimed at creating new security regimes and reducing the 
pressure on defence budgets would be welcomed as initial steps 
towards arms control. Recent developments in Latin America would 
seem to support this view. Initiatives from President Alan Garcia of 
Peru and complementary steps by the Contadora group have been geared 
to the reduction of military expenditures and a freeze on 
conventional armament imports into the region. Garcia's proposals 
may in the future be accepted by the Andean countries - Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru - although the Brazilian claim that
regional intiatives should be dependent upon positive moves by the 
superpowers is an obstacle.
In 1985 the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
emerged with a consensus that surprised many observers. Although the 
non-nuclear weapons states mounted a legitimate attack against the 
nuclear club for failing in their commitment to reverse the nuclear 
arms race, the regime has survived intact. Indeed, in 1985 the 
Pakistani President, the late General Zia, pledged to join the NPT 
providing India did the same. A positive response by India is 
unlikely, given that country’s long-standing opposition to the NPT, 
but future forward momentum in this direction could greatly 
strengthen the regime. The emergence of Benazir Bhutto undoubtedly 
augers well for a more normal course of events in South Asia, but 
scarcely enough to halt the nuclear arms race in the region.
In addition, there have been several other promising moves towards 
enhancing regional security. With the increasing possibility of 
political change in South Africa, there also exists the possibility 
of an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone; all countries bar South 
Africa support such an initiative. In September 1985 the South 
Pacific Forum opened a treaty to establish the South Pacific as a 
nuclear free zone and signatories thus far include Australia, New 
Zealand and Fiji. In early 1986 North Korea pledged to launch an 
anti-imperialist and anti-nuclear campaign to rid the Korean 
peninsular of nuclear weapons and create thereby a nuclear free zone. 
The USSR and Japan have started talks based upon Far East Confidence 
Building Measures aimed at the concern of the Soviet Union's eastern 
neighbours lest arms control measures in Europe take place at the
63
expense of a Soviet nuclear build-up in the East. China, Taiwan, 
North and South Korea are also involved. In December 1985, India and 
Pakistan reached agreement not to attack each other's nuclear 
facilities. In addition, negotiations over a non-aggression pact or 
a treaty of friendship are ongoing which keeps open the possibility 
of a South Asian nuclear weapon free zone. In early 1986 the leaders 
of New Zealand and Indonesia met to discuss the possibility of 
pursuing a South East Asian Zone of Peace.69 Last, but not least, 
the recent INF agreement and the concomitant new detente between East 
and West suggests that there exists a new momentum towards achieving 
a more settled international system.
Yet, these initiatives should be taken for what they are and for what
is excluded - they are both partial and cosmetic. The prospect of a
Middle East nuclear weapon free zone is nowhere near the agenda and
Israel continues to enjoy the benefits of a nuclear weapons policy
based upon ambiguity. Negotiations over creating the Indian Ocean as
a zone of peace have languished. Political change in South Africa
would virtually obviate the need to create a nuclear weapon free zone
in Africa, temporarily at least, unless a successor regime discovers
a bomb in the basement and equivocates over what to do with it. The
Garcia initiative in Latin America is hardly a departure. In 1974
the Declaration of Ayacucho committed the Andean group plus Argentina
and Panama to the creation of conditions permitting an effective
limitation of armaments and an end to their acquisition for offensive
purposes, but arms production and imports did not subside thereafter.
In 1978, a conference was convened to consider exclusively the
69 Details of these and other arms control negotiations can be
found in the authoritative Arms Control Reporter produced by the 
Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, Brookline, Mass.
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problem of conventional arms control in the region, followed in 1980 
by the adoption of a Charter of Conduct on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes’70. Significantly, none of these initiatives have included, 
or received blessing from Brazil, the major power in the region.
The NPT has survived so far due to its imperfections. Article X 
permits the signatories to leave the regime with three months notice, 
should their security interests be so threatened. The third NPT 
Review Conference succeeded for negative rather than positive 
reasons. In the prevailing international climate the collapse of a 
major arms control regime would have been extremely serious. Access 
to nuclear technology, a major problem for previous review 
conferences, is no longer a problem given the current recession in 
the nuclear market place and reduced forecasts for nuclear energy 
growth through the end of the century71. Moreover, the NPT comes up 
for renegotiation in 1995; the benefits of destroying or degrading 
the regime until then are few. Finally, the level of interest and 
commitment to a chemical weapon non-proliferation regime is 
lamentably low, given the current situation72. All in all arms 
control has largely failed, in no shape or form does it really 
address the real security problems of Third World countries.
70 For a discussion of the Latin American proposals which preceded 
the Garcia initiative see, Goldblat and Milan [1982].
71 Reiss [1985], pp.226-234.
72 For a review of the proliferation of chemical weapon 
capabilities see Ember [1986], pp.8-16.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ARMAMENT PROCESS IN THE THIRD WORLD:
TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 The Limitations of Development Studies
In the previous chapter two major development paradigms/schools have 
been discussed in relation to their approach to what might broadly be 
described as the armament process in the Third World. It has been 
argued that both contain remarkable shortcomings in their ability to 
analyse comprehensively the complexity of military institutions, 
defence technology and the competing claims of national security 
requirements and development needs. Thus, the modernising paradigm 
looked solely at the role of military institutions and largely 
ignored the growing evidence pointing towards both the deleterious 
effects of defence expenditure upon development (or argued that the 
opposite was true). Equally poorly understood was the role of the 
military in defending governments which appeared to be increasingly 
unable to manage the complex economic, political, social and cultural 
aspects of the development process. In attacking the shortcomings of 
the prevailing paradigm, the emerging school of dependency stressed 
the negative impact of the military on development and sought 
linkages between military institutions, the technology they 
assimilated and the resources they absorbed, to both the maintenance 
of underdevelopment at the national level and to the divisions 
between North and South.
During the early-1980s, the cutting edge of the development debate 
was usurped by a reformed and revitalised (neo-)liberal paradigm.
The assault upon the centre stage was so effective and rapid that 
within a few months the neo-liberal agenda had impacted in a major 
way upon the economic policies of many developing countries. The 
heady rise of the neo-liberal paradigm has been documented elsewhere1 
but two aspects of this phenomenon are relevant to the way in which 
the defence sector in the Third World might be understood in the 
future.
First, notwithstanding the failure of the dependency school to 
sustain its treatment of militarisation and demilitarisation in the 
Third World, all allusions and direct observations to either the 
positive or the negative impact of the defence sector have been 
omitted - they have slipped from their traditionally low position on 
the development agenda into virtual obscurity. Even the punishing 
effects of war or the advanced conditions of insecurity, such as 
exist in Southern Africa, have failed to qualify some states as 
special cases. No real concern is paid to the inescapable fact that 
wars in the Third World create their own particular form of 
structural adjustment.
Nevertheless, the movement of defence and security issues to the 
outer limits of the development debate is consistent with the neo­
liberal framework for analysis which in essence turns on the role of 
the state in the development process. Essentially, neo-liberalism 
seeks to reduce the role of the state which, in economic terms, 
requires that government expenditure be cut to the minimum for,
1 For a particularly good account see Toye [1987].
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although necessary in some instances, it is also seen as a drag on 
the economy in so far as it limits the scope of the 
enterprise/private sector to maximise investment and reduces the 
spending power of the household.
The question of military/defence expenditure poses something of a 
problem within this paradigm. Whereas there is scope for debate, 
manoeuvre and interpretation when, for example, health and education 
issues are addressed, witness the ongoing debate over the charging of 
user fees, the options for reducing the role of the state when it 
comes to security issues is apparently minimal. Moreover, the two 
major international organisations primarily responsible for 
implementing the policies most favoured by neo-liberals, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund $XMF), have traditionally 
fought shy of raising questions relating fco defence expenditure and 
defence procurement. This is understandable and has little to do 
with what some might see as a conspiracy of silence designed to 
protect military institutions in the Third World and ignore both geo­
political exigencies and the international trade in defence 
equipment, which has become so crucial to the ability of the smaller 
NATO countries to keep their own defence expenditures within 
politically acceptable fiscal limits. More realistically, both the 
Bank and the Fund fight shy of raising these issues because, as 
primarily financial organisations, defence considerations are 
patently outside their remit.
Moreover, there would be very real problems associated with such 
organisations informing a developing country that military 
expenditures must decline or procurement preferences be foregone, if
loans are to be forthcoming. For to do so would be to trample upon 
the basic right of all governments to exercise their sovereignty when 
:\t comes to an assessment of external threat and the requisite 
defence preparedness. Many of the defence-related policy decisions 
taken by most Third World governments may often be wrong but this 
does not ipso facto give the IMF or the World Bank the right to 
intervene in this particular sector even though there are known 
examples of this occurring, albeit in a guarded fashion; for example, 
it is known that the IMF brought up the question of military aircraft 
procurement during talks with the Peruvian Government and more 
recently with the Jordanian Government over the purchase of the 
Tornado multi-role combat aircraft2.
Much less defensible, however, is the persistent failure to recognise 
the debilitating effects of war, for which there is no real 
explanation except for Reg Green's observation that neo-liberals and 
World Bank officials may both feel ill-equipped to tackle anything 
related to the economics of war, which is essentially the economics 
of intervention, and, furthermore, that to admit the degree to which 
war impacts upon the economy of a developing country might reopen the 
door to state economic intervention3 . Nor, apparently, is there any 
regard for the difficulties faced by elected governments when it 
comes to the implementation of policies favoured by the IMF. Prior 
to the election of Benazir Bhutto in late-1988, the IMF negotiated a 
particularly tough set of conditions with the Pakistani bureaucracy. 
Ms Bhutto's political future, which may be inseparable from the 
future of democracy in Pakistan, may yet hinge upon whether or not
2 Andoni [1989].
3 Green [1988], pp.7-8.
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the new Prime Minister has the political skill and fortune to absorb 
the inevitable popular protest which will emerge in response to the 
IMF package. A very similar situation currently exists in Ecuador.
At first glance it is tempting to be extremely critical of this 
development given the clear links between international debt, 
democracy and militarisation. Demilitarisation, it may be argued, is 
the obverse of democratisation and respect for human rights. The 
elimination of the former from the debate suggests that the entire 
currency of development has been devalued and this has led in turn to 
the proferring of development strategies which lack the basic 
qualities of humanism, dignity and equality. Nor would it seem 
appropriate or even honest to eliminate the costs and effects of war 
from the development agenda in certain regions of the Third World. 
Moreover, the passive nature of the neo-liberal response to much or 
most of what'the defence sector represents in development terms can 
be ascribed to a series of ideologically convenient oversights in so 
far as any discussion of the defence sector in the Third World brings 
into sharp relief numerous moral and political questions relating to 
development and underdevelopment. And these are precisely some of 
the issues which neo-liberalism has attempted to erase from the 
agenda.
In addition, there is evidence here of institutional inertia - being 
unable to respond directly to defence related issues and problems 
does not mean that organisations such as the Bank and the IMF should 
remain forever oblivious to the working of individual defence 
sectors. Thus, for example, the World Bank was outraged when, in the 
early-1980s, India agreed to purchase the Mirage 2000 from France
7d
only weeks after having negotiated a major loan from the World Bank4 . 
Yet, embarrassing though this was for the Bank should outside
observers remark that the funding intended for sectoral and
macroeconomic medium term production/supply based development should 
instead be subsidising the purchase of one of the most expensive 
combat aircraft on the open market, it was also the case that nobody 
in the Bank appeared to know about a deal which had been in both the 
offing and the news since 1978.
The second aspect of note is that the emphasis of the neo-liberal
paradigm is unequivocally centred upon development policy rather than 
theory, although the theoretical underpinnings are clear enough. 
Certainly, it is not the case that this will lead in the future to 
the evolution of a coherent framework capable for tackling at the 
policy level the contradictions which relate to the interlocking 
aspects of Third World security issues - defence will certainly 
remain outside the remit of those responsible for shaping and 
implementing policy. However, it is the case that development 
studies is now being encouraged if not forced to relate most areas of 
concern to policy, which has marginalised the more esoteric research 
areas and focused thinking upon the immediate and pressing problems 
of the 1980s. Nevertheless, there are significant costs involved as 
all too few now have the opportunity to undertake quality research, 
in-depth studies and use cross-disciplinary skills. However, the 
current focus upon the need for implementing policies can only be a 
positive development in principle, although in practice the policies 
adopted by neo-liberals are open to criticism on many counts.
4 Conversations with the author, Washington, July 1988.
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Nevertheless, the marginalisation of defence and disarmament issues 
should not be considered a totally negative development. The 
circular logic and pious undertones of the dependency school endowed 
the debate with a particularly unhelpful vocabularly which was 
intended to mean a great deal but in effect amounted to very little. 
Thus, the debate became a hostage to a conceptual framework which is 
most unlikely ever to be realised, witness the continuous need to 
link disarmament and development as a preliminary step towards Third 
World demilitarisation. Although few alternative perspectives exist 
at present, it is now possible to discuss the issues without 
consistent reference to untenable concepts. Furthermore, there is a 
new urgency within development studies to link the solving of 
problems to the development of policies.
Throughout much of the recent literature relating to development 
studies theory and the 'state of the debate', it is remarkable how 
little attention is afforded both international relations as a 
subject discipline and recent debates within the field. At the 
outset, it is reasonable to suggest that if the post-war study of 
international relations had evolved in a less US-dominated and 
ethnocentric fashion, the need for a separate discipline of 
development studies might well have been unnecessary.
Recent theoretical developments within the field of international 
relations, coupled with the inability of the neo-liberal paradigm to 
encompass issues relating to defence and militarisation in the Third 
World, suggest that a tentative bonding of the two areas might 
provide a more productive framework for analysis. Indeed, to a great 
extent, the issues which have thus far been discussed in relation to
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development paradigms have all too frequently been considered within 
the ambit of international relations. This is particularly the case 
with the arms trade, where much of the work has been primarily 
descriptive, witness the early treatment of the subject by Stanley 
and Pearton and, to a lesser extent, the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute5 .
The bifurcation between development studies and international 
relations in this instance stems from a gross methodological error; 
namely that the transfer of military technology and the politics 
which underlie are considered to be within the remit of international 
relations, whereas the impact and effects, particularly at the 
intranational level, are within the domain of development studies.
It is largely for this reason that the overall treatment of the 
subject area reflects a curious form of impotence - fragmented on the 
one hand and significantly weak in the formation of implementing 
policies on the other.
The division is made all the more questionable when the broad 
development of the two disciplines are compared. The theoretical 
contours of the development and international relations debates 
parallel each other to an extent. International relations as a 
distinct subject of academic enquiry emerged as a direct result of 
the First World War and the universally accepted notion that a 
prevention of future wars of this type was urgently required in the 
form of a new world order. For a brief period the Idealist tradition 
held sway, only to be unequivocally marginalised by the onset of the
5 Stanley & Pearton [1972]; SIPRI [1971].
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Second World War and the total failure of both mediation and rational 
decision-making as mechanisms for the prevention of war.
In the immediate post-war period, Idealism was greatly overshadowed 
by Realism, which posited a very different view of the international 
community and the motivations of individual nation-states. The basis 
of the Realist view directly contradicted the faith placed in the 
international system's acknowledgement of the dysfunctional aspects 
of modern warfare and the inherent pacifist tendencies of decision­
makers, a vision rooted in the humanism of Immanuel Kant and the 
search for an international system based upon global justice. In 
contrast, it was the intellectual heritage of Machiavelli and Hobbes 
which influenced the new, Realist school. For theorists such as Hans 
Morgenthau, states were power-maximisers and his view of human nature 
was extremely low. Thus, his theoretical framework came to be 
defined by power as the means to acquire national security, which is 
the central concern of every statesman. In the event of a conflict 
between national interests and the international system, decision 
makers will always opt for a course favourable to the former.
Whilst Realism was uncontested during a period when international 
relations was almost an exclusively US-dominated subject, and when 
the Cold War dominated the thinking of policy makers throughout the 
world, the modernisation school emerged as the prevailing paradigm in 
the nascent development studies. The points of contact between the 
two are numerous; the centre of gravity of both was in the US, both 
were ethnocentric, both were concerned with order rather than change, 
both were concerned primarily with the nation-state and governance, 
one from an endogenous, the other from an exogenous perspective.
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During a similar period when the modernisation paradigm came under 
attack from the dependency school, the Realist tradition was also 
under fire. In contrast to the Realist penchant for normative 
statements, the competing Behaviouralist school was rooted in a 
positivist tradition and, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, became a 
credible alternative to Realism, in much the same way as dependency 
theory mounted its attack on the modernising school with similar 
success. Furthermore, the style of attack was also similar - both 
used multi- and cross-disciplinary tools of analysis and the centre 
of gravity of both were located outside the US. Indeed, dependency 
theory can be seen to fit well into the dialectical approach to 
international relations'51.
By far the most important contribution offered by the Behaviouralist 
approach was its unequivocal rejection of the normative assumptions 
which underpinned Realism. Nevertheless, too little was either 
attempted or achieved when it came to usurping the dominance of the 
Realist paradigm7 . In effect, it was not until a new form of 
idealism emerged in the mid-1970s, in the form of liberal 
transnationalism, that a more credible and conscious alternative to 
Realism developed. Just as the Idealist tradition stressed the need 
for peace and the non-violent mediation of conflict, the 
Transnationalist approach stressed interdependence, integration, 
cooperation and common interest.
6 Alker and Biersteker [1984], pp.121-142.
7 Smith [1987], p.196.
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During the late-1970s and early-1980s, adverse developments in the 
international system prompted a new approach in international 
relations in the form of Neo-Realism, which duly prompted many to ask 
searching questions as to whether or not the Realist paradigm had 
ever really been displaced. As detente and the optimism of the 
Carter era collapsed, Transnationalism and Interdependency theories 
suddenly appeared woefully inappropriate as tools for understanding 
the contours of the international system - Iran, Afghanistan and the 
new Cold War for example. However, if Transnationalism became 
rapidly conspicuous by its abserice in academic circles, it 
consistently reappeared in various quarters of the international 
community where it had not previously been institutionalised; the 
Brandt, Palme, Brundtland and South Commissions, the European Nuclear 
Disarmament movement and nuclear freeze campaign, and, even, Band 
Aid.
The confrontation offered by Neo-Realism turned essentially on the 
nature of international anarchy. Once again, it seemed, the 
contemporary history of the international system confirmed that 
states were pcwer maximisers and that the system as a whole was 
essentially anarchic. At the same time, however, Neo-Realism appears 
to eschew the normative foundations of Realism which strongly 
suggests a process of synthesis between Realism and Behaviouralism. 
Indeed, the very existence of Neo-Realism is in part due to the 
internal critique of Interdependence based upon the latter's 
disregard of national interest8 .
8 Luckham [1988], p.50.
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Both the emergence and potency of Neo-Realism has provoked 
considerable debate and controversy. In part this is because Realism 
is closely associated with both foreign policy analysis and practice 
and there is every indication that similar links are emerging in the 
US, at least between Neo-Realism and the foreign policy community. 
Certainly, there is an axiomatic truth to this - foreign policy 
practitioners are more likely to seek advice from, and be influenced 
by, scholars whose primary concerns centre upon the nation-state and 
national interest.
I
In a similar fashion to development studies, much of the contemporary 
focus in international relations rests upon the role of the 
discipline in the development of implementing policies and nowhere 
has this been more stark than in the sub-field of defence studies.
On the one hand the past decade has been a period when the use of 
military power has acquired, up until very recently, a new 
legitimacy, whether in the cementing of political alliances, outright 
intervention and power projection or, specifically in the Third 
World, the maintenance of domestic order.
On the other, it has also been a period when strategists, defence 
analysts, politicians and voting publics have become sensitised to 
much that is wrong and contradictory over the way in which states 
seek security. The most obvious manifestation of this shift was seen 
in the development of a politically significant anti-nuclear movement 
which mounted a sustained and often cogent attack on the defence 
policies of NATO members throughout the early- and mid-1980s. This 
in turn pressed the media and many politicians to acquire rapidly a 
better grasp of the issues. The combination was a powerful one and
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placed defence issues in general and nuclear issues in particular 
high on the political agenda of most Western democracies. Equally, 
strategists and defence analysts were coming to accept that nuclear 
deterrence in both its simple and complex forms posed almost as many 
security and political problems as it solved9 .
Against a background of public concern and military-professional 
confusion as to the efficacy and desirability of nuclear deterrence 
and active shifts in NATO's nuclear policy and posture, concern 
centred upon the problem of how to eliminate or reduce substantially 
the role of nuclear weapons. At the same time, however, most agreed 
that nuclear disarmament/arms control or minimum deterrence could not 
be introduced at the expense of national security or compensations in 
the conventional, non-nuclear domain which would force defence 
budgets over the threshold of both political and fiscal acceptance. 
The result has been the development of a politically and 
intellectually intriguing debate on military futures involving 
military personnel, strategic thinkers, defence analysts, peace 
researchers and, to a very limited extent, members of the peace 
movement. The debate turns upon a widely held conviction that the 
well recognised 'security dilemma' is rapidly becoming politically 
untenable. As such there is an urgent need to restructure the 
defence policies of the two major power blocs which will either 
eliminate or severely reduce the risk of nuclear war.
Although a consensus exists in favour of alternative defence 
strategies, there is no agreement as to what constitutes such a
9 For a brief and cogent explanation of this debate see, Buzan 
[1987b], Chapter 13.
strategy. Instead, a continuum exists which spans non-violent 
civilian based resistance at the one end and minimum nuclear 
deterrence at the other - the two poles could hardly be further 
apart. Nevertheless, what does exist is the broadly accepted need 
within both the Realist and the Idealist traditions of a need for 
synthesis and it is here that the interface between Realism and 
Transnationalism, namely Neo-Realism, offers the most intellectually 
fertile ground, whereas both appear somewhat limited when considered 
alone,
"... because Realist policies require the arming of the 
state and a power-struggle analysis of the system, they 
naturally clash with idealist policies based on 
disarmament, international co-operation, and a harmony- 
of-interests model of the system. If that clash is seen 
as so basic that it precludes a meaningful mix between 
them, then each alternative must carry alone the whole 
burden of security. To do this, the Realist policy must 
exaggerate the necessity for a powerful state, and the 
idealist one must leap all the way into utopias of 
general and complete disarmament and world government."10
The alternative defence debate has been discussed and outlined 
elsewhere11. Although the impact upon the policy process is minimal 
as yet, there have been few such occasions which match the potential 
ability of this debate to shape the policies of states through a 
double-edged appeal to both national interest and the future well­
being of the international community. (A parallel example can be 
seen in the ongoing movement towards greater environmental 
protection.)
Nevertheless, a glaring anomaly exists in so far as the alternative 
defence debate has studiously avoided any mention of the Third World. 




relations community and their undue concentration upon intra-alliance 
and East-West defence issues - indeed, the Third World generally 
comes into focus only in relation to East-West security, witness the 
level of concern over the Middle East and the base race in the Indian 
Ocean for example. On the other hand, the rise of neo-liberalism and 
the traditional failure within the prevailing development paradigm to 
consider fully both the exogenous aspects of the development process 
and the defence sector accounts for the lack of interest in the field 
of development studies.
However, both areas ignore the armament process in the Third World at 
great cost. Without doubt the 1980s have been of particular 
significance and importance. Many of the inherent contradictions 
contained in the transfer of advanced military technology from North 
to South have finally unfolded for both suppliers and recipients.
What seemed a smooth and steady process in the 1970s now seems 
fraught with political, economic and technical dilemmas.
Conceivably, many Third World countries will no longer find it as
easy or indeed possible to maintain their defence sectors along 
traditional lines. At the same time, there is very little to suggest 
that policy makers have recognised the scale of the contradictions or 
the extent of the emerging defence dilemma. The central concern 
therefore, is to construct a regime which is capable of guaranteeing 
the security of Third World states whilst at the same time reducing 
the demand for armament. In order to address this complex issue it 
is necessary to understand what drives the systematic transfer of 
military technology to the Third World, what changes are occurring 
and, finally, how the present fluid period can be exploited to
institute changes based upon an alternative security regime and the
80
adoption of radically different defence policies by Third World 
countries.
2.2 The Arms Trade in the 1980s: An Approaching Crisis
Since the Second World War armament production has become a large and 
important industrial sector in most of the member countries of the 
two primary military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Politically, 
for an individual country to maintain the potential for war 
preparedness is considered by governments well worth the costs which 
such an activity requires, although judgments about how much the 
costs are differ markedly12. The embodiment of increasingly 
sophisticated technology in weapons systems has created complex 
industrial requirements. The size and complexity of defence 
production spanning the complete cycle of invention, innovation and 
production involves thousands of managers, bureaucrats, skilled and 
semi-skilled workers. If such a capability is to be maintained the 
defence industries must have orders. However, as governments become 
less able to allocate increasing resources to defence due to poor 
growth rates, the full utilisation of capacity becomes impossible. 
These problems are greatly compounded by the increasing cost of 
weapons systems, a function of increasing sophistication.
As such the export market is a vital element which sustains 
production and prevents defence expenditure from rising beyond
12 The most pessimistic view of how defence expenditure and
production can seriously damage the economy is provided by Mary 
Kaldor. A more benign view of the economic effects of military 
expenditure can be found in Kennedy [1975].
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acceptable political and fiscal levels. All countries must now 
consider the export market if national defence production 
capabilities are to be maintained and high research and development 
costs offset. Exports bring down unit costs and they also maintain 
production runs; an optimum production run will be of sufficient 
duration to satisfy initial domestic demand and then for exports to 
continue through until a successor system is either ready or 
affordable. The Third World offers the most lucrative and 
straightforward export market.
On the demand side arms imports are the result of several 
interlocking factors. The conventional wisdom which links the demand 
for arms to the turbulence of intra-Third World relations at the 
regional level and the slow and uneven progress of political 
development tells only half the story. The other view which sees 
demand patterns as the orchestration of Third World leaders by the 
unscrupulous representatives of government and industry, or as the 
irresponsible actions of authoritarian leaders, is equally selective.
Many Third World countries do not possess a balanced means of taking 
and implementing decisions. Decisions taken often seem misguided and 
unsympathetic to other, pressing national needs particularly those 
relating to economic development. However, this should not obscure 
the fact that defence policy is rarely, if ever, an issue that is 
treated lightly. The demand for military technology differs from 
country to country and from region to region. As in the North, the 
policy which defines defence needs is comprised of competing claims 
to scarce resources and, as such, is pragmatic, the result of 
domestic political bargaining processes in the context of available
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resources and foreign policy, of which threat perceptions are a sub­
set.
In reality, within Third World countries there exists an armament 
process, significantly different from those within the advanced 
producer countries but present nevertheless. Thus, decisions on the 
how, why and wherefore of armament procurement can be explained to 
varying degrees by a mix of perceptions of external threat, differing 
professional responses to how threats should be countered or 
diminished and what military technology can be acquired from either 
external or indigenous sources. Certainly, whilst all these factors 
are present, their salience will differ according to the size, geo­
political position, stage of political development, influence of the 
military, economic capacity and external perception.
The arms trade, the most useful starting point for an analysis of the 
Third World armament process, can be understood as a subsystem of the 
international system which has prevailed since the end of the Second 
World War. The system exists on two axes; North and South, East and 
West. The transfer and sale of armaments from North to South has 
performed several functions for both suppliers and recipients. Third 
World countries exploited the Cold War to amass the maximum defence 
capability in the minimum time and at the lowest price. Arms 
transfers also permitted Third World countries to confront regional 
problems, to defend themselves against irredentist claims, 
insurgencies, great power interventions and, above all, to 
consolidate and protect sovereign rights. However, the economic and 
political conditions which facilitated the rapid accumulation of 
armament in the Third World no longer obtains. Already these changes
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are being reflected in the statistics on military expenditure in and 
arms sales to the Third World13. In effect, the systemic transfer of 
military technology from North to South is currently approaching a 
crisis due to several factors.
All major arms producers face pressures to export. At certain times 
the pressure to export is more intense, particularly for the major 
industrial exporters such as France, Britain and West Germany. 
Periodically, defence expenditures in the West European countries 
enter into a period of structural crisis. This is due to 
combinations of poor overall economic performance, military 
inflation, higher inelastic costs (fuel and forces pay), and the 
prevailing procurement culture. As a result the pressures upon 
defence budgets rise and opportunity costs become more difficult to 
endure. Arms exports are a means of both alleviating many of the 
costs associated with military inflation and cushioning the effects 
of falling domestic demand.
Britain provides an excellent example of this trend. Defence 
expenditure since-1979 has increased by about 20% in real terms.
Even though the Conservative Government is more committed than its 
predecessors to increase Britain's defence capability, partly in 
relation to its own perceptions of foreign policy and partly in 
response to pressure from the United States, because of poor economic 
performance the upward rise has been halted and slightly reversed1,4. 
As a result, immediate pressure is placed upon those industries which
13 These developments have been studied and discussed by the SIPRI 
arms trade and military expenditure team whose reports are to be 
found in the SIPRI Yearbooks, 1986 in particular.
14 Statement on the Defence Estimates [1986].
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benefitted most from the previous increases, in this instance the 
weapons (as opposed to platforms) manufacturers and the electronics 
industry. Funding gaps grow larger and programmes are deferred. As 
the real value of defence resources decreases the services are faced 
with the prospect of being cut back.
In early 1986, the British government secured a defence deal with 
Saudi Arabia for the sale of 72 Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft 
valued at £5 billion over the first three years together with firm 
indications that an extension will cover a further two years for an 
additional £2 billion at least. In addition, smaller deals for the 
Tornado have also been struck with Malyasia and Jordan. The effects 
of such a large deal for the RAF are far reaching. Coupled with the 
MoD's good housekeeping measures the deal will afford defence 
planners a greater degree of flexibility in the 1990s.15
If Britain is to maintain its overall defence capacity into the 
future the Government must look for similar ways of offsetting the 
mounting pressures on the defence budget. One proposal is to 
amortize a major proportion of the MoD's defence expenditure through 
increased exports. This would require exports to run at least three 
times higher than the average annual level of £2,500 million per 
annum (export profit margins are about 20% over the direct cost of 
production)16. Britain, other relatively small industrial suppliers 
and even the United States may move in this direction over the next 
decade. In the US the combination of increased defence expenditure
and mounting federal deficits places defence in the front line when
15 Defence Industry Review [1986], p.6-7.
16 Defence Industry Review [1986], p.18.
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the need to reduce the federal deficit becomes as serious as it is at 
present. However, the emphasis of the Reagan Administration was on 
increasing equipment procurement and investment, precisely the areas 
of the defence budget where cost projections are traditionally very 
poor which makes these budget heads very inaccurate17. This form of 
inflation coupled with the regional and national implications of 
cancelling whole programmes will create enormous pressure on the 
defence sector which, according to the General Accounting Office, may 
be underfunded by 31% in some areas. One option which Congress may 
contemplate is to sacrifice readiness programmes to protect equipment 
procurement1®. Another option could be to increase arms sales, thus 
having the effect of transforming the United States once and for all 
into an industrial supplier.
The problem faced by the major arms suppliers is that the market for 
arms in the Third World does not exist as it did in the 1970s.
During the 1970s the increasing need on the part of all major arms 
suppliers to export arms coincided with the economic conditions which 
prevailed in the Third World. In 1973 oil prices rose by 400%, and 
doubled again in 1978-79. This rapid accumulation of wealth by the 
OPEC countries opened up a massive arms market for arms exporters in 
both East and West. Other Third World countries financed their arms 
imports through drawing on reserves or through a positive net flow of 
capital on their balance of payments. Thus, directly or indirectly, 
these arms imports were financed through borrowings from official
17 Quoting from Congressional reports and Congressional Budget 
office reports Seymour Deitchman has estimated that the average 
growth of military system costs over initial estimates range 
between 50 and 80 per cent, Deitchman [1983], p.219.
18 Clark [1985], p.39.
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bilateral and multilateral sources and the international capital 
market19. Furthermore, during this period the major arms importers 
found it necessary to modernise equipment generally considered to be 
obsolete. One reason why arms imports in South Asia rose throughout 
the early-1980s whilst elsewhere they declined is because the 
modernisation programmes in India and Pakistan started much later.
In Pakistan this was due to the drawn out negotiations with the 
United States over the size of the military and economic aid 
agreement. In India, the interruptions caused by the Emergency, the 
subsequent short period of office of the Janata party and shortages 
of foreign exchange prevented a full scale modernisation programme 
until 1980, when Indira Gandhi was re-elected.
In recent years many Third World countries have found themselves less 
able than ever before to afford to import arms, which are themselves 
becoming more expensive. Declining terms of trade, debt crises, the 
reduction of oil prices and the global recession have severely 
reduced arms markets. Also, during a period when many modernisation 
programmes are well advanced, there is more potential for adjustment. 
Moreover, some of the stronger developing countries, such as Brazil, 
have become producers themselves and with relatively low levels of 
domestic demand they are now aggressive exporters free of the 
restrictions imposed on many of the traditional suppliers. As a 
result, arms sales to the Third World are declining, and Western 
European countries are either buying indigenous products or products 
from the consortiums in which they are involved. At the 1986 
Farnborough Air Show, the biggest military aircraft showcase, the US
19 Kitchenman [1983], p.8.
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aerospace firm Grumman decided not to put in an appearance, and other 
US companies declined the option to display20.
Third World countries have been prevented from raising or maintaining 
military expenditure because of pressing economic problems: there is 
no intention to practice armament limitation and control. Looking 
ahead to the future suggests that the current period of restraint may 
not last through until the end of the century. The debt crisis is 
unlikely to afford many options for many Third World countries. 
Declining export revenues and continued uncertainty and disagreement 
amongst OPEC countries might also reduce defence and security 
options. However, over the next decade, defence decision makers will 
begin to request follow-on systems to replace those currently in use. 
Wars in the Third World will be followed by reequipment programmes. 
Inelastic costs, such as those for maintenance, repair and spare 
parts will increase. The current trend towards force multipliers, 
such as AWACS, will involve very high extra costs. Head and 
shoulders above other claims, the military will continue to argue 
that national security considerations are paramount; the lessons of 
history suggest that they will succeed.
2.3 Military Technology - An Ally of Arms Control?
The prospects for arms limitation and control in the Third World seem 
remote. However, there are changes occurring in a different 
dimension which suggest that a more positive preferred defence and 
security system for the Third World is becoming more feasible. Arms
20 Bedard [1986].
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control in the Third World has yet to be seen to be in the interests 
of Third World governments. However, an alternative security system 
based upon alternative defence strategies may come to be seen as one 
route out of the increasingly contradictory armament process.
The rising cost of weapons systems coupled with the declining 
economic conditions have created a crisis for the systematic transfer 
of military technology from North to South. In addition, it is also 
becoming evident that the characteristics of advanced military 
technology are becoming less appropriate for Third World countries.
On the one hand, there is some evidence that the armed forces of 
Third World countries are experiencing problems in their ability to 
exploit the technology upon which they rely so much. On the other, 
whether or not advanced military technology will function efficiently 
in both time of conflict, and in the often extreme geographic 
conditions which prevail in the Third World, is becoming an 
increasingly relevant question on the basis of a growing body of 
evidence on the shortcomings and limitations of advanced military 
technology.
The realization of the capabilities of a weapons system depends not 
just upon its import and deployment. It also requires the adoption 
by a military establishment and, further, its assimilation into 
tactics, doctrine and organisation21. The act of import/procurement 
suggests that a weapon system has been adopted by the military 
establishment, although this might not always be the case2 2 . 1 In
21 Dupoy [1984], p.301.
22 In India there is a great deal of support of the development of 
nuclear weapons. But the armed forces are not in favour of 
taking the nuclear option as they realise that it will reduce 
their power of decision taking during time of crisis.
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developed countries there is a continuing tension between the 
invention and the adoption of weapons and a rich array of evidence 
which documents the lag between what industry can produce and what 
the military is prepared to accept and assimilate. For example, for 
many years the cruise missile was an institutional orphan within the 
United States; it took time before the revolution in military 
technology, which the cruise missile embodied, took root in the minds 
of the military which then opened the way for a full discussion and 
consideration of its capability23. For Third World countries, the 
problem manifests itself in a different way. In 1965 the Pakistan 
tank crews were unable to operate the automatic fire controls on 
their Patton tanks which indicates graphically the adverse effects of 
importing and deploying sophisticated technology whilst neglecting or 
being unable to cope with aspects of training24. Lack of centralised 
command coupled with inherent confusion (fog of war) prevented a full 
application and exploitation of the Argentine Exocet option during 
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict25. In 1981 Iran had the ability to 
use tanks, artillery, air defence and close-support aircraft in 
concert to mount offensive and potentially decisive operations 
against Iraq. However, due primarily to the internal, domestic chaos 
of the time, in particular Khomeini's brutal purge of the officer 
corps in 1980, Iran's offensive potential dissolved in a sea of 
logistical chaos resulting in the permanent loss of the requisite 
organi s at ional f ramework2 6 .
23 Builder [1985], p.4
24 Albrecht and Kaldor [1979], p.8.
25 Ullman [1985], p.250.
26 Stuadenmaier [1985], p. 214, 224.
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Much more suspect than the ability of Third World militaries to 
assimilate advanced military technology is the ability of the 
technology itself to survive in difficult conditions. Unfortunately, 
the successes and failures of military technology in the Third World 
are somewhat difficult to assess. Military success in conventional 
war tends to be explained by superior military technology coupled to 
effective organisation and high morale. Failures are more often than 
not explained by poor tactics, misuse of resources, chaos and 
military incompetence. In some respects these views are valid. Wars 
in the Third World often do take place during periods of political 
crisis and national disaffection, which inevitably ramifies into 
civil-military command problems and logistical shortcomings.
Equally, the Third World invariably provides the theatre in which 
modern military technology is subjected to its only relevant test, 
that of performance under real rather than simulated conditions.
Thus, the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East was seen as a triumph for 
Syrian and Egyptian air defences and anti-tank weapons. The potency 
and potential of precision guided munitions were once again confirmed 
during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict when the Exocet became a 
'combat proven' system. Israel's efficient destruction of Syrian air 
defences based in the Bekaa valley in 1982 was closely analysed 
primarily for the military lessons contained therein. However, the 
tendency is for defence analysts to look closely at Third World 
conflicts for signs of technological success but explain away 
failures in terms of human error.
The same cannot be said of the debate in the West where there is 
considerable concern over the implications of the deployment of
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complex weapons systems which are becoming increasingly inefficient, 
particularly in the United States. America's multi-option defence 
posture, its global role and enormous defence budget have maintained 
that country's position at the cutting edge of advanced military 
technology. The US perception of military strength is the unshakable 
belief in the formula of organisation, morale and superior 
technology, all of which are given a forward momentum through an 
ideology of manifest destiny. Yet, this formula is being seriously 
compromised by an unforeseen and contradictory trajectory. As 
weapons systems become more complex, they are also becoming less 
robust and more prone to failure. In addition, unit costs are 
escalating, as are the logistical problems in relation to service, 
repair and maintenance. Some of the more advanced systems bought by 
the US armed forces such as the K-l tank.* the cancelled Sergeant 
York/Divad anti-aircraft grm, the Copperhead 'smart' missile and the 
Maverick air-to-ground missile have prcwed to be either operationally 
flawed or only barely fit for service during peace. In time of 
conflict, or when subject to adverse weather conditions, many 
advanced weapons systems may be serviceable for only a fraction of 
the time intended. Fractures in an ever increasing logistical chain 
involving disruptions to spare parts and maintenance facilities will 
render virtually useless large parts of NATO and American 
conventional defence capability.27
In addition to the 'reformist' movement and the media, there are 
dissenting voices from within the American defence community.
Franklin Spinney, a Pentagon systems analyst, has noted that whilst 
many of the technical failures can be ironed out with sufficient
27 Rasor [1983].
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investment of resources and expertise, the root problem is a 
conceptual failure. The pursuit of technological complexity has 
become confused with capability and the former is more a cost than a 
benefit,
"Increasing complexity increases the number of parts, 
thereby decreasing the ability of an individual to 
comprehend the whole. Increasing complexity is a cost, 
because it decreases the ability to understand and 
consequently makes it more difficult to adjust to, or 
shape, internal and external change. Put another way, 
increasing complexity increases rigidity in a game in 
which flexibility is a paramount virtue".2®
Whilst Spinney argues that increased complexity at the sharp end of 
defence capability does little to improve overall defence efforts, he 
also raises concern over the secondary effects. Operating and 
support costs are difficult to determine once the opportunity costs 
vis a vis other areas of the defence budget increase. Reductions in 
training and supplies and maintenance short cuts have eroded 
capability and weakened morale. Furthermore, increasing complexity 
requires a commensurate rise in skills for operation and repair and 
entail costs which the military paymasters are viewing with 
concern29.
What are the implications for Third World countries which are wedded 
to this particular technique of force? At the conceptual level, and 
with few exceptions, the armed forces of the Third World have adopted 
completely the Western model of defence; technology embodied in 
weapons systems to afford firepower, mobility and protection and 
facilitated by an organisational structure utilising techniques of
28 Spinney [1985], p.6.
29 Spinney [1985], p.39.
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command, control and communication to ensure the optimum use of the 
technology available. However, it is difficult to estimate to what 
extent Third World countries have absorbed the problems and 
contradictions inherent in Western defence capabilities. For 
political, strategic and morale reasons, few of the major exporters 
are willing to export state-of-the-art technology, although there are 
several examples where this has happened, witness the sale of the 
MIG-29 to India, or the Tornado MRCA and AWACS to Saudi Arabia, or 
the F-16 to Thailand and Pakistan. Furthermore, although many 
developing countries may want this type of technology, they must 
first be able to pay for it; China rejected the Harrier VSTOL on the 
basis of cost, not capability. Eventually, however, most advanced 
weapons systems released onto the export market, both good and bad, 
appear to find their way into Third World inventories. For example, 
during the 1970s India had agreed to procure the Jaguar Deep Strike 
Penetration Aircraft to be replaced in the 1980s by the Mirage 2000. 
Foreign exchange shortages during the 1970s prevented the immediate 
procurement of the Jaguar. As and when political and economic 
conditions permitted in the 1980s, India procured and deployed both 
the Jaguar and the Mirage simultaneously.
The mounting evidence regarding the adverse cost and utility of 
advanced military technology for Third World countries is a 
persuasive.argument for radical changes in defence policy and the 
adoption of alternative defence policies. However, when seen through 
the eyes of those who define defence and security needs, the 
perspective is very different. For professional bodies noted for 
their conservatism, advanced military technology has much in its 
favour. World War II was an overwhelming victory for superior
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technology deployed on a wide scale. There is no complete defence 
against nuclear war. As and when structural problems occur, it is 
often less complicated to argue that increased resources will 
suffice. After all, 'throwing money1 at problems is a failure in 
government departments other than defence. Indeed, considering the 
blinkered approach towards product improvement, is it fair to expect 
anything more than improvement through a constant process of 
'debugging'?
Moreover, alternative defence policies spanning the continuum from 
the present policy debate in Western Europe through to the more time- 
honoured approach to territorial defence and non-violent civil 
resistance have been neither tried nor tested at the state level. 
Also, many of these policies are essentially strategies for coping 
with defeat and the political cost of implementation would be 
massive30. Nevertheless, a situation is evolving whereby the 
tenacious retention of the status quo is no longer appropriate and 
may be impossible. Alternative defence policies will not appear 
overnight and, in the present environment, few analysts would 
advocate their adoption but, at the conceptual level, alternative 
defence does offer the basis for the design of implementing policies.
Already, it is possible to detect pockets of concern and innovative 
thinking along the lines of alternative defence for Third World 
countries, but primarily in quarters with no apparent axe to grind in 
the arms limitation/disarmament or the development debates. 
Technical/professional journals, defence analysts and the military 
are occasionally given to measured critiques of the prevailing
30 Clark [1985], p.9.
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philosophy of defence31. As economic conditions continue to afford 
fewer choices more questions will be asked. However, the debate must 
go beyond defence alone in order to add credibility and imagination 
to an alternative security regime.
The maintenance of the status quo would be wrong. We have already 
seen the horrific consequences of chemical weapons in the Gulf War - 
such scenes could become more widespread if more states opt for the 
deployment of the 'poor man's deterrent' in the face of growing cost 
and operational problems at the conventional level. Despite a 
growing body of empirical evidence which testifies to the 
relationship between armament and underdevelopment, this has not 
effected a move towards arms limitation in the Third World. If the 
current system is not replaced by adequate alternatives history may 
well repeat itself with dire consequences, and not just for the Third 
World. Finally, this type of armament limitation in the Third World 
could influence significantly the situation in the rest of the world. 
Arms sales, it can be argued, have avoided the inevitable 
confrontation with structural crises in the defence sectors. By 
radically changing patterns of demand, the crisis would no longer be 
avoidable.
31 For example, Vlahos [1985], pp 39-42, 62.
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CHAPTER THREE
INDIA: REGIONAL SECURITY FROM THE ARYAN TIMES TO THE PRESENT
3.1 External Events: Their Importance and Relevance
"The trouble with the seamless web is that its logic 
pushes towards hopelessly complicated holistic 
perspectives. If the security of each is related to the
security of all, then nothing can be understood without
understanding everything. The reality of security 
interdependence is unavoidable."1
In all too many respects a comprehensive survey of India's security 
threats, perceived or otherwise, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The disaggregation of security perspectives is a very complex process 
covering domestic/national, regional and international issues and, 
equally important, their inter-relationships. To a limited extent, 
it has been attempted several times before: assessments of the 
regional security environment in the Indian sub-continent and the 
impact of events and issues, such as the 1962 war between India and
China, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the nuclear aspirations of the
two major regional powers, have occupied the minds of many academics 
and policy makers since the sub-continent first became a major area 
of geo-political importance2.
It would not, therefore, be either original or useful to attempt a 
similar appraisal. Excellent studies have already been made and the
1 Buzan & Rizvi [1986], p.5.
2 See, for example, Thomas [1978, 1987]; Subramanyam [1982]; 
Maxwell [1970]; Gupta [1966]; Buzan & Rizvi [1986].
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results published. This study is concerned to a degree with India's 
external security environment but for a different reason. It is 
primarily concerned with the myriad domestic, internal conditions 
which have influenced the way in which India has developed its own 
particular defence postures, the various pressures at work when 
decisions pertaining to defence are made and the way in which these 
factors can aid our understanding of how and why India has emerged 
with a particular set of defence postures over the past forty years.
However, the external environment cannot be ignored, even if it is 
considered to be of less central importance in this study than in 
others. The foreign and defence policies of neighbouring states, 
wars of all kinds and economic and political developments beyond 
territorial boundaries do affect the way in which public opinion and 
decision makers view and condone the need for defence. Even though 
external factors do not define exclusively the size of military 
budgets or choice of technology, for example, they may influence and 
legitimise the way in which decisions are taken and the form which 
these decisions may take.
Traditionally, the level of analysis has concentrated primarily upon 
external threats and the reactions of the state to those threats. 
This has made India, the nation state, the primary unit of analysis. 
However, glaringly absent from previous attempts to explain India's 
foreign relations is any form of discussion or understanding of the 
relationship between foreign and defence policies, the roots of 
defence policy and the effect that decisions about defence may have 
upon regional security.
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The exclusion of domestic, bureaucratic and, indeed, technological 
angles in understanding defence conflicts with a widely accepted body 
of research on the formulation of defence and foreign policies of the 
major powers, the United States in particular3 . Put simply, regional 
and international studies tend to ignore the well-established fact 
that defence policy is just as much a product of bureaucratic 
bargaining and compromise as other areas of public policy, such as 
health and education. The key difference, of course, between mature 
democracies, such as the US, and Third World countries, is the 
relative difference in the level of compromise. Nevertheless, this 
should not obviate the degree of bargaining which takes place when 
defence decisions are on the agenda.
The intention of this study is to promote a keener analysis of 
domestic factors in the broader understanding of events in India and 
South Asia in particular and the Third World in general. In this 
instance the domestic perspective is deemed to be of greatest 
importance. However, it does not follow that the regional or 
international environments are at all irrelevant but it is necessary 
to place these factors in their correct place. All states react to 
important events which take place outside their borders. However, it 
is the way in which the perspectives of decision makers are framed 
and, subsequently, how policies are shaped and implemented which 
combine to provide the basis for foreign and defence policy.
Analytic and empirical detail are of necessity casualties in this 
chapter. The intention here is to develop a perspective on India's
3 For a review of this literature see Curnow [1976] and Graham, M. 
[1981].
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external security environment which will provide a useful backdrop to 
the discussion and analysis of the domestic, supply or 'push' factors 
which have such a strong if not definitive influence upon the way in 
which India conducts its territorial defence. A major justification 
for sacrificing detail relates to the tendency for most regional 
security assessments to present a complex environment in a two- 
dimensional, static fashion. Thus, India's security environment, in 
the conventional view, changes according to which concentric circle - 
regional or global - is under consideration at any given point; for 
example, which major maritime powers patrol the Indian Ocean, the 
political and economic health of Pakistan and the size of its 
military aid agreement with the United States, India's own foreign 
exchange reserves and, even, the weather in Western India and in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Unable in this study to take each and every 
security consideration into account and unwilling to compromise with 
an inadequate 'snapshot',‘one is left with the option of a broad 
brush. Thus, the presentation of India's security environment here 
will be schematic. It is an attempt to capture many of the essential 
aspects and some of the inter-relationships between domestic, 
regional and international levels of security.
3.2 From the Aryans to the British: The Legacy of Invasion
Security concerns in the Indian sub-continent have been significantly 
influenced by a long history of waves of immigration and invasions 
which stretch back over some four thousand years. Throughout this 
period northern India in particular was subjected to successive
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incursions by waring tribes and invasion attempts from the north­
west. Some were successful, others were not.
First and foremost, there was a period of successful colonisation by 
the Aryan tribes dating from c.1500 BC. The Aryan influence was 
important. Not only did it exert a strong influence upon Indian 
culture and the religious life of the native population but it also 
conflicted, both socially and politically, with the indigenous 
Dravidian culture. This encounter may have been an initial catalyst 
for the unique Indian system of caste. In addition, it may have laid 
the cultural foundations for a divide between north and south by 
pushing the Dravidians to the South.
Following the Aryans came the Greeks, the Scythians, the Parthians 
and the Huns. All attempted to establish their rule over areas of 
northern India but none succeeded for very long. By the middle of 
the tenth century (AD) the Muslims had arrived, also from the north­
west and were more successful than their predecessors over a 
protracted period of time. The influence of the Mughuls, after they 
established their empire in India, was immense and as important and 
enduring as that of the Aryans. The Mughuls were followed by French, 
Portuguese and British trading companies which appeared in several 
areas, notably Pondicherry, Calcutta and Goa, but arrived from many 
directions. Eventually, the sub-continent fell to British 
colonialism and was transformed into the Indian Empire.
Several thousand years of foreign domination and invasion had a 
considerable impact on Indian civilisation, particularly in the North 
and later in the South as well. However, the effects are various and
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far from easy to assess. On the one hand, the extent and duration of 
foreign domination, specifically in the north, has honed perceptions 
on threat and the ability to calibrate insecurity. On the other, 
Hinduism and, consequently, India has proved adept at absorbing and 
assimilating foreign influence which both minimises conflict and 
gives the society the ability to retain the key aspects of religion 
and culture.
Hinduism, a term which has come into common usage during the last one 
hundred years, is unique amongst religions of the world due to its 
degree of catholicity and capability for assimilation4 . Thus, 
invasions of India, and, dbversely, Hindu 'colonisation' in South 
East Asia, were rendered muck less traumatic by a very advanced 
degree of cultural elasticity, particularly on the part of Brahmins, 
the religious caste which traditicually assumed responsibility for 
legal, religious and cultural aspects of Hinduism.
During the period of the "Muslim rule in India, there was a clear 
divergence of security perspectives between the Muslim rulers and the 
Hindu subjects. The former perceived threats to their empire from 
the North-West as well as from the Hindu rajas within the sub­
continent. The latter perceived a threat to their way of life from 
the aliens who kept arriving from the North-West. It is only with 
the coming of the Europeans that both became aware of the threat from 
the sea.
4 The author is grateful to his former colleagues at the Centre 
for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi, particularly 
Giri Deshingkar, for detailed discussions concerning the nature 
of Hinduism.
102
For racial, cultural and economic reasons the Hindu/Indian reaction 
to the British was more fractious. Initially/ the British were 
welcomed and the indigenous population was grateful for the 
establishment of law and order. Within the social grid the British 
were treated as a kind of Kshatriyas. Also, the first British to 
reach India were much more accommodating and less racially conscious 
than were successive generations. So, during the early phase of 
colonisation both parties were capable of a form of integration. At 
one time it was not uncommon for the angrez to marry local women, 
wear traditional Indian dress and even worship Hindu deities which 
signified a near complete break with European culture. This was 
later reversed as the sea route was shortened by the opening of the 
Suez canal and an increasing number of European women came to settle 
in India.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the permanent 
presence of the British in India completely altered the security 
configuration in the Indian sub-continent. India had been made into 
the British Indian Empire and Indian leaders and opinion shapers were 
no longer concerned about external security decisions. All decisions 
concerning security from invasion were taken in London or by the 
British Viceroy in Delhi. Policy implementation was the task of both 
the military and civilian British bureaucrats in the sub-continent. 
Consequently, throughout modern history and up until 1947, the 
development of Indian political culture was such that external issues 
and security considerations had little influence upon the emerging 
nationalist ideology. The British presence in India reinforced this 
tendency in another way. The collective political mind of India 
concentrated itself upon the British and independence, particularly
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during and after the Hindu and Muslim intellectual revivals of the 
nineteenth century which culminated in the creation of the Indian 
National Congress (INC) in 1895s. Also, in one sense, the presence 
of the British in India reduced if not eliminated the importance of 
communal tensions in the sub-continent - to the British all Indians 
were 'native' subjects.
The lack of attention devoted to events and trends outside the Indian 
sub-continent was an oversight on the part of the Indian 
nationalists; the geographic involvement of the Indian subcontinent 
in an emerging international system had come about almost a century 
earlier due to the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. This treaty represented 
an attempt by Napoleon Bonaparte to eliminate Russia from the 
European balance of power. In order to consolidate and preserve the 
Napoleonic empire, Bonaparte had to isolate Britain which could be 
done most effectively by diverting Russia away from both events in 
Europe and a possible alliance with Britain. Consequently, Napoleon 
persuaded Tsar Alexander I to accept the illusion that he could 
become Emperor of the East providing France did not interfere. In 
return Alexander would allow Napoleon to consolidate his empire in 
the West.
The direct importance of the Treaty of Tilsit for the Indian sub­
continent was negligible. However, it was not without significance 
for two reasons. First, although Britain was able to check 
Alexander's expansion East towards Persia and the sub-continent, the 
geo-political importance of Russia for India became an established 
fact. Second, for the first time, the sub-continent became enmeshed
5 Calvocoressi [1977], p.239.
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in a wider geopolitical framework. Hitherto, India had been a 
largely imperial prize by virtue of its size, raw materials, 
indigenous products and enviable markets. Essentially, the Indian 
sub-continent was an end in itself. The rise of Russia and its role 
in the European balance of power, coupled with its geographic 
position and potential for expansion to the east and the south, 
implicated India in international political developments beyond South 
Asia. Quite suddenly, far flung countries such as India took on a 
strategic significance in relation to the major European powers, 
primarily due to the emergence of Russia. By the initial decades of 
the twentieth century the Indian intelligentsia had started to 
respond to geopolitical developments. External issues were far less 
subtle than before and the interpreters within the Indian National 
Congress (INC) more receptive than their predecessors.
During the First World War Indian troops contributed to the British 
effort on the Western Front. The cost was considerable, 62,056 
Indian troops were killed during the war; less than a thousand were 
officers6 . The educated officers, at least, had some sense of why 
the British Empire was at war with Germany and the role of India 
therein, the jawans would have had little idea as to why and against 
whom they were fighting. At the same time, the British rulers 
realised the importance of running the Indian Empire with the consent 
of their Indian subjects. India had little choice as to whether or 
not it became involved in the war though its contribution earned for 
India a promise of swaraj, or 'home rule', over the course of the 
conflict. However, it is a moot point as to whether or not this was
6 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During 
the Great War, [1922].
105
intended as a reward and compensation or as an inducement for 
further, increased contributions to the vast resources of manpower 
needed to fight the war.
Despite attempts at prevarication, the British Government published 
the Montagu-Chelmsford report in 1918 which wasintended to establish 
the principle of self-government for India and hasten the 
Indianisation of the Indian Army. However, the recognition on the 
part of the British Government that ’home rule' was inevitable was 
offset by an marked ambivalence over the question of, and the 
undeniable ramifications for, the future of the British Empire. In 
the meantime, sentiments for complete independence were growing in 
India with each passing year. By 1935, Britain was ready to pass the 
Government of India Act which gave a great deal of domestic autonomy 
to India but retained defence matters in British hands.
The outbreak of the Second World War sharpened nationalist sentiments 
amongst the INC. Even so, once again the incumbent Viceroy involved 
India in a war without prior consultation with Indian Ministers, who 
on this occasion promptly resigned. In the event, the resentment of 
the Indian elites made little overall difference to the British, 
partly because economic conditions in India had deteriorated during 
the 1930s. Despite rising nationalist sentiments, recruitment for 
the Allied war effort was successful. Nationalist sentiments had 
grown stronger and concerted at the local/regional levels but the 
linkages were relatively weak. It was Mahatma Gandhi who 
subsequently strengthened these links and due to him swaraj became a 
nationalist strategy. Although the Quit India Movement of 1942 was 
suppressed, the question of independence for India could no longer be
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avoided. Over the course of the war the INC secured a firmer grip on 
the political situation withi-.i India and managed to channel 
nationalist sentiment into the Quit India Movement, which grew in 
numbers and appeal. Britain, fighting a two-front war against 
Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia, and that too with a large number 
of Indian troops, was particularly vulnerable at that time within 
India.
The end of the war and the election of a Labour Government in Britain 
in 1945 lent new impetus to the British commitment to independence 
for India. The Attlee Government sent three cabinet ministers to 
India to iron out the growing differences between Britain and the two 
major political groupings in India; the Muslim League, which had 
developed the notion of an independent state for Muslims to be called 
Pakistan, and the INC. However, the mission proved to be impossible. 
Over the course of the war relations between the INC and the Muslim 
League had deteriorated markedly. Britain's attempts at arbitration 
were negated by the Muslim leader Jinnah's conviction that Britain 
was partial to the INC. By 1946 Jinnah had inaugurated a programme 
of direct action to establish a separate, sovereign state for Indian 
Muslims. Communal violence in late-1946 forced Viceroy Wavell to 
recommend that his Government either maintain power for a further 
decade, or transfer it piecemeal to the provinces.
In the event the British Government did neither. Instead, Attlee 
retired the incumbent Viceroy and gave Louis Mountbatten the onerous 
task of partitioning India and granting independence in the form of 
two sovereign states in the Indian sub-continent. The projected date 
for independence was June 1948. However, it quickly became clear to
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Mountbatten that, given his assessment of the severity of communal 
violence, the time span involved was too long. The British 
Government duly brought forward the date to August 1947.
That Mountbatten could effect a transfer of power in such a short 
time was a remarkable political achievement. However, in the time 
available, administrative shortcuts were inevitable. Given that the 
British government was in effect creating two new nation states, the 
territorial issue was paramount, sensitive and divisive. A 
representative boundary commission was formed and chaired by Sir 
Cyril Radcliffe. However, the equal balance of Muslim and Hindu 
votes from among the representatives of the two communities meant 
that Radcliffe was frequently left with a casting vote and often took 
decisions on the basis of insufficient information and, sometimes, 
outright ignorance. Of particular importance for the future was the 
commission's indecisiveness over the northern state of Kashmir. At 
the time of partition Kashmir had a Hindu ruler but the state was 
predominantly Muslim. The Maharaja could not decide in which 
direction to move and, as a result, the Radcliffe Plan excluded 
Kashmir.
3.3 The First Round - The Indo-Pakistan War of 1947
The two-way diaspora which occurred around the time of independence 
of both India and Pakistan bred confusion, insecurity and atrocious 
bloodshed. The process of partition resulted in the death of two 
million people. The violence of partition compounded the existing 
atmosphere of mistrust, and additional resentment in Pakistan grew
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over India’s de facto control of the valley of Kashmir. In October 
1947 tribesmen from Pakistan invaded Kashmir with a view to 
'liberating' the Muslims of Kashmir from the the Hindu Maharaja.
When the raiders reached the valley of Kashmir the Maharaja appealed 
to New Delhi for help but the Indian Government refused to commit 
troops until he ended his procrastination and formally acceded to 
India. The Maharaja's subsequent period of deliberation and New 
Delhi's inaction permitted the tribesmen to move right up to the 
capital of Kashmir, Srinagar. By the time the Indian Government felt 
able to commit troops, Srinagar was already occupied. The Government 
had to organise a major airlift of troops, first to capture Srinagar 
airport and, subsequently, some portions of the valley.
In early 1948 Nehru referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations 
Security Council. Before a ceasefire could be agreed, on 1 January 
1949, Pakistan had committed army units to Kashmir with sufficient 
success to occupy a significant proportion of the state in the west, 
Azad Kashmir, a position from which it has never retreated.
The first Indo-Pakistan war, often referred to as the 'First Round', 
was a direct result of partition. Since that time relations between 
India and Pakistan over Kashmir have been acrimonious and embittered. 
One, short-lived, exception was the agreement arrived at in the wake 
of Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war reached between Mrs Gandhi and 
Mr Bhutto in 1972 at Simla involving provisional lines of demarcation 
in Kashmir. Overall, however, Pakistan has never been prepared to 
surrender the territory annexed in 1947-48 and for its part, India 
has not fulfilled its promise to honour the UN Security Council 
recommendation for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which is why Kashmir
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remains a disputed territory. Compounding these problems is the fact 
that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a strategically important but 
troublesome state in the Indian union. The State Government has 
frequently expressed opinions which deviate from the preferred 
position of the Centre. Thus, political intervention from New Delhi 
in the state’s affairs is routine and no Indian Prime Minister would 
risk a plebiscite, such is the degree of mutual mistrust.
3.4 Independence, Statehood and Insecurity
The creation of Pakistan affected India in a more profound way than 
is immediately evident from an historical account of the First Round. 
The partition of the Indian sub-continent created two nation states 
and the very existence of the other created for each a national 
security problem. The war of 1947 merely confirmed what was already 
known in New Delhi and Islamabad; namely, that there would be near 
permanent hostility between the two states. For Pakistan, India 
emerged as a geo-politically dominant power which could not be 
ignored, although Pakistani perceptions of Indian power and potential 
are not of direct concern in this instance.
For India, partition had both direct and indirect effects upon Indian 
perceptions of security. First and foremost, it was the prelude to 
the dispute over Kashmir, which would always be a difficult circle 
for India to square. The acceptance of de facto borders and a move 
away from the status quo ante would amount to a considerable loss of 
regional prestige for India, international opinion notwithstanding.
In addition, it would constitute a loss of security. Given the
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prevailing regional security equation, the loss of Kashmir would 
increase the size and potential resources of Pakistan and would also 
alleviate in part Pakistan's primary strategic weakness - a 
conspicuous lack of defence in depth. Above all, it would cut off 
India's important supply route to Ladakh, which is important for 
defence against China.
Less directly, Pakistan posed security problems in other areas. The 
very act of partition blunted for the Congress Party the political 
euphoria of independence. Having been traditionally the party in 
favour of a free, undivided India, partition and the very existence 
of Pakistan were to an extent symbols of what could not be obtained 
from Mountbatten. Moreover, it was also the partition of a 
'motherland', complete with a particularly strong sense of religious 
geography7 . Finally, the existence of Pakistan threw into sharp 
relief the unresolved debate between the theological/Islamic and the 
ideological/nationalist-secularist definition of nationhood®. In 
contemporary India this is of more than a passing concern given the 
discernible political ground which has been gained by Hindu 
chauvinism in recent years.
3.5 Indian Security Perceptions and the 'Seamless Web1 of 
International Politics
The rapid crystallisation of India's perception of Pakistan took 
place against the backdrop of an unfolding Cold War between the
7 Bhargava [1983], p.111.
8 Deshingkar [1980].
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United States and the Soviet Union. The development of Forward 
Defence Areas and the policy of containment has already been 
discussed (see p.11-14). Seen from the narrow, ethnocentric view of 
international politics held by Cold Warriors in the United States 
during the late-1940s/early-1950s, an open offer to upgrade the 
depleted Pakistani defence posture made excellent sense. However, US 
attempts to encircle the Soviet Union was extremely destabilising in 
South Asia. It added to existing tensions in the region and the arms 
race between India and Pakistan.
In May 1954 Pakistan signed an agreement with the United States which 
opened the way for military aid on the condition that Pakistan 
accepted co-operation in a regional defence network directed against 
the Soviet Union. Pakistan's geographic position was of critical 
importance to the containment strategy. Apart from Pakistan's 
borders with Afghanistan and its control over the strategically 
important Hindu Kush mountain ranges, it was also situated 
favourably, split as it was between East and West Pakistan and 
between the regions from which the member countries of both SEATO and 
CENTO were drawn. In September 1955 Pakistan joined CENTO and by the 
end of the same year it had also joined SEATO. President Eisenhower 
went to considerable pains to justify to India the wider rationale 
for the military aid to Pakistan but failed. Nehru and key opinion 
shapers in New Delhi saw the act as a direct and aggressive move 
designed to compromise India's foreign policy based upon non- 
alignment. Conciliatory statements from the American President and a 
rise in US economic aid to India could not offset the strident 
remarks from Secretary of State Dulles, who considered the Indian
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policy of non-alignment to be 'an immoral conception'9 . Nor did 
policy makers in New Delhi ignore the view held by Vice-President 
Nixon that a defence alliance with Pakistan would provide 'a counter­
blast to the confirmed neutralism of Nehru's India'10.
More to the point, perhaps, totalling as it did over US$1 billion 
during the period 1954-65, American military aid to Pakistan affected 
significantly the regional military balance. All three services in 
Pakistan benefited substantially from the military aid package, 
particularly the Pakistan Air Force. For example, the Army received 
460 M-47 and M-48 Patton battle tanks between 1955 and 1965. The 
Navy received coastal minesweepers, two 'CH' class destroyers and, of 
great importance at the time, a Tench class submarine in 1964, albeit 
on loan. Air Force strength was increased by an approximate order of 
magnitude with the acquisition of 120 F-86F fighters between 1956 and 
1958, 26 Martin B-57B Canberra long-range bombers and later, in 1962, 
the Lockheed F-104 equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.11
In the period between 1947 and 1965, therefore, the date of the 
second Indo-Pakistan war, India's security perceptions vis a vis 
Pakistan were influenced by three factors. First, and with 
reservations, it has been suggested that the Indian elites may have 
harboured a cultural sense of insecurity following a long history of 
invasion from the North West. On the one hand, prior to the arrival 
of the British, Indian culture had evolved a unique system for 
assimilating successful 'invasions'. On the other, the period under
9 SIPRI [1971], p.493.
10 SIPRI [1971], p.493.
11 SIPRI [1971], p.836-7.
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British rule and subsequent independence moulded India into something 
approximating a nation state which superceded this well-tried 
cultural mechanism and created instead the problem of 'national 
security1.
Second, a sense of insecurity arose from the very creation of 
Pakistan. Henceforth, the security configuration in the sub­
continent was conditioned by the existence of two nation states whose 
very creation and existence stemmed from religious antipathy, the 
'two nations theory', and profound mistrust. The act of independence 
created India and Pakistan as nation states which, in the prevailing 
atmosphere of mistrust, raised pertinent questions with regard to 
territorial integrity, national security and sovereignty. In short, 
the creation of Pakistan in turn created for India not just a 
security problem but also a security dilemma; it could not live 
easily with such a neighbour nor could it eliminate or absorb 
Pakistan. Finally, partition was neither a complete nor a compulsory 
process and a large number of Muslims, which now total 80 million, 
remained in India. Indian leaders habitually assumed that the 
primary allegiance of the Muslim minority was towards Pakistan; they 
thus constituted an internal threat and a potential fifth column.
Third, the military alliance between Pakistan and the United States, 
however cosmetic, mutually opportunist and, for the United States, 
intended primarily to deter the expansionist aims of the Soviet 
Union, pushed India's security problems into another dimension. 
Henceforth, any attempts to steer clear of, or rise above, the ebb 
and flow of Cold War politics was impossible for India. Conflict and 
war between India and Pakistan would be more than a regional issue;
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India was now unwittingly integrated into the ’seamless web' of 
international politics. Also, the military aid relationship between 
Pakistan and China after the 1962 war pushed India indirectly into 
the proximity of the major dispute between the Soviet Union and 
China.
3.6 Territorial Integrity and the Threat from the Worth-West
Having mapped out the historical development of India's external 
security environment vis a vis Pakistan, it is now appropriate to 
measure more precisely where the points of actual insecurity 
currently lie. A basic rationale for India's security problem is 
concerned with the possibility of future conflict along the Indo- 
Pakistan border, which is approximately 1,100 miles in length, 
although the Sino-Indian border dilemma is sometimes used instead.
The Indo-Pakistan border can be divided into five distinct theatres; 
the Siachin Glacier, Jammu & Kashmir, the Punjab, the Rajasthan 
desert and the Rann of Kutch.
The loss of the strategically important area within Jammu and Kashmir 
comprised about one-third of the state to the north. Within this 
disputed area, the central focus is the small town of Gilgit. The 
1949 Karachi Agreement which brought active hostilities to an end, 
and the later Simla Agreement (1972), delineated a cease-fire line, 
now referred to as the Line of Control, which terminated just north 
of the town of Thang. The status of the area to the north was not 
delineated. This is due to the enormous problems which military 
operations north of Thang have always posed to both sides. Apart
115
from the logistical problems of moving food, fuel and equipment in 
mountainous regions as high as 20,000 feet, temperatures during the 
winter can drop to -40° Centigrade. At the time of partition the 
demarcation of such a desolate border made little sense, military 
technology had not developed sufficiently to warrant the boundary 
commission's close consideration of the area. (Military operations 
only began during the early-1980s when the relevant equipment became 
available.)
After 1948 the region attracted little attention from either side.
In recent years, however, the situation has changed. The area north 
of Thang contains the Karakoram mountain range. Here, there are some 
visually spectacular peaks which appeal to tourists and also pose 
enormous challenges to mountaineers constantly in search of new peaks 
and approaches. Pakistan has capitalised on this demand and has 
opened up the area for tourism and mountaineering. Thus, a recent 
BBC radio travel programme featured an 'adventure holiday' involving 
a tour along the Karakoram highway12. More important since 1974, 
specialist mountaineering journals have advertised in such a way that 
the area is regarded as within Pakistan. Moreover, respected atlases 
such as the Times Atlas and the Readers Digest Atlas have started to 
show the line of control extending to the Karakoram Pass which is 
significantly to the north of the hitherto accepted most northern 
point - NJ 9842.13
In effect this amounts to a de facto gain of approximately 3,000 
square kilometres for Pakistan. Furthermore, there are also
12 Breakaway, BBC Radio 4, [14 March, 1987].
13 The Hindu, [22 June 1985].
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strategic considerations for both sides. For India, Pakistan's
inherent strategic weaknesses, which range from a severely
underdeveloped resource base to a chronic lack of defence in depth,
can be partially offset by the threat of involving India in a two-
front war with China. Acquisition of the Siachin glacier not only
places a formidable logistical obstacle behind the Pakistan border
but it also increases the common border between Pakistan and China.
In the words of an Indian general,
"The strategic Tibet-Sinkiang road passes through 
territory captured by China east of Siachin [in 1962]. 
Northwards we have a new road from Pakistan going through 
the Khunjerab Pass. These form a noose [a]round India's 
jugular. If they took Siachin, they would be holding a 
dagger to our backs in the Nubra Valley."14
A simple, non-military explanation for these developments is that
Pakistan has seen in the Siachin glacier an opportunity for earning
valuable foreign exchange from tourism, just as Nepal has done in
recent years with its trekking and 'white water sport' holidays.
After all, Pakistan is not at present and probably never will be a
tourist haven in the traditional sense. It is natural for the state
to maximise its comparative advantage in other areas.
Without doubt, the foreign exchange benefits from tourism are almost 
certain to be secondary to security considerations. Even so, the 
advantages of control over Siachin have been overestimated, 
particularly in the wider context of a fully fledged conflict between 
the two countries when the main theatre of conflict is likely to be 
much further to the south. Nevertheless, Pakistan is scoring some 
valuable propaganda points, some military experience in high altitude 
warfare and, obversely, the Indian army is facing a limited conflict
14 India Today, [31 July 1985], p.79.
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of attrition. Pakistan's success in this quarter will increase the 
importance of the control and sovereignty of the Siachin region for 
India. It is an area of dispute which could precipitate a full-scale 
conflict under certain political conditions. Moreover, when placed 
in an historical context, any threat of territorial loss in this 
region assumes exaggerated dimensions.
In the rest of Jammu & Kashmir India faces another threat from 
Pakistan. The most obvious concern is India's strategic weakness 
around the Pathankot corridor, the so-called 'chicken's neck', which 
lies to the very south of the state. At the narrowest point of the 
corridor a mere 90 kilometres separate Pakistan and the steeply 
rising Himalayas. Above the corridor lies the whole state of Jammu & 
Kashmir. India fears a surprise attack from Pakistan in this 
extremely vulnerable area. Such an attack on the corridor could cut 
off India's rail and road access to the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. 
After declaring a cease-fire, Pakistan could open negotiations and 
offer back to India the seized territory in exchange for the valley 
of Kashmir.15
South of the 'chicken's neck' lies the state of Punjab which presents 
a completely different set of security problems for India, 
particularly since the army action against the holiest of the Sikh 
shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, in June 1984. The Punjab, 
which is the home of the Sikhs, is the most productive and wealthy 
state of the Indian Union - it is often referred to as the bread­
basket of India. Lately, it has become the centre of India's most 
contentious and violent internal security problem which stems from
15 Deshingkar [1984], p.9.
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the Sikh claim to an independent homeland, Khalistan. Here, Pakistan 
holds numerous options for destabilisation, which New Delhi claims 
Pakistan has exploited in recent years. The Indian Government has 
produced the testimonies of several captured Sikh militants saying 
that the Pakistan government has permitted Sikh terrorists to 
establish training and supply camps over the border. This allows the 
terrorists a fundamental advantage which military strategists 
consider to be essential for the success of this type of long-term 
operation, namely the existence of a friendly border and access to 
bolt-holes beyond the reach of counter-insurgency forces, witness the 
important role played by Costa Rica and Cambodia in recent decades.
In principle the Punjab could be the staging area for a Pakistan 
attack upon India but in practice it is unlikely to be so. 
Traditionally, Pakistan has stressed fixed defences in the form of 
two deep and wide trenches around Lahore which suggests defence, not 
attack. India has also built significant fixed defences near the 
border backed by very elaborate defence in depth arrangements. For 
Pakistan, the capturing of Amritsar during a war would be of great 
psychological importance but, in order to move beyond the Punjab, 
Pakistani armed forces would have to cross two major rivers16. Given 
the cost and inherent difficulties in mounting such an operation, it 
is unlikely to be a realistic choice.
Further South of the Punjab lies the Rajasthan desert, an area in 
which much of the armoured fighting between India and Pakistan has 
taken place in the past. The arid and semi-arid environments lend 
themselves well to armoured manoeuvre. Here, the strategic advantage
16 Rikhye [1985], p.124.
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lies with India, not Pakistan. In this theatre India would seek to 
advance to the Indus river, capture the road and rail links between 
north and south, separate the vital port of Karachi from the north 
and effectively cut Pakistan in two. This was precisely the scenario 
Pakistan feared during the Indian military exercise of October 1986- 
February 1987, codenamed Operation Brasstacks. Pakistan's options 
are less straightforward. It would take a long and resourceful 
campaign to make a major impact beyond the Rajasthan desert by 
capturing, for example, Jodhpur, Jaiselmere or Jaipur; and a long and 
resource-intensive campaign is precisely the type of warfare which 
Pakistan is least equipped to undertake. The only way Pakistan can 
counter an Indian attack across the Rajasthan desert is by 
threatening the narrow 'chickens neck'. This is what it chose to do 
during Operation Brasstacks and almost stopped the exercise in its 
tracks.
Finally, the most southern stretch of the border between India and 
Pakistan and the least likely theatre of attack is the Rann of Kutch. 
This area is a large salt waste, equally hazardous and attritious for 
soldiers and mechanised equipment alike. It is most unlikely that 
Pakistan would see much profit in mounting an attack in this region.
India's security concerns vis a vis Pakistan should also be seen in 
relation to the capabilities of the latter. Put simply, Pakistan is 
a weak country, both economically and strategically.
Economically, Pakistan has always been a curious country. It is 
known for being poor. In many respects, however, it is not poor.
GNP per capita is one-third higher than India. The infrastructure -
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roads, transportation, telephones - is superior to that of India. 
Indeed, Pakistan has been likened to Israel, it is politically 
beleaguered by large and powerful countries but it haj been built by 
migrants with as much entrepreneural spirit as the Jews of Israel.
The economy is growing by an average of 7% per year whilst population 
growth is a mere 2.9%. Migrant workers in the Gulf and non-resident 
Pakistanis repatriate large quantities of their earnings in foreign 
exchange.17 Though indebted, aid flows into Pakistan without 
apparent misgiving.
Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to suffer as much as it benefits. 
Unlike Israel there is an amorphous lack of commitment to national 
development. Corruption is rampant - Karachi, for example, is now 
understood to be ungovernable13. Industrialists are wary of 
investment lest the recently elected Benazir Bhutto repeats the 
profligate and irresponsible nationalisation favoured by her father. 
Like India, many of the best and the brightest Pakistanis are working 
abroad. The Government admits to spending 40% of its revenue on 
defence, but the total is undoubtedly higher. Rich nationals keep a 
nest-egg of money outside the country.19 Despite opportunities and 
potential, there have been as many failures as there have been 
successes in Pakistan.
Strategically, Pakistan's situation is less difficult to assess. To 
the north, Pakistan faces both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. 
Relations with both are rarely warm. To the south, the country is
17 The Economist, [17 January 1987], p.3,4.
18 Rashid [1987].
19 The Economist, [17 January 1987], p.3,4.
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dwarfed by India which has consistently intimidated and, on one 
occasion, divided Pakistan. Since its creation Pakistan's key ally 
has been the United States. However, relations have never been 
assuredly good. Although in recent years Pakistan has received two 
massive tranches of military and economic aid from the USA, which 
together amount to almost US$8 billion (about 40% was for military 
equipment), the relationship is a complex one. First, political and 
military leaders in Pakistan have never fully internalised their role 
as a client and Cold War accomplice. Second, the present aid 
agreement is based upon the dictates of the latest chapter of the 
Cold War, in which there are unequivocal signs of thaw, and the 
recently ended Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
Pakistan's ambitions to become a nuclear weapon state have convinced 
the US Congress that aid should be extended with great caution or 
withdrawn20.
Although relations with the Reagan Administration were good, there is 
no certainty that this situation will continue. Now the Soviet Union 
has left Afghanistan, much of the rationale for such high levels of 
military aid will disappear, even though Soviet military and economic 
aid to the Afghan Government will certainly continue. The United 
States will eventually no longer require a consistent conduit for 
channeling arms to the mujahideen. Nor will the conceptual 
rehabilitation of Pakistan as a Forward Defense Area be as relevant 
as it was in 1980. In addition, it is by no means certain that 
George Bush will be as much of a friend to Benazir Bhutto as Reagan 
was to Zia, particularly when it comes to assessing military aid in
20 Smith C. [1986].
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relation to Pakistan's nuclear aspirations. After all, the key 
problem facing President Bush is a reduction of the federal budget.
Pakistan requires the support of a power such as the United States 
primarily because it is an artificial country, created by bureaucrats 
rather than by history or geography. It is surrounded by hostile 
neighbours, two of which are more powerful and involved in a treaty 
of co-operation and friendship. To be sure, this encirclement is to 
an extent offset by Pakistan's relationship with China but this 
relationship has never been very easy to assess. On the one hand, 
Pakistan has ceded territory to and has bought defence equipment from 
China. On the other, China is alleged to be assisting Pakistan with 
its nuclear weapon programme, possibly with regard to testing and the 
handling of fissile material at the criticality stage, but there is 
as yet no evidence for this. The benefits for China beyond the 
sharing of nuclear technology are difficult to discern, particularly 
given the declared Chinese policy of not sharing nuclear weapon know­
how with other countries. Nevertheless, there are several observers, 
some of whom claim to be in possession of classified information, who 
are convinced that nuclear collaboration is occurring21.
Above all, however, Pakistan is topographically very difficult to 
defend. It is a narrow country and most of the industrial centres 
and major cities lie close to the Indian border, on which there are 
no geographical impediments such as a major river or a mountain 
range. Karachi, Pakistan's only major port, is relatively easy for 
India to blockade. Thus, those responsible for defence in Pakistan 
confront the problem on two fronts and are forced to consider the
21 Information made available to the author, May 1987
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protection of 90% of the population and most of the infrastructure 
and economic assets.22 Pakistan's vulnerable strategic position 
coupled with its economic weakness has forced defence planners to 
adopt a policy based upon offensive defence. Thus, during a crisis, 
Pakistan is likely to be the first to escalate to armed conflict and, 
moreover, will employ a heavy use of force to gain an initial 
advantage. Such a small country cannot trade space for time, nor can 
it sustain a war that lasts for longer than ten or fourteen days. 
(Also, Pakistan is heavily reliant upon US defence equipment and it 
is US policy to keep its clients on a short leash so that Washington 
is able to determine or at least influence significantly the outcome 
of any armed conflict in which client states become involved.)
Equally important to Pakistan is the stress upon superior generalship 
and the high performance of its weapons systems.23
Both before and after 1971 Pakistan has always been a weak and 
exposed state. At no point, except perhaps during the Kashmir 
operation of 1948, has it been able to pursue a defence policy and 
posture any more ambitious than a capability which will raise 
significantly the cost of an attack by India. Indeed, even 
Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear option can be seen in this way. 
Nevertheless, these views are rarely shared by policy makers in New 
Dehli.
22 Tellis [1987b].
23 Cohen [1984], p.142
3.7 Pakistan and India's National Security Problem
Indian decision makers do not believe that Pakistan is capable of 
unpicking the Indian Union through military operations in Kashmir or 
elsewhere, although successive governments have traditionally made 
enormous political capital from a stress upon the military threat 
from the north-west and the linkages to the wider East-West conflict 
In particular, during the fading months of Indira Gandhi's last term 
of office, the Government was all too quick to spot 'gathering war 
clouds' on the Indo-Pakistan border or perfidious 'foreign hands' at 
work inside the country, witness the tone of Government press 
releases and partisan media statements over this period.
The real threat from Pakistan for India, however, is much more 
complex. India's regional vulnerability stems not from great power 
presence or from Pakistan or China per se. The threat lies in 
India's own political weakness and the potency of centrifugal forces 
which run through the whole country; Nagaland, Manipur, Punjab, Goa 
Tamil Nadu, Darjeeling, for example. What really concerns the more 
sober and thoughtful Indian security analysts is the link between 
partition and the potential Balkanisation of the Indian Union. Or, 
put another way, are anti-centre sentiments in Goa and Darjeeling 
symptomatic of the same basic problem which led to partition in 1947 
Indeed, was the partition of Pakistan in 1971 a part of the same 
process in which India played a catalytic role? Once again, it is 
the very existence of Pakistan, an example of a minority achieving 
separation, which is the core of the problem. At one and the same 
time Pakistan is both tied to India's internal weaknesses and an
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external security threat. However, the absorption of Pakistan is not 
an option, India's military strength notwithstanding.
Independence required India to become a nation state in contrast to 
the political culture which obtained for centuries before the arrival 
of the British. It was an alien and untried political format which 
exaggerated the authority and rule of the centre and, furthermore, 
presented the new Government in 1947 with the unusual problems of 
nation statehood, of which territorial integrity was one such 
example. In essence, the relationship between the British Indian 
Empire and the kingdoms prior to the arrival of the British was 
somewhat benign, founded as it was upon a mutuality of interests, or 
exploitation. Because India became a nation state at independence 
with a federal constitution which institutionalised centre-state 
relations in a different way, based more upon western political 
culture, the power relationship changed. Cosmetic legislative rather 
than cultural mechanisms, such as the imposition of a common language 
(Hindi) and revenue disbursements from the centre to the states, were 
used as a means of binding the 'nation' together to a degree which 
had no precedent. The conflicts and frictions which have resulted 
are a considerable source of confusion for India.24 In addition to 
these structural conflicts there are majority-minority conflicts and 
Hindu-Muslim tensions have always been the most salient, at least 
until the recent troubles in the Punjab. Any dispute involving the 
Muslim minority in India always generates protests in Pakistan.
24 For an insightful discussion of state formation in India see 
Rudolph and Rudolph [1987], pp.60-98.
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Seen from these perspectives it is possible to understand why Indian 
opinions, particularly those based upon Hindu chauvinism, still 
consider Pakistan to be a salient security threat even though both 
the 1965 and 1971 wars (the Second and Third Rounds) went in India's 
favour, the latter in particular. Pakistan may not pose a 
significant military threat to India, and probably never will on 
account of its strategic weakness. Instead, Pakistan poses an 
altogether different type of threat, much less quantifiable than 
those which are rooted in strength, power and territoriality. It is 
the view of many decision makers that if Pakistan cannot be 
controlled and the power relationship maintained, the internal 
security problem could proliferate and bring about further acts of 
partition. This is mainly because Muslims and Sikhs could provide a 
trojan horse on behalf of the Pakistan Government which could break 
up the Indian Union and thereby create fewer security problems for 
Pakistan - Khalistan would provide a useful buffer state. It is 
particularly relevant to note the difference in India's approach to 
China, which has the distinction of inflicting on India its worst 
national humiliation in 1962. Pakistan has done no such thing but it 
is always considered within India to be a greater threat to security 
than China.
3.8 Indian Independence and the Emergence of China
For historical, political and, perhaps, cultural reasons Indian 
Governments have prioritised the security threat from the north-west, 
often if not always to the exclusion of other concerns. However, to 
the north and north-east is China, but Nehru paid little attention to
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this area after 1947. Also, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was not 
considered salient; from an economic, political and military point of 
view it was never seen as a threat even when it was a part of 
Pakistan and much less so after 1971. It is also possible to exclude 
the security threat posed by the other small states such as Nepal and 
Bhutan. Although the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation) process may in time evolve to offer these countries a 
less impotent role, they barely figure in India's security calculus.
In the late 1940s China underwent tremendous internal, domestic 
upheaval which culminated in the success of the Communist 
'liberation'. During the 1950s, Mao Zedong was concerned with the 
major powers, the Korean War and internal consolidation and 
retrenchment. Consequently, Nehru did not consider China to be 
either an immediate threat or a serious security consideration, 
although immediately after China's entry into Tibet (1950), Nehru 
took immediate steps to include Nepal in India's defence perimeter 
and extend Indian administration into Tawang, a monastery town beyond 
the MacMahon line.
In addition, the mid 1950s was the Bandung period and the spirit of 
non-alignment influenced India's perception of Chinese communism.
The Bandung conference was in essence a meeting of those countries 
whose domestic interests lay in avoiding, even counteracting, the 
magnetic force field engendered by the Cold War. Bandung was a forum 
for the needy and indignant, in which neutral countries could display 
solidarity25. The Indian Government saw in Bandung not only a spirit 
of general non-alignment and neutralism but also a special
25 Calvocoressi [1977], p.267
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relationship with China, the other major Asian power. Hindi-Chini 
Bhai Bhai (the brotherhood of Indians and Chinese) became the slogan 
of the day. Perhaps the goodwill between Beijing and Delhi was based 
on pragmatism as well. The evolution of a 'third force' in 
international politics could barely succeed without the participation 
of both.
In later years the spirit and intention of non-alignment and 
neutralism continued, albeit in a battered form. Cordial relations 
between India and China did not. Immediately after the success of 
the Chinese revolution, India was one of the first countries to both 
recognise communist China and extend goodwill. However, 
reciprocation on the part of Mao was hardly fulsome; Peking initially 
referred to the Indian government as both a 'puppet' of imperialism 
and an obstacle to movements of national liberation26. It was only 
when India proved its neutrality in the Korean War that China 
grudgingly accepted India's anti-imperialist credentials. However, 
towards the end of the 1950s, Sino-Indian relations deteriorated 
rapidly.
Ideology aside, China's problem with India concerned Tibet; a desire 
for a permanent incorporation of Tibet into China and a concomitant 
fear of Indian objections and even Indian covert support to Tibetan 
independence. For China, the annexation of Tibet was the final stage 
in the unification of the 'five races' in China. However, such a 
move would give India and China a shared and 'live' frontier. Thus, 
the Chinese had to legitimise and control the situation. The process
26 Thomas [1971], pp.40-41
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was a crude one; the 'liberation1 of Tibet was accompanied by the 
denegration of India.
Despite the initial impulse of Beijing to create an atmosphere of 
hostility, Nehru refused to be drawn. Indian, or rather Nehru's, 
foreign policy was conditioned by the belief that China would not 
threaten India directly because it was preoccupied with both internal 
and external problems. Thus, Nehru felt that a policy of friendship 
would serve India's ends. After all, the 'third force' was worth a 
great deal in both the long and the short term. And, India could 
least afford either a war or a policy based upon deterrence through 
strength.
As a result, Nehru pursued a distinct policy of appeasement towards
China on the Tibet question. Ideally, Nehru would have preferred
China to accept a low profile relationship with Tibet based upon a
system of suzerainty guaranteeing extensive autonomy for Tibet. To
this end, during the discussions over the Sino-Indian treaty on
Tibet, the Indian negotiators accepted the inclusion of a reference
to the 'Tibet region of China'. Nevertheless, towards the end of the
1950s, a dispute over the Sino-Indian border arose and rapidly became
intractable. Nehru continued to hope for a solution in India's
favour based upon diplomacy but the Chinese Government wanted a
package deal which included concessions by both sides. When Nehru's
Government expressed its total inflexibility on the issue, the
Chinese held 'the Indian bourgeoisie and their expansionist
tendencies', as responsible for the impasse:
"Interference in China's internal affairs by certain 
political figures is not fortuitous. India is a country 
that has gained independence after shaking off the 
colonial rule of British imperialism. It desired to
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develop its national economy in a peaceful international 
environment and has profound forces. This is one aspect 
of the picture. Another aspect is that the Indian big 
bourgeoisie maintains innumerable links with imperialism 
and is, to a certain extent, dependent on foreign 
capital. Moreover, by its class nature, the big 
bourgeoisie has a certain need for outward expansion. 
This is why, whilst it opposes the imperialist policy of 
intervention, it more or less reflects consciously or 
unconsciously, certain influences of imperialist policy 
of intervention, (emphasis added)27
However, at no point since 1947 has it been at all easy to see India
as an expansionist power outside the sub-continent.
For India the Himalayan frontier is of critical strategic importance 
in relation to China. This has been so since the time of the British 
Indian Empire. In addition, the creation of a buffer zone in Tibet 
is particularly important given the complicated geo-strategic aspects 
of the area which comprises today’s Northern and Eastern India, 
Northern Pakistan, Tibet and the Chinese province of Xinjiang 
(Sinkiang), Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal.
To the extreme north-west of the sub-continent lies the border 
between India and Pakistan and the disputed area of Kashmir. The 
part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan is contiguous with the 
Xinjiang province of China and close to the Tadzhik Republic of the 
USSR. The area separating the Soviet Union and Pakistan is the 
Wakhan corridor (which has been largely depopulated since the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan). Linking Pakistan to China is the mountain 
pass which now carries a highway through the Karakoram mountain range 
linking Gilgit in Pakistan to Kashgar in Xinjiang.
27 Jen-Min Jih-pao [6 May 1959].
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East and a little south of this point is the Aksai Chin area which is 
occupied by China but claimed by India. Further south there is a 
harrow parcel of land controlled by India which borders Tibet but has 
no natural communications features. Below Ladakh there is a short 
border between Himachal Pradesh (India) and Tibet which contains the 
strategically important Spiti Pass and below this area is the even 
more significant Shipki Pass, which used to be an ancient trade route 
but now links up to the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway. The northern border 
of Uttar Pradesh also borders Tibet with several passes that are also 
in proximity to the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway due to a complex network 
of ancient trade routes. Further south Tibet and Nepal share a 
border. There are several passes which can be penetrated. The Nara 
Pass, the Kodari Pass and the Rasa Pass are all points of access for 
China into Nepal and it is the exposed plains of Nepal which run into 
the Indo-Gangetic plain, the heartland of eastern India.
East of Nepal is the state of Sikkim which was until 1975 a 
protectorate of India but is now the twenty-second state of the 
Indian Union. Between Sikkim and Tibet there are several passes 
which can be used throughout the year. Sikkim is rich in timber and 
mineral resources and is close to Tibet in terms of culture and 
ethnicity. The strategically important Chumbi valley lies between 
Sikkim and Bhutan but is a part of Tibet. It is often described as a 
dagger pointed at India. Further south lies the Jalpaiguri district, 
a narrow corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh. This area is only 
one hundred and fifty miles from the Chumbi valley and links all the 
north-eastern states of India to the rest of the country.2®
28 Bandyopadhyaya [1979], p.34-36.
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After backing down over the question of China's suzerainty over 
Tibet, by tacitly accepting the Chinees government's claims to 
'liberate' Tibet, India lost the Tibetan buffer and sought thereafter 
to reach a working agreement with Communist China over the Macmahon 
Line, the border recognised by the governments of India and Tibet but 
not by China in 1914. The attempts failed and throughout the late 
1950s relations with China grew steadily worse. India, to bolster 
its claims on the ground, adopted a 'Forward Policy' which put Indian 
troops behind Chinese positions. In 1960 and 1961, sporadic border 
incidents occurred and grew more frequent. On 30 November 1961, the 
Chinese delivered a written warning to India: 'The Chinese Government 
would have every reason to send troops across the so-called Macmahon 
Line and enter the vast area between the crest of the Himalayas and 
their southern foot hills'29. In April 1962 the eight year agreement 
over Tibet between India and China expired and Chinese activity in 
the disputed region intensified. In September 1962 war broke out and 
the Indian army suffered its worst and most humiliating defeat in an 
area in which it had long shown neglect and disinterest. The 
ramifications of defeat in this war will be considered later in 
relation to defence policy and posture.
3.9 The Maritime Threat: India and the Indian Ocean
When India became independent all security threats were deemed to 
come from the north west. Indian policy makers never appeared 
particularly concerned about threats from the sea. This was in part 
because the Indian Ocean was still patrolled by the Royal Navy.
29 Khera [1968], p.171.
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Also, however, Indian defence decision makers decided to avoid too 
great an emphasis upon naval power because of the resources required 
to build-up a blue wat->r navy. In later years, particularly during 
the 1980s, this policy was reversed as Indian policy makers came to 
see a much greater need for naval deterrence.
The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world, after the 
Pacific and the Atlantic. It extends over 75 million km2. India is 
one of the most geo-politically important littoral states in the 
region. It lies at the very centre of an immense 'bay' reaching from 
the Cape of Good Hope around to the Australian city of Perth.
Immediately after the war it was the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 
which attracted the attention of defence planners in the major 
powers, mostly due to the Cold War and the proximity of the 
superpowers to both oceans. The Indian Ocean was still considered to 
be a British 'lake1, for good reason. After the war Britain 
maintained a considerable naval interest in the region and amongst 
certain littoral states, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Aden (now 
South Yemen). Over 100,000 British troops were stationed in the 
littoral islands and over 10% of Britain's defence expenditure was 
earmarked for operations in the Far East30. Under these conditions 
India had little to be concerned about in this theatre. Pakistan had 
no real naval capability until the 1960s and China had no access - in 
order to reach the Indian Ocean the Chinese navy Would have been 
forced through the Straits of Malacca and/or Sunda and would have 
placed itself in direct confrontation with Britain.
30 Braun [1983], p.93.
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In the 1960s Indian policy makers recognised the need for a more 
conscious maritime strategy and policy changed significantly. By the 
early 1960s it became evident that Indonesia considered itself a 
significant maritime power and, moreover, laid claim to the Nicobar 
Islands which were under India's control. A marked decline in 
relations between India and Indonesia was arrested only when the 
Sukarno government collapsed in 1965.
Equally important for India was Prime Minister Harold Wilson's 
decision in late 1967 to withdraw British forces from all points east 
of Suez. Wilson wanted to direct more attention and resources to 
Europe. This effectively created a power vacuum which was filled 
primarily by the two superpowers. By the mid-1970s the region had 
become of particular significance for both powers. Apart from the 
retreat of Britain and the felt need to compete for new strategic 
advantage, the superpowers had other reasons for reassessing their 
position in the Indian Ocean.
For the Soviet Union, involvement in the Indian Ocean theatre and 
efforts to curry favour with several littoral states was an attempt 
to negate the successes of the American strategy of containment. In 
addition, ideology was important. Along the littoral there were many 
states, including India and Indonesia, which could be coaxed close to 
the Soviet camp. These were countries which displayed a leaning 
towards socialism even if their own communist parties were ignored 
and marginalised. Nevertheless, Soviet policy was founded more upon 
the basis of inevitability - eventually the progressive forces in the 
Third World would form an alliance against the pro-Western, 
reactionary forces. Moreover, the axes of conflict cut across the
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Indian Ocean which also lent a form of inevitability to a Soviet 
presence in the region - the East-West, North-South and Sino-Soviet 
conflicts.
As a result the Soviet Union formed loose but significant bilateral 
ties with several of the littoral countries which laid the basis for 
a more opportunist policy towards the Third World during the 1970s, 
much to the consternation of Washington. In addition, the Soviet 
Union had another, equally important mission. Since the early-1960s 
the Soviets had struggled with Washington and the Western world in 
general to be taken seriously as a great power. On the negative side 
it required recognition of its military capabilities. More 
positively, it sought a form of detente which could only be achieved 
when other states recognised and adjusted to the relative strength of 
the Soviet Union. However weak the results may appear with the 
benefit of hindsight, this policy was in a large part responsible for 
many of the arms control agreements which were consolidated in the 
late-1960s and early-1970s.
Just as President Theodore Roosevelt had understood the meaning of 
naval power and force projection a half-century earlier and the 
British before that, the Soviet Union became aware of how important a 
significant naval build-up could be, particularly when massed in a 
volatile region which was logistically beyond the comfortable reach 
of the US fleets.
Direct military confrontation with the United States in this theatre 
is unlikely. A war between the two superpowers would likely take a 
nuclear direction long before the option to destroy merchant shipping
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in the Indian Ocean is taken. However, the Soviet naval build-up has 
a considerable nuisance value. Apart from acting as a symbolic 
force, Soviet naval power in the region has initiated a 'base race1 
with the United States and the ability to shadow American naval 
manoeuvres has become valuable for intelligence purposes. Nor should 
it be forgotten that Polaris, Poseidon and Trident nuclear submarines 
which are targetted at the Soviet 'soft underbelly' are deployed in 
the region. Also, a more realistic mission for the Soviet Navy is to 
counter a Chinese nuclear build-up in the region.
Furthermore, the Indian Ocean is an untapped region for mineral 
wealth, fishing and possibly oil. The depletion of stocks in 
traditional Soviet fishing grounds, such as the North Sea, and the 
increasing importance of economic zones in less expansive maritime 
regions has made the Indian Ocean an attractive region for a major 
Soviet search for resources. As yet, however, it does not appear 
that the Soviet Union has any design upon the energy sources in the 
region, now or in the immediate future.
The undeniable wish on the part of the Soviet Union to use the Indian 
Ocean as a region in which to compete with the USA should not lead to 
a misunderstanding of subsequent American activities in the region. 
The superpowers are not involved in a traditional 'action-reaction1 
competition with each other for a form of cosmetic control over the 
Indian Ocean. The threats to the United States in this region are 
more than maritime.
First and foremost, the United States sees the Indian Ocean as an 
area which abuts the problematic 'arc of crisis'. Within this arc
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there are substantial American economic and political interests, oil 
in particular. The current unpredictability of the Islamic world 
threatens the legitimacy and the efficacy of American influence, 
particularly in the Persian Gulf. The key feature of this threat is 
the apparent failure on the part of Washington to formulate an 
adequate response. In certain circumstances, such as with Pakistan, 
carrots and/or small sticks may work. In other places they do not. 
Moreover, as the Americans proved during the last months of the 
Carter regime, force is also difficult to apply. Ronald Reagan has 
also found the use of carrots ineffective, embarrassing and 
politically expensive.
The increasing failure of some key states in the Middle East and 
South-West Asia to recognise the legitimacy of the American role in 
the region has been disruptive for the United States. However, the 
policy response has been relatively orthodox. Within operational 
reach of the South-West Asian hinterland the United States has 
steadily increased its military power in the form of the Rapid 
Deployment Force (renamed since 1983 as the US Central Command).
Second, the Indian Ocean has become important for the United States 
because of developments in technology. Certainly, it can be well 
argued that the era of the gargantuan aircraft carrier as a viable 
military option for force projection may be drawing to a close. Air 
power, enhanced by missile capability, is outpacing developments in 
point defence and many Third World countries (including India) now 
have such a capability. However, in the case of nuclear submarines, 
a different situation obtains. In recent years the deployment of 
successive generations of nuclear capable submarines in the Indian
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Ocean has had the military effect of opening another front. This is 
particularly true of the Trident submarines, in both their variants. 
Nor has there been a sufficient increase in anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities to threaten nuclear strike submarines in the region31.
Because the Indian Ocean lies so far from either coast of the United 
States, there is a need for obtaining base facilities for basing 
agreements ranging from 'rest and recreation1 facilities to a fully 
equipped base such as Diego Garcia. By and large, over the past 
decade, the American pursuit of such agreements has been successful. 
Apart from Diego Garcia, none of the bases impinge directly upon the 
immediate security concerns of New Delhi. However, in recent years 
there has been some concern over the possibility of the Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka Governments offering basing rights or access 
in Baluchistan, Chittagong and Trincomalee respectively. Despite 
some rather sensational media reporting from within India and the 
occasional equally unsubstantiated statement from outside India, 
there seems to be little to suggest that the United States is seeking 
in earnest basing rights in this region. Nevertheless, questions 
relating to contingency planning and seizing 'windows of opportunity' 
should not be overlooked completely.
The question which is rarely asked inside or outside New Delhi is 
where Indian security interests and the presence of major naval 
powers in the Indian Ocean conflict. Over the past decade the 
Ministries of External Affairs and Defence have voiced criticism and 
concern about the increase in non-Indian defence capability in the
31 For a non-technical but persuasive view which puts ASW and
nuclear deterrence into perspective see Brown [1977], p.158-9.
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Indian Ocean. However, few have asked how much these developments 
concretely impinge upon the security interests of India. Nor has 
there been any appreciable attempt at an official level to ascertain 
where the fit lies between naval threat perception and appropriate 
response in this particular theatre. Moreover, the advantage to 
India in having the US presence in the region guarantee the 
uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf is similarly overlooked.
India too needs to import oil from the Persian Gulf and, furthermore, 
the sacrosanct nature of oil reserves established by the 
international community may in the future benefit India as it now 
does most OPEC countries, for India too has potentially enviable oil 
reserves within striking distance of many Islamic countries.
There are two ways to assess India's insecurity from the direction of 
the Ocean. First, what is the possibility that India might be 
invaded by an enemy approaching from the Indian Ocean? Second, how 
much are India's regional and international interests threatened by 
the recent activities of some major powers in the Indian Ocean?
From a purely military perspective India does have a sense of 
weakness in the south. Ironically, it suffers from a marked surfeit 
of defence in depth. India's defence arrangements traditionally 
concentrate the country's defence in the north, although a Southern 
Command has recently been established. In addition, the national 
capital is well to the north, which is important for a country with 
such a poor infrastructure. Furthermore, there is a cultural and 
political divide separating north and south which would complicate 
but not nullify the degree to which India could respond to an 
invasion from the south.
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Obversely, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which India 
would be threatened by outright invasion from this direction. New 
Delhi has created of late a blurred image of a threat from the ocean 
but it is no more than that. The only theoretically conceivable 
threat is from the United States. Yet to most observers outside 
India, and to many inside as well, there is no circumstance in which 
the Rapid Deployment Force would invade the beaches of Tamil Nadu or 
Kerala. It is difficult to see why foreign policy and defence 
planners see such a degree of insecurity in this theatre. It is, 
perhaps, for this reason that the threat is articulated in the 
vaguest of terms.
Second, India’s external perspective on the Indian Ocean raises some 
interesting questions. The foreign nationals of Indian descent who 
reside in island or littoral states in the Indian Ocean number 
approximately 4.6 million32. However, the Indian Government has 
shown no particular strength of feeling when it comes to the often 
disturbing status of these minorities in East Africa, Malaysia and 
Burma, for example. Of late, the plight of Indians in Fiji and Sri 
Lanka has caused much greater concern but mainly for political not 
humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, there are other factors which 
the Government might consider important. Many of these migrants are 
traders, often from Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. As such they establish 
good links with Indian businessmen thereby increasing India's 
comparative trade advantage in the region. Some are comparatively 
wealthy and through kinship ties they repatriate considerable sums of 
foreign exchange to India.
32 Elkin [1987], pp.52-53.
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Raw materials are also important. Since the early 1980s India has 
developed its oil industry and the newest fields are located off 
Bombay High and the Orissan coast. Together, these oil fields 
provide a good proportion of India's fossil fuel requirements which 
are essential to economic development and the military's petrol, oil 
and lubricant (POL) requirements. Furthermore, India has a 
substantial merchant navy and the Indian Ocean is potentially rich in 
mineral deposits such as manganese and other metallic nodules.
Certainly, these commercial and economic attributes add up to 
something worth protecting. However, translating the protection of 
these assets into a part of the security equation is difficult. The 
treatment of Indian nationals in countries such as Uganda, Kenya and 
Fiji has not by and large drawn a particularly militant response from 
the Indian Government. In reality, the Indian Government is impotent 
to act outside the sub-continent, just as Western Governments can do 
little about the harsh legal penalties imposed upon Western narcotics 
smugglers convicted in Asia. The protective wall of sovereignty is 
difficult to breach, short of invasion. The exception is, of course, 
Sri Lanka, where 70,000-100,000 Indian troops are currently 
stationed. In addition, in 1988 an Indian task force successfully 
prevented a coup d 'etat in the Maldives. In the same year 
unsubstantiated reports emerged suggesting that the Government was 
considering sending a naval task force to Fiji in a display of 
forceful protest against the disenfranchisement of Fijian Indians.
Nor can it be convincingly argued that India faces the prospect of a 
resource war within its Exclusive Economic Zone. Its off-shore oil
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fields constitute only a partial source and are not likely to attract 
aggressive foreign exploiters. In the case of mineral reserves, 
conflicts over these will be contested in international courts of law 
and United Nations fora, not the ocean itself. In this respect, the 
naval presence of the superpowers and the increasing strategic 
importance of the region will serve as an unintended benefit for 
India. A country such as Indonesia would be very reluctant to wage a 
regional resource war in such a sensitive area and both superpowers 
would be keen to prevent a collision between regional powers.
Indeed, in this respect New Delhi has more to fear from its liberal 
policy towards multinational corporations than it has from the 
military force of other states.
Despite the undeniable fact that India is a rising middle power in 
all senses, it has little to fear in either a territorial or an 
economic sense from the present configuration of power in the Indian 
Ocean. Unless India seeks to extend significantly its sphere of 
interest, military activities in the Indian Ocean short of nuclear 
war will not affect dramatically the health and welfare of the Indian 
state.
Finally, in the light of recent events, it is relevant to consider 
India's relationship with Sri Lanka. In a similar way to the 
position in the north, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is tied to 
the internal crisis facing the Indian state. In the final analysis, 
Indian intervention was prompted by the non-negotiable positions 
adopted by the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Bellicose and heavy-handed though the 
peacekeeping operation may have been, it arrested the inevitable
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drift towards violence and carnage on a massive scale. In addition, 
unlike the British in Northern Ireland and the Turks in Cyprus, where 
comparisons are frequently drawn, the Indian Government is keen to 
withdraw. The cost of the peacekeeping force, some $3 million per 
day, is too high a price for a poor country to pay over an indefinite 
period. Furthermore, given that a strong political rationale for the 
involvement of the Indian Government stems from the tension between 
the Union government and the state of Tamil Nadu, it is a stratagem 
which could backfire.
3.10 Security Perceptions in the Indian Sub-continent: Concluding 
Remarks
At this juncture it is important to recognise a paradox. Any 
discussion from a non-Indian source whose affinity to the country is 
primarily intellectual will inevitably fail to recognise completely 
how perceptions and reactions to threat really affect individual 
decision makers and voters at the socio-psychological level. For 
example, the level of public enmity, particularly in North India, 
towards Pakistan is often grossly underestimated. Obversely, as the 
published material often reflects, Indian commentators can allow 
xenophobia and popular mythology to colour their views on security, 
particularly in relation to Pakistan (as distinct from Muslims)33. 
This degree of polarisation cannot be eliminated but it can be 
reduced. To some extent, the views of each will never be acceptable
33 During an interview with a prominent member of the defence 
community I was told in response to a question relating to 
India's views on nuclear disarmament and its stance on nuclear 
proliferation vis a vis Pakistan that the problem of dealing 
with Pakistan at this level was that they were all madmen.
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to the other. Nevertheless, the existence of this paradox should not 
nullify attempts to acquire a better understanding of the roots of 
Indian security perceptions.
An essential aspect of the regional security problem for India lies 
in the historical development of the Indian state. External 
observers invariably fall into the trap of analysing Indian security 
perspectives from two intellectually flawed positions. First, there 
is a tendency to adopt a tidy but a-historical approach which ignores 
the elements of continuity and discontinuity which exist between the 
major periods of Indian history. Thus, the complex and unique 
development of the Indian nation state and the relationship to 
contemporary foreign and defence policies is overlooked. Certainly, 
the development of India's security dilemma can be dated from 
independence and partition. However, the response of India the 
nation state to external threats is in part both shaped and 
complicated by what existed before. Second, analysts tend also to 
see the Indian nation state as a convenient unit. Internal 
contradictions may not be directly linked to external perceptions but 
both exist in a dialectical relationship.
That security problems exist for India is not in question. Although 
relatively safe from external invasion, as it has been since 1947, 
the very survival of the Indian state is in part threatened by events 
and entities inside its borders, particularly Sikh extremism.
Further, these internal contradictions have made an impact upon, and 
are linked to India's relations with other South Asian countries. 
Thus, for as long as marked centrifugal tendencies exist internally, 
India will be less secure within South Asia and attempts to normalise
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relations with, say, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan will fail if Sikh 
extremists decide that failure is a preferred course of action for 
their cause. Conversely, to a certain degree the Indian Government 
requires an external threat in the shape of Muslim Pakistan or 
Communist China as a part of a negative nation-building process. At 
critical points external threats may create a form of internal, 
domestic political cohesion which is far from evident in contemporary 
India under normal conditions.
The troublesome aspects of India's security problems are twofold. 
First, the resolution of South Asia's security problems in general 
seem at present to be infinitely more complicated than the type of 
'security dilemma' which exists in the West. For the future, the 
tenuous 'no war, no peace either' stalemate will turn largely on the 
ability of the Indian state to understand, manage and control its 
domestic problems. Yet there does not appear to be either the 
political capability or the political will to grasp this particular 
nettle. As so many Centre-State conflicts become time-honoured and 
reluctantly accepted by the polity as unfortunate facts of 
contemporary life, solutions will become more difficult and the 
tendency to use regional problems to explain domestic crises will be 
more tempting.
Second, and equally problematic, is the Indian Government's response 
to its security problems. Essentially, complex and deep-seated 
political problems are side-stepped and this process of prevarication 
is masked by a series of military-technical fixes which bear little 
relation to the true nature of India's security problems yet 
sufficiently strain the exchequer to engender security problems in
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other non-military spheres, such as food security. Why, for example, 
does India require a 3:1 conventional superiority over Pakistan, a 
neighbour which it has successfully partitioned and whose weaknesses 
are evident? Moreover* this scale of domination emerged well before 
Pakistani nuclear ambitions became evident. Why too is India 
concentrating so much upon the threat from the Indian Ocean which at 
best is grossly exaggerated and at worst is beyond India's control 
and direction? Why is the response to China so different to the 
response to Pakistan when essentially the threats are not dissimilar? 
True, the threat from Pakistan is made all the more worrisome on 
account of the Muslim population in India, Kashmir and the bitter 
memory of partition. It is also true that the least activity by 
China in border areas creates panic in India, witness the sharp dip 
in bi-lateral relations which occurred in 1986 for few good reasons. 
China, it seems, has never lost its status as both a long term and 
serious threat to India but, overall, the attempts at reconciliation 
and normalisation in this quarter are more sincere - where possible 
the China problem is tackled at the diplomatic level but the threat 
from Pakistan is habitually explained in military terms.
Clearly, however, there are other factors to be considered and 
investigated. Are Pakistan and other security issues as critical for 
India as levels of defence preparedness would suggest? If not, then 
what precisely are the driving forces behind India's search for 
military power? Although the response to external threats may be 
primarily military it is not necessarily the case that military 
activities are the outcome of external threats. This is the case in 
other countries, particularly amongst OECD countries, and it could 
well be the case in India.
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To several observers both inside and outside India the configuration 
of Indian defence policy appears to make little sense because it 
relates so unevenly to India's insecurities, although this is an area 
of enquiry which has received less attention than it deserves. In 
the following chapters the mismatch between defence policy and 
external security threats will be explained. Nevertheless, defence 
in India will be seen to have a logic of its own, however destructive 
this may turn out to be in both an economic and a political sense.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DEFENCE POLICY AND PRACTICE: 1947-1962
Until the 1971 war with Pakistan, the 1962 war with China had been 
the most significant factor in India's short history as an 
independent nation state (see Chapter Five). Since that humiliating 
defeat successive Indian Governments have given defence a high 
profile to ensure that amongst both the voting public and regional 
adversaries there is confidence that India is well defended. In the 
immediate aftermath of the 1962 war, decision makers and the critics 
of the Government concentrated upon three sets of reasons for the 
failure to prevent not just defeat but also the abortive attempts to 
check the scale of the humiliation and the ineptitude of the defence 
effort.
First, Nehru was severely criticised for misreading Chinese 
intentions and failing to prepare for war. This failure was seen to 
be a by-product of non-alignment, but this was a rather simple-minded 
interpretation of a very complex situation. Second, Krishna Menon 
was criticised for under-equipping the armed forces, although this 
too was at best a simplified and misleading view of what Menon was 
attempting to do within the Ministry of Defence. During his tenure 
as Defence Minister, Menon had changed the emphasis of defence 
policy, particularly in relation to defence production. His root and 
branch reorganisation of the defence sector engendered considerable 
ill-feeling amongst senior members of the armed forces. His service 
promotions were considered to be politically motivated and led on one 
occasion to the attempted resignation of General Thimayya, the Chief
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of Army Staff. Menon’s arrogant handling of the defence portfolio 
made him- unpopular in several quarters and a natural target for 
Parliament and the press during the embittered post-war atmosphere. 
Third, the country was widely considered to be generally 
underdefended.1 Indian leaders were assumed to have lacked the 
political will to ensure adequate defence arrangements between 1947 
and 1962. As a result, when the Chinese attacked India lacked the 
material to defend itself.
This alleged lack of preparedness is the subject of this chapter. 
Surprisingly, this question has only been lightly covered by defence 
analysts. It is generally considered to be unimportant because 
during this period defence expenditure was extremely low, procurement 
modest and, more generally, defence was the junior partner of 
development on the one hand and non-alignment on the other. In fact, 
this was not the case. Not only did defence have a life of its own 
but it was also much more prominent than what most, if not all, 
analysts have thus far suggested. By looking beyond what India was 
spending and acquiring for defence purposes it can be shown that the 
period between 1947 and 1962 was extremely important, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. It was during this period that 
many of the key debates concerning future defence and foreign policy 
were decided and, contrary to popular opinion, it appears to be the 
case that Indian decision makers were ambitious, not cautious. This 
entailed rather more expenditure than is immediately obvious from the 
allocations to the defence sector and it also required the 
sanctioning of key defence missions which added up to a defence
1 For a comprehensive coverage of these issues see Thomas [1978],
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posture which conflicted with the statements made by Nehru and others 
during that period.
4.1 Defence Before Independence
Prior to independence, defence was a neglected aspect of thinking 
amongst the leaders of the Indian National Congress (INC).
References to defence in early INC resolutions and policy documents 
are very limited. When defence issues did emerge they were often in 
the context of industrialisation strategy: a free India would strive 
to develop defence industries under public ownership subject to the 
ability of the state to mobilise sufficient resources and capacity2 . 
Generally, the INC collectively assumed that a free India would be 
relatively secure from attack and invasion on the basis of natural 
frontiers and its neutral and peaceful status as a post-empire state. 
After so many years under the yoke of the British Indian Empire 
independent India would emerge as a model and example of a new nation 
which no major power would consider worth the risk of invasion - the 
political cost would be too high and the economic returns too low. 
This propensity to ignore defence was strengthened by the primacy of 
non-cooperation and non-violence in Indian thinking and the 
overwhelming concentration of the struggle for independence as an end 
in itself. Furthermore, Pakistan was not a consideration until the 
eve of independence and few senior INC members foresaw major tensions 
emerging with other countries, such as the Soviet Union, or direct 
threats to Indian sovereignty.
2 Indian National Congress [1954], p.32.
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When Nehru became a prominent member of the INC he shared many of his 
colleagues' assumptions concerning the future defence of independent 
India. However, at the same Lime, he attempted to inject more 
thinking and sophistication into planning for future defence needs 
and foreign policy goals. A free India, he maintained, would be 
equally protected by the balance of power in the world at large.
None of the major world powers would be prepared to permit the 
invasion of the sub-continent on account of its geo-strategic, 
political and economic potential and importance once the British had 
left. During the 1930s Nehru wrote frequently on the issues of 
foreign policy an independent India would have to deal with in the 
future3 .
Mahatma Gandhi gave little thought to the national defence issue but 
wished to institutionalise non-violence when India became 
independent, which would have had major implications for future 
defence plans. In stark contrast to the prevailing Gandhian ethic 
based upon non-violence, non-cooperation and anti-militarism, Nehru 
and Subhas Chandra Bose, subsequently the leader of the Indian 
National Army (INA)4 , gradually developed their own independent views 
on defence and both argued for the creation of a military capability 
based on a defence industry under solely public ownership. As early 
as 1928 Nehru stated his position on defence on several occasions 
without equivocation, for example,
3 See for example Nehru [1936].
4 The INA was formed in 1941 when captured Indian soldiers drawn
from defeated units of the British Indian Army in the Southeast 
Asian theatre were organised by the Japanese invading forces 
into an Army which would fight alongside Japan for the 
'liberation' of India. Subhas Chandra Bose revived the INA in 
1943, to great effect.
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"When freedom comes, we shall develop our army and 
strengthen it and make it more efficient than it is 
today.1,5
At a meeting in Bombay in March 1946 Nehru remarked upon the fluid
state of defence due to scientific developments, although he declined
to comment directly upon independent India's defence policy. Nehru
was fascinated throughout his life by modern science and its
potential role in an independent industrial India,
"It is science alone that can solve the problems of 
hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of 
vast resources running to waste, of a rich country 
inhabited by a starving people ... The future belongs to 
those who make friends with sciencel&
Nehru envisaged a major partnership in the future between the
scientific community and the armed forces in the same way as he
worked towards similar partnerships for development. Indeed, the
establishment of 'mother industries' to produce the means of
production under public ownership was a key tenet of INC policy.
Also in 1946, Nehru informed another audience in Bombay that India
would defend itself by all the means at its disposal and apparently
implied clearly that this did not exclude nuclear weapons, or atomic
weapons as they were known during that period7 .
4.2 Independence and the Formation of Defence Policy
Beyond the occasional statements by Nehru and Bose the INC came to 
power in 1947 without a defence policy of much substance - the goal 
of independence and the accompanying sentiment of nationalism had 
absorbed the energy of the movement to the cost of virtually
5 Bright [1946], p.152.
6 Vishvanathan [1985]. Quoted originally by Ram [1966].
7 Kavic [1967], p.27.
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everything else. Once independence had been achieved Nehru, as the 
first Prime Minister, was confronted with the task of moulding India, 
now divided into two sovereign independent states since the 
withdrawal of the British, into a viable nation state. Partition and 
the impact of the First Round (see Chapter 3, pp.107-109) had 
highlighted the problem of defence and sovereignty giving both a 
sense of urgency. In this context, as Prime Minister, Nehru had 
three major problems to confront.
First, the INA had been emasculated by the British some years before
independence but a legacy remained insofar as the ideas and example
of Bose, who died in 1946, appealed to those concerned with direct
action and ethnic unity. Although Congress had great credibility
with the former, it commanded less respect in relation to the latter,
particularly since it failed to prevent partition. Furthermore, the
INA has been a popular force in the struggle for independence and its
suppression by the British had increased its appeal amongst the rank
and file and, in particular, with the extremists. Bose, who
attempted to align himself with the Axis powers during the war,
peddled a political philosophy which conflicted directly with the
teaching and example of Gandhi,
"Bose viewed the I.N.A. and its officers in highly 
political terms. Like the military of totalitarian 
states, the INA was regarded as a center (or one of the 
main centers) of politics and national regeneration. It 
was the model of an Indian 'people's army', a military 
organisation truly representative of the nation, the 
focus of national attention, the servant of a 
neototalitarian ideology."®
For the Congress leadership the INA represented a total antithesis of
both the ends and means of the movement for independence. Yet,
paradoxically, the INA was extremely popular and potentially a threat
8 Cohen [1971], pp.162-163.
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to both the hegemony of the Congress Party and, indeed, to the 
process of representative government. It was a difficult circle for 
the Congress to square. First, the INA unequivocally and 
deliberately compromised the ethic of non-violence and much of what 
the INC stood for. Second, it would have been a substantial 
political risk for the Congress to alienate such a powerful group. 
Third, the INA had challenged the monopoly of the INC as the body 
which had achieved independence, albeit without sucess.
Somewhat fortunately for the Indian National Congress, Bose had died 
in 1946. After the Second World War, most of the INA officers were 
shot, the troops demobbed and the INA gradually faded away as a 
political force. However, the threat of resurgence and the existence 
of an old guard remained as problems. In order to both reward and 
emasculate the movement the remaining ex-INA members of sufficient 
status were dispatched to various corners of the world as high status 
ambassadors, who could not criticise their own government. Others 
were given positions at home on a deputy minister level.9
This process of assimilation without marked alienation or threat was, 
according to Stephen Cohen, 'an act of great political skill1, a 
judgment with which it is difficult not to agree10. However,
although the INA had been dissolved, Nehru was mindful of the
popularity and prestige Bose had commanded. With the INA's high 
profile with the Indian public, the spectre of militarism had emerged 
within India bringing with it the possibility, albeit distant, of an 
active role for the military in the Indian political process11. In
9 Cohen [1971], p.165, fn.# 51.
10 Cohen, [1971] p.163
11 India is often if not always thought to be one example of a 
developing country where the military is content not to
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addition, the Army was the most powerful and well organised 
institution in the country even though it was not controlled by INA 
members or sympathisers. Indeed, Cohen has also argued that the low 
profile defence policy eventually adopted by Nehru was a direct 
result of the popularity of the INA and there may well have been a 
direct connection between Nehru's outward policy framework and the 
legacy of the INA12.
Throughout his short career Bose spoke and wrote at some length about 
the issue of defence in a free India, even though he managed to say 
little of substance about policy. For Bose the Indian Army was a 
symbol of both subjugation and complete independence. During the 
Round Table Conference sessions, between 1930 and 1933, Bose was 
openly critical of Gandhi's failure to voice without equivocation the 
demand for full control over the Indian armed forces. Then, in 1933, 
the British Government issued a White Paper which stated that the 
Governor General, rather than elected bodies, would have control over 
the 'independent' defence forces13. Quite understandably, Bose read 
into this an attempt by the British Government to retain an option to 
maintain its monopoly over organised force, which could be exercised 
at will thereby having the effect of negating the political gain of 
representative government. For Bose, firm control over a strong 
defence force and independence were two sides of the same coin,
intervene in the political process. However, in the late-1950s 
and early-1960s commentators on India and Pakistan, such as Hugh 
Tinker, were suggesting that if public order in India 
degenerated as it had done in Pakistan the A m y  might intervene, 
given that it was the real power behind the state 
administration. The confidence shown towards the Indian 
military as an apolitical force is more recent.
12 Cohen [1971], p.1676
13 Amita [1984], p.90.
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India wants the status of a free country, with her own 
flag, her own army, navy and defence force, and with her 
own ambassadors in the capitals of free countries ... 
Independence which India aspires after, today, is not 
'Dominion Home Rule' as we find in Canada or Australia, 
but full national sovereignty as obtains in the United 
States of America or in France ... Building up a national 
army will be a ... difficult task. ... the dearth of 
Indian officers of high rank remains and will present 
some difficulty in building up a national army. In this 
connection India's chief problem will be to train up a 
large number of officers of all ranks within a period of 
ten years - and thereby complete the formation of the 
National Army. Along with the Army, [the] Navy and Air 
Force will also have to be built up..."14
Somehow, therefore, Nehru had to develop a defence policy which did
not appear to take too many leaves from the INA's book, a difficult
task considering the erstwhile convergence of Nehru and Bose's
defence views prior to independence.
The second problem which influenced defence policy after 1947 was 
partition. Naturally, early policy makers had no idea that partition 
would accompany independence. Still less were they prepared for the 
bloodshed and carnage which accompanied partition or the atmosphere 
of profound mistrust and hatred between India and Pakistan which 
resulted. Also, partition readjusted completely the erstwhile policy 
based upon India's relative power in the region, about which the INC 
leadership was so confident before independence. Through partition 
India lost the deep port of Karachi - strategically important for 
naval docking purposes - and many of the natural features which could 
have inhibited territorial invasion, although India's geo-political 
importance remained largely unchanged. In addition, India acquired a 
significant security problem in the form of Pakistan which promptly 
resulted in both a war and a significant loss of territory in 
Kashmir.
14 Bose [1964], pp.366, 453-454.
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The third problem which influenced defence policy in the formative 
period was that the creation of a new state in the region further 
provided an extra avenue for major powers to project power and 
influence and an opportunity for competition by proxy; the history of 
superpower influence in South Asia would have been markedly different 
without the creation of Pakistan. Nehru made a conscious attempt to 
sidestep the Cold War and avoid being dragged into the force field of 
superpower politics. India's experience during the two world wars 
was also at the forefront of Nehru's mind and he wanted to avoid 
putting his country in a position whereby it could be drawn into a 
war without its prior consent. Coupled with India's extreme 
weakness, this led initially to a policy of neutralism which later 
became more active in the form of non-alignment. Here, Nehru and 
Menon were being primarily pragmatic. If the Congress Party was to 
survive the early years of independence, it was essential for it to 
meet at least some of the rising expectations of the masses following 
the departure of the British. However, involvement in superpower 
politics would have led inevitably to rising defence expenditures 
even with grants and aid from, say, the United States. Increased 
defence expenditures during this period would have affected 
significantly the resources available for development. This is not 
to doubt the sincerity of Nehru's foreign policy, his commitment to a 
'third force' and his role within the United Nations, but, pressing 
domestic concerns were also a factor which influenced the evolution 
of foreign policy - a guns without butter routine for India could 
have been political suicide for the Congress Party.
During the first decade of independence, Nehru was determined to 
industrialise the Indian economy and bring millions above the poverty 
line, all within the framework of democratic socialism. In order to
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achieve this end, Nehru realised that defence expenditure had to be 
subject to the strictest control. Consequently, between 1947 and 
1962 defence^ expenditure was low, averaging no more than 2% of GNP 
per annum. During this period the net national product increased 
unevenly and the rate of growth fluctuated between one and four 
percent. Allowing for an increase in population of over two percent, 
very little was left over for increases in standards of living or, 
indeed, improvements to the national security apparatus.15 
Furthermore, Nehru also prompted a political debate regarding the 
effect of high defence expenditure upon national development.
Consequently, when designing a policy for defence, Nehru seemed keen 
to ensure three basic conditions. First, the armed services and the 
threat of militarism had to be kept in check. Second, given the 
nature of the relationship between defence and foreign policy, the 
attainment of self-sufficiency in defence production and independence 
from the superpowers became two important criteria. Third, over the 
course of the nation-building programme, expenditure on defence 
should not reduce significantly the resources available for 
investment.
4.3 The Blackett Report
In practice, however, it seems that Nehru lacked the expertise to 
translate his broad policy aims into a strategy for long-term 
military building in general and arms procurement in particular. 
Neither he nor his civilian advisers understood sufficiently the 
intricacies of military technology and strategy and the advice of the
15 Figures taken from Chaudhuri [1978], p.52.
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service chiefs alone would have been inappropriate and insufficient. 
Consequently, Nehru sought the advice of an outside expert, a famous 
British physicist, P.M.S. Blackett, who later became the President of 
the Royal Society. Nehru asked Blackett to prepare a report 
outlining the measures necessary for India to become near self- 
sufficient in defence production over a period of approximately seven 
years (the time scale appears to have been arbitrary), but at the 
same time to retain adequate defence and security. During the second 
half of 1948, Blackett assessed India's economic, industrial and 
technological capability in a geo-political framework. The result 
was a short report submitted to the Indian defence minister, in which 
Blackett attempted a study of how India could 'best cut her defence 
coat according to her scientific, financial and industrial cloth'16.
In 1948 India's per capita income totalled less than one-tenth that 
of the United Kingdom and industrial production was a mere two 
percent of the same. Blackett endorsed the need for self-sufficiency 
but he framed his recommendations in the context of available 
resources. The Blackett Report followed an earlier report by another 
British advisor, Dr Wansborough Jones, who had previously submitted a 
paper on the scientific and organisational measures required to make 
India a self-supporting defence entity. The paper was commissioned 
by the Interim Government prior to independence in 1947. In this 
report Wansborough Jones outlined four central roles for the Indian 
armed forces. First, to secure the land frontier against raids from 
border tribes or from attack by a second class army. Second, to 
support civil power; this role was later dropped and correctly 
ignored by Blackett. Third, to provide a small expeditionary force 
capable of protecting India's regional interests. Fourth, to develop
16 Blackett [1948].
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a force capable of taking the field in a first class war; this had to 
be achieved froii. available financial resources. With the exception 
of the second element Blackett followed these guidelines.
From the outset Blackett worked from the assumption that India was a 
new nation which wished to stand unaided in defence issues. This was 
in direct contrast to a previous, pre-1947 conception held by Britain 
that India would look towards the Commonwealth of Nations for 
protection in the event of hostilities, particularly in relation to 
naval assistance. Blackett realised that defence policy had not yet 
acquired either a traditional pattern or entrenched bureaucratic 
interests, which would make policy shifts very difficult once final 
decisions become increasingly characterised by bureaucratic-political 
criteria17. Ample opportunity existed for an innovative approach to 
both defence doctrine and policy. Above all, Blackett advised the 
Indian Government not to prepare to fight a Third World War which he 
considered both irrelevant and impossible anyway: India's defence 
needs were primarily related to threats from the North-West.
Technical planning for a small scale war was the fundamental 
requirement, although this did not eliminate conceptualising for a 
more sophisticated defence profile in the future.
Blackett's starting point for his defence plan was India's extreme
economic weakness. On this basis he outlined the choices open to the
Government. In order to become self-sufficient a strong economy and
industrial base was essential. The import of sophisticated defence
equipment would drain foreign exchange reserves and slow the rise in
national income through industrialisation and improved agriculture,
17 For an excellent explanation and analysis of bureaucratic
politics in the US context see the unparalleled essay by Allison 
[1971].
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upon which any future rise in military expenditure would itself be 
based. In fact, Blackett recommended initial reductions in defence 
expenditure to encourage growth in other sectors.
In relation to choice of technology Blackett recognised the 
inevitability of foreign imports but suggested a strategy for 
minimising the impact of defence imports on foreign exchange 
reserves. He proposed the bifurcation of procurement into 
competitive and non-competitive weapons. In so doing he kept in mind 
India's likely enemies and chose to ignore major power intervention 
on the understanding that such a scenario would inevitably draw in 
other major powers, which would to some degree protect India's 
interests. Thus, even if India was in possession of extremely 
advanced military equipment it would not be quantitatively sufficient 
to offer many independent options against a major power given the 
posture India could afford in the foreseeable future.
Competitive weapons were the type of front-line weapons platforms 
which relied upon state-of-the-art technology for optimum performance 
during engagement with enemy forces - fighter aircraft, heavy tanks, 
an aircraft carrier task force, for example. Non-competitive weapons 
were those which were used in roles which did not require optimum 
military performance characteristics in order to be effective - small 
arms, field guns, motor transport and night bombers, for example.
Both the USA and Britain possessed large materiel stockpiles 
following the end of the Second World War. If India bought up some 
of these surplus stocks, if it avoided where possible high 
performance weapons choosing instead low-performance weapons in non­
competitive areas, and linked defence planning to relevant scenarios, 
a measure of self-sufficiency was possible in the future.
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If surplus weapons were available Blackett saw only thre ̂ reasons for 
importing new and improved models. First, when the weapon was highly 
competitive. Second, if an non-competitive weapon system offered a 
markedly improved performance over its predecessor so as to justify 
the capital cost by reducing running and maintenance costs. Third, 
to supply training schools with single models to keep the services in 
touch with modern developments. Furthermore, Blackett argued that 
self-sufficiency would create freedom of choice in foreign policy 
rather than strategic isolation. Although Blackett did not place 
particular stress upon this observation, it was in fact of immense 
importance because therein lay the link between a preferred, 
affordable and independent defence policy and posture, as outlined by 
Nehru, and the policy of non-alignment.
With regard to the composition of the three services, Blackett made a 
series of specific recommendations. Wisely, he paid considerable 
attention to the missions of the armed services as well as the type 
of equipment each should be seeking.
The Indian Navy was ascribed three central missions1®. First, to
protect coastal shipping against mining, submarines, surface and
airborne attack; coupled with the capability to respond in kind.
Second, to escort and protect a small number of ocean convoys between
Aden and Singapore but no further; merchant shipping was always going
to be a valuable national asset for India and important for the
development of trade. Third, to co-operate with the Army and Air
18 The Blackett Report contains far more detail on naval policy and 
is quite weak on considerations for the Army. This is 
undoubtedly because Blackett was a naval officer during the 
Second World War and had relatively little knowledge of ground 
forces and tactics.
163
Force in repelling enemy landing operations and advances along 
coastlines, and to be able to undertake similar operations against 
the enemy. Given the general principles from which he was working, 
Blackett argued that the acquisition of cruisers was inadvisable due 
to a combination of cost and vulnerability; the deep draught of a 
cruiser renders it vulnerable to mines and submarines. With the 
exception of convoy protection, the advice was invariably the same - 
opt for small, cost-effective and non-prestigious systems for the 
central missions and generally. Surprisingly, in view of the costs 
involved, the acquisition of a small escort carrier for convoy 
protection was recommended and justified on the basis of having 
greater utility than the cumbersome cruiser. However, Blackett also 
pointed out that such a mission was far too expensive for India at 
that time and, moreover, that 'India's assumed opponent', i.e. 
Pakistan, would be unlikely to acquire the type of bombers required 
to attack convoys in the foreseeable future.
In his discussion of the future of the Indian Air Force, Blackett's
recommendations were much more guarded. First, he ruled out a long
range bombing role on the basis of cost and efficacy. Blackett was
also highly opposed to strategic bombing on humanitarian grounds
following the destruction of German cities during the last stages of
the Second World War19. In particular, he argued that India could
not hope to acquire a precision bombing capability, so any long range
bombing mission would have to be directed against civilian population
centres. Apart from the unlikely military gain, such action might
lead to a campaign of mutual destruction,
"In view of the high density of India's own cities and 
the impossibility of affording an adequate defence 
against enemy air attacks, it would seem a great mistake
19 Zuckerman [1982], p.111.
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for India to initiate such a campaign of mutual 
destruction, and probably even a mistake to retaliate in 
kind even if so attacked."20
Where India could profit was through the acquisition of smaller, 
single-engined fighter-bombers which would not need fighter escort 
and offered an adequate if not an optimum strike capability.
Blackett was also unconvinced that the IAF required jet fighters. 
Apart from the need to evaluate carefully the suitability of, for 
example, Vampires and Meteors for the arid and semi-arid conditions 
of North-West India21, jet fighters were also too fast to offer joint 
Army-Air Force target identification missions. Nevertheless,
Blackett endorsed fully the procurement of night fighters, photo­
reconnaissance aircraft and trainers, and he recommended a major 
boost to the Hindustan Aircraft Factory at the earliest possible 
moment.
Blackett's report was much less comprehensive on the future role of 
the Indian Army. However, he did highlight the potential for a 
relatively rapid progress towards self-sufficiency which would be 
made less difficult by the prior existence of ordnance factories 
established by the British. In addition, the Army was the best 
possible candidate for the exploitation of non-competitive equipment. 
The only specific recommendation was for the development of highly 
trained anti-aircraft units to protect airfields, factories and other 
key targets.
9
Finally, Blackett considered the role and organisation of defence 
science in India. This contribution was perhaps the most relevant in
20 Blackett [1948], p.12
21 This was presumably due to problems relating to dust and high 
ambient temperatures.
165
the report, particularly in relation to self-sufficiency. First, 
Blackett dismissed India's potential for developing an indigenous 
capability in the more advanced fields of defence technology, such as 
chemical and biological warfare, high performance aircraft, guided 
missiles, atomic warfare, millimetric radar and large ship design. 
Instead, the preferred route towards self-sufficiency should be in 
increasing the efficiency of weapons systems which were both tried 
and tested and familiar to both the armed forces and defence 
scientists. Thus, both servicemen and scientists could usefully 
collaborate on radar tracking, interception, bombing accuracy and air 
attacks on ships. Equally, the scientific community should be given 
the space and resources to nurture a research and development 
capability that was both relevant to India and kept abreast of 
developments elsewhere by covering in detail the open literature on 
defence science and technology. This called for a considerable 
increase in funding, sound organisation under the Scientific Adviser 
to the MoD and carefully controlled collaboration between the 
Government, the armed forces and the science community.
The Blackett report appeared to be accepted by the policy makers of
the day. In February 1949 Blackett received a letter from the
incumbent Defence Secretary, H.M. Patel, which read,
"I am glad, however, to be able to inform you that the 
Government have accepted your report practically in its 
entirety. The only important point of difference related 
to your recommendations for the Navy, but the difference 
is not, to my mind, one of great substance." (emphasis 
added)22
However, despite Patel's comments to Blackett and the realistic and 
affordable policy options offered to India, Blackett's 
recommendations were either ignored or very poorly implemented.
22 Letter from P.M. Patel to P.M.S. Blackett, P.O. No 62/5/49, 
(Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, 10 February 1949).
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Thereafter, Blackett's contribution to science and technology in 
India came only in the form of proposals to reorganise the National 
Physics Laboratory, the task for which he is most well-remembered23. 
However, according to one former decision maker, Blackett moved from 
defence to non-military science policy primarily because he 
considered his efforts in the former to have been a failure24. 
Although the report remained both well known and well read by policy 
makers, it also became an unpopular document in later years. At a 
press conference to celebrate the silver jubilee of the Defence 
Research and Development Organisation on 12 January 1984, the 
incumbent Chief Scientific Advisor to the MoD, Dr. V.S. Arunachalam, 
was openly critical over Blackett's 'ruse' to retard the development 
of India's indigenous defence capability.
Inevitably, Blackett did encounter opposition within India, 
particularly from the armed forces, which is understandable and 
predictable considering his recommendations concerning non­
competitive equipment, development before defence, indigenous 
production and reductions in defence expenditure. In effect,
Blackett was attempting to downgrade the relative importance of the 
armed forces in favour of economic growth and his report left all 
three armed services with the need to protect a considerable amount 
of bureaucratic turf. Furthermore, all or most of the advice he gave 
cut against the grain of military professional interests which had 
been so successfully transferred from Britain to India but which, 
after 1947, required a prince's purse from a pauperised polity. 
Amongst his private papers there are signs that his attempts to
23 Vishvanathan [1985].
24 NagChaudhri, conversations with the author (15 October 1984, 
Delhi).
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rationalise defence policy met with stiff resistance from the service 
chiefs,
"At my first meeting with the Defence Minister, I asked, 
as a starting point for my thinking ... to be told the 
military plans of the three armed forces ... The next day 
the Service chiefs produced their future plans. It only 
needed a short perusal of these documents to see that the 
total proposed packages of the three services nearly 
reached the total Indian Central Budget."25
Elsewhere in his papers there is a transcript of an interview given
in Delhi. Over the course of the interview Blackett reiterated his
reservations about the recommendations of the service chiefs,
"I usually managed to speak to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
meeting. But I am not of any official status in defence 
matters. I found it very interesting and I think it was 
useful getting to know a country which has got
independence. You got certain advice from the old
British advisors, which may or may not suit the occasion. 
Then there was very dangerous advice, it was hard to get 
objective advice and I had a lot to do ... I think I
saved India a lot of money by discouraging her from some
of the wilder ideas that the Chiefs of Staff had when I 
went there ...I once wrote a paper which was read, I was 
told, by new ministers coming in for tho next ten 
years."2e
Despite the 'wild1 advice of the chiefs of staff, the Indian Cabinet 
did indeed take a decision in 1949 to adopt a narrow and circumspect 
defence policy with the defence of the North-West as a priority. The 
policy was based upon the assumption that, in the event of a war, 
Pakistan would have the initiative in launching an attack on Kashmir. 
In such a situation the Indian Army divisions in Kashmir would 
attempt to hold the attacking forces whilst the rest of the Indian 
Army advanced towards Lahore and Sialkot. A decisive defeat of the 
Pakistan Army, coupled with the occupation of Lahore, was considered 
sufficient to bring Pakistan to the negotiating table. At the
25 Blackett, P.M.S., Blackett Papers G-29, (Royal Society Archives, 
London), p.3.
26 Transcript of P.M.S. Blackett radio interview, Blackett Papers 
G-12, (Royal Society Archives, London), pp.2-3.
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diplomatic level, the Indian Government would work to prevent 
Pakistan from receiving war credits from external powers, which would 
enable it to continue fighting the war. If these efforts failed to 
halt the war, the Government would mobilise international support for 
a negotiated settlement.27 No moves were made to make anything more 
than a token defence in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) against 
a potential threat from China - the diplomatic process was considered 
sufficient. However, it also occurred to Nehru that the logic of 
accepting that an exceptional threat from China existed would have 
demanded a very much more expensive defence policy28. In principle, 
therefore, early defence policy was the result of Nehru's attempts to 
contain defence expenditure and find a reasonable fit between India's 
defence and foreign policies.
Without doubt, the Blackett Report was a document of exceptional 
insight which could have been particularly useful to Indian defence 
policy makers and may have influenced early policy formation.
Without losing sight of the central problem of defence, Blackett 
offered India a means to relative security which contained four 
important ingredients. First, the report emphasised the need for 
self-sufficiency. Second, the defence policy proposed was consistent 
with the foreign policy of non-alignment. Third, it would have been 
relatively cheap to implement. Fourth, the armed services would have 
been controlled, both politically and financially.
The policy adopted in 1949 was encouraging. Indian policy makers 
appeared to recognise that India was unable to fight anything like a
27 Kavic [1967], p.37.
28 I am grateful to Lorne Kavic for this insight. Conversations 
with the author, Vancouver, July 1988.
169
major war, and they adopted instead a policy that was both sensible 
and affordable. Furthermore, through the stress upon negotiation and 
the exploitation of international opinion, there was a conscious 
attempt to link defence policy to foreign policy.
Nevertheless, it is axiomatic that policies do not succeed on paper 
alone; they require successful implementation. Although Nehru may 
have attempted to restrain the role of the military and cap defence 
expenditure, it is by no means clear that he succeeded. Nor is it 
clear that Nehru fully came to terms with the implications of the 
principles he valued. There is little disagreement as to the general 
direction of declared defence policy between 1947 and 1962. However, 
so far there has been no real attempt to investigate whether or not 
the Indian Government attempted to implement the policy described 
above, or succeeded in so doing. In order to understand this more 
clearly it is necessary to look closely at India's defence policy in 
practice, namely, the import and production of weapons systems based 
upon the defence missions which evolved during the 1947-62 period.
4.4 The Indian Army
As a result of the policy adopted soon after the attainment of 
independence, the Indian Army maintained its position as the focal 
point of defence. During this period over 75% of the defence budget 
was allocated to the Army but, at the same time, equipment 
modernisation was perfunctory due to the Government's unwillingness 
to expend limited foreign exchange reserves, which were stretched to 
the limit to pay for the modernisation of the other two services and 
for non-military requirements. Also, much of the Army budget was
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given over to pay and pensions, which always account for a large 
proportion of the Indian Army1s annual budget on account of the 
country's tradition of maintaining an extremely large standing army. 
Consequently, until 1962 the Army could only allocate 50% of its 
budget to capital expenditure.
In 1950 Nehru reduced the size of the Army by 50,000 men to 
approximately 300,000, in a bid to make economies and to 
simultaneously transform the Army into a mechanised rather than an 
infantry force. However, the places where the cuts were made 
scarcely amounted to anything of military significance, and a 
proposal to cut the Army by a further 100,000 men in 1951-52 was 
abandoned29. Nevertheless, despite the apparent wish for 
mechanisation. Army procurement during this period was relatively 
insignificant in terms of major weapons systems, but quite 
comprehensive in terms of stores and ammunition, which allowed 
adequate stockpiling for defence but not modernisation.
Given India's limited resources, the evolution of defence policy and 
posture should certainly have favoured the Army. At independence the 
country possessed a well organised and professional Army, by far the 
senior service. By contrast, the Navy and Air Force were both much 
smaller and younger. Under British rule, their roles were 
insignificant, particularly that of the Navy. In addition, there was 
a natural fit between what the Army could provide, what decision­
makers felt they wanted from defence, the resources available for 
defence, and current threat perceptions. Without any serious change 
in organisation the Army could provide a defence against Pakistani 
based initially upon a relatively cheap and labour intensive fcrnn of
29 Kavic [1967], pp.84-85.
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security. Increasing the material strength of the Army would not 
require excessive imports or major structural changes to the 
composition of the armed forces.
Between 1947 and 1958 India made little effort to acquire modern 
infantry weapons, the emphasis changed in 1958 when Krishna Menon 
took over the defence portfolio. The Army retained in service the 
mortars, artillery and howitzers from the Second World War and, for 
many years after 1947, the Enfield .303 rifle, a weapon of World War 
I vintage30. However, towards the late-1950s, after the scale of US 
military aid to Pakistan became evident, tank procurement increased, 
the most notable acquisition being the purchase of over 200 Centurion 
tanks from Britain between 1956 and 195731.
The somewhat mediocre fortunes of the Army should also be seen 
against the backdrop of three significant constitutional and 
governmental changes by which the Indian Government sought to limit 
the Army's power and authority. First, on the very first day of 
independence, the separate post of Commander-in-Chief was abolished 
and the title was given to the President of India, which transformed 
it into a largely ceremonial post. Ostensibly, this was to promote 
balance between the three services but the move was also intended to 
minimise a possible challenge to civilian authority from the senior 
and numerically stronger Army. Second, the Ministry of Defence 
became civil service dominated and thereafter expanded its capacity
30 SIPRI [1971], p.475.
31 Evidence of tank purchases differs considerably. According to 
SIPRI India bought 180 Sherman, 210 Centurion and 40 AMX-13 
tanks but according to Kavic the figures are 30, 200 and 150 
respectively.
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to control information and make decisions on military matters32. 
Third, for several years after independence the Government gradually 
changed the Warrant of Precedence which substantially reduced the 
Army's prestige and its pay, and further emphasised the principle and 
practice of civilian control.33
4.5 The Indian Air Force
The 1949 policy guidelines adopted by the Cabinet (see p.167) 
dictated that the Army become the pivotal service, with the Air Force 
and Navy ascribed little more than a supporting role. However, 
between 1948 and 1956, the Indian Air Force (IAF) received, by any 
standards, sufficient hardware to constitute an independent build-up, 
far beyond the role of support alone. Starting with 100 Spitfires 
and Tempests in 1948, the IAF took delivery of an unspecified number 
of De Haviland Vampire F.3 fighters in late 1948, 52 Vampire F.B.9's 
and Vampire N.F.54's in 1949-50 and 71 French Dassault MD-450 Ouraqan 
fighter-bombers in 1953-543*. Following a decision in principle on 1
32 The civilian control of the MoD also harks back to the famous 
dispute between Kitchener and Curzon in the nineteenth century. 
Cohen p.??
33 Cohen [1971], pp.171-3.
34 When matched against Pakistani procurement prior to the aid 
agreement with the US, the acquisition of the Ouraqan may seem 
profligate, particularly so many units. However, correspondence 
between high ranking members of the British Air Ministry in 1952 
provides a possible explanation: "... I am led to believe that 
the Indian Air Force will do its best to convince their 
Government that the French product is the better bet. Behind 
their conviction is the thought that the Ouraqan can be made 
readily available to them in the numbers they require, and also 
the desire not to place all their orders for aircraft in a 
single country. ... The Indians are of course looking for their 
"top cover". They are quite happy with the Vampires as ground 
attack aircraft and also as day interceptors of piston engined 
opposition, but they are also conscious of the unbalanced nature 
of this fighter force and want an aeroplane that can tackle a 
really high level opponent whether he be a bomber or a top
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April 1956 to procure the English Electric Canberra, ten months later 
the Government ordered 54 B(l).58 light bombers, eight P.R.57 
photoreconnai'T.ance aircraft and six T.4 dual-control trainers. 
Deliveries began in the early summer of 1957. The inventory of 
Canberras was further increased by 20-30 units in 1961/62. In mid- 
1955, the Government was considering the purchase of 80 Dassault 
Mystere IVA interceptors or the licensed production of the British 
Folland-Gnat. At a later date the Government placed orders for 
another 33 Dassault Ouragans, superseded its earlier Ouraqans with 
110 Mysteres and extended negotiations with Folland for the Gnat, 
which eventually went into production. As the IAF was taking 
delivery of these French aircraft in mid-1957, and HAL was beginning 
production of the Gnat in Bangalore, the Government ordered 160 
Hawker Hunter Mk.56 FGAs (ground attack fighters) and 22 Mk.66 
trainers from Britain.35
These procurement details seem to reflect a departure from the policy
adopted in 1949 in which the Cabinet essentially committed India to a
defence policy based upon a strong Army and relatively little else.
It is not possible to detect much of Blackett's influence here
either. To all intents and purposes, the IAF became henceforth an
independent service with a role that exceeded support. By the late-
1950s the IAF, through the procurement of the Canberra, had a
strategic bombing role vis a vis Pakistan35. Moreover, with regard
screen. As they spend most of their time looking over the fence 
at Pakistan, I would imagine they are not thinking in terms of 
any very large numbers, but have perhaps heard of UK offers of 
the Canberra to Pakistan." [emphasis added] Public Records 
Office, London, Ref: 371/1011211 110720.
35 Kavic [1967], pp.102-104.
36 Although the rate of technological change over the past three 
decades makes comparison difficult, it was the equivalent of 
India purchasing the Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft in 1983.
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to Vampires, all the models procured by the IAF had only recently 
entered service with the RAF in Britain. For example, the Vampire 
F.3, a tropicalised version of the F.B.5, was developed by Britain 
for deployment in the Far East. Although India purchased the system 
between 1949 and 1950, it did not enter RAF service in the Far East 
until January 1952. Much the same is true of the Canberra (See Table 
4.1). Furthermore, the relative capability of the Canberra should 
not be overlooked. In its time it was considered a remarkable 
aircraft, capable of extremely high altitudes and, during the period 
in question, it was an extremely advanced weapons system37.
The rate of aircraft procurement either represents an astounding 
institutional victory for the IAF throughout the 1950s, or a 
significant policy change on the part of the Government during the 
implementation process. Certainly, procurement details suggest that 
neither Blackett's recommendations nor the policy guidelines adopted 
in 1949 were followed with any great enthusiasm, even though the 
practical problems associated with competitive and non-competitive 
weapons are most pronounced in the field of aeronautics, which was in 
a rapid state of evolution during this period. The fact remains that 
the Air Force managed to ensure that all or most of the weapons 
systems it required were forthcoming even before the ascendancy of 
Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister renowned for his support of the 
IAF. So too did the expansion precede the consolidation of the US- 
Pakistan military aid agreement, even though Indian intelligence 
sources may have anticipated such an agreement several years earlier. 
IAF procurement signified a widening gap between public defence 
policy and actual defence posture.
37 The Canberra was later adapted by the US for extremely high 
altitude photo-reconnaissance in the form of the famous U-2.
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T a b l e  4 . 1 :  S e l e c t e d  I n d i a n  A i r  F o r c e  a n d  R o y a l  A i r
F o r ' c e  P r o c u r e m e n t  1 9 4 6 - 1 9 6 1
Make/Model RAF front-line service/ 
squadron service (a)




December 1946 March 1950 1948
Vampire F-3 FL service - April 
1947; sq. service - 




versions of F.B5 
in service 
from 1949/50)
FL service - Nov 
1951 (Malta)
FL service - 
1956 (remained 







July 1951 1954 IAF received 









June 1972 July 1955 - 
late-1956 (d)
(a) For training purposes the date of squadron service if about six months 
later than the date of front-line services.
(b) The NF-24 was a private venture intended for the export market. An arms 
export ban in 1950/51 prevented the sale of NF-24s to Egypt. Instead the 
units were taken by the RAF as an interim measure due to production delays 
on other versions of night fighter.
(c) A central mission for the B(l).8 was low level nuclear strike.
(d) One Canberra was exported to India directly from the first production 
batch, the thirteenth from an initial batch of thirty. Between August 1956 
and September 1958, sixteen units reached India directly, the bulk arriving 
in late 1956.
Source: Armament and Disarmament Information Unit resource base.
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4.6 The Indian Navy
At independence the Indian Navy was a meagre force comprising thirty- 
two obsolete vessels primarily intended for coastal patrol, including 
four sloops, two frigates, one corvette and twelve minesweepers - 
nothing of any great worth38. In addition, for reasons which are 
unclear, the British had tended to recruit primarily Punjabi Muslims 
into the lower ranks of the Navy, who went to Pakistan in 1947. This 
left India with a very small number of ratings after partition.38
Initially, Britain attempted to persuade India to build up a Navy 
which could integrate itself into a larger force based upon the 
Commonwealth navies. However, Indian decision makers were adamant 
that India should control a strong and independent Navy commensurate 
with the country's size, the long coast-line, geo-political location 
and potential wealth. As a result, the Indian Government laid down 
plans for a strategic role for the Indian Navy after 1947. In 
response to a Government directive in late-1947, before Blackett 
arrived on the scene, the Indian Naval Headquarters drew up a ten 
year plan of naval expansion under the direction of Vice-Admiral 
Parry, seconded from the Royal Navy.*40 The proposed programme 
envisaged the development of a carrier force comprising two light 
fleet aircraft carriers, three light cruisers, eight to nine 
destroyers and the necessary support vessels. If implemented this 
programme would have represented a quantum increase in naval 
capability.
38 Larus [1978], p.l.
39 Kathari [1982], p.62.
40 Kavic [1967], p.117.
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The expansion prograinme commenced in 1948 and within two years a 
light cruiser and three 'R'-class destroyers had been purchased from 
Britain. A Directorate of Naval Aviation was also formed in 1948 
with a remit to develop plans for a fleet air arm. The procurement 
of two aircraft carriers from Britain was planned for 1955 and 1957, 
by which time India would also have obtained 300 modern naval 
fighters, fighter-bombers and anti-submarine aircraft. In the event, 
the prograinme was severely affected by the uncertain market 
conditions stemming from the Korean War, the formation of NATO and 
the ensuing rise in domestic demand amongst the major defence 
exporters. In particular, the British were unable to commit 
themselves to a sales package of this magnitude; during this period 
Britain was India's main and preferred source of defence equipment, 
particularly for the Navy. However, the situation then was somewhat 
different from what it is during the present era. Immediately after 
the end of the Second World War Britain had very little surplus 
capacity in the defence sector and the sale of equipment to countries 
such as India and Pakistan often involved juggling between the needs 
of the domestic forces and overseas customers; latterly Britain has 
become much more reliant upon the Third World export market and is 
often prepared to meet requests from overseas buyers before its own 
armed forces have acquired all the units on order. Meanwhile, the 
Indian Government reconsidered the naval prograinme and concluded that 
it was beyond the country's means, irrespective of supply shortfalls. 
Nevertheless, new plans for a small carrier force were drawn up in 
1949 and revealed in January 1950. The scheme was marginally revised 
in 1953 resulting in decisions to purchase a fleet replenishment 
vessel from Italy and to borrow three ex-escort destroyers of the 
Hunt Type-2 class from Britain. In addition, a light cruiser and two
17
inshore minesweepers were also purchased from Britain in 1954 and 
1955.
As part of the expansion plan, a six-year naval programme was 
revealed in 1955 with the purchased vessels to be built in British 
shipyards. Actual procurement was cut back significantly due to a 
foreign exchange shortage in 1957-58 which followed a balance of 
payments crisis which amounted to deficits which reached $650 
million. However, the financial crisis did not prevent the purchase 
of the British light fleet carrier, Hercules, in 1957 and its 
modernisation in Belfast or the purchase of Sea Hawks and Alizes 
aircraft for the fleet air arm. The carrier, renamed the INS 
Vikrant, was bought from Britain in January 1957, commissioned in 
March 1961 and received its full complement of naval aircraft five 
months later.41
In the case of the Indian Navy the situation is relatively clear.
Both Government and the services intended India to have a blue water 
Navy with an ability to operate in the ocean reaches to the South, 
East and West. However, a lack of foreign exchange coupled with the 
non-availability of British vessels for purchase prevented the 
immediate attainment of such a capability. Because of financial 
stringency, the Navy had to be the first casualty despite Blackett's 
recommendations for significant expansion; the bottom line on defence 
policy was an adequate land-air based defence against Pakistan, and 
the naval role in such a posture was limited. In the event of a war 
with Pakistan the Navy was responsible for bottling up the Pakistan 
Navy in Karachi harbour and to a lesser extent at Chittagong.
41 Kavic [1967], pp.116-125.
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Nevertheless, it is somewhat misleading to describe the Navy as 
India's 'forgotten service'”42, even though it received very small 
budgetary allocations during this period - a mere 4.7% of the total 
defence budget and 13.3% of capital expenditure, even in the 1962-63 
budget (both the Army and Air Force received over 40% of capital 
expenditure, which was under 10% of the entire defence budget)43.
The reason for this apparent 'forgetfulness' was that India could 
always have turned to Britain in the event of a pronounced security 
threat from the Indian Ocean. During this period the Indian Ocean 
was still a 'British lake' - Britain had not yet withdrawn from East 
of Suez.
4.7 Actors and Institutions: The Dynamics of Defence Policy
The evolution of defence policy in the years following the attainment 
of independence is so confusing as to beg the question as to whether 
there was any policy at all. From the information available and 
presented here it would appear that Nehru's well documented wish to 
restrain defence expenditures was ignored, both directly and 
indirectly, despite the 1949 policy directives which came from the 
Cabinet. The resources committed to the Indian Army were broadly in 
line with Nehru's defence policy and also the recommendations of 
Blackett. However, the arrangements made for the other two services, 
notably the speed and scale of procurement, connote the adoption of 
far reaching missions. This suggests that either Nehru had much less 
control over defence policy than is generally accepted or, 
alternatively, that, under pressure from the service chiefs, he
42 Larus [1978].
43 Thomas [1978], Table 4, p.147.
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willingly acquiesced to what amounted to a significant deviation from 
declared policy.
Although the allocations to the Navy were low during the first two 
decades of independence, there was a firm intention on the part of 
the key decision makers to build up a strong naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean. It is clear that the naval programme was restrained 
through necessity rather than choice; the Indian economy was not 
growing at a particularly rapid rate during the period in question. 
But for the domestic foreign exchange crisis and the contraction of 
supply on account of the Korean War, the naval programme could well 
have been more dynamic. Even so, the acquisition of an aircraft 
carrier, light cruisers and a fleet air arm less than fifteen years 
after independence amounts to something considerably different to 
neglect.
The development of the Indian Air Force is even more at variance with
declared policy. According to the Cabinet's policy guidelines
adopted in 1949 and not changed subsequently, the task of the Air
Force was primarily to support the Army in the event of a land war
against Pakistan. The Chief of Air Staff affirmed this in the
aftermath of the 1965 war,
"The task of the Air Force is to give effective support 
to [the] Army, and during the 1965 operations we were 
able largely to achieve that".44
However, the procurement of defence equipment suggests otherwise.
The Canberra and the Hunter, for example, had little to do with
either supporting the Army or countering the acquisitions of
Pakistan, even after the signing of the 1954 military assistance pact
with the United States; either they were designed for missions which
44 Thomas [1978], p.176.
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were not included in declared policy or they were purchased for 
national prestige45. Furthermore, the Air Force may have been used 
primarily to support the Army during the 1965 war but it is important 
to differentiate between the complete spectrum of activities and 
options at the disposal of an armed service, and its activities in a 
specific conflict. For example, during the Vietnam war the US Air 
Force did not use nuclear weapons, but there was no suggestion of the 
USAF losing its position within the strategic triad. Much the same
can be said of the Royal Navy task force during the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict.
With both the Navy and the Air Force it is more important to 
understand their institutional development in terms of missions, 
rather than to look exclusively at procurement and expenditure. In 
particular, the deliberate or almost casual development of both a
blue water navy and a strategic bombing mission imply that both the
Air Force and the Navy fared much better in their mission-directed 
institutional development than is traditionally assumed. Once 
missions have been established they are relinquished or reversed with 
extreme reluctance; they invariably reflect or reinforce either key 
tenets of foreign policy, major perceptions of threat or 
institutional interests, both military and civilian46. Furthermore, 
once a mission has been established it must be followed by 
procurement. Otherwise, by definition, a country is not adequately 
defended.
45 SIPRI [1971], p.475.
46 The development of a nuclear weapon option may be said to 
reflect a civilian rather than a military predilection. The 
Indian armed forces have been traditionally cautious of the 
nuclear option, possibly because in time of war decision making 
will become much more of a political rather than a military 
process.
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Unlike the situation in the United States, for example, it is 
difficult to define with documented precision the contours of 
decision making and bureaucratic infighting which during this period, 
led to the departure from declared policy. (Whether one policy 
replaced another is debatable but certainly defence posture changed 
significantly.) This is due to the considerable amount of secrecy 
which surrounds issues relating to defence within India and the 
unusually small number of actors involved - for a decade Nehru and 
Menon had primary control over both defence and the foreign affairs; 
the defence portfolio was invariably given to junior ranking cabinet 
ministers and was not considered a prestigious post. Cabinet debate 
on key issues was lacking. This was in part due to Nehru's style of 
government but also because of the closed nature of the debate, 
compounded by legislative ignorance.
From an examination of the rate of procurement by the Indian armed 
forces and the abiding sense of equivocation which emerges when 
defence policy during the period in question is placed under the 
microscope, it appears that the received wisdom is significantly 
misinformed. Much of the evidence and many of the relevant policy 
moves have been misread: India did not proceed along a defence path 
characterised by policy restraint nor does it seem that defence 
policy was sufficiently well linked at the conceptual level to 
foreign policy, witness the fate of Blackett's recommendations. The 
armed forces may have been demoted in relation to their civilian 
peers but, when resources permitted, they received the equipment they 
wanted.
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How then can this period be understood? The evidence points 
persuasively if not conclusively to a defence policy which drifted 
rather than evolved. However, although it is not clear why this 
happened, there are four possible explanations for understanding 
India's defence policy between 1947 and 1962.
The first explanation is that the decision making process tilted in 
favour of the long term ambitions of the Indian elites. They 
believed that India was destined to become a nation of considerable 
power and influence in both South Asia and the Indian Ocean. This 
influenced the defence thinking of those who made and implemented 
policy from the outset, and caused them to lay the foundations for a 
blue water Navy and a land-air strength of impressive proportions.
The continuing ambiguity of policy on nuclear weapons, both before 
and since independence, reflects well the duality of defence policy, 
as does the rate of Naval and Air Force procurement after 1947. In 
particular, the procurement of both an aircraft carrier task force 
and strategic bomber squadrons indicate that defence policy reflected 
a more ambitious and comprehensive defence posture than Nehru had led 
both the Indian nation and the rest of the world to believe. Thus, 
in tandem with other influential policy and opinion shapers, Nehru 
the international statesman, Gandhian and democratic socialist may 
have harboured a very different agenda for his country from the one 
he publicly avowed.
The second possibility is that Nehru may not have understood or 
recognised the growing drift in defence policy. It is well known 
that Nehru was impatient with policy detail even though he exercised 
considerable control over the foreign and defence portfolios. His 
excessive workload, the overall diversity of the problems he elected
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to confront, international, regional and domestic, may have permitted 
a situation in which an alternative defence policy could emerge. In 
addition, Nehru harboured a pious objection to becoming involved in 
the workings of defence and was well-known for his general impatience 
with the minutiae of policy which led him to leave policy 
implementation to others. However, there is no evidence that Nehru's 
ministers and gatekeepers were in any way disloyal. Krishna Menon 
may have upset the armed forces during his period of tenure as 
Defence Minister, and he may also have misjudged the 'forward policy1 
against China, but he adhered broadly to declared policy. Within 
that he was committed to increasing the efficiency of professional 
leadership amongst the armed forces; this led to the famous dispute 
with General Thimayya over promotions. Second, he was committed to 
increasing India’s capacity to produce indigenous defence equipment. 
Both missions sat comfortably with declared defence policy, though 
the impetus on Menon's part may have stemmed from his more narrow 
political ambition.
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the professional 
bureaucrats in the MoD were intent on subverting the policy laid down 
by Nehru. Blackett appeared not to find antagonism to Nehru's 
directive amongst the members of the MoD he encountered. Obversely, 
the service chiefs were less enamoured with the attitudes of the 
bureaucrats, witness the complaints of the first Chief of the Navy 
Staff,
" ... wise counsel ... helped me to exercise restraint 
in periods of frustration. These frustrations arose 
chiefly from the bureaucratic machinery. Bureaucrats 
fall into two categories. There were those who knew all 
about everything, including operational and technical 
matters, and those particularly of the Finance Ministry, 
who did not seem to care what harm they did to the 
service so long as they saved money for the exchequer. 
There was a third neuter group whose effective 
contribution was minimal. The basic fault lay in the
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system of functioning of the ministry whose officials 
played no part in the initial formulation of plans, thus 
depriving themselves of the opportunity to appreciate 
both the professional considerations and requirements as 
well as financial and practical limitations that are 
involved in any proposal. They preferred to remain the 
ultimate arbiter.47
A third possibility is that the three Chiefs of Staff were the key to 
the yawning gap between formulated policy and its implementation.
The Chiefs of Staff's opposition to the Blackett approach has already 
been considered. Is it possible that the authority of these actors 
extended to redefining the policy of Nehru, the key architect of 
defence policy? Here it is necessary to consider the way in which 
policy decisions were formulated between 1947 and 1962.
Immediately after independence a number of committees were set up to 
advise the Government and the defence minister on defence problems, 
particularly in relation to Pakistan. The structure comprised the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet which was underpinned by a series of 
other committees, of which the most important were the Defence 
Minister's Committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee and the Joint Planning Committee. The Defence 
Committee comprised the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, Foreign 
Minister, the Finance Minister and other important Cabinet ministers. 
On all the other committees designed to underpin the Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet sat members of the armed forces ranging from 
the Chiefs of Staff (Defence Minister's Committee, Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, Joint Planning Committee) to the Directors of Intelligence 
of the three services and the representatives of the Chiefs of 
Staff.43 Consequently, at the formal decision making level, the
47 Kathari [1982], p.63.
48 Rao [1970], pp.307-308.
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Chiefs of Staff constituted a ubiquitous presence either directly or
by proxy. In practice, Nehru would have been constantly bombarded by
the views of the service chiefs during policy planning sessions.
Moreover, not only were non-military views in the minority but,
because of poor technical and operational knowledge, they were
probably less persuasive as well,
"In the opinion of H.M Patel, a former Defence Secretary, 
the policy organisation of the Defence Ministry was 
'sufficiently flexible to ensure that every relevant 
point of view has a chance of being presented at 
appropriate level if necessary1. The theory is rarely if 
ever translated in practice, however ... The ability of 
the average civilian official to make such decisions ... 
must be judged against Patel's own admission that the 
ignorance of civilian officials (to which may properly be 
added that of the politicians) is so complete as to be a 
self-evident and incontrovertible fact."49
Before independence, the commander-in-chief was also the War Member 
on the Governor-General's Executive Council. Because of this, all 
proposals requiring decisions were sent first to the Military Finance 
Department. If the proposal was accepted the file was sent to the 
Defence Department for implementation. Under this system, the armed 
forces took whatever decisions they could and saw no need to consult 
the Defence Department.
Obviously, this situation was clearly untenable after 1947, 
particularly as the three service chiefs were under the control of 
the Defence Minister who needed to know a great deal about what was 
going on. In 1949, over the course of the defence review, new rules 
governing decision making were brought in. Thus, a list of the most 
important areas of decision making was drawn up and the Service 
Headquarters were instructed to send anything relating to this list 
to the MoD in the first instance. The Ministry would then examine
49 Kavic [1967], p.217.
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the request from all the relevant angles and any differences of 
opinion were taken up in meetings.
Nevertheless, although the MoD slowly built for itself a base of 
expertise and knowledge, it could not acquire the required skills 
quickly enough to confront the armed forces on equal terms.
Moreover, in 1958, Krishna Menon reversed the new procedures and gave 
the power of decision making back to the service chiefs. Thus, at 
the Secretariat level, the MoD became little more than a post office 
and the ministry itself became a much less attractive area of the 
bureaucracy in which to work.30
The initial system of decision making was set up by Lord Ismay, an 
adviser to Mountbatten. However, over time the formal committee 
structure disintegrated: the Defence Committee, the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and the Intelligence Committee were effectively telescoped 
into one and decisions were increasingly considered on an ad hoc 
basis by the Prime minister, the Defence Minister, the Chief of Army 
Staff and some senior Army officers51. For example, in January 1948, 
prior to leaving for Washington to take up the task of advising Sir 
Gopalaswamy Ayyangar, the leader of the Indian delegation to the UN 
Security Council concerned with the Kashmir dispute, B.M. Kaul, then 
a low-ranking military officer, was called to Nehru's residence. 
Referring to a recent discussion between Air Vice Marshall Mukerji 
and himself, Nehru asked Kaul to explore the possibility of 
purchasing the Mitchell bomber whilst in the USA. Kaul did so but 
his request was eventually turned down primarily because of the 
unorthodox approach, but also because of the failure of the Indian
50 Venkateswaran [1984].
51 Rao [1970], p.309.
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Government to inform either the US State Department or the British 
Government as the customary supplier of defence equipment to India.52 
Such an informal method of decision making would have further 
excluded non-military decision-makers.
It is also necessary to consider the possibility that the level of 
military ignorance on the part of both Government and bureaucracy may 
have allowed the armed forces to get their way through incremental 
changes. It is true that only the armed forces were able to link 
defence policy to technological needs. However, the notion that the 
armed forces conspired against their civilian counterparts for 
enhanced allocations or unnecessary equipment contradicts all that is 
known about both sides. Moreover, Nehru was the shrewdest of 
politicians and it is extremely unlikely that his political instinct 
would have permitted defence policy to develop in a direction which 
he did not approve. Finally, the nature of the ad hoc policy making 
machinery described above, suggests that the Army would have fared 
much better if it had enjoyed undue influence during this era. The 
logical conclusion is that the increased strength of the armed forces 
came about with Nehru's approval.
Fourth, it is conceivable that defence policy went through several 
redefinitions as a result of the strained relations with Pakistan 
over Kashmir and, in addition, the establishment of a bilateral • 
economic and military aid agreement between the United States and 
Pakistan. Despite Nehru's attempt to isolate his country from the 
impact of the Cold War and the inevitable domestic consequences, he 
was unsuccessful for reasons over which he had little or no control.
52 Kaul [1967], pp.97-98.
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During the early 1950s the United States pursued a collective 
security policy based upon the creation of an interlocking series of 
alliances designed to hem in the Soviet Union and prevent communist 
expansionism (See Chapter One). Pakistan became a member of the 
Baghdad Pact in September 1955 and later that year joined SEATO. 
Although talk of arms transfers had been in the air for several 
years, when the agreement was struck Pakistan concentrated upon using 
the aid to create a multi-service capability to resist external 
attack, from India in particular53. Consequently, the Government of 
Pakistan paid special attention to the development of the Pakistan 
Air Force through the acquisition of the F-86 Sabre, the B-57 
Canberra and the F-104, equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. 
The Army received heavy artillery, Patton and M-24, M-4 and M-41 
tanks.
The motivation on the part of Pakistan was undoubtedly to counter 
India's growing military strength and the gradual erosion of the only 
advantage Pakistan enjoyed, that of superior firepower. Moreover, 
Pakistan was convinced that Britain favoured India when it came to 
deliberations concerning arms transfers and the military balance. 
Thus, if Pakistan was to continue to dispute Kashmir it had to find 
economic and military-political aid from somewhere. In the event it 
somewhat reluctantly pandered to Secretary of State Dulles' policies 
opposing Soviet expansionism. Nor did the aid arrive without 
conditions: Pakistan was compelled to offer its airfields as an 
alternative escape route for US spy planes flying over the Soviet 
Union, and to permit the construction at Peshawar of a communications 
base which became an important intelligence centre.
53 SIPRI [1971], p.494.
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Nevertheless, there are however four important points to recognise 
concerning the effect upon India of US aid to Pakistan. First, 
although it did have an impact upon India's security perspective, its 
defence policy and posture was not fundamentally altered. India's 
rearmament programme was well in motion before the mid-1950s, and the 
argument that there was an 'action-reaction' process which compelled 
India to change its defence policy has been overstated. Second, tjie 
'action-reaction' cycle can act both ways, and it is more likely that 
Pakistan's decision to seek military and economic aid was a reaction 
to the erosion of its firepower capability vis a vis India. As Table 
4.2 and Figure 4.1 indicate, India appears to have been intent on 
seeking a significant advantage well before the aid agreement was 
signed. Many but not all of the acquisitions which arrived after 
1955 were both planned and/or ordered well before. Moreover, 
although the records are both poor and patchy, it would seem that 
India consistently outspent Pakistan on defence by an approximate 
factor of three. Third, despite reservations about India's non- 
aligned foreign policy, the United States also provided small 
quantities of defence equipment to India in the mid-1950s. This of 
course implies that in the event of renewed fighting between India 
and Pakistan, problems would occur for US policy makers over which 
side to support. This is precisely what happened in 1965. The US 
embargoed both sides thereby making a victory for Pakistan remote if 
not impossible.
If during this period there was a distinct gap between India's 
declared defence policy and its actual posture, this would suggest 
that India should have been spending considerable quantities of 
precious foreign exchange on defence, particularly as India received 
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terms and as a proportion of GNP, defence expenditure was low, 
although the defence burden as a percentage of central government 
expenditure was high; in 1950 the Government allocated 29% of current 
expenditure to defence54. The costs in terms of foreign exchange 
have been estimated at approximately US$50 million in 1950, rising to 
US$210 million in 195955.
However, in the immediate post-war period, India did not need to draw
on its foreign exchange reserves, as it obtained most of its defence
equipment from Britain. It was able to pay for much of its defence
equipment by drawing heavily on the sterling balances representing
the debts incurred by Britain during the Second World War when many
of the latter's costs in India were paid in rupees. This was an
extremely useful situation for India as the British Prime Minister,
Winston Churchill, recognised when he alluded to the dilemma it posed
for Britain in a memorandum circulated to his Cabinet,
"It must be remembered that these two countries [India 
and Pakistan] may go to War with one another and that is 
the only object for which they seek arms. Unfair balance 
was shown to India in the arrangements made at the time 
of partition and the balance might be slightly redressed 
in favour of Pakistan. On the other hand we place 
ourselves in a very questionable position of arming both 
sides with no other object than long-term advantages of 
keeping up the United Kingdom manufacturing potentials. 
For instance, forty-two bombers for Pakistan raises the 
query "who are they going to bomb?" Obviously the cities 
of India. This involves us in serious responsibility.
We are like an arms merchant supplying both sides in a 
possibly impending struggle. There is of course this 
difference that we do not get paid anything. All that 
happens is that the amounts are marked off the so-called 
1 sterling balances1 ... A refusal to continue supplies 
would not prevent them from obtaining at any rate some of 
their requirements from elsewhere. This would almost 
certainly be from outside the sterling area and would
54 Kavic [1967], Appendix I.
55 Terhal [1982], Table I.
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thus impose a further strain on the foreign currency 
reserves of the sterling area as a whole."3e
Thus, the real cost df growth in the defence sector was largely 
hidden. The gap between procurement and expenditure is further borne 
out by Figure 4.2. As procurement increased dramatically between 
1956-57 defence expenditure remained relatively constant and did not 
rise significantly until after the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
Based upon the evidence it is possible to conclude that India had 
embarked upon a significant defence build up well before both the 
establishment of the US-Pakistan military aid programme and the 1962 
war. The background to this policy can be examined from three 
angles37.
First, it is inconceivable that Nehru was unaware of the defence 
build-up. More likely the duality of defence policy during this 
period stems from the inherent contradiction between Nehru the 
idealist, international statesman, pacifist/Gandhian and democratic 
socialist, and Nehru the realist and leader of a large, newly- 
independent country with the potential for real international power 
and significance. Although by instinct Nehru preferred to use 
political power and diplomacy rather than force, he may also have 
realised that a shallow defence capability would severely compromise 
India's future greatness. In addition, many of the hopes for 
regional stability were disappointed and from the 'First Round' 
onwards India sought at least to match and in the event greatly
56 Supply of Arms to India and Pakistan, (Memo from Prime Minister
Winston Churchill to Cabinet, CAB 129/49, Public Records Office,
London).
57 I am grateful to Lorne Kavic for his comments on this part of
the analysis. Conversations with the author 26 July 1988, 
Vancouver.
196
exceeded the military capability of Pakistan. Yet, at the same time, 
Nehru had to be seen to be placing maximum emphasis upon economic and 
social development, which ruled out expenditures and investments for 
future international power. The confused defence policy which 
emerged was a tortuous attempt to find a fit between the present and 
the future, the domestic and the foreign, and the regional and 
international influences bearing upon the Prime Minister, who himself 
was torn between idealist aims and realist instincts.
Second, the role of the armed forces should not be underestimated. 
Although they were weakened in relative terms after Independence they 
still managed to score many institutional successes. This was in 
part because they controlled the monopoly over the information and 
knowledge required to link policy, strategy and technology. It was 
also because of their steadfast refusal to break conceptually with 
the Sandhurst legacy; as soldiers schooled in the British tradition 
they clung tenaciously to the European/Western way of defence despite 
the costs and dependency which such a process entailed. Or, put 
another way, they were clever enough to offer no attempt to assist 
Nehru with the design of a defence policy which would have reflected 
the key tenets of non-alignment and would have built upon the ideas 
put forward by Blackett. They just ignored the contradictions 
between actual and declared defence policy and readily accepted the 
considerable rewards of a confused defence policy.
Finally, despite Nehru's best intentions, policy making and 
implementation were a ramshackle process and remain so to this day. 
Although the need to deter further threats from Pakistan in Kashmir 
was accepted by all concerned, the lack of debate, discussion and 
clear thinking resulted in a confused policy based upon a covert
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acceptance of realism on the one hand, and the occasional 
genuflection to idealism on the other. Nehru may have been too 
preoccupied to orchestrate and follow through a debate amongst 
experts, while the armed forces stuck rigidly to their traditionalist 
views, which eventually prevailed. As it became clear that 
procurement reflected a slow and moderate growth towards eventual 
great power status, with all the attendant regional and economic 
ramifications, the armed forces were content to profit from the drift 
which others were ill-equipped to halt. Thus, although all agreed 
that the country had to purchase enough to retain an edge over 
Pakistan, only the armed forces could differentiate precisely between 
adequacy and excess. As with other countries the 'how much is 
enough' problem proved to be an insoluble dilemma for policy makers 
because the policy process never squarely investigated, debated or 
rationalised the moves required to deter both Pakistan and to retain 
the key tenets of Nehru's idealism.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FROM HUMILIATION TO REGIONAL HEGEMONY - 
THE MATURING OF DEFENCE POLICY: 1962-1980
5.1 Conventional Defence
5.1.1 The Sino-Indian War of 1962
The 1962 Sino-Indian war was both a surprise and a disaster for India 
and the ramifications were numerous and far reaching. Nehru and his 
advisers had placed little emphasis upon the threat to NEFA (the 
North East Frontier Agency, now renamed Arunachal Pradesh). As 
suggested in the previous chapter, this may have been in part because 
to recognise China as a threat to India's security would have
involved the State in a much more significant defence effort than was
deemed expedient or affordable, over and above the arrangements which 
had already been made for defence in the North West. Secondly, 
Nehru's idealism and the importance of China to the non-aligned 
movement urged that the two Asian giants should be seen to be on the 
best possible terms. Consequently, India's policy towards China was 
invariably forgiving and, wherever possible, Nehru attempted to find 
foreign policy solutions to bi-lateral problems, even though his 
policy led on several occasions to loss of face. For example, Nehru 
was relatively weak over the independent status of Tibet and little 
protest was made over the several references to Nehru in Chinese
political writings as an 'imperialist running dog' and a 'member of
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the political garbage group in Asia'1. However, when relations with 
China eventually became excessively strained the Government's 
reaction was one of indecision and prevarication.
The drift towards war began in 1960 when the Chinese made limited 
advances into areas around Ladakh. Neither the Nationalist Chinese 
Government under Chiang Kai-shek nor the Communist Government which 
replaced it were prepared to accept the status quo. Each served 
notice on India that China would challenge the legitimacy of the 
McMahon Line, the border between Tibet and India which had been 
recognised by both parties in 1913-14. Both Chinese Governments had 
committed themselves to the restoration of China's former historical 
power. To this Mao Zedong added his own particular revolutionary 
perspective. Whilst the Indian Government was relatively complacent 
regarding the aggression of the Kuomintang Government, over 
suzerainty of Tibet for example, the accession of a communist 
government created some alarm. Furthermore, after 1949 there several 
Maoist communist groups emerged on the Indian political scene and the 
potential threat of a fifth column would certainly have increased the 
concern engendered by the accession of Mao Zedong. Nevertheless, 
Nehru calculated that China could not threaten India so soon after 
such a long and attritious civil war.2
Nehru and his advisers continued to misjudge fundamentally the 
Chinese intentions. In 1960 the Chinese Government began to question 
blatantly the legitimacy of the McMahon Line by sending patrols into 
disputed areas. In 1961 the People's Liberation Army occupied Dehra
1 Sardesai [1976], p.85.
2 Kavic [1967], pp.41-43.
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Compass and established a border post on the Chip Chap river which 
brought the Chinese to their 1960 territorial claim line. The Indian 
Government began to respond in kind by establishing outposts 
throughout the disputed areas for both military and political ends.
By mid-1961 the Indian Government considered the position to be 
relatively stable and balanced. It concluded that it was time to 
challenge the Chinese outposts and severed their lines of supply and 
communication. On 30 November the Chinese delivered a written 
warning to India - 'The Chinese Government would have every reason to 
send troops across the so-called McMahon Line and enter the vast area 
between the crest of the Himalayas and their southern foot'3. In 
April 1962 the eight year agreement over Tibet between India and 
China expired and Chinese activity in the disputed region 
intensified. By mid-1962 Nehru was claiming that his China policy 
had been a success but Beijing retaliated by increasing the number of 
patrols in the area and attacking India aggressively in newspaper 
editorials. In July both sides met eyeball to eyeball when Chinese 
troops surrounded an Indian post but the Chinese eventually retreated 
when the Indian troops stood their ground. Interpreting the Chinese 
action as a 'blink' the Indian Government became more strong-willed 
and began to challenge forcefully China's movements into NEFA. By 
September the border dispute appeared to be on the verge of 
unravelling. Throughout the month the two sides clashed 
sporadically. By mid-October Nehru let it be known to the press that 
the Army had been instructed to eject the Chinese troops from NEFA. 
After further skirmishing the Chinese mobilised along the borders of 
Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA. By 20 October the conflict had started and 
the Chinese advanced on both the Ladakh and the NEFA fronts.
3 Khera [1968], p.171.
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In the Ladakh theatre India proved just able to prevent a complete 
rout, although by mid-November the Chinese Army was in possession of 
all the territory its government had previously claimed. In NEFA the 
Indian Army fared much worse. In the face of a forceful assault by 
the Chinese, the Indian defence effort collapsed, the morale of the 
troops was crushed and the Army leadership disgraced. General Kaul, 
who had been sent to organise the defence of NEFA, was posted to the 
Punjab and General Manekshaw took over, whilst the Chief of Army 
Staff, General Thapar, opted for indefinite 'sick leave1. With the 
Chinese within 40 miles of Tezpur (now in Assam) and 100 miles from 
the Digpoi oil fields, both the military and the Government were in 
complete disarray.
Although the Indian Army possessed considerable reserves and 
resources during the early-1960s, its weapons and ancillary equipment 
were dated, its troops disorganised and, as an institution, the Army 
was still in a state of transition because it had previously clung 
too tenaciously to the traditions of the Raj. Furthermore, the 
defence of NEFA had been overlooked and neglected. After several 
years of procrastination at the political level throughout the mid- 
1950s, a suitable strategy for the defence of NEFA was not given 
either consideration or resources until 1960 when General Thimayya 
conducted a study of alpine defence organisation and tactics in the 
Italian Alps. Thimayya's recommendations for a strategy based upon 
lightly equipped and mobile infantry in the forward areas and backed 
by a strong and highly mechanised force on the plains was rejected by 
Nehru for three, inter-related, reasons. First, he felt that the 
Chinese did not constitute a sufficient threat to warrant such a
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dedicated strategy. Second, the implications for defence expenditure 
were considerable. Third, he did not want to jeopardise his 
carefully constructed foreign policy.4
On 20 November the Chinese Government announced a unilateral 
withdrawal to points where it considered the territorial boundaries 
should be. The Indian Government objected vehemently but there was 
little it could do except appeal for both a withdrawal and a 
reversion to the status quo ante. To all intents and purposes India 
had lost the war and was forced to face the implications of both 
territorial loss and national humiliation on a grand scale.
The scale of the defeat and the culpability of both the civilian and 
military institutions cannot be underestimated. In terms of national 
identity the 1962 war had an impact upon India similar to the US 
defeat in Vietnam. An even greater loss of international prestige 
was avoided only by the coincidental occurrence of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis which kept the rest of the world greatly concerned and fully 
occupied. From a military standpoint the armed forces proved to be 
utterly incapable of defending India's territorial integrity in the 
East and the implications of the debacle were not lost on those who 
were concerned for the future of Kashmir.
Although all agree that the Indian armed forces fared very badly, 
there are differences in the judgements of exactly how poorly they 
performed which range from total non-performance to marginal defeat. 
Over the course of the war only the Army was actively engaged. The 
Navy was incapable of playing any part in the conflict. The Air
4 Kavic [1967], p. 96.
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Force was scarcely used for four possible reasons. First, there were 
technical difficulties involved in operating in Himalayan altitudes, 
particularly when the aircraft were fully armed and, when the 
problems became evident, military leaders became reluctant to use air 
power5. Second, the threat from the Chinese armed forces was 
exclusively ground based because they too sidelined their Air Force, 
which reinforced the hesitance of the Indian leadership, though much 
might have been gained from ground attack missions against an 
opposing army devoid of air cover. Instead, the role of the IAF was 
limited to supply and transport duties but even these perfunctory 
tasks were complicated by a limited number of poor quality landing 
strips at Leh in Ladakh and Chusul in NEFA. Third, the Army 
reluctance to call upon the IAF was possibly due to traditionalism 
and inertia on the part of the Army concerning inter-service co­
operation.6 Fourth and more likely, however, the Army may have 
decided to sideline the Air Force as a way of downplaying the 
importance of airpower during a period when the IAF as an institution 
was in the ascendancy. In addition, had the Army performed better it 
could have increased the legitimacy of its claim for increased 
capital expenditures following a period when its own fortunes had 
been meagre.
Following the termination of hostilities the Government commissioned 
an enquiry by Lt. Gen. Henderson-Brooks. This remains classified, 
and since the war successive Indian Governments have refused to 
release this and other documentation pertaining to the war. Most of 
the information available is to be found either in autobiographical
5 Subrahmanyam [1976], p.119.
6 Thomas [1986], p.145-6.
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accounts from high-ranking officers involved in the war or from 
commentators who have used either these sources or their authors for 
primary source material.
The most popular and enduring explanation for the Indian defeat 
charged Krishna Menon with almost total blame although the 
significance of the 'Menon factor1 is unclear. In many ways it does 
seem that Menon had a poor record in certain areas of security 
planning, particularly with regard to the Army and his alleged 
attempts to build a separate political base through promotions. More 
to the point, however, although a significant amount of advanced new 
equipment was absorbed by the armed forces during Menon's term, for 
the most part it had been ordered before he took control of the 
defence portfolio. With the exception of the Hunter, Menon generally 
attempted to acquire a reputation as an economy-minded rather than a 
profligate defence minister7 . Equally, however, Menon was the 
politician senior Indian Army officers loved to hate and the crushing 
defeat against China offered an opportunity to place total blame on 
Menon1s shoulders and mount a full scale campaign to have him removed 
from office. Over time the constant and unrelenting criticism of 
Menon from the press, the armed forces and the Congress Party created 
a situation which led directly to Menon’s resignation. It also 
created an atmosphere in which any other explanation for defeat 
became inconceivable. Nevertheless, Vertzberger has traced the roots 
of the 1962 failure to bureaucratic mismanagement and dereliction of 
duty on the part of the key decision-makers®. In contrast, Lt. Col. 
J.R. Saigal, a senior ranking Army officer who experienced at first
7 Kavic [1967], fn #33, p.155-156.
8 Vertzberger [1984], pp.69-93.
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hand the rout in NEFA, has argued that excessive corruption and 
incompetence in the higher echelons of the Army during the early 
1960s was to blcjae. He also asserts that India's defences in NEFA 
crumbled from the very start of the war9 . Nehru himself remained 
loyal to Menon and only demoted him under extreme pressure, 
preferring instead to blame defeat upon equipment and logistical 
failures.
The causes of the 1962 defeat remain, therefore, somewhat confused. 
Clearly, the defence effort was deficient and it is likely that the 
war was lost due to a combination of political miscalculation, 
inadequate security arrangements, intelligence failures and military 
error, in that chronological order. However, in this instance, the 
ramifications of the 1962 defeat were more important than the defeat 
itself, including the loss of territory. The outward sense of 
optimism which had characterised defence and foreign policy making at 
the political level between 1947 and 1962 never returned.
Thereafter, politicians from all parties were at one in arguing that, 
in the future, expenditure on defence should be a first charge on the 
exchequer.
In the aftermath of the humiliating defeat Nehru admitted to a 
failure in defence planning claiming that 'military weakness has been 
a temptation, and a little military strength may be a deterrent'10.
In October 1962 Menon was demoted within the Cabinet and the 
Government lost not only a remarkable if controversial political
9 Saigal [1979]. As a Lieutenant Colonel Saigal ranked seventh in 
the Indian Army Chain of command and rank structure.
10 Kavic [1967], p.192.
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figure but also a decision maker with a genuine commitment to self- 
sufficiency in the defence sector, which, as will be seen, was very 
significant for India over the long term. Following pressure from 
senior members of the Congress party Nehru took up the defence 
portfolio himself and moved Menon to a newly created but 
insignificant cabinet post of Minister for Defence Production, a 
position which deprived him of much of his earlier influence.
Once Menon had been sidelined the cabinet set about redressing what 
it considered to be one of the former Defence Minister's key 
failures, namely a lack of defence preparedness. Whether or not this 
charge against Menon was justified, it had the effect of 
concentrating the Government's attention on technological rather than 
institutional solutions to the country's insecurities. Indeed, the 
former virtually cancelled out the latter: an under-equipped army is 
not necessarily inefficient or the victim of poor foreign policy, 
military, intelligence and political decision making.
However, Nehru and the rest of the Cabinet were admitting to the 
wrong mistake. As has been argued in the previous chapter, India was 
not a militarily weak country overall, even though the Eastern 
borders may have been poorly defended and these problems compounded 
by an inhospitable terrain and acute logistical shortcomings11. The 
modernisation programme of the 1950s had given India a defence 
posture of some significance, inappropriate perhaps for defence
11 According to Raju Thomas a shipment of small arms was rapidly 
moved from the Western to the Eastern sector when hostilities 
began but took six weeks thereafter to reach the front line, 
Thomas [1986].
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against China and biased towards the Air Force but, nevertheless, 
India could hardly claim to be militarily weak.
In the years before the war the armed forces had been given a 
relatively free hand in the interpretation of defence needs. In so 
doing and together with the politicians, they had virtually ignored 
the prospect of a conflict with China, although they did demand a 
change of policy when it became evident that the defence of NEFA was 
inadequate given Chinese intentions. For the armed forces and, 
indeed, Nehru and his advisers, the threat to India's security was in 
the North West and their reasoning was much more subtle than politics 
and defence, as Kavic has recognised,
"In the absence of a clearly identifiable threat from 
China until the later 'fifties, Pakistan provided an 
expedient strategic rationale without which, given the 
pronounced nonaligned posture of the government, sound 
and efficient military policies would have been difficult 
to formulate and implement. The civilian fear and 
distrust of Pakistan thus appeared as a 'blessing in 
disguise' in preventing even greater economies in defence 
outlay and was used to good effect."12
5.1.2 Defence Policy
In the aftermath of the 1962 war the Indian Government and polity 
were united in the need to commit increased resources and effort to 
upgrade the country's defence capabilities. The first budget after 
the war in 1963 planned for a near doubling of defence expenditure 
from Rs.473 crores allocated in 1962-63, which included an emergency 
allocation of Rs.100 crores for the war effort, to Rs.867 crores13.
12 Kavic, [1967], p.153.
13 Thomas [1978], p.106.
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In the following year India increased the percentage of GNP spent on 
defence to 4%, 32.5% of total government expenditure. At the same 
time, all debate at any level on the required scale of defence 
expenditure disappeared. Instead, the primary question became one of 
how best to allocate the quantum increase in defence allocations.
The rise in defence expenditure after the war led to a rigorous 
upgrading of defence capability. The result was a five-year plan for 
defence made public in early 1964 and implemented immediately. The 
plan had six objectives. First, the creation of an 825,000-man army 
and the modernisation of its weapons and equipment. Second, the 
modernisation of the IAF and its stabilisation at forty-five 
squadrons. Third, the modernisation but not the expansion of the 
Navy. Fourth, an increase in the domestic defence production base. 
Fifth, infrastructural improvements in the border areas. Sixth, the 
expansion of research and development1,4. However, it is interesting 
to note at this point that the modernisation programme represented 
essentially more of the same. Nehru and his successor, Shastri, 
(Nehru died in May 1964), committed India to a full scale 
modernisation programme with a renewed emphasis upon the threat from 
China but neither considered a defence review. At no point, it 
seems, was the question addressed of why India failed to defend 
itself adequately against China, given the resources it had at its 
disposal overall. Consequently, failures at the level of strategic 
planning, intelligence and military performance were subsumed under a 
more general acceptance that whatever resources the Indian armed
14 Kavic [1967], pp.192-193.
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forces had at the time were insufficient to meet the security threats 
on all the relevant fronts.
Coupled with the commitments already made to defence between 1947 and 
1962, some of which had not come to fruition by 1962, the five-year 
plan amounted to a significant increase in India's defence 
capability. Nevertheless, there were inherent and persistent 
weaknesses. Despite the commitment to increased defence production, 
the armed forces remained heavily and unduly dependent upon imported 
military technology. A clear strategy for reversing this situation 
was nowhere in evidence, in stark contrast to Nehru's stated 
commitment to indigenisation and the 1964 defence plan. Not only did 
this place increasing pressure upon foreign exchange reserves, which 
eventually led to substantial delays in procurement, it also begot 
political obstacles.
5.1.3 The 1964 Rearmament Programme
The new defence plan began in April 1964 and was designed to extend 
over a three year period. The scale of the defeat by China forced 
the Government to concentrate primarily upon re-equipping and 
strengthening the Army following a period of restraint before the 
1962 war. Moreover, the Army programme was specifically directed 
towards meeting the Chinese threat and Nehru went to considerable 
pains to assure the Pakistan President, Ayub Khan, that the programme 
was designed for defence against China rather than belligerence 
against Pakistan.
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As a first step India appealed for military aid, despite the 
consensus over the need to raise defence allocations, and the 
response was a good one. This also contradicted India's policy of 
non-alignment. The United States and Britain both extended equipment 
grants of $60 million and France, Canada and Australia contributed 
about $10 million of supplies.15
In March 1962 the budget for the Army stood at Rs.245 crores and in 
the budget following the war allocations more than doubled to Rs.571 
crores15. Together with the aid packages this rise facilitated a 
major reequipment programme and an organisational and training 
review.
On materiel, the replacement of the Lee-Enfield .303 rifle by the 
semi-automatic Ishapore was speeded up, heavy mortars were procured 
from France together with an agreement on licensed production, the 
ordnance factories were instructed to develop a mountain howitzer and 
the production of Japanese Nissan trucks was increased17. The Avadi 
Heavy Vehicles factory in Madras delivered seventy medium tanks to 
the Army in 1965, the Sten machine gun was replaced by the more 
modern Sterling, the .303 was rebored to a new standard and improved 
types of communication equipment were sought from both foreign and 
domestic sources. Also, efforts were made to upgrade the quality of 
the vehicle fleet by discarding vehicles after less use and acquiring 
better licensed production arrangements.15
15 SIPRI [1971], p.477.
16 Thomas [1978], p.151.
17 SIPRI [1971], p.477.
18 Kavic [1967], p.195.
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The size of the Army was increased from 10/11 divisions to 21 
divisions and stress was placed upon the development of mountain 
divisions and the recruitment of hill peoples such as Gurkhas and 
Nagas. Troop training for jungle and mountain warfare was stepped 
up, largely through the expansion of the High Altitude Warfare 
School. Some attempt was made to overcome the extreme reliance upon 
conventional tactics, particularly with regard to mobility, which 
made the Indian Army so vulnerable to the unorthodox procedures 
employed by the Chinese Communists which resulted from the distinct 
approach to warfare developed by Mao Zedong. On the organisational 
front new logistical guidelines were introduced and similar efforts
were made to make better use of intelligence.19
The acquisition of armoured fighting vehicles had been largely 
decided upon before the war and little was accomplished between the 
termination of the Sino-Indian war and the outbreak of the 1965 war 
with Pakistan. Even the acquisition of the Soviet PT-76 light tanks 
dates back to 1955 and the agreement to procure 225 T-55 main battle
tanks between 1968 and 1971 also pre-dates the 1962 war.
For both the Air Force and the Navy there was less that could be 
achieved directly because the blame for defeat and the emphasis upon 
modernisation, was placed squarely upon the Army. However, this did 
not prevent the Air Force receiving a substantial increase in planned 
strength, although not all for front line equipment. Contained 
within the plans for expanding the Air Force to forty-five squadrons 
were proposals for a strengthening of ground based air defence,
19 Kavic [1967], pp.183-4, 195.
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increased transport capacity, to be financed from US military aid, 
and Soviet and French helicopters in the form of 50 Mi-4s and 20 Sud 
Alouette III. The Government also reached agreement with France over 
the licensed production of the Alouette III and between 1966 and 1973 
120 units were produced at HAL, allegedly with an indigenous content 
of 90%2°. Another fillip to the indigenous defence effort came with 
the redeployment of the team working on the Kiran jet trainer to the 
HF-24 fighter project, although in the event the hopes for the swift 
upgrading of the aircraft to a supersonic version came to little. 
Indeed, the procurement of 160 Hawker Hunter F.56 through the 1950s 
to replace the Vampires, Ouraqans and Mysteres was seen as an interim 
measure pending the completion of the HF-24 project, which perhaps 
indicates the lack of faith of the defence planners in the 
capabilities of HAL (see Chapter Seven).
The Navy received even less in the modernisation programme. Although 
overtures were made towards the Swedish and Japanese Governments 
concerning possible collaborative ventures, it is likely that the 
moves were made to unsettle Britain's confidence in future orders and 
thereby up the ante. The strategy quickly showed results when 
Britain offered the Indian Government credits totalling £4.7 million 
for the construction of three Leander class frigates, an offer that 
was swiftly accepted. Both Britain and the United States refused to 
accede to India's request for three destroyers and Britain was also 
equivocal over requests for production facilities for the Oberon 
class submarine following the Indian Government's acceptance of the 
Navy's argument for a submarine arm. However, the Government did 
manage to augment the capability of the Vikrant and establish bases
20 SIPRI [1975a].
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on the Andaman Islands and at Vishakhapatnam, which also became a 
major dockyard21.
5.1.4 The Strengthening of Soviet-Indian Relations
Perhaps the major shift in Government policy over this period 
concerned the consolidation of cordial relations with the Soviet 
Union and, to a much lesser extent, the development of a supplier- 
recipient relationship with the United States. The flirtation with 
the Soviet Union was primarily intended to provide the quantity of 
defence equipment which India's meagre foreign exchange reserves 
could not cover if all the equipment was procured from Western 
sources.
The burgeoning relationship with the Soviet Union in fact went back.
to the mid-1950s and does not date from the cooling of Sino-Soviet
relations in the early-1960s, as might be expected. A major turning
point came as the Soviet Union moved away from the isolationist
policies adopted in the 1940s under Stalin in favour of a more active
foreign policy under Khrushchev. Even before the crucial Twentieth
Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, the Soviet Union was eyeing
India as a co-operative and ally. As early as August 1953 Malenkov
made a straightforward bid for friendship,
"The position of so large a state as India is of great 
importance for strengthening peace in the East. India 
has made a considerable contribution to the efforts of 
peace-loving countries aimed at ending the war in Korea, 
and relations with India are stronger; cultural and 
economic ties are developing. We hope that relations 
between India and the Soviet Union will continue to
21 Kavic [1967], pp.201-202.
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develop and grow, with friendly cooperation as the 
keynote.1,22
A trade agreement in 1953 was followed by an unofficial visit in the 
same year by Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. Then came the 
unprecedented visit by Nehru in June 1955 which was followed by the 
visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Delhi five months later. The 
material benefits which India derived from the relationship were 
considerable. In 1953 trade turnover between the two countries was 
only $1.6 million, a total lower than the level during the closing 
days of the Tsars. However, by 1958 trade had increased to $94.6 
million and by 1965 India had become the largest non-communist 
trading partner of the Soviet Union.
The relationship was also significant in other ways. Whereas Western 
suppliers often prevaricated over the transfer of capital goods, the 
Soviet Union wasted no time when it came to turnkey projects such as 
the Bhilai steel mill. In 1960, the Soviets began to provide India 
with cheap crude oil. On all transactions India was able to pay 
either with rupees or in goods, which permitted it on occasion to 
export manufactured items which could not be sold in the West. 
However, this benefit was partially offset by the Soviet penchant for 
reselling certain Indian goods in Europe to help its own foreign 
exchange problems. This subsequently drove down the value of Indian 
exports. Finally, economic aid was given on extremely favourable 
terms, generally with an interest rate of 2.5% over twelve years with 
payments beginning only when the project was completed. In contrast,
22 Menon [1963], p.58.
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offers from Western governments were in the region of 4.5-6.3% over a 
shorter length of time, with repayments in hard currency.23
However, head and shoulders above all other benefits, the Soviets 
began to export defence equipment on equally favourable terms. In 
1960 both sides reached agreements on military credits and in the 
followings years up until 1965 the transfer of helicopters and 
aircraft (Mi-14, An-12, MiG-21), Atoll air-to-air missiles for the 
MiG-21 and light tanks, proceeded apace. This equipment came cheaply 
and permitted India the opportunity both to diversify and increase 
its overall defence capability. Moreover, the Soviet Union proved a 
useful ally in other, related ways. When India invaded the 
Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Damon and Diu the Soviet Union used its 
power of veto in the UN Security Council to minimise the scale and 
impact of international condemnation. As relations between China and 
India grew worse prior to the outbreak of war the Soviet Union 
adopted a neutral position which was as much a disadvantage for 
Beijing as it was an advantage for New Delhi, although during the 
early stages of the conflict the USSR appeared to favour 'brotherly' 
China over 'friendly' India, albeit temporarily24.
Nevertheless, the Indian Government managed to extract the most 
advantageous conditions from the Soviet Union in part because it 
successfully played off the two superpowers against each other. 
Throughout the period leading up to the MiG deal, the Indian 
Government actively entertained the idea of a significant procurement 
of advanced military technology from the United States. For example,
23 Horn [1982], pp.1-15.
24 Sandhu [1988], p.175.
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throughout early 1964 the Government appeared to be negotiating 
actively with the USA for the commercial sale of finished and 
unassembled F-104s (including a plant to be built in India by the 
Americans), the F-101 Voodoo, the F-102 all weather interceptor - the 
system most comparable to the MiG-21 - and, also, three to five 
squadrons of F-51 Skyray and F-5B Freedom Fighters, both equipped 
with Sidewinder missiles25. However, negotiations came to nothing.
In theory, a defence agreement with India would have been in the best 
interests of the US as a further bolster against the Communist bloc. 
(Even though tensions between China and the. Soviet Union had already 
occurred the full significance of the Sino-Soviet split was 
recognised somewhat slowly in Washington.) At one point it looked as 
though India might acquire a 20 year credit arrangement with the 
Export-Import Bank for a part of the transaction, but India's 
inability to finance such a major deal was fairly evident from the 
outset. Quite likely, the flirtation with Washington was probably a 
well disguised attempt to create concern in Moscow and offset Soviet 
attempts to curry favour with Pakistan during this period. What the 
Kremlin was hoping to achieve was to deprive both China and the USA 
of a useful and strategically important ally. Furthermore, during 
the period when the MiG deal was under consideration Moscow was by no 
means convinced that India should become the favoured state in South 
Asia.
As the inter-war (1962-65) rearmament process continued the scale of 
diversification became clear, as did the Government's willingness to 
consider acquiring military technology from practically anywhere. 
Basically, India had started to move away from reliance upon the
25 Kavic [1967], pp.198-199.
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British for defence equipment and turn instead to both Eastern and 
other Western suppliers to ensure that no one country or power bloc 
could be in a position to deny selectively defence equipment and 
thereby influence either defence or foreign policy. In effect what 
this amounted to was a form of negative non-alignment. Nevertheless, 
the strategic wisdom of this policy is open to question. 
Diversification without doubt makes for an excellent political 
choice, particularly when a country's foreign policy is based upon 
the principle of non-alignment, which is so difficult to practice in 
many areas. However, from a logistical perspective the acquisition 
of equipment from so many different sources with such little 
interoperability must have created some extremely time consuming and 
expensive problems, particularly vis a vis spare part inventories and 
maintenance. It only needs to be remembered how much concern there 
is in NATO over interoperability to appreciate the problems for a 
country with a considerably less developed infrastructure than exists 
in Western Europe and which operates both Western and Soviet 
equipment.
5.1.6 The 1965 and 1971 Wars with Pakistan: Consolidation and a New 
Direction
In 1965 Pakistan and India clashed again (the 'Second Round') but 
India had relatively little difficulty in asserting its undoubted 
quantitative military superiority. The Pakistan Air Force was in 
principle much better equipped than the IAF due to the recent 
acquisition in significant numbers of the F-104 and F-86 from the 
United States and, indeed, it conducted some successful operations.
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However, the Pakistan pilots found the F-104s extremely difficult to 
handle and throughout the conflict they were deployed with less 
efficacy than the Indian Gnat. Much the same was true of Pakistan's 
Patton tanks whose operatives were unable to come to terms with the 
automatic fire controls2&. All in all, the conflict was short-lived 
and relatively fruitless. Pakistan's attempt to spotlight the 
Kashmir problem on the world stage by provoking action by Muslim 
freedom fighters across the UN cease fire line was rather futile. 
Similarly, India's attempt to weaken seriously the Pakistan defence 
effort through attrition on the ground was hardly a resounding 
success either even though the Indian armed forces did prevail 
following both counter attack and invasion27.
Coming so soon after both the 1962 Sino-Indian war and the death of 
Nehru, the 1965 war prompted a serious political debate within India 
over the credibility of non-alignment as a means towards security. 
Nehru had always possessed a wider vision as to the positive role and 
indeed the nuisance value of neutralism and non-alignment. However,
the effect and impact of his foreign policy was experienced
principally beyond the region of South Asia and, furthermore, non- 
alignment did not seem to deliver the requisite security closer to 
home. Within the space of three years India had been attacked by 
both China and Pakistan, both of whom were edging closer together 
diplomatically, and India held territory claimed by both. Neither 
the superpowers nor Britain seemed to possess either the loyalty or 
the influence to prevent an attack by either Pakistan or China.
Still less could be done to prevent a united front. Without doubt,
26 SIPRI [1971], p.75.
27 Kavic [1967], p.189.
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non-alignment was the preferred foreign policy for India but the new 
Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, was faced with the problem of finding 
a fit between foreign policy, security and defence in the absence of 
both healthy foreign exchange reserves and alignment with a major 
power.
In the wake of the 1965 war Indira Gandhi sought to consolidate 
India's regional position after two decades of flux in defence and 
foreign policy coupled with an uncertain domestic political 
environment. First, however, she addressed the complex and 
troublesome domestic front, an inevitable prerequisite for future 
activity at the regional level. In the late 1960s Mrs Gandhi split 
the Congress Party and in so doing consolidated her political 
position and guaranteed her immediate political future by alienating 
the right with the backing of the left and centre of the party. This 
gave the Prime Minister an increasingly firm grip upon the political 
process and gave her a much sounder political power base.
Between 1965 and 1971 activity on the defence front was low key. 
Without doubt, the new Prime Minister's concern to ensure her own 
political future distracted her attention from regional issues, 
particularly after the successful conclusion of the 1965 war. It was 
also the case that Mrs Gandhi had two major problems to confront 
which slowed the rate of further defence procurement; the first 
concerned internal economic problems, the second a pronounced dip in 
relations with the Soviet Union.
During the late-1960s the Indian economy started to show signs of 
stagnation. Until 1965 economic progress had been reasonably good.
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The industrial base had grown significantly between 1950 and 1965, 
particularly after the balance of payments crisis in 1957 which led 
directly to severe import controls. Government investment in the 
capital goods sector and the intermediate sectors, such as iron and 
steel, had been considerable and with development expenditure, the 
demand for these goods increased. During this period industrial 
output grew by about 7% per annum. Agricultural output increased by 
2.8% per annum and the annual GNP growth rate was in excess of 4%. 
Furthermore, the battle within the Congress Party between the more 
conservative groups aligned to business interests during the first 
few years of independence, led by Vallabhbhai Patel and Prakesh 
Tandon, and the democratic socialist/development lobby led by Nehru 
had been resolved in the latter's favour. During this era it seemed 
as though India could possibly find answers to its enormous and 
complex problems of poverty and underdevelopment, even though really 
effective wealth redistribution was lacking - the lower 40% of the 
Indian population experienced little benefit from these economic 
improvements.
Yet at the very point when the Indian economy should have experienced 
take-off it drifted into a decade of stagnation caused by a 
combination of the appalling droughts of 1965-66 and 1966-67, a sharp 
decline in foreign aid and growing contradictions within the economy. 
As the numbers employed in the industrial sectors increased, by 6% 
between 1960 and 1965, agricultural production declined. Although 
food aid created initial stability, nevertheless, agricultural prices 
increased one-third more quickly than the price of manufactured goods 
between 1960 and 1964. Basically, the Indian agricultural sector was 
failing to keep pace with the growth rates in other parts of the
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economy, which caused both inflation and an undue reliance upon food 
aid.23
Coupled with increasing problems over the nature and direction of 
foreign assistance, particularly from the United States23, and unable 
either to raise taxes further or to push public sector industries to 
produce their own savings, the Indian economy became vulnerable as, 
during the Third Five Year Plan, industries expanded, consumer 
incomes rose and the Government encouraged exports. The increasing 
lack of fit between agricultural and industrial growth presented the 
Government with impossible choices which were compounded by the 
opposition of farmers to compulsory state procurement at fixed prices 
and the taxation of agricultural income30. The choices open to the 
Government were either to extract savings from the economy and suffer 
the political consequences or to push for substantially increased 
foreign aid both to tide the economy over and to stimulate exports 
and agricultural growth. However, whichever strategy was chosen, 
good harvests were needed to relieve the aid burden and this is 
precisely where the economy came unstuck when failed harvests and
famine struck India in the two year period, 1965-1967.31 All in all
the economy did not recover for almost a full decade.
The onset of agricultural problems and the economic crisis did not 
lead to a reduction in defence allocations but certainly to their 
stabilisation. Between 1965 and 1971 total defence expenditure never
28 Mellor [1981], p.100.
29 Weiner [1981], p.49-68.
30 Rubin [1982], p.182.
31 Mellor [1981], p.103.
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actually went down, though it fell as a percentage of both total 
government expenditure and of GNP. From a high point in 1965-66, 
when defence expenditure totalled 4.0% of GNP, it declined to under 
3.5% before rising again temporarily between 1971 and 1973 to a 
fraction under 4.0%32. Also, during the period after the 1962 war, 
the growth in defence expenditure was compensated for by 
corresponding tax increases. However, the raising of taxes to fund 
increased defence expenditure did not increase the resource base 
available for investment in the public sector which inevitably added 
to the economic problems which the Government had to face33.
The second factor which influenced defence policy and posture was 
increasing uncertainty regarding India's relationship with the Soviet 
Union. The motivations on the part of both sides during this period 
were extremely complicated and have much to do with the international 
geo-political web involving China, the Soviet Union and the United 
States on the one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other. The 
common denominator throughout this period was China, and the attempts 
by both superpowers to alter the balance of power in Asia and 
globally by either including or excluding the Communist Government.
The interest in China followed two unrelated events, the Sino-Soviet 
split and President Nixon's decision to withdraw from Vietnam. For 
the Soviet Union, China presented a major problem. Unable and 
unwilling to mend the rift that had opened up in the late-1950s, the 
Soviet Union sought to isolate Communist China and prevent if 
possible the growing rapprochement between China and the USA. After
32 Thomas [1986], Table 5.5, p.184.
33 Rubin [1982], p.184.
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1962, India became a natural ally in this process but for unrelated 
reasons Soviet-Indian relations deteriorated over the late-1960s. 
First, the Soviet Union was disappointed when India failed to sign 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was opened for signature in July 
1968, even though the treaty was clearly unpopular in India. Second, 
internal developments within India, prior to Mrs Gandhi's 
consolidation of power, appeared to the Kremlin to be moving too far 
to the right and frequent references to Indian 'monopoly capitalism' 
in the Soviet press fuelled the rift, as did calls for increased 
nationalisation. The Soviets were also critical of progress on some 
of the major turnkey projects they had developed in India. Nor was 
the situation improved by New Delhi's cautious but unequivocal 
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the 
brutal suppression of the Prague Spring. Third, New Delhi objected 
to the publication of Soviet maps of South Asia which placed the 
Sino-Indian border more or less in its de facto position.
Above all, however, New Delhi was dismayed by Soviet efforts 
throughout the last half of the 1960s to drive a wedge between China 
and Pakiistan by successfully developing closer relations with the 
latter, which was in part motivated by Moscow's supposition that 
India was too independent an ally to trust implicitly - at one point 
India even considered offering an olive branch to China to ensure New 
Delhi's independence of action. The most important activity between 
the Soviet Union and Pakistan following economic aid packages in the 
early-1960s was the successful conclusion of an arms transfer 
agreement in 1968. For Pakistan, the deal was designed to fill the 
vacuum created by the US embargo in 1965 which, though partially 
lifted in 1966, had created great problems due to Pakistan's
224
erstwhile near complete reliance upon US defence equipment. The arms
actually transferred were barely significant and did not include, for
example, missiles, and also came with a proviso which prevented their 
use against India34. However, it was the political context which 
concerned India. Not only did the deal coincide with a further
weakening of US-Pakistan relations following the premature
cancellation of the US lease on Peshawar, but around the same time, 
Western newspapers reported discussions between Pakistan and the USSR 
over refuelling rights in East Pakistan; India had earlier refused to 
consider a similar request35.
The combination of economic and internal political problems and a 
cooling of relations with the Soviet Union severely restricted 
India's ability to continue the modernisation of its armed forces; 
the Government was simply unable to acquire defence equipment on the 
open market from Britain, the United States and other major Western 
suppliers. Arms transfers from the Soviet Union did not cease 
completely during this difficult period but the lack of commitment 
was evident. In September 1964, Moscow agreed to provide India with 
an additional 38 MiG-21s as well as SA-2 Guideline missiles for air 
defence. In 1968 the transfer of 100 Su-7B fighters costing $1 
million per copy began and continued until the end of the decade. 
India also received 40 T-54 tanks in 1968 and 1969 and, perhaps most 
significantly, three 'F' class submarines during the same period35.
34 Reports differ as to what the agreement entailed. The Statesman
(Calcutta) (12 July 1968) suggested that the transfer consisted
of spare parts for the dilapidated tanks (T-59) and aircraft 
(MiG-19) Pakistan had received from China whereas SIPRI [1970] 
p.25, suggest that the transfers were tanks and aircraft spare 
parts.
35 SIPRI [1971], p.499.
36 SIPRI [1971], pp.833-836.
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Nevertheless, much of the equipment received was agreed during a 
period when relations were much less strained and India's economy 
less precarious - the announcement that India would request Soviet 
submarines, for example, came in early 1964 following the US delivery 
of a submarine to Pakistan.
For the Air Force and Army the period between the two wars with 
Pakistan was largely given over to operational improvements rather 
than procurement. After the 1962 and 1965 war it became evident that 
the Army was not exploiting the potential military utility of air 
power. Although the problems in 1962 were both technical and 
institutional, in 1965 the Army only considered using the country's 
considerable air power for tactical combat support when it found 
itself under extreme pressure. For the most part the Army and Air 
Force fought separate wars. In 1969, however, the command and 
control boundaries between the two services were redefined to 
facilitate coordination and the benefits of this move were reaped in 
the 1971 war.37
What India appears to have experienced during this period was 
significant assimilation problems3®. After more than a decade of 
frantic procurement for the Air Force in particular, minimal attempts 
appear to have been made to exploit effectively all aspects of the 
technology on offer - the full potential of the equipment was not 
recognised or, if it was, the military leadership failed to master 
the new found capability.
37 Thomas [1986], pp.152-153.
38 For a useful explanation of the assimilation concept see Dupoy 
[1984].
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A very different picture obtained for the Indian Navy between the 
wars. As with the Air Force, the Navy saw little in the way of 
active duty during the 1962 and 1965 wars, in part because the wars 
were land based and the naval threats were minimal, but also because 
the Indian military leadership failed to request naval assistance for 
blockades, for example.
The Indian Navy's blue water role had been established nearly two 
decades earlier and during the late-1960s the chiefs of naval staff, 
Admirals Chatterji and his successor S.M. Nanda, coordinated a high 
profile debate on raising the status of the Indian Navy. However, 
arguing that the country's naval power should be increased was made 
all the more difficult by the relative absence of a viable threat 
from the Indian Ocean. In recent history the most significant event 
which the key opinion-shapers could allude to were the reports during 
the 1965 war, and later confirmed in the memoirs of a Pakistani Air 
Marshal, that Indonesia's President Sukarno had offered to divert 
India's attention and resources by seizing the Andaman and Nicobar 
islands which lie roughly between the two countries39. Another tack 
considered the growing dependence of China on oil imports and the 
military value which could be gained through interdiction of Chinese 
shipping to relieve the pressures on India's northern landward 
defences40.
39 Thomas [1986], pp.152-153.
40 This was the view of Capt. D.R. Mehta, quoted in Harrigan 
[1969], p.30.
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The key to the naval debate centred upon the British decision taken 
n 1966 to withdraw all forces east of Suez and surrender above all 
the control of the Indian Ocean. The prospect of a power vacuum in 
the region and the entrenched belief amongst Indian strategists, 
notably K.M. Pannikar, that whoever controls the Indian Ocean has 
India at its mercy, opened up an opportunity for naval planners to 
argue that the country should extend its naval influence.
A report undertaken by the naval study group at the Indian Defence 
College in early 1969 mooted the idea that India should take the 
initiative to form a strong military alliance with 'other1 South East 
Asian countries and/or one of the two superpowers. In open defiance 
of existing Government foreign policy the study group argued the need 
to contain China by superior strength and this entailed a departure 
from non-alignment until such time as India's industrial and econonic 
base was sufficiently strong to support independent action, which 
would be unlikely until around 1980.41 The incumbent defence 
minister, Swaran Singh, rejected the report as did Indian Army 
strategists who argued that India should have a brown, not a blue 
water naval strategy.
Nevertheless, the British withdrawal from East of Suez provided 
momentum for the debate over allocations to the Indian Navy, much of 
which was articulated via the influential Madras newspaper, The 
Hindu*2. Moreover, the Navy found a measure of support in 
Parliamentary circles, particularly amongst Elites which shared the 
long term view of India becoming a world power of some significance.
41 The Times [13 May 1969].
42 Thomas [1978], p.206.
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Also, a parallel debate emerged in the United States which proposed
that the US should protect India's maritime interests until such time
as it could fully afford to operate independently, which also fitted
well with the foreign policy designs of the era,
"... the United States should underwrite the maritime 
security of India and the emergent nations of South and 
Southeast Asia, whose limited resources can then better 
be used for the development of their armies and air 
forces for effective deployment in the immediately 
threatened areas of their territories.1143
Even without the acceptance of this grand design, Indian naval 
planners argued that naval allocations had to increase to overcome 
the growing problem of obsolescence. By the late-1960s, for example, 
the Sea Hawks allocated to the Vikrant were obsolete yet the 
carrier's decks were too small for more modern aircraft. Although 
replacement was beyond the country's means, greater attention to 
detail was urgently required44.
Despite the Government's reservations concerning the cost and 
desirability of implementing the requests of the naval lobby, it 
proved to be not wholly unsympathetic. Throughout the last half of 
the 1960s allocations to the Navy grew steadily at the expense of the 
Air Force, from 7.8% of capital total in 1966-67 to 34.3% in 1970- 
7145. The capital-intensive nature of naval equipment 
notwithstanding, this was a significant institutional victory which 
was underscored in 1968 by the elevation of the Chief of Naval Staff 
to Admiral thereby bringing the post in line with the other services.
43 US Naval Institute Proceedings [1962], p.109.
44 US Naval Institute Proceedings [1968].
45 Thomas [1986], Table 5.9, p.192.
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In terms of equipment, the favourable mood in New Delhi and increased 
allocations actually bought very little. Apart from the equipment 
received from the Soviet Union, in 1968 the Navy received the first 
Leander class frigate from Mazagon Docks in Bombay and Alouette 
helicopters from HAL in Bangalore. A year later, India received from 
Britain Hunt Escort Type destroyers, which had long been obsolete in 
the Royal Navy, and a new helicopter squadron was constituted. In 
addition, there were proposals and promises to establish a new naval 
base in the Bay of Bengal and that at some time in the future the 
likely replacement for the Vikrant's strikeforce would be the V/STOL 
Harrier.A&
One of India’s most memorable feats since 1947 came with the 
successful 'liberation' of Bangladesh in 1971, which not only heaped 
ignominy on Pakistan as the first newly independent country to be 
dismembered but also assured and increased India's sense of regional 
hegemony. However, prior to the conflict, India's iegional position 
threatened to become far from secure as the Soviet Union continued 
its flirtation with Pakistan as a means of pursuing its by now long 
standing conflict with Communist China. Nevertheless, a combination 
of both nimble and heavy diplomatic footwork by New Delhi in 1969 in 
effect assured Indian freedom of action thereafter and, in addition, 
paved the way for an enduring relationship with the Soviet Union from 
which the Indian defence sector has been the principal beneficiary.
By early-1969 the Soviet Union showed little sign of back pedalling 
over arms supplies to Pakistan even though it increasingly required a
46 Thomas [1976], p.214-215.
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sympathetic voice from India on China, the more so as Pakistan showed 
little predilection to lean to one side and reduce its ties with 
China. Instead, Pakistan agreed to a road building programme to link 
China and Pakistan via the old Silk Route and through territory 
claimed by India. Indeed, as a direct affront to the Soviet Union 
and Mrs Gandhi the Pakistan Government offered to open border talks 
with China with no preconditions in an obvious gesture of defiance 
and irritation*7.
For its part, Mrs Gandhi was running dangerously short of options and 
desperately needed the support of the Soviet Union which could only 
be achieved by brinksmanship which necessitated threatening the 
Soviet position in South Asia. The US withdrawal from Vietnam and 
President Nixon's announcement that henceforth the US would expect 
Asian countries to look after their own security meant that for India
f
there was little immediate chance of securing concessions from the 
Soviet Union by currying favour or, perhaps, acquiring arms from the 
United States. Nevertheless, the Kremlin must have accepted the risk 
involved in alienating India but as problems emerged between East and 
West Pakistan the extent of the gamble must have become clearer - 
effectively Moscow risked losing all its influence in South Asia if 
it alienated India and Pakistan became too difficult an ally.
The growing problems between East and West Pakistan were rooted in
economic disparities which stemmed from the inordinate economic and
47 The anti-Soviet nature of this gesture is underpinned by the
observation that the Indian Prime Minister could not offer talks 
without preconditions - the original Sino-Indian border is 
enshrined in the Indian constitution and, as such, any 
resolution of the long standing dispute requires a change in the 
Indian constitution and a two thirds majority in Parliament 
which no Prime Minister before Rajiv Gandhi has ever possessed.
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political power wielded by the Punjabi ruling classes and the 
military. Conflict between East and West was inevitable, 
particularly given the level of inequality between the two wings and 
the unwillingness on the part of the state to redress the situation. 
In all likelihood Pakistan would have divided itself, even without 
the assistance of India. However, the 'liberation' of Bangladesh 
offered a considerable regional prize for India and virtually negated 
the effects of the 1962 war.
Following the 1970 election in Pakistan, the leader of the Awami 
League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, took control of East Pakistan, which 
constituted one of the five provinces in Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto won a less than decisive victory than predicted but became 
Prime Minister. The strength of Mujibur's support in the East forced 
Bhutto into talks with the provincial leader which quickly came to 
nothing. In addition, East Pakistan was reeling under the effects of 
an appalling cyclone and its problems were compounded by the 
inability of relief organisations to cope with the disaster. 
Approximately ten million Hindu refugees and fugitives from the 
internal fighting that had erupted spilled over into India. Seizing 
the opportunity India invaded East Pakistan, swiftly overran its 
defences and captured 90,000 prisoners. In the West, India moved 
into the Rann of Kutch and regained a slice of Azad Kashmir. The 
drawn out conflict between East and West Pakistan and the 
reorganisation and synchronisation of the armed forces bestowed upon 
India two decisive advantages. The event was marred for the Indian 
Government, however, by the appearance of the USS Enterprise and 
several escort ships in the Bay of Bengal. This symbolic gesture in 
support of Pakistan was not lost on the Indian elites and the event
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still figures frequently in foreign and defence policy debates - it 
has become an extremely potent symbol.
5.1.6 The Soviet Union and India - Burgeoning Dependency
The 1970s was the most turbulent decade independent India has yet 
experienced; a period of both political and economic chaos.
Throughout the early 1970s the economy went from bad to worse. The 
fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) was characterised by reckless deficit 
financing. In 1972-73 the important growing season which occurs 
during the monsoon, the kharif, was largely a failure and this 
setback was swiftly followed by rises in oil prices following the 
formation of OPEC. Between January 1972 and January 1974 the price 
index rose by 40%. ‘4S The political coalitions which Indira Gandhi 
had so successfully engineered a decade earlier along class lines 
began to break up as disenchantment appeared amongst the ranks of 
organised labour, students and the intellectual left. The growing 
tension between these groups and the Government was exacerbated by 
strike breaking, rises in the base lending rate and other measures 
designed to decrease dissent, increase savings and investment and 
reduce the flow of credit in the economy. Although some of these 
measures improved the Prime Minister's popularity to some extent, 
they did not prevent the Emergency which resulted from the Allahabad 
High Court's indictment of Mrs Gandhi on charges of electoral 
malpractice which subsequently led to her receiving a statutory 
disqualification from political activities for five years. Although 
the Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal, the Prime Minister
48 Jha [1980], p.135.
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declared a state of emergency two days later, swiftly arrested large 
numbers of political opponents and imposed draconian censorship 
measures.
Started in June 1975, the Emergency lasted for nearly two years, 
until eventually the Janata Party was elected in 1977 with Morarji 
Desai as Prime Minister. However, no sooner had the new government 
taken power than the inevitable splits in the fragile coalition 
occurred. This allowed Mrs Gandhi to resume power three years later 
after winning the 1980 election.
The complacency with regard to security brought about by the 
dismemberment of Pakistan, the parlous state of the Indian economy, 
together with the level of political turmoil, pushed defence and, to 
a lesser extent, foreign affairs into the background. Moreover, the 
aftermath of the war was double-edged for India. Although regional 
hegemony and additional security were recognisable gains, sufficient 
problems occurred during the 'seventies to diminish considerably the 
gains from the war.
First and foremost, the complex diplomatic game involving India, the 
Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan and China proceeded apace. 
Although the United States continued with its arms embargo on South 
Asia and generally concentrated upon extricating itself from the 
Vietnam war, the movement towards China was unmistakable. This 
process reawakened Soviet interest in Pakistan, particularly since 
many of the problems of political instability which emerged in the 
1960s been resolved, ironically by India for the most part.
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Although Soviet policy was open to opportunities to weaken China 
through overtures to Pakistan, nevertheless, the Kremlin did its best 
to fulfil all its political obligations to India under the 1971 
Treaty of Co-operation and Friendship. In 1972 Moscow gave Foreign 
Secretary T.N. Kaul and Planning Minister D.P. Dhar warm receptions 
on separate visits. Both events led to increased diplomatic support 
and assistance for India's ailing economy. Also in 1972 Admiral 
Gorshkov visited India to encourage the expansion of the Indian Navy 
as an additional counter to the burgeoning US naval build-up in the 
region. During the same year Moscow offered New Delhi another Petya 
class frigate. In October 1972 General Secretary Brezhnev visited 
Delhi. The occasion was given a very high profile in Moscow as part 
of an attempt to reactivate interest in an Asian security complex to 
form a power bloc against China.
Despite the Soviet Union's equivocation over whether or not to pursue 
friendly relations with Pakistan and India's countering by either 
cooling its rhetoric or threatening to play the China card, which 
entailed a normalisation of relations intended to isolate the Soviet 
Union, nevertheless, the underlying strength of bi-lateral relations 
continued through until the mid-1970s. However, after the 1971 war 
the Kremlin barely raised the issue of military aid and arms 
transfers, although it is unclear as to how interested the Indians 
were in further agreements. Until 1975, procurement from the Soviet 
Union was low key and amounted to little more than the facilities to 
produce improved versions of the MiG-21. On the Soviet side the 
level of antipathy may have been a manifestation of the burgeoning 
detente between East and West and, given the US arms embargo on the 
region, which remained in place until 1975, the desire not to upset
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the regional balance. In Delhi it may have been the case that first, 
the Government was becoming aware that dependence upon the Soviet 
Union was uncomfortably strong. By the early-1970s, arms imports 
from the Communist bloc represented an inordinately high percentage 
of military imports. In 1961 imports from these sources amounted to 
a mere 10% of total military imports, in 1971, 1972 and 1973 the 
level was consistently 90%49. Second, the decision makers in New 
Delhi undoubtedly came to the conclusion that further modernisation 
was too expensive and unnecessary, from a regional political 
perspective at least- Even though Moscow accepted payments in rupees 
and goods, the benefits were frequently negated by 'switch trading' 
whereby East European countries would export goods previously given 
to the Soviet Unicarv for payment by India as a seans of raising 
foreign exchange. Payment to the Soviets im exportable goods may not 
have actually reduced levels of foreign exchange but would have cut 
considerably the potential for earning hard currency during a period 
when India's reserves were extremely low.
Nevertheless, on the question of Soviet defence equipment the pattern 
of Indian behaviour was contradictory for the first half of the 
decade. On the one hand there was a growing awareness of dependency 
and concern thereof. In addition, during this period there were 
several suggestions that the Indian armed forces were dissatisfied 
with the quality and flow of equipment from the Soviet Union. The 
Foxtrot submarines, originally designed for cold war operations, gave 
recurring problems in tropical zones. Over thirty Su-7 fighter- 
bombers were lost during the 1971 war in part because their slow rate
49 Terhal [1982], Table 6, pp.14-15.
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of climb made them vulnerable to ground fire.50 Because of 
centralised production schedules Soviet spare parts were taking up to 
37 months to come through51. Also, on each given system spare parts 
requirements would have been greater for the Indian armed forces on 
account of the inevitable increase of workload due to smaller 
inventories. For example, an Indian MiG-21 would require more 
frequent tyre and brake pad renewals as each system would be used 
more frequently than their Soviet counterparts.
On the other hand, New Delhi had nowhere else to go for defence 
equipment during a time when the mounting bill for foodgrains, 
fertilisers, oil and steel had virtually wiped out the country's 
foreign exchange reserves. For example, interest in the Harrier to 
replace the obsolete Sea Hawks for the Vikrant dates back to at least 
mid-1973. It came to nothing as the cost would have amounted to at 
least Rs.100 crores of foreign exchange52. Reports that India would 
acquire the Soviet Yak-36 strike fighter instead to refurbish the 
fleet air arm were never substantiated. Thus, in the quest to expand 
the Navy, India was forced to continue its dependent relationship 
with the Soviet Union. By the end of the decade, therefore, 
following great political and diplomatic manoeuvering, India had 
acquired an array of modern naval equipment from the Soviets 
including 8 F-class submarines, 10 Petya II frigates, 3 Nanchuka 
corvettes equipped with SSM and SAM missiles, 16 of the Osa class 
missile patrol boats, which had performed so well in the 1971 war,
50 Rikhye [1975], p.14.
51 The Times [3 July 1970].
52 Malhotra [1973].
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coastal patrol boats and minesweepers53. However, in keeping with 
the naval expansion policy 7 11-38 Mays were procured for long range 
reconnaissance and, in 1974, the Soviets undertook to refurbish 
completely the naval base at Vishakhapatnam.
For the Air Force, further expansion and modernisation was barely 
possible in the early-1970s. Although there was a widespread desire 
to replace the Canberra bomber and the Hunter, the Soviet Union was 
unable to fill the gap and other systems were considered too 
expensive. In fact, interest in the Anglo-French Jaguar as a 
potential follow-on system emerged as early as July 1968 following an 
offer by the British Aircraft Corporation which included license 
production rights of the 'paper' plane54. Nevertheless, the 
increasing age of India's long-range strike force and the 
implications thereof were not lost on defence planners. In addition,
the obsolescence of other aircraft, coupled with the rumour in the
mid-1970s that Pakistan might augment its inventory of Miraqe-3/5 
fighter bombers with a shipment of similar aircraft from Libya, 
raised the option of acquiring a long-range fighter bomber55. In 
addition to the Jaguar other similar aircraft which came under 
consideration were the MiG-23, the Swedish Saab-37 Viggen and the 
French F-l Mirage.
In the period between the 1971 war and the Janata period, the Army 
fared badly with regard to the import of equipment but much better in 
relation to indigenous production. However, its relative share of
53 The Military Balance 1979-80.
54 Flight International [1968].
55 Thomas [1986], p.169.
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the defence budget declined. During the 1960s the Army received on 
average 77.7% of the annual defence budget but by 1973-74 this had 
declined to 71.1%5e. Moreover, soaring inflation and rising manpower 
costs further eroded the Army's purchasing power. Thus, by 1973-74 
capital expenditure for the Army had fallen to 38%, some 10% less 
th a n  for the Navy, as against a mean of 53.4% during the 1960s57. 
Consequently, little in the way of planned or actual procurement 
actually occurred during the 1970s.
In summary, therefore, it seems that throughout the 1970s India's 
defence procurement policy was low key, especially with regard to the 
Array. The only realistic source of equipment given the foreign 
exchange crisis was the Soviet Union. Although it was well 
recognised that the country required a more modern deep strike 
capability, the availability of hardware from the Soviet Union was 
limited and the foreign exchange costs from elsewhere prohibitive. 
Where the commonality of interests did occur was in the mutual desire 
on the part of both the Soviet Union and India to see a stronger 
Indian blue water navy. For the Soviets this was a means of 
retaining influence with India, partially countering the US naval 
build-up in the region, avoiding a strain on US-Soviet relations by 
disturbing the Indo-Pakistan balance of power through the transfer of 
ground and air forces and, perhaps, laying the foundations for 
gaining access to the strategically sited naval base at 
Vishakhapatnam. For India, it was an opportunity to build upon its 
dormant blue water strategy, plenish naval power and capitalise upon
56 Figures extrapolated from Thomas [1986], Table 5.9, p.192.
57 Thomas [1986], Table 5.9, p.192.
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but not fill the power vacuum that had emerged following Britain's 
retreat East of Suez.
5.1.7 The Janata Period - Reduced Dependency and Increased 
Procurement
Although it was clear that India could ill-afford to modernise parts 
of the Air Force, nevertheless, a head of steam had built up under 
discussions for modernisation. Replacement discussions were well 
advanced when Morarji Desai came to power in 1977. Years before, 
Desai had held the Finance portfolio in the Nehru Government and he 
was well known for his reluctance to expend resources on defence, 
until after the 1962 war.
Politically, the Janata Government framed its policies in a reactive 
fashion. It was essentially a loose knit coalition which owed its 
existence to both Mrs Gandhi and the Emergency. Once both had 
disappeared (Mrs Gandhi, however, kept up an extremely good public 
profile which served her well in the future) an ideological vacuum 
occurred which was filled with responsive gestures rather than with a 
vision of where realistically the new Government could take India in 
the crucible of international politics. The policies which emerged 
were very much the antithesis of Mrs Gandhi's. First, Desai rejected 
India's equivocal nuclear policy and pledged not to pursue the 
nuclear option, although this fell well short of signing the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. Second, the new government attempted to reduce 
the dependence upon the Soviet Union, a policy which was facilitated 
by a dramatic rise in foreign exchange reserves. In November 1976
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reserves stood at Rs.2403 crores but exactly two years later they 
more than doubled to Rs.5153 crores53. Third, and related to the 
previous policy plank, the Government attempted to reestablish 
India's credibility as a non-aligned power.
The new Government continued the policy of its predecessor and kept 
alive the prospect that India would acquire a deep strike penetration 
aircraft some two generations beyond the Canberra and the Hunter. 
Prior to the election of Janata a roll-on plan for 1976-81 had been 
adopted and the new government honoured the plan. With foreign 
exchange reserves much higher, the Government could afford actively 
to consider the Jaguar deal. This had been on ice for a decade, and 
was only revitalised in theory as a result of Pakistan1s procurement 
of the Miraqe-3/5. In addition, India could also play the market and 
force the major European arms exporters to compete against each 
other. In February 1978 Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram announced that 
India was considering the Saab-Scania Viqqen, the Dassault-Breguet 
Mirage F-l and the Anglo-French Jaguar. From the Soviet side an 
offer of the MiG-23, the Su-20 and the Su-22 had been considered but 
was rejected because none of the aircraft were suitable for the 
intended missions, and questions had been raised about their 
performance capabilities. The factors which influenced decision 
makers were unit costs, terms of payment, delivery schedules, 
licensed production options and offset arrangements59. Although it
58 Thomas [1982], Appendix I, p.113.
59 Offset arrangements have become increasingly a part of most arms 
deals in recent years. Basically, the system works in the 
following way. Country A will sell to country B and include 
licensed production arrangements. Country B will include in the 
deal the option to produce more than is required for domestic 
purposes and either sell the surplus spare parts to a third 
country operating the same system or back to the original 
supplier. In this instance an element of the offset deal
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is thought that the IAF favoured the Swedish Viggen in all its 
variations (reconnaissance, high altitude, interceptor and strike), 
this option was blocked by the United States. The plane was powered 
by a Pratt and Whitney engine (a US corporation) which gave the US 
Government the power of veto60. The Mirage was turned down, probably 
on the grounds of the French relationship with Pakistan61. In 
February 1978 the British Prime Minister James Callaghan visited 
India with the thinly disguised intention of securing the Jaguar deal 
and an order for six cargo ships62. The visit was preceded by a 
visit in January from the US President, Jimmy Carter, when the US 
veto was probably discussed in detail. However, by June it was 
becoming clear that the Indian Government was coming down in favour 
of the Jaguar, ostensibly due to the system's low-level navigation 
capability, range and avionics equipment63. More likely, however, 
the Government was faced with a single option for political rather 
than technical reasons; primarily a desire to move away from 
dependence upon the Soviet Union but, at the same time, the choice of 
alternative suppliers was extremely limited. In October 1978 the 
Government announced its selection and at the cost of $2.2 billion 
agreed to purchase 200 Jaguar International aircraft - 40 to be
involved Britain buying back India's obsolete Canberras and 
Hunters once the Jaguar entered service (Air International, 
(December 1978), p 254. For an analysis of the more recent 
offset trend see Neuman [1985],
60 Nagchaudhri, Conversations with the author (New Delhi, March 
1985).
61 For an overview of this relationship during this period see, 
India Backgrounder [1979].
62 Far Eastern Economic Review [17 February 1978].
63 The Financial Times [28 June 1977].
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purchased outright and the rest to be built in Indiafe4. The
announcement came as a relief to both sides. As one source
commented, somewhat wryly,
"Serious negotiations began in 1972 or 1973 and it has 
been hot and cold ever since, largely on the question of 
financing.1,65
The importance of the Jaguar deal was that it signified the end of 
India's low key procurement, heralded the onset of a large-scale 
modernisation programme and, furthermore, indicated that India was 
henceforth prepared to buy from whichever source provided the most 
relevant and superior technology. Or, put another way, India now 
felt able to reduce its dependency upon the Soviet bloc for defence 
equipment.
Although little else appeared to be under consideration for the IAF, 
except the MiG-23 to augment the Jaguar DSPA strike force, in early- 
1979 a high powered Indian defence team toured Europe to gather 
information concerning a further modernisation of the Navyefe. In 
particular, the team assessed four European shipyards for the ability 
to provide India with some twenty submarines to replace the eight 
Soviet Foxtrots currently in service. Uppermost in the minds of the 
team members was the desire to strike a deal similar to the Jaguar 
involving outright purchase, technology transfer and offset options. 
For this, the Government was prepared to consider costs of between
64 The Jaguar International is the export version of the Jaguar 
deployed by France and Britain. The key difference is that the 
International is powered by two Rolls-Royce-Turbomeca Adour Mk. 
102 engines which contain 17% more thrust than the standard 
Jaguar.
65 Aviation Week and Space Technology [16 October 1978].
66 Sharma [April 1979].
243
$700 and $1,000 million67. In addition, interest in the Harrier 
VSTOL was rekindled, albeit with an upwardly revised price, and the 
deal was announced in October 1978.68 In effect, the Government had 
no choice. The Soviet equivalent, the Yak-36 Forqer-A was too much 
of an unknown quantity, the US Skyhawk was never a serious contender 
on account of US arms sales policy to the sub-continent and no other 
system was suitable for the relatively short flight deck on the 
Vikrant, which at the time did not have a ski ramp.
Around the same period the Army were given the go-ahead to consider a 
new generation main battle tank. Although the West German Leopard II 
and the British Chieftain V were considered, competition with the 
Soviet T-72 never appeared really serious as 100 units had already 
been procured whilst the evaluation of the former tanks was in 
progress. Also under consideration during this period was a 
replacement for the Czech OT-62 armoured personnel carrier, a 
decision which also came down in favour of the Soviet BMP-1 with the 
only close contender being the less well armed but faster and more 
expensive West German Mander69.
Clearly, the Janata Government was extremely serious in their 
attempts at an across-the-board modernisation of India's defence 
capability. The motivation appears to have been primarily 
technological, although there were strong but unsubstantiated hints 
of corruption over the Jaguar deal, involving commissions totalling
67 Marshall [1979].
68 Air International [December 1978], p.254.
69 India Backgrounder [July [979], p.1802.
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£56.8 million70. However, the bulk of the allegations were made ten 
days before Prime Minister Charan Singh sought a vote of confidence 
in Parliament71. Unquestionably, there were few security 
considerations which required urgent attention and, also, little 
attempt was made to justify the process on these grounds,
"The modernisation programmes for the three services will 
take at least three years to carry out, but there is no 
hurry since India does not expect an immediate threat 
from across its borders. China is still showing signs of 
wanting to mend fences and the threat from Pakistan is no 
longer serious because internal upheaval rules out 
military adventures. The main purpose of the Defence 
Ministry's multi-pronged effort is to keep abreast of the 
latest advances in defence technology and to begin 
preparations immediately to face the expected strategic 
challenges of the 1980s."72
5.2 Nuclear Weapons Policy
5.2.1 India and Nuclear Weapons: The Importance of the 1970s73
Any discussion of India's defence policy over the period in question 
cannot ignore the significance and impact of deliberations over the 
direction of India's nuclear weapon programme. Equally, the decision 
to eschew one of the major multilateral arms control initiatives of 
the period, the opening for signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
70 Sharma [August 1979].
71 International Herald Tribune [11-12 August 1979].
72 Sharma [April 1979].
73 For a broader analysis by the author of India's policy towards
nuclear weapons and the nuclear proliferation situation in South 
Asia generally see, Smith C. [1984], and, Smith C. [1987].
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(NPT) in 1968, should also be considered. Both affected India's 
foreign policy and its relations with foreign powers, especially the 
two superpowers. One advantage of possessing nuclear weapons is the 
implied capability to reduce or fetter expenditures on conventional 
forces on account of the considerable firepower and deterrent value 
afforded by either free-fall nuclear bombs or nuclear missiles.
Whether or not this was debated within military or political circles 
must also be examined.
Successive Indian governments have always displayed a distinct
ambiguity towards the question of whether or not to include nuclear
weapons in their force structure. As indicated in the previous
chapter, Nehru was equivocal in principle although there is no
suggestion that had he been confronted with a real option that he
would have accepted the need for a nuclear deterrent. However,
against this must be set the considerable ignorance amongst policy
makers throughout the world at that time - nuclear weapons were seen
as contiguous to large conventional weapons rather than the
qualitatively different, awesomely powerful and destructive weapons
that we now more correctly consider them to be. The extent of
Nehru's ambiguous policy towards the nuclear option was reflected to
a statement he made to the Lok Sabha on 10 August 1960,
"So far as we are concerned, we are determined not to go 
in for making atomic bombs and the like. But we are 
. equally determined not to be left behind in this advance 
in the use of this new power."74
Homi Bhabha, a brilliant scientist and the father of India's nuclear 
weapon programme, used both his personal power base (which stemmed
74 Quoted in Kapur [undated], p.17.
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from his pre-eminent position within the scientific bureaucracy 
during the 1960s) and hi°. personal relationship with Nehru to advance 
the nuclear power programme and keep open the option to produce 
nuclear weapons. From 1948 until his accidental death in January 
1966, Bhabha was the director of India's atomic energy programme and 
largely responsible for keeping the military option open during a 
period when internationalism rather than narrow self-interest 
dominated the opinion shaping process in this area.
Three factors influenced interest in nuclear weapons during the mid- 
1960s. First, the 1962 war made its impact in this arena as it did 
in others. Second, the death of Nehru permitted a new and more 
hawkish political debate on the defence options open to India.
Third, in late-1964 China successfully conducted a nuclear test which 
offered the Government an excellent case for keeping open the nuclear 
option. Bhabha was quick to take the opportunity to convince both 
government and the public that 'The explosion of a nuclear device by 
China is a signal that there is no time to be lost'75.
After this time and up until the nuclear test in 1974, public opinion 
appeared increasingly to favour the pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
According to public opinion surveys conducted in Delhi, Calcutta, 
Bombay and Madras throughout the late-1960s, strong support existed 
in favour of going nuclear. Indeed, the urban-based, conservative 
party, the Jana Sangh, was the most outspoken pro-bomb party.
Strength of feeling in favour of the bomb was particularly strong in 
Delhi7&. However, in a survey of the attitudes of Indian elites to
75 Jain [1974], pp.158, quoted in Jones [1985], p.109.
76 Jones [1985], p.108. Jones uses data from Monthly Public 
Opinion Surveys [1974].
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both the bomb and the NPT, Ashis Nandy identified a stronger anti- 
bomb sentiment (53.7%) than existed in the public domain but, on the 
other hand, an extremely strong and unqualified antipathy (68.9%) 
towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)77.
It was both the weight of public and Congress opinion and the 
inherent shortcomings of the NPT which persuaded Mrs Gandhi not to 
make India a signatory. No conflict existed in adopting a stance 
which was anti-bomb on the one hand and anti-NPT on the other. The 
anti-bomb sentiment amongst elites stemmed from several quarters, 
notably the Gandhian legacy of pacifism and the Nehru legacy of 
internationalism. Over time the potency of the anti-bomb lobby 
declined and the growing equivocation of this quarter contrasted 
strongly with the burgeoning, strident support for developing nuclear 
weapons amongst the pro-bomb lobby. Furthermore, this perspective 
was juxtaposed with a growing opinion in favour of isolationism.
Condemnation of the NPT was relatively straightforward. The NPT was 
something of an arms control flagship during the 1960s and 
represented a carefully negotiated but highly compromised treaty 
designed to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Its 
success rested on a fundamental clause which required the states in 
possession of nuclear weapons to make every effort at the earliest 
date to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Or, put another 
way, the non-nuclear states would only forego the option to go 
nuclear on the understanding that meaningful and discernible 
disarmament measures would be taken by France, Britain and China and
77 Nandy [1972].
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the superpowers. Indian public opinion and voices within government 
doubted the sincerity of this commitment, a view which was more than 
vindicated in later years given the persistent prevarication over 
East-West arms control issues, the recent Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
(INF) agreement notwithstanding. The reciprocity factor has always 
been a fundamental sticking point in NPT review conferences, held 
every five years, and may yet be the problem which prevents the 
survival of the non-proliferation regime into the 1990s. Indian 
strategists may also have concluded that the bifurcation between the 
haves and have nots and the relative power of the former group placed 
India in a disadvantageous position vis a vis China. Internally, 
bureaucratic support for rejecting the NPT may have stemmed from the 
desire not to eliminate a major counter-balance to the poor 
performance of the nuclear energy industry - whilst the bomb option 
is kept open the nuclear energy programme must continue.
Despite the fact that the NPT was an important goal of Soviet foreign 
policy in 1968 (perhaps designed to offset the international 
condemnation engendered by the invasion of Czechoslovakia which took 
place a month after the treaty opened for signature) and pressure was 
placed upon India to adhere, the Indian Government refused to sign - 
Mrs Gandhi read the public mood well. The definitive act of 
rejection had the twin effects of stimulating and legitimising a 
debate on the nuclear option and, duly, the clamour for a test 
increased.
From the Government viewpoint, there was growing concern during this 
period over the Soviet Union's integrity as a loyal ally. Detente 
between the superpowers, closer Soviet-Pakistan relations and Sino-
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American rapprochement sharpened the perception that India could on 
no count afford to place an element of its security in the hands of 
others, however powerful.
The nuclear weapon programme in India probably began after the 
Chinese test in 1964. Although evidence that the programme started 
at this point is scarce, such a reactive response was widely 
considered to be inevitable. In all probability India possessed the 
capability to conduct a nuclear test in the late-1960s but chose not 
to do so until 1974 when a nuclear device with a yield of 12-15 
kilotons equivalent was successfully exploded near Pokhoran, a small 
town in the Rajasthan desert. Exactly why the test was conducted in 
1974 is not clear. Possibly, Mrs Gandhi's declining political 
fortunes during that period, which included tensions between the 
Centre and the States of Gujarat and Bihar and a national rail 
strike, a desire to influence the forthcoming 1975 NPT Review 
Conference and a sense of regional power were contributory factors. 
It is also clear that a bureaucratic and technocratic head of steam 
had built up in favour of a test.
However, although the test was successful and warmly welcomed 
throughout the country, the strength of international condemnation 
was unequivocal. From the outset, the international community, 
including the Soviet Union, was singularly unimpressed by the 
protestations of the Government that the test was a bona fide 
peaceful nuclear explosion designed to keep the country abreast of 
technological developments in the fields of mining and earthmoving 
operations78. The plutonium for the test could only have come from
78 SIPRI f1975b1, p.16.
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the research reactor at Trombay, a heavy water reactor that burned 
natural uranium and produced plutonium. India had acquired the CIRUS 
reactor in 1955 from Canada on particularly beneficial terms, 
financial and otherwise; the Canadian Government had stipulated that 
the reactor should be used for peaceful purposes only and, on the 
understanding that India had accepted this condition, no discussion 
of safeguards took place79. The Canadian Government was deeply 
offended by the test and along with the rest of the international 
community considered that the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Regime 
and what remained of the 'Atoms for Peace' ideal had been severely 
compromised. Soon after the test the Canadian Secretary of State for 
External Affairs issued a firm statement of protest which concluded,
"(Canada) fully respects India's sovereignty and 
independence in all matters. It cannot, however, be 
expected to assist and subsidise, directly or indirectly, 
a nuclear programme which, in a key respect, undermines 
the position which Canada has for a long time been firmly 
convinced is best for world peace and security."30
Two years later the Canadians withdrew all cooperation for and 
assistance to India's nuclear energy programme.
The United States and France were also involved by virtue of previous 
aid agreements. The Americans had trained more than 1,300 nuclear 
scientists and technicians from India and had also extended 
subsidised loans and research grants for both applied and pure 
research in this area. The United States thereafter refused to 
supply spare parts and enriched uranium for the Tarapur power station 
and in so doing revoked the bilateral agreement of 1963 which
79 Goldschmidt [1983].
80 SIPRI [1975b], p.21.
25
extended American cooperation in nuclear energy for thirty years, an 
issue which has conditioned bilateral relations ever since. France 
had aljo entered into similar agreements but showed altogether less 
concern than the two North American states81.
The Indian Government's somewhat weak protest that the test had been 
conducted without any form of foreign assistance made little 
difference. In the space of two years India had lost most of the 
foreign assistance for its nuclear energy programme. Although the 
programme continued, rigorous sanctions, lack of sufficient foreign 
expertise, the dispersal of many bright young Indian scientists to 
the West and pronounced managerial problems combined to slow the pace 
of the Indian nuclear programme to a virtual standstill by the turn 
of the decade82.
During the Janata period a very different policy towards nuclear 
weapons was articulated. In keeping with the overall strategy of 
negating the policies adopted by Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Desai 
attempted initially to reject unequivocally not just the nuclear 
option but nuclear testing as well. This was in part an attempt to 
win back the technical cooperation lost from the United States, 
although President Carter was less than accommodating on this issue. 
It was also a reflection of Desai's deep commitment to the ideals of 
pacifism, internationalism and, perhaps, prudent housekeeping83. In
81 Weissman and Crossley [1981], p.131.
82 In 1970 the Department of Atomic Energy estimated that India 
would have 2,700MW of installed nuclear power capacity. By 1980 
installed capacity was no more than 240MW.
83 Subsequent estimates of the scale of financial resources 
required suggest that the Government would have to find an extra
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June 1978 Desai announced that India would no longer engage in 
nuclear testing, whatever the policies of other countries - the 1974 
test had prompted Pakistan to step up the military dimension of its
nuclear programme, which had first become evident in 197284. Strong
political objections from within Janata and other political parties 
forced a volte face and a month later Desai was forced not to rule 
out the possibility of testing for peaceful purposes. Three days 
later, however, the Prime Minister directly contradicted himself and 
gave assurances that under no circumstances would nuclear testing 
take place, at least whilst the Janata party was in power85.
With the benefit of hindsight the 1974 nuclear test was a major 
policy mistake for India, although at the time the scale and 
intensity of international condemnation and the sanctions which 
followed could not have been foreseen. It cast India dangerously 
close to pariah status and negated much of the country's credibility 
throughout the world. This apart, however, it is apparent that the 
motivation behind the nuclear test was primarily if not exclusively 
political. At no point does it seem that military considerations and 
problems were considered and no discussion appears to have taken 
place between Government and the military as to exactly what the 
country would do with such a capability once a positive decision had 
been taken to produce nuclear weapons. This was perhaps because the 
armed forces are less enthusiastic about a nuclear India than their
$15 billion over a ten year period to fund an unambiguous 
nuclear weapon programme. Sen Gupta [1983], pp.23-27.
84 The literature on Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme is
extensive. However, for a succinct review of the programme see, 
Kapur [1987].
82 Thomas [1986], p.108.
253
civilian counterparts. Not only would a nuclear arsenal cut deep 
into the procurement budget and reduce the resources available for 
conventional defence but, equally important, the military would 
effectively lose bureaucratic turf, given that the threatened or 
actual use of countervalue nuclear weapons is more a political than a 
military decision: the latter are primarily used to destroy
population centres not military targets. Nor was there then or has 
there been since any discussion concerning the assimilation of 
nuclear weapons into the Indian defence forces - which service would 
assume control, how conventional and nuclear forces would interface 
and how deterrent capability could be maximised.
5.3 Indian Defence Policy 1962-1980: Answers in Search of Problems
During the 1960s and 1970s India's defence posture expanded 
significantly, given the paucity of foreign exchange reserves, the 
parlous state of the economy and domestic political upheaval.
However, as the defence postures evolved it does not seem clear as to 
what decision makers and planners were seeking - clear policy 
guidelines appeared to be lacking.
First and foremost, the post-1962 political atmosphere left Indian 
leaders in no doubt that substantial changes were required in the 
defence sector. To allay public doubts and fears remedial action in 
the form of extra allocations was an understandable gesture to ensure 
the political survival of the Congress Party. However, the new 
guidelines of 1964 notwithstanding, Nehru appeared not to see the 
need for a wide-ranging defence review. India lost the 1962 conflict
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with China because of incompetence, both before but especially during 
the short w a r .  The defence sector may have been lacking in certain 
areas which could otherwise have allowed the armed forces to fare 
less atrociously, such as better aircraft, infantry weapons and 
artillery. However, the root cause of the defeat was poor defence 
organisation and a failure to ensure an adequate defence capability 
in the North-east, a lack of training for high altitude warfare, poor 
decision making at the political and intelligence levels, which 
resulted in the Chinese threat being taken altogether too lightly 
and, finally, inadequate combat capability.
In 1964 the Indian Government sanctioned and allocated resources for 
a new defence capability based upon high altitude warfare training.
It also endeavoured to reduce the institutional cleavages between the 
three services. However, essentially, the Government looked for 
technical and matdriel solutions to political and organisational 
problems. Instead of seeking the aid of the UN Security Council over 
the border dispute, India sought military aid instead. True, any 
Security Council resolution would have been totally ignored by 
Communist China, given that the Government was not recognised by the 
UN during that time. Also, the involvement of the UN would have been 
embarrassing for India, given the long-standing failure to comply 
with the UN ruling over Kashmir in favour of a plebiscite. However, 
given Nehru's predilection for the resolution of conflict by 
multilateral negotiating mechanisms, the failure to involve the UN 
and attempt a peaceful settlement in principle suggests double 
standards on the part of the Nehru Government. It seemed that 
Nehru's pleas for peaceful solutions to international conflicts did 
not apply in a regional setting. The benefit of involving the UN
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would have been more than cosmetic. By permitting an international 
bureaucracy to take its stand, India would have captvred the moral 
high ground for the years to come, just as Pakistan had done fifteen 
years earlier over Kashmir.
The defence build-up which followed the war essentially masked deeper 
problems and may even have created more. The weakness of foreign 
policy formulation and intelligence gathering was not given the 
salience it deserved. Instead, military technical solutions were 
sought, rather than a review of foreign policy formulation and 
decision making. Within the defence sector itself, there were
similar misperceptions. Rather than review defence policy with a
view to ensuring that India was better defended, policy makers 
assumed that an increase in the strength of all the three services 
was the primary requirement. Conceivably, organisational changes and 
cost-benefit analyses could have led to a stronger defence and major 
rises in defence expenditure beyond the need to assuage public 
opinion could have been avoided. In the absence of a really
effective policy making process, the armed forces were permitted to
preside over a rather haphazard rearmament process, just as they did 
in the years before the war.
The full negative effects of the defence build-ups both before and 
after the 1962 war were not felt for many years, although Rubin has 
argued that increased defence requirements after 1962 were the single 
cause of the largest growth in tax revenues since independence®6. 
Where problems first began to .occur was after the 1970s when the need 
for replacement and modernisation became evident but the Government
86 Rubin [1982], p.183.
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lacked the foreign exchange reserves and the political mandate to 
engage the country in a new defence build-up, the more so following 
the dismemberment of Pakistan. Consequently, Mrs Gandhi was forced 
into the Soviet camp and finally into a Treaty of Co-operation and 
Friendship. Thus, in political terms the haphazard policy making 
process in the years between 1947 and 1962 eventually compromised 
significantly the policy of non-alignment. It also led to a marked 
dependence upon the Soviet Union and established a patron-client 
relationship of a similar intensity to that of the United States and 
Israel.
When the Janata Party came to power, it had no clear vision of which 
way to take defence policy after a decade of burgeoning dependency 
upon the Soviet Union, witness in particular the extreme confusion 
over India’s nuclear weapon policy. On conventional defence 
modernisation, the new Government was singularly unambitious. Once 
again the patterns of the past were repeated. There were no calls 
for a wide-ranging defence review. Parliamentary debate was lacking 
in the extreme. Nobody in Parliament seemed to question the lack of 
fit between defence and foreign policy. Moreover, as arms imports 
began to appear from a diverse array of suppliers to break the 
dependency upon the Soviet Union, nobody questioned the economic 
costs or the potential operational problems which could emerge from a 
defence capability drawn from so many different areas.
In contrast, the dlites of India, the Press and all other interested 
parties seemed content to see the country move gradually towards the 
attainment of regional power status, even if this implied an 
increased reliance upon the Soviet Union, despite the ambivalent
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attitude towards the Communist bloc. The durability of the national 
consensus for medium power status at least was fully borne out by the 
reaction to the nuclear test in 1974. It was a popular decision 
taken by Mrs Gandhi even though it cast the country so close to the 
periphery of the international community whereas before India had 
been in the vanguard of the attempts to attain a more stable and less 
violent world order. In addition, the developmental costs entailed 
by foreclosing access to nuclear technology were also considered to 
be worthwhile.
Throughout the years between 1962 and 1980 defence policy drifted 
away from the basic need to acquire security into a poorly thought 
out policy of acquiring the symbols required by a regional power.
The naval build-up, for example, reflects well the policy of drift. 
Although an opportunity arose with the departure of the British Navy, 
India was ill-equipped economically to undertake the blue-water 
mission, with or without the backing of the Soviet Union. Rather 
than heed the lessons of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars which indicated 
the marginal utility of either a brown or a blue water naval 
capability in a conflict with either Pakistan or China, the Indian 
Government pressed ahead during a period when the economy was weak 
and the international climate had ceased to favour military aid.
By the time Mrs Gandhi was returned to power, it became clear that 
all the three services were in need of attention, despite or perhaps 
because of the rate of procurement over the 1970s. True, the Janata 
Government had put into motion a form of modernisation but not, it 
seemed, after due policy debate, threat assessment and consideration 
of the short- and long-term policy implications. Mrs Gandhi merely
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picked up where Morarji Desai had left off and only after an 
agreement had been reached to modernise the armed forces did the 
Government begin to articulate new fears from new quarters, such as 
the superpower build-up in the Indian Ocean and the new Cold War. As 
will be seen, the defence postures which followed were even more 
unwieldly and irrelevant than those of the 1960s and 1970s and seemed 




INDIAN ARMS IMPORTS 1980-1988
6.1 The New Cold War and Afghanistan
1980 was a watershed in post-Second World War international affairs.
The fragile detente which existed between the two superpowers during 
the late-1960s and early-1970s ended finally when the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. This was the first time that 
the Soviet Union had invaded a nation state outside its recognised 
sphere of influence or in South Asia and the ramifications were 
extensive. Tension between the two superpowers and their allies was i
further exacerbated when a resurgence of trade union activism in !|
Poland prompted a heavy handed response from Moscow and an equally 
strident condemnation from the West.
On the other side of the Iron Curtain a new radicalism emerged in the 
United States and, to a lesser extent, other NATO countries. A 
significant amount of change had already occurred in the late-1970s, 
particularly in the US. Former President Carter attempted to redress 
perceived weaknesses within NATO by demanding with some success that 
on the one hand all NATO countries raise their defence expenditures 
by 3% in real terms. On the other, an attempt was made to bind the 
Western alliance together and simultaneously counter the Soviet 
deployment of SS-20 medium range nuclear missiles through 
strengthening intermediate range nuclear weapons in the form of the 
technologically advanced Pershing II missiles and the near
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revolutionary cruise missile. At the same time, in keeping with the 
'dual-track1 policy, NATO tried to force the pace on arms control. 
Following the anticipated success of the SALT II talks NATO wanted 
the Soviets to remain at the negotiating table over the short period 
when NATO would have enjoyed a clear nuclear superiority. However, 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Congress refused to ratify 
the SALT II Treaty.
The humiliation and impotence felt by the United States during the 
internment of American hostages by the Khomeini Government 
contributed to a crushing electoral defeat for Carter in the November 
1980 US presidential election. The outcome of the election was far 
from just a victory for the Republican Party and Ronald Reagan. It 
was also a triumph for the New Right and an opportunity to reshape US 
foreign, defence and domestic policies following a decade or more of 
perceived decline and national humiliation - Viet Nam, Watergate, and 
Iran.
The re-emergence of Cold Warriors in some of the major capitals of 
the western world coupled with knee-jerk reactions by the Soviet 
Union to its regional and peripheral problems had a profound effect 
upon not only East-West relations but the international system as a 
whole. In addition, the international debt crisis, a growing 
awareness of the extent of environmental problems, a crisis of 
multilateralism which left many major international organisations in 
disarray, broad based economic recession which exacerbated the impact 
of the debt crisis, reductions in bilateral aid and the burgeoning 
budget deficit in the US added to the level of concern over the state 
of the international system. In effect, during a period when
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multilateral solutions were required to solve the problems engendered 
within an increasingly interdependent international system, the 
direction of change turned in favour of unilateral and bilateral 
measures and a resolve on the part of the major powers to regain 
security through the pursuit of relative military power, whatever the 
cost.
Against this bleak backdrop Indira Gandhi was re-elected in India 
following the collapse of the Janata Government. As with previous 
Indian elections, the external regional and international setting 
played a negligible part in the choice of candidate or party. Indian 
elections are extremely parochial events which is due as much to the 
complexity of the political culture within the country as it is to 
the relative ignorance of Indian voters on events outside national 
boundaries.
However, the new Cold War impinged upon the Indian sub-continent in 
three direct ways forcing the new government to respond. First, the 
Soviet invasion of a country within the sub-continent confronted 
India with some awkward policy choices, particularly given the level 
of international condemnation which the event engendered. Second, 
started under Carter but pursued with a great deal more commitment by 
the Reagan Administration, the evolution of the Rapid Deployment 
Force and deployments at both Diego Garcia and several Indian Ocean 
littoral states presented India with new perceived security threats 
from the Indian Ocean. Third, the decline in East-West relations and 
the invasion of Afghanistan was paralleled by an emulation of the 
containment and forward defence policies pursued in the 1950s. This 
led directly to the extension of a massive economic and military aid
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package to Pakistan, the first tranche amounting to US$3.2 billion1. 
Apart from securing the immediate political survival of President 
Zia, the aid package facilitated the procurement of advanced military 
technology, notably 40 F-16 air combat fighters and the Abrahms MI 
main battle tank.
Although the military aid was intended to provide a first line of 
defence against further Soviet expansionism, the US-sponsored defence 
build-up created intense suspicion in New Delhi. With some 
justification, few believed that the Kremlin intended Afghanistan to 
be the first step in either the acquisition of warm water ports or 
the initial step towards the subjugation of South Asia2. Given too 
that Pakistan is a narrow country (see Chapter Four), US-Pakistan 
protestations that the new defence equipment was intended solely for 
the defence of Pakistan's north-west border were greeted with 
scepticism within India - forward defence may have been uppermost in 
the minds of American decision makers but President Zia undoubtedly 
had India in mind. Nor was New Delhi happy with the fact that the F- 
16 is capable of delivering nuclear weapons or that Pakistan received 
a controversial waiver on the Symington Amendment, which forbids 
Congress to extend military aid to a country which is known to be 
producing nuclear weapons. The failure on the part of the US to
1 President Carter was only prepared to offer $400 million of aid, 
which President Zia rejected as 'peanuts1. His arrogance 
towards the US indicates how much he recognised Pakistan's 
renewed geo-political significance.
2 The approach of those who read most into the Soviet invasion is 
succinctly summarised by Amaury de Riencourt, "The Russian 
venture is one further step in a long-term process which aims at 
reaching the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The prospects are 
even more tantalizing in the latter part of the twentieth 
century than they were in the nineteenth, in the days of 
Kipling's 'Great Game'", De Riencourt [1982], p.431.
263
recognise Pakistan1s intentions in this direction was made all the 
more worrying for New Delhi as Islamabad made all too little attempt 
to conceal the military side of the nuclear programme. Indeed, in 
1987 Pakistan's cavalier attitude to this sensitive subject was fully 
revealed when, immediately prior to Congressional agreement on the 
second tranche of military and economic aid, A.Q. Khan, the father of 
Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, admitted in an interview that 
the nuclear establishment could offer General Zia a nuclear weapon if 
so requested3.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented Mrs Gandhi with a
considerable problem. With a forthcoming New Delhi meeting of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) scheduled for February 1981 and with
herself in the chair, she could not be seen to support the Soviet
Union's actions, which thus required an unequivocal statement in the
1980-81 Report of the Ministry of External Affairs,
"India's position was clearly enunciated on several 
occasions - namely, that it was opposed to the presence of 
foreign troops and bases in any country and that all forms 
of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan must cease."4
At the same time, however, the Prime Minister did not wish to 
alienate the Soviet bloc during this particular period. Apart from 
respecting the cordial relations which had gone before, Mrs Gandhi 
may also have been aware that the completion of the defence
3 Pakistan's behaviour on this question appears to many as
reckless, considering the risk involved in losing billions of 
dollars worth of military and economic aid. However, it is 
possible to see Pakistan's behaviour from another perspective, 
as a calculating and subtle attempt to legitimise by default a 
nuclear weapon capability and so move closer to the Israeli 
position on nuclear weapons. For an analysis of similar 
behaviour patterns during negotiations for the second tranche of 
military and economic aid see Smith, C. [1987].
4 Ministry of External Affairs [1981], pp.iv-v.
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modernisation programme and the perceived need to counter the 
newfound friendship between Pakistan and the US would require 
considerable assistance from the Soviet Union. Nor could she have 
forgotten the magnitude of non-military Soviet aid entering India and 
the need for steady increases in the future5. Her response in 1980 
was, therefore, measured. India's role in the NAM and its genuine 
antipathy to this type of force and subjugation, witness the policy 
adopted following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
prevented a response in press statements and UN fora which could have 
been construed as acquiescent6. Equally, India adamantly refused to 
condemn outright Soviet actions. Whilst gestures of support would 
have been wholly out of place, New Delhi reacted with forbearance to 
the invasion following what the Prime Minister referred to as 'a 
realistic look at the situation'7.
The new situation in South Asia, set against a series of disturbing 
developments between the two superpowers and around the sensitive 
region of the Persian Gulf, created a complex problem for New Delhi 
primarily because of linkages from the regional to the international 
level. First and foremost, the US interest in Pakistan had been 
revived and Zia could henceforth rely upon a wide-ranging defence 
modernisation programme on reasonable terms. For India, the 
consolidation of US-Pakistan ties exposed the sub-continent to the 
vissitudes of wider international events over which it had little or
5 According to the US Dept, of State, economic credits and grants 
to India have increased dramatically in recent years. In 1983 
the figure stood at $140 million but by 1986 had risen to $2,125 
million. Department of State [1988], Table 8, p.9.
6 For example, Wigg [1980].
7 Quoted in Horn [1982], p.183.
no control. Second, there existed the complex linkage between 
Pakistan and both Saudi Arabia and Iran. During the 1960s Pakistan 
greatly assisted Saudi Arabia and Jordan in defence training3 - 
indeed, Zia himself acted as an adviser to the Royal Jordanian Army 
between 1969 and 19819. In return, Pakistan gained financially from 
its relationship with the Gulf States. Obversely, Zia was careful 
not to alienate Iran during the Gulf War as defeat for the latter 
could have led to ethnic problems along the common border in the 
absence of strong central governments. Moreover, the defeat of Iran 
would have left Iraq in too strong a position in the Gulf10.
Consequently, as Mrs Gandhi sought to consolidate her power at home a 
new set of foreign policy considerations emerged for Indian policy 
makers. Would Pakistan flex its new found military muscle given the 
compliant attitude adopted by the Reagan Administration? If events 
in the Gulf were to take an adverse turn, would South Asia become 
involved in some way? Would the new Cold War spill over further into 
the Indian sub-continent? How could India preserve its relative 
naval power and all it represented in the midst of an unprecedented
superpower build-up in the region? Would the US seek further basing
rights in Baluchistan (Pakistan), Chittagong (Bangladesh) or at the 
tank farm in Trincomalee (Sri Lanka)11?
8 By the mid-1980s some 30,000 Pakistani troops were stationed 
throughout the Middle East - 10,000 in Saudi Arabia and the rest 
in Libya, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.
9 Who's Who [1982], p.1174.
10 Robertson [1987], p.169-175.
11 In 1981 the US Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger, visited 
both Pakistan and Sri Lanka which fuelled suspicions that basing 
rights were high on the agenda. Also, during the same period it 
was alleged that an agreement had been reached between Sri Lanka 
and the US to develop in Sri Lanka a 'rest and recreation'
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Indian decision makers certainly did respond to these changed 
conditions. In addition to the modernisation programmes sanctioned 
by the Janata Government, procurement rose substantially and the 
export equipment available from several major buyers in the West and 
the Soviet Union underwent consideration and evaluation. Initially, 
the process of continuity with the Janata Government turned on a five 
year defence plan adopted in May 1980 and a major defence review in 
May 1981, shortly before the US Congress acceded to the Reagan 
Administration's proposed aid package to Pakistan, but not before it 
became evident that a substantial commitment was on the horizon12.
The result was an open season for the defence sector during which 
India imported Western and Soviet defence equipment on an 
unprecedented level. It was a conventional defence build-up of 
enormous width and depth which proceeded apace largely unnoticed both 
within and outside India. Throughout the 1980s all the major defence 
exporters attempted to establish a toe-hold in the Indian market 
during a period when demand in other parts of the Third World was 
declining precipitously. Only in mid-1988 did it become apparent 
that the modernisation programme which had endured for nearly a 
decade was on the decline. In the 1988-89 defence budget, aggregate 
allocations were raised by only Rs.10 billion which represented a 
nominal increase but a backward step in real growth terms. Whilst 
all three services received overall increases, their combined capital 
outlay actually declined from Rs.39,777.9 million in the previous
facility for the US seventh fleet, Times of India, [9 August 
1981].
12 Negotiations for military and economic assistance package were 
successfully concluded in September 1981. Full details of the 
deal can be found in Cronin [1987].
year to Rs.38,721.2 million13; additional resources would have been 
required for imported goods such as fuel and lubricants and armed 
forces pay awards.
6.2 The Indian Response
India emerged from the 1971 war with a keen sense of destiny but 
without the foreign exchange resources to turn strategic opportunity 
and political vision into reality through the acquisition of the type 
of defence technology which would identify India as a major Asian 
power and, indubitably, as the power broker in South Asia. In 
addition, much of the defence equipment deployed by India was in 
urgent need of modernisation. Following economic recovery in the 
late-1970s, the Janata Government was able to bow to many of the 
pressures coming from the defence sector once foreign exchange 
reserves became stronger. When Mrs Gandhi was re-elected, the 
economy still appeared reasonably strong, at least until the 1982-83 
monsoon failure which cut the annual growth rate to 1.8%. In the 
previous two years, growth rates reached 7.5% in 1980-81 and 5.2% in
1981-8214. However, against this must be set double figure inflation 
rates during this period and a negative growth rate of -4.8% in 1979- 
80.
Continuing relative economic strength permitted the Prime Minister to 
accept further defence modernisation and realise more of the 
potential afforded by India's victory in the 1971 war. Yet, there
13 International Defense Review [May 1988], p.478.
14 Thomas [1986], p.215.
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was a significant lack of fit between the new threats as defined in 
New Delhi, however vaguely, and the type of defence equipment sought 
by India, particularly with regard to naval expansion. Throughout 
the early-1980s Congress(I) politicians were persistently alluding to 
'gathering war clouds', 'the imminent threat of war' and, of course, 
the responsibility of a 'foreign hand* in the destabilisation of 
India and the sub-continent15.
In fact, the scale of the programme was more than modernisation
alone; the rationale was much wider and found expression in the so-
called 'Indira Doctrine*. Since 1971 India had been the de facto
regional power in South Asia but needed to express power as much as
consolidate it. This could come only by serving notice on both the
other South Asian countries and their allies that India would
henceforth claim a vital interest in instabilities in South Asia and
a right to intervention to protect India's own secularity from the
potentially damaging spill-over effects of ethnic disturbance and
religious fundamentalism. Using primarily the euphemism of 'non-
alignment ', a mantle which India could not have worn in any
convincing way since 1971, Mrs Gandhi set out an agenda based upon
the illegitimacy of foreign bases in South Asia, 'demilitarisation'
of the Indian Ocean - a thinly veiled attempt to eliminate superpower
presence in the region - and, most important, bilateralism as a means
of undercutting relations between hostile neighbours and extra-
regional powers, such as China and the US. It was, in essence, a bid
for great, even superpower status which entailed assuming the role
15 An excellent cartoon in the Indian Express around this period 
depicted a senior politician moving away from a microphone 
having just finished a campaign speech. Half-way back to his 
seat he turned back towards the crowd saying, "And by the way, I 
forgot to mention, there's an imminent threat of war".
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nearly attained by the deposed Shah of Iran. At the same time this
also required driving a wedge between the US and Pakistan lest the
relationship both erode India's relative power and bring foreign
troops into South Asia.ie The extent to which India saw other Soiuth
Asian countries as 'back yard' problems is reflected in K.
Subrahmanyam's17 attitude in 1984 to the ramifications of the
emerging Sri Lankan problem,
"There is no possibility of Sri Lanka doing anything 
militarily against India. But there is the possibility of 
[Colombo] going to the US, Israel or Britain for various 
kinds of assistance or training of troops. And if we 
permitted this it would give the wrong kind of impression 
of how far Colombo can go in dealing with its Tamil 
problem.I|:LS
Such a policy could scarcely carry weight without the military 
symbols of great power status which, in this instance, required 
state-of-the-art military technology and weapons systems commensurate 
with international power - modern long-range bombers, aircraft 
carriers, nuclear powered submarines, even nuclear weapons. With the 
exception of pursuing the nuclear option, this was the task which the 
Prime Minister set herself in 1980 and 1981.
In May 1980, less than six months after her re-election, Mrs Gandhi 
secured an arms supply agreement with the Soviet Union which amounted 
to the transfer of $1.63 billion of defence equipment giving India a 
two year grace period and then fifteen years to repay the aid (as
16 For an incisive and very critical review of Indira Gandhi's view 
of India's future role in South Asia and the political culture 
which underpined it see Nations [August 1984].
17 K. Subrahmanyam is a well known Indian defence analyst who was 
until recently Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis. His views are generally regarded as 'hawkish', 
especially on nuclear issues, but they often parallel those of 
the Government.
18 Nations [August 1984], p.26.
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opposed to the ten year repayment period offered by Western 
suppliers), at an interest rate of 2.5%. All repayments could be 
made in local currency or goods, whereas all other suppliers required 
payment in hard currency. The central feature of the deal concerned 
the T-72 tank and the MiG-25 Foxbat, probably in its reconnaissance 
version only, but also included air-to-air and Frog-type surface-to- 
surface missiles, Petya-class missile patrol boats, anti-tank weapons 
and electronic equipment19. Negotiations on this deal were started 
by the Janata Government20. Apart from the enviable repayment 
conditions the deal was further characterised by an unusual 
willingness on the part of the supplier to discuss technology 
transfer. Equally important, this deal came at a time when Pakistan 
had received an offer of credit only totalling $400 million for arms 
repayable at 11% interest21. Agreement on the massive economic and 
military aid package was nowhere in sight at the time.
The deal with the Soviet Union was swiftly followed by a rare press 
conference given by the Prime Minister over the course of which she 
intimated that her Government was on the verge of a heavy defence
spending programme22. In the next budget Finance Minister Pranab
Mukherjee announced a 20% increase in defence expenditure to be 
financed by increased taxation23. Soon after the budget the combined 
effect of these moves was to bring the representatives of all the 
major arms exporters from the West to New Delhi. From this point on
19 Honsa [30 May 1980].
20 MILAVNEWS [April 1980], p.16.
21 Honsa [30 May 1980].
22 Sharma [11 August 1981].
23 Financial Times [1 March 1982].
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the Indian Government manipulated what became increasingly a buyer's 
market with considerable finesse.
In October 1980 an Indian defence team visited the USA and the 
occasion was followed by speculative reports that a $340 million deal 
had been signed for the supply of 230 light-weight, long-range 
howitzers and a large number of TOW (tube launched, optically 
sighted, wire-guided) missiles for the Indian Army24. Some months 
later it was rumoured in Delhi that India had turned down an earlier 
offer from the US to supply India with the F-16 and co-production of 
the F-5G intermediate fighter. Although the US had been interested 
in the Indian arms market for some time nothing more was heard of or |
j]
reported on this deal. The Government's intention was probably to |
serve unequivocal notice upon the Soviet Union that the policy of 
diversity would continue.
In March 1982 Soviet Defence Minister Marshall Ustinov undertook a I
six day visit to New Delhi. He was accompanied by the largest and j
most senior defence team ever to visit a country outside the Soviet j
bloc. The upshot of the visit was the promise of T-80 tanks and the I
Mig-27 Flogger tactical, strike fighter. The real or purely 
provocative plan to consider importing American defence equipment 
coupled with the previous report that India was actively considering
Ia number of arms deals with the French including the Mirage 2000 j
(comparable to the MiG-27), Exocet missiles and Super Puma 
helicopters appeared to have worked. During such a tense period in 
US-Soviet relations and given too the Soviet Union's spectacular lack 
of success in acquiring basing rights in the Indian Ocean to counter
24 The Statesman [14 October 1980].
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the US, the Kremlin needed all the allies it could acquire, with 
massive arms imports or otherwise25. Soon after, in June 1983, 
Defence Minister Venkataraman visited Moscow to discuss the 
possibility of acquiring the MiG-29 interceptor as a counter to the 
F-16. The significance of the request rested in the fact that the 
plane had yet to enter Soviet service. Later reports suggested that 
the Soviet response had been favourable26. As and when details of 
the deal became more widely known it seemed that the Indian success 
went beyond the MiG-29 and also included a licensed production option 
on the T-80 tank and MiG-31 Foxhound fighter27.
Despite or even because of successes with the Soviet Union, the 
Indian Government continued to entertain export offers from the West. 
In May 1984 a senior British sales team arrived in Delhi to attempt 
to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and build upon previous 
successes with Westland, Rolls Royce and British Aerospace. However, 
the visit was not well timed, coming as it did during a period when 
foreign exchange reserves were low and the emerging consensus within 
the Government appeared to be to sacrifice diversification, albeit 
temporarily28. During the same period, however, a draft agreement 
between Italy and India was announced to open the way for 
collaboration in defence electronics28. A five year MoU was signed
25 For many years the Soviet Union has attempted to persuade India
to permit it basing rights at Vishakapatnam, the naval base on 
the East coast of India which the Soviet Union has twice 
assisted in modernising.
26 Aerospace Daily [24 October 1983], p.282.
27 Defense Week [February 1984], p.6.
28 Washington Times [5 July 1984] and Ram [May 1984], pp.26-27.
29 Jane's Defence Weekly [20 October 1984).
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in August covering the exchange of information with a stress upon 
Electronic Counter Measures30. Similar discussions were held with 
Spanish representatives in March 1985 with talks covering advanced 
jet trainers, field artillery and other armaments31.
In October 1984 Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh 
bodyguards. Between October and the year end India remained
j
suspended in political confusion until Mrs Gandhi's son, Rajiv, won I
the most astounding landslide victory in India's independent history. j1The new Prime Minister made little attempt to redirect Indian defence I 
policy. However, one key difference soon became evident. Unlike his 
mother, Rajiv Gandhi is well disposed towards the United States and 
from the outset he appeared more willing to consider American defence 
imports. This benign approach towards the United States did in time
lead to defence orders but had less of an effect than expected; by
the time the deals were agreed, a new detente between the two 
superpowers was well underway.
It was, therefore, continuity rather than change which has 
characterised the defence policy of Rajiv Gandhi. One exception is
i j
his technical expertise based upon his training and experience as a j
pilot for Indian Airlines. This has given him the capability to I
discuss in much greater detail technical issues, an aspect of J
bargaining in which his mother took no interest32. Although the new j
Prime Minister may be willing to reduce the ties that bind India to 
the Soviet Union he has been unable to move too far, too quickly.
30 International Defense Review, [August 1985], p.1346.
31 Taibo [9 March 1985]
32 Bobb [31 August, 1984], p.84.
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First, India does not have the economic base to ignore completely 
Soviet offers of military equipment in favour of Western suppliers; 
the ability to diversify is constrained by limited foreign exchange 
reserves. Moreover, the new Prime Minister's insistence upon 
economic liberalism has cost the country dearly in foreign exchange. 
Second, there are delivery lead times to consider. Much of the 
Soviet defence equipment which has arrived in India since Rajiv was 
elected was ordered during his mother's term of office and before.
Third, the inherent differences between Soviet and Western technology 
make such a radical shift very difficult to execute in practice, 
although at great cost and military aid Egypt has made just such a 
transition on two occasions in the past. With tanks, for example, 
the Soviets rely heavily upon quantitative rather than qualitative 
strength to gain the upper hand through rapid attrition. Such 
tactics have evolved from the technological limitations which exist 
in the Soviet defence industry and its inability to match the pace of 
technical change which obtains in the West. However, in a planned 
economy long production runs are less difficult, so Soviet military 
planners are bound to exploit this comparative advantage. The 
transfer of Soviet military technology to Third World countries will 
undoubtedly carry with it a degree of doctrinal baggage which will be 
influential in how the weapons systems are assimilated by the 
recipient armed forces. The use of relatively low technology 
compensated for by weight of numbers will require a specific set of 
tactical considerations distinct from what would be required from 
technology which is more capable, more costly and more difficult to 
repair. Other factors are also relevant. Current Soviet doctrine 
has been reluctant to reduce the primacy of the human factor in
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aviation, whereas the opposite situation is apparent in the West. 
Air-land battle concepts have not been given the salience that they 
have in the West. Uncompromising defence of the homeland is 
fundamental to Soviet strategic thinking. Finally, Soviet command
i
and control is a great deal more centralised than that of NATO.33 5i
At the time of writing Rajiv's first term in office is drawing to a 
close; elections must be held by December 1989 at the latest.
However, after four years in power it is barely possible to say what 
the new Prime Minister believes in, or understands, in relation to 
India's global or regional role. Certainly, he still lacks the 
political depth of both his mother and his grandfather. Although his 
initial impact upon the world stage was highly favourable, his 
popularity was short-lived and he is now considered to be of little 
significance in the NAM or any other form of Third World politics.
On specific questions of defence policy and posture rather than more 
general questions of foreign policy, Rajiv has changed little. On 
the foreign policy front, his pathbreaking visit to China, which took J
place in mid-December 1988, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka I
1(which was mooted in New Delhi as early as mid-1984), the brief 
intervention in the Maldives and a warming of relations between India <j
and the US have been the dominant events. With Pakistan, Rajiv has 
maintained the mix of 'no war, no peace either', although this may 
change following the election of Benazir Bhutto, and he has on 
several occasions acquiesced to the armed forces flexing their muscle 
on both the Chinese and Pakistan borders34. Probably, he has no
33 Brown [1986], pp.41-47.
34 The most significant display came during the Operation
Brasstacks military exercise which involved the Indian Army in a
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specific antipathy to the course charted by his mother which appears 
to be popular within Congress(I), with the public at large and, in 
particular,, with the armed forces. The only perceivable policy 
adjustment appears to be the desire to see the indigenous defence 
base develop at a much more rapid rate and overcome the inertia which 
set in over the 1970s. Finally, although Rajiv himself and some of 
his key advisers, such as Arun Singh, have held the defence 
portfolio, the emphasis has been on the internal security problem.
In particular, there is concern that Pakistan's support for the Sikh 
terrorists might both strengthen their resolve and options and, 
furthermore, that the critical logistical importance of Pakistan as a 
sanctuary might become a major source of bilateral tension.
6.3 The Indian Army
Over the past decade, the Indian Army has once again fared much less 
well than the other two services, for two reasons. First, with 
manpower levels standing at 1.1 million, a very large proportion of 
the Army's allocations are absorbed by pay and stores and this has 
been the case since 1963-6435. During the late-1970s and early 
1980s, the Army received a decreasing proportion of the overall 
defence budget. From receiving 74% in 1970-71, by 1980-81 the figure 
had dropped to 66%, (excluding pensions). This trend was also
rapid movement towards the Pakistan border. In addition to 
souring relations for some months, the exercise prompted a full 
scale mobilisation of the Pakistan armed forces and almost the 
outbreak of war.
35 Pensions are not included in defence expenditure figures.
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reflected in capital allocations which declined from 51% to 36% 
during the same period.
Nevertheless, the Army did receive a significant share of the 
modernisation package. However, unlike the other two services, much 
of the planned procurement was drawn primarily from Soviet or 
indigenous resources, which increased considerably its inventory but 
with a minimal drain upon foreign exchange.
The agreement signed with the Soviet Union in May 1980 gave the Army 
a significant increase in firepower. The long standing desire to 
replace completely the aging Centurions and supersede the obsolete 
and troublesome Vijayanta main battle tank was at last granted 
through the procurement of 800 T-72 tanks, two hundred to be supplied 
directly, the rest built under licence. However, the Vijayanta was 
not in fact withdrawn and, by the mid-1980s, 1,250 units were still 
in service33. Instead, the Army examined various proposals for 
retrofitting the Vijayanta including the installation of a new and 
more powerful engine, laser ranging and night-visual systems37. 
Moreover, by 1986 only 350 T-72s had been received33.
In addition, the Army was scheduled to receive anti-tank and surface- 
to-surface missiles. Also mooted at a later point was the potential 
acquisition of the T-80 main battle tank which had yet to come off
36 International Institute for Strategic Studies [1986], p.154. 
Also, the Government cancelled the proposed sale of Centurion 
tanks in December 1980 and decided instead to utilise 'the tanks 
and their firepower in a suitable way1, Indian Express [10 
December 1980].
37 Asian Defence Journal [November 1981], p.36.
38 International Institute for Strategic Studies [1986], p.154.
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the production line in the Soviet Union39. The offer finally came 
during the Ustinov visit in March 1982 although the primary purpose 
of the visit was to dissuade Indi?. from purchasing the Mirage 2000 by 
offering the MiG-27 fighter bomber40. When Venkataraman visited 
Moscow in June 1983, Army equipment was scarcely on the agenda, 
except for the request for an updated technology transfer package for 
the T-72 to include the new laser range finder41. In early-1984 New 
Delhi placed a significant order with the Soviet Union which 
reconfirmed that the Indian Army was in line for the more advanced T- 
72M and the T-80. In addition it was also to receive more BMP 1 
armoured personnel carriers, the BMP 2 airportable version, the SAM 8 
missile, a mobile field surface-to-air system, the SAM 5 long-range 
surface-to-air missile and, in addition, long-range, dual-capable 
surface-to-surface missiles.42 Several of these acquisitions related 
to the decision in mid-1981 to modernise the air defence regiments 
under Army command43.
Other imports for the Army arrived in piecemeal fashion during the 
mid-1980s. In mid-1985 the Government placed an order with the Dutch 
Government for 250 Hollandse Signaal Flycatcher radar weapon systems 
for its air defence regiments and intended for use in tandem with the 
Contraves Superfeldermaus weapon control systems44. One year later 
120 Simfire Mk II Extended Range-Improved Tactical and Gunnery
39 Ram [October 1981], p.27.
40 Congressional Research Service [1985], p.132.
41 Bobb [15 August 1983], p.41.
42 Furdson [19 January 1984].
43 Times of India [13 August 1981].
44 The Statesman [1 January 1986].
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Simulators were ordered from Britain for the Army's main battle tank 
fleet.
If the Indian Government appeared to err on the side of economy when 
it came to the modernisation programme for the Army, it was 
undoubtedly due to the impending decision to procure a substantial 
number of 155mm artillery systems following Pakistan's decision to 
buy 75 155mm M198 towed howitzers from the US. Although Pakistan's 
howitzers arrived under the military and economic aid agreement,
India had been investigating the procurement of a 155mm system since 
1977^5. requirement was for a medium gun capable of firing
heavy artillery at a long range. The key targets for the artillery 
would be enemy armour, troop carriers, roads and bridges and with a 
range of c.30 km which would mean that it could only be attacked by 
air. By early-1981, the choice had been narrowed down to four 
options with Sweden, Austria, France and a British-German-Italian 
consortium as the contenders for the contract. In March 1986 the 
contract for 1,500 artillery pieces costing $3.5 billion (although 
some sources put the cost much lower at $1.14 billion) was awarded to 
Sweden, which came as a great surprise to many.
Soon after, the deal erupted into a major scandal involving the 
payment of commissions to middlemen and unnamed Congress(I) party 
heads. Even the Prime Minister, who also held the defence portfolio 
at the time, was accused of being involved, partly through his 
dealings with Olaf Palm£ who visited New Delhi some two months before 
the deal was signed. Also, it has been alleged that the brother of 
Amitabh Bachchan, an MP-actor associate of the Prime Minister's,
45 Bobb (et al) [15 May 1987], p.18.
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handled much of the money in Switzerland. Although Rajiv was 
officially cleared of receiving any part of the £30 million 
commission and wind-up fees, the event rocked the Government and led 
to the resignation of V.P. Singh, who has since emerged as a 
formidable voice in opposition. However, at no point, it seems, did 
the scandal shake public confidence in the way defence decisions are 
taken - it was primarily a political issue which did not involve 
questions of national security.
To add to the massive deal with Bofors, in late-1986 India considered 
the purchase of a self-propelled 155mm howitzer from Britain with the 
intention of utilising the Vijayanta chassis46. Only weeks later 
Royal Ordnance, the British government-owned munitions and arms 
factory won an order from India for 14 Combat Engineering Tractors in 
a deal worth £40 million47.
In 1987 the Army came under criticism for its prevarication over 
which rifle to choose as a replacement for the indigenous Ishapore. 
All the choices are for an imported weapon, although a licence for 
production will certainly form a part of any deal which emerges.
Surprisingly, a report in early 1988 indicated that a new 
modernisation phase for the Army was underway. Plans were reported 
to include, more and better main battle tanks, an infrastructure for 
overhauling T-72 and BMP-1 units and several areas of indigenous 
production48.
46 Jane's Defence Weekly [27 December 1986], p.1472.
47 Financial Times [22 January 1987].
48 Jane's Defence Weekly [5 March 1988], p.390.
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In addition to increased procurement the Army had another 
bureaucratic battle to wage through the 1980s. Since independence 
the status and role of the Army, in absolute terms and in relation to 
both the civilian bureaucracy and the other services, had gradually 
declined over the years. Yet at the same time, the role of the Army 
in the sensitive area of internal security gradually increased up 
until the point when by 1980 the Army had been used on 375 occasions 
to assist the police in maintaining law and order over a four year 
period49. Certainly, much of this was related to relatively minor 
disturbances but Mrs Gandhi's decision in June 1984 to sack the Holy 
Temple in Amritsar (Operation Bluestar) was a particularly difficult 
task for the Army to undertake. It lowered morale amongst the ranks 
and led to desertions and alienation amongst Sikh troops.
As the Army became increasingly indispensable to the Centre's drive 
to maintain law and order and reverse the centrifugal forces within 
the country which stretched from Tamil Nadu in the South East of the 
country to the Punjab in the North West, its leadership began to 
request compensation in various forms. First, the Army successfully 
pushed for a degree of reorganisation to reflect its declining 
relative dependence upon basic infantry strength. Between 1979 and 
1983 the overall strength of the Army increased, over and beyond 
armament procurement. The total number of Independent Armoured 
Brigades was raised to seven from five and a Mechanised Division was 
created50. However, the continuing debate over whether or not to
49 Jacobs [September, 1985], p.4.
50 Jacobs [1985], p.6.
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create a post of Chief of Defence Staff has not been resolved in the 
Army's favour (see Chapter Eight).
Second, during the mid-1980s, a separate debate emerged over the 
position and status of the Indian Army in society. By March 1986 the 
Prime Minister had ordered an enquiry into the continued degradation 
of defence service officers in the warrant of precedence (see Chapter 
Three). Equally, a related issue emerged in the form of technical 
competence on the part of the Army. Traditionally, the Indian Army 
is notable for its conservatism but the Chief of Army Staff over this 
period, General K. Sundarji, attempted to do to the Army what Rajiv 
Gandhi wished to do with the rest of Indian society in relation to 
science and technology. In a letter to the officer corps, Sundarji 
made his preferences very clear,
"Many of us have not kept ourselves professionally 
uptodate, doctrinally or technologically: we have felt that 
we have 'got it made', and rested on our oars: we do not 
read enough: we do not think enough, and some of course, 
have been promoted well beyond their capability. In the 
practice of our profession, we have not insisted on 
standards being maintained and turn our eyes away from 
irregularities.. .1151
Apart from the attempt to capitalise upon the compromises engendered 
by a greater involvement in internal security issues and thereby 
increase size and status, the Army were also aware of an burgeoning 
and serious skills shortage. All in all the Army was apparently 
becoming an unattractive career. Of the troops selected for training 
some 37.5% deserted. At the other end of the spectrum the Indian 
Military Academy, the main feeder institution for the officer cadres, 
have become desperately short of worthwhile recruits, particularly in
51 The Indian Express [3 March 1986].
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engineering. A shortfall of 18% in 1976-77 rose to 75% in 1982-83.
In the same year the technical course on offer at the Officers' 
Training School was discontinued due to a lack of adequate response. 
In order to redress this marked decline the Army requested lump sum 
grants to young soldiers and special allowances for high risk jobs. 
Other demands included more respect in civilian circles for Army 
personnel.32
Third, the Army sought expansion through the creation of an Army 
Aviation Corps (AAC). Such an organisation was created in mid-1986 
with the intention of providing the Army with at least 200 
helicopters, including gunships. Eventually, however, it turned out 
to be a hollow victory when allocations for the AAC dwindled to 
virtually nothing during the late-1980s. In the 1988-89 defence 
budget the army aviation wing received only Rs.0.2 million 
($154,000)33.
6.4 The Indian Navy
During the 1980s, the longstanding commitment to an ambitious naval 
presence in the region finally came to fruition. A Government report 
in 1978 signaled the onset of a twenty year naval development 
programme designed to give the country an indubitable 'blue water' 
naval capability34. In keeping with Indira Gandhi's view of the 
preferred defence policy for India, the naval modernisation programme
52 Gupta [31 January 1985], pp.94-99.
53 MILAVNEWS [August 1988], p.17.
54 Tellis [1987b], p.193.
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was unequivocally based upon power projection. The proposed role for 
the Navy went beyond sea denial and was intended to include both the 
complete control of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and the 
ability to come to the aid of small developing countries within the 
region55. The primary naval missions during this period were 
fourfold:
1) Protection of India's water frontiers and sea approaches to 
the country.
2) Protection of India's natural resources in the waters 
contiguous to the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.
3) Protection of the country's foreign marine traffic.
4) Utilization of the Navy to promote Indian political and 
national goals throughout the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.
As with other areas of defence procurement, many of the decisions 
regarding expansion were in fact taken by the Janata Government and 
implemented during the 1980s with several additional acquisitions, 
and were continued by Mrs Gandhi because they suited so well the 
search for regional hegemony. Also, the process of decision making 
took a considerable amount of time, particularly with regard to the 
evaluation of competing systems available from West European 
suppliers.
Another striking aspect of the naval modernisation programme was the 
determination to move away from the Soviet Union as a sole source of 
supply. During the 1970s the state of the economy and the 
willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to supply naval equipment 
gave the Indian Government no choice but to accept the offers. In
55 Jacobs [1983], p.886.
the 1980s India found itself able to afford a more independent naval 
build-up which could permit the Navy to develop independent missions 
without external constraint.
One of the first agreements in this direction was the decision to 
supersede India's eight aging Soviet Foxtrot1s with SSK-1500 Type-209 
hunter-killer submarines of West German design. The deal took over 
two years to confirm on account of stiff competition from the Kockums 
shipyard in Sweden. In addition to the two craft from West Germany, 
it was agreed that India would produce at least two more units 
indigenously in a deal costing an initial $500 million. In some 
quarters the agreement was heavily criticised on account of the poor 
performance of the Type-209 and its aging design55. The deal was 
cancelled in 1988 when India alleged that the West German company HDW 
had sold similar design plans to South Africa but not before at least 
one of the boats had been received57.
The West German submarine deal was followed by a procurement rush 
throughout the mid-1980s from both the Soviet Union and West European 
exporters. Without doubt, the key beneficiary during this period was 
the fleet air arm following the modernisation of the Vikrant during 
the early-1980s to include a ski ramp to accommodate the Harrier 
V/STOL and other needs for the future. Initial offers were received 
from France, Spain and Britain5®. In addition, the Government began 
to approach foreign firms to buy the plans for the production of a
56 Karnad [21 November 1981].
57 Jane's Defence Weekly [14 March 1987].
58 Mukherjee [1985], p.14.
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second aircraft carrier59. However, exactly where in India such an 
enormous vessel could be produced was not clear at that time.
India's first Sea Harrier FRS Mk.51 was handed over to the Indian 
Navy in January 1983, which was followed by another five front line 
aircraft and two trainers. The order was expected to be followed by 
a request for more Harriers as six aircraft were obviously an 
inadequate complement for the Vikrant60. The aircraft were armed 
with Matra 550 Magic dogfight missiles and, in the wake of the 
Falklands War, the Navy seemed keen to acquire the Exocet for the 
Harrier's anti-ship role. In the event, however, India ordered the 
more sophisticated Sea Eagle anti-ship missile from Britain, which 
the Royal Navy was acquiring to replace their Exocet missiles51. The 
Sea Eagle was also intended to arm the 12 Sea King helicopters 
ordered from Britain following the rejection of an offer by France to 
supply a package involving the Super Puma and the Exocet, primarily 
for the Godevari frigates which carry two helicopters52. The Sea 
King order was swiftly followed by a parallel order to MEL (UK) for a 
£9 million Super Searcher airborne command and control system.
French and British companies also competed for the sale of the anti­
ship missile to equip the 24 Dornier Do 228 aircraft purchased in 
1985 and designed to enter coastal patrol duties in 1988, an order 
worth £60 million53. The Sea Skua air-to-surface missile was the
59 Dua [7 May 1981].
60 Daily Telegraph [17 December 1983].
61 British Aerospace Dynamics Group News Release [20 July, 1983].
62 MILAVNEWS [August 1983], p. 17*
63 Chuter [21 September 1985], p.601.
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eventual choice, in part because of their interface with the Super 
Searcher6* .
Interest in a second aircraft carrier took several years to bring to 
fruition. However, on 24 April 1986 India announced plans to 
purchase the British carrier HMS Hermes (renamed the Viraat) for a 
sum of $94 million including drydocking, refit, spares and support. 
The ship had been laid up for two years after serving as the flagship 
to the Royal Navy task force during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict. 
As with the Vikrant, Hermes was laid down after the Second World War 
and would have been scrapped by the UK if India had not bought the 
carrier65. Even with refitting the vessel had a limited life in 
1987. Inevitably, the agreement to purchase another carrier led to 
increased orders for the Harrier and other equipment relevant to the 
deployment and protection of an extra carrier. Shortly before the 
deal was announced, reliable reports suggested that the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed with the British had been revised to accommodate 
more Harriers and Sea Kings to equip the new carrier66. By mid-1985 
further orders for the Sea Harrier looked likely, to bring the number 
of Indian purchases to 4867. In addition, the Chief of Naval Staff, 
Admiral R.H. Tahiliani, immediately indicated that a third and 
possibly fourth aircraft carrier to replace the aging Vikrant would 
be required but that in future the vessels would be produced 
indigenously6® .
64 Jane's Defence Weekly [19 July 1986].
65 Navy News & Undersea Technology [9 May 1986]. See also, Jane1s 
Defence Weekly [22 June 1985], p.1197.
66 Jane's Defence Weekly [21 September 1985], p.605.
67 MILAVNEWS [July 1985], p.5.
68 International Defence Review, [March 1986], p.369.
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Increasing interest in the naval equipment on offer from the West 
brought several offers from the Soviet Union. In 1982 the Soviet and 
Indian navies underwent joint training exercises69. Rather than a 
sign of success for Soviet attempts towards a collective security 
system in Asia, the exercises were probably designed to impress upon 
the Indian Navy the capabilities of ships such as the Kresta II class 
anti-submarine warfare cruisers and the aircraft carrier Minsk which 
visited Bombay in 1982, together with the cruiser Tashkent70. 
Nevertheless, the Soviets were disappointed. In particular, it was 
reported that the Navy was largely disatisfied with Soviet naval 
equipment. The only Indian ship sunk in the 1971 war with Pakistan 
was a Soviet supplied destroyer. It was alleged that Soviet 
submarines had to be serviced too frequently and that the overhaul 
period took too long. Also, the Natya class vessels had to be 
modified for stability when major defects became apparent on the 
delivery run from Vladivostok71. However, as the Kremlin saw its 
influence decline its offers became more attractive and included 
nuclear powered attack submarines and the Kilo type submarines which 
were under development when India ordered the Type-209 submarines 
from West Germany72. These offers met with some success. In 1986 
the decision was taken to replace the Petya type ASW corvettes with 
Nanuchkas or newer types73. At the same time it was announced that
69 Jacobs [August 1983], p.886.
70 Jacobs [August 1983], p.888.
71 Tandon [5 March 1988].
72 Pacific Defence Reporter 1985 Annual Reference Addition 
[December 1984/January 1985], p.208.
73 Jane's Defence Weekly [20 September 1986], p.622.
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the fourth of the Rajput class of guided missile destroyers (Soviet- 
built Kashin) had joined the Indian Navy74. This was swiftly 
followed by the first of six Kilo class submarines to augment the 
acquisition of Type-209s which together replaced the Foxtrots75. All 
in all the naval equipment procured from the Soviet Union during this 
period amounted to $750 million and formed a part of the $1.6 billion 
deal76.
The major agreement of the 1980s came in late-1987 when India 
announced that it would shortly receive a nuclear powered submarine 
from the Soviet Union. Early the next year the boat was identified 
as a Charlie I type cruise missile carrier equipped with eight 
launcher tubes and missiles with a range of 64 km77. This was the 
first time that a nuclear powered submarine had sailed under the flag 
of a non-builder and caused surprise and confusion within the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, it was unclear whether or not the transfer 
contradicted the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Whilst the 
transfer was first mooted as early as 1984, nevertheless, it was 
still a great surprise to the West76. This deal may yet be followed 
by the transfer of another four or five similar systems, a part of a 
package involving expenditure in the region of Rs.3,000 crores79. 
Also, it was anticipated that by late-1988 the Very Low Frequency 
communication station started in 1984 (the same date that
74 Jane's Defence Weekly [20 September 1986], p.618.
75 Jane's Defence Weekly [27 September 1986], p.670.
76 Jane's Defence Weekly [29 November 1986], p.1260.
77 Jane's Defence Weekly [6 February 1988], p.199.
78 Jane's Defence Weekly [23 January 1988], p.116.
79 India Today [31 December 1987], p.72.
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negotiations opened with the Soviet Union over the nuclear powered 
submarine) would become operational thereby giving India a naval 
capability unmatched by any other Indian Ocean littoral state.
Coupled with an ambitious naval shipbuilding programme, the 
modernisation programme of the 1980s has given the Indian Navy a 
substantial increase in its ability to patrol the reaches of the 
Indian Ocean. Although the Navy has yet to use its guns in anger 
since the 1971 war, the growing capability of the Indian Navy is 
slowly becoming evident. In 1987 Indian frigates were seen off the 
coast of Mozambique, although the purpose of the visit was unclear.
In 1988 the Government was able to intervene in the Maldives to 
prevent a successful coup, an act condoned by the Commonwealth but 
greatly resented by many of the smaller states in South Asia, 
particularly Sri Lianfca. Further afield, there were unsubstantiated 
reports during the same year that India was considering intervention 
in Fiji to protect the lives and property of dispossessed Indians. 
Quite how much further the Government is prepared to go in displaying 
its now formidable naval force is not clear- Nor is it apparent how 
free the Government is to operate the nuclear submarines without
l
restrictions, particularly with regard to deployment and engagement.
6.5 The Indian Air Force
1980 was a year of confusion for both the Indian Government and the 
IAF. Following widespread allegations over corrupt practices 
surrounding the Jaguar deal, which was eventually signed during the 
Janata era, the new Government prevaricated over how to proceed. A
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key difficulty stemmed from the fact that some of the most vociferous 
critics of the deal were by 1980 in decision taking positions. Mrs 
Gandhi had criticised the deal on the basis of cost-effectivaness, 
alleging that the cost of producing the Jaguar domestically was twice 
that of buying it direct from Britain60. Nevertheless, in March 1980 
Mrs Gandhi took the decision to proceed with the £1 billion deal with 
Britain81. Shortly afterwards she rejected an official enquiry which 
came as a surprise as one of her key political opponents, Jagjivan 
Ram, held the defence portfolio during the negotiations and the calls 
for a probe were widespread82.
The major deal agreed with the Soviet Union in mid-1980 led the 
Government to renegotiate the terms of the Jaguar deal. On offer 
from the Soviet Union was the MiG-23 at one third the cost of the 
Jaguar and with all the favourable repayment conditions. Instead of 
purchasing 40 Jaguar units outright before moving on to the licensed 
production of 110 units, the Government decided to double the 
quantity of units bought 'off the shelf1 and cancel the licensed 
production agreement83. So confident was the British Government that 
the order would be taken up in full, or so desperate was the same 
Government to see it go through, that cancellation penalties were not 
included in the contract8-4. Nor did the British Government expect 
its Indian counterpart to waste £30-50 million of industrial
80 Anthony [1988], p.229.
81 Sharma [14 March 1980].
82 Flight International [5 April 1980], p.1048.
83 Sunday Times [22 June 1980].
84 Reports as to the cancellation fee differ, the Far Eastern
Economic Review [1 August 1980] reported high cancellation fees 
as a reason for continuation.
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investment in the form of tooling up at HAL which would potentially 
go to waste with the cancellation.05 However, even as late as mid- 
1982, the situation was still unclear when Defence Minister R. 
Venkataraman remarked that 'the manufacture of more Jaguar aircraft 
had not been ruled out'06.
Equally confusing was the explanation coming from the Government that 
the Jaguar order had been scaled down in favour of the MiG-23 when in 
fact the systems were not comparable. The former has a dedicated 
long range strike role, whereas the MiG-23 is designed for ground 
support within a 150 km radius. Moreover, the latter is single- 
engined whereas the IAF prefer twin-engined aircraft such as the 
Jaguar.
Part of the confusion was explained by the mid-year news that France 
had emerged as a prospective supplier of front-line aircraft in the 
form of the Mirage 2000, an offer said to be 'irresistible1 for 
India,
"India has been promised 'exclusive' production rights for 
the area- including exports to the Gulf and South-east 
Asia, if any country there can eventually afford the plane 
- if India signs a sizable contract, say 150 planes to be 
built in the mid-1980s. However, France has let it be 
known that a refusal could result in the Mirage F 2000 
going to Pakistan and that France is considering a 
Pakistani request for 35 of these planes.
Thus the French are trying to box in India with its own 
security considerations - principally the denial of this 
ultra-advanced technology aircraft to Pakistan.1,07
85 The Guardian [12 August 1980].
86 MILAVNEWS [May 1982], p.7.
87 Mascarenhas [20 July 1980].
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In addition Dassault offered India a place at the drawing board on 
its new development, the Mirage 4000, an extremely advanced aircraft 
intended to compete with the Grumman F-14 Tomcat and the McDonnell 
Douglas F-18es. The offer came at a time when French defence exports 
were facing serious problems, which explains why Dassault should in 
effect bid against itself as Dassault had an ongoing interest in the
iJaguar deal on account of its recent takeover of Brueget, British f
Aerospace's collaborator on the Jaguar. The Mirage 2000 had largely 
failed to find a niche in the export market due to the success of 
rival systems such as the F-16. At a later date, whilst the Indian 
Government equivocated over the option to produce the Mirage under 
licence, the French offered to tie the deal to the development of the 
indigenous Light Combat Aircraft through 'unrestricted access' to the 
technology embodied in the Mirage 2000s9.
The French negotiating team arrived in New Delhi in late-1981 for 
final negotiations over the Mirage 2000. Such was the concern in the 
Kremlin that a firm toe-hold in the Indian market was on the point of 
being lost that an offer of the MiG-25 air superiority fighter as a 
counter to the F-16 coincided with the French visit. In addition, it 
also became known that India had accepted an earlier Soviet offer to 
procure and produce under licence the MiG-27 Flogger J tactical 
strike fighter rather than the MiG-23 BN90. Also on offer from the 
Soviet Union during this period were AN-32 transport planes and Mi-24 
helicopter gunships91.
88 MacLachlan [26 May 1981], p.l.
89 MILAVNEWS [December 1983], p.16. .]
90 MILAVNEWS [May 1982], p.8.
91 Asian Defence Journal [November 1981], pp.36, 38.
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The Mirage 2000 deal was finally signed in February 1982 after 
negotiations slowed down following Indian demands for a more 
attractive technology transfer and follow-on package plus a more 
powerful engine, the Snecma M-53p-2 capable of an increased combat 
range, and reduced interest rates. The first stage of the deal 
involved the outright purchase of 40 units, costing $1.3 billion at 
$32 million per copy, with an option to proceed on to a second stage 
involving the licensed production of another 110 units92.
Amidst the tension surrounding the negotiations with France, a 
British defence export team arrived in New Delhi with the intention 
of interesting the Indian Government in the air defence variant (ADV) 
of the Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA). The pitch centred 
upon the ADV but would have been extended to the Interdictor Strike 
(IDS) had the Government shown any interest. In the event, the team 
returned to the UK empty-handed and reports at the time suggested 
that the MRCA was too expensive93. However, a key argument put 
forward by the sales team was that the MRCA would in fact be less 
expensive than the Mirage9* . Also, it became clear around the same 
time that India was uninterested in submissions by Northrop for co­
production of the F-20A by India95. Even if the Indian Government 
had shown more than a perfunctory interest, any deal involving the F- 
20 would have required Foreign Military Sales funding which would
92 Malhotra [13 February 1982].
93 Smith C. and George [2 March 1985], pp.365-370.
94 Asian Defence Journal [November 1981], p.38.
95 MILAVNEWS [February 1983], p.17.
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have been unlikely given Congressional concern over policies which 
had in the past led to the arming of both India and Pakistan.
However, the MRCA failure was partially offset by the Government's 
decision to revive the licensed production section of the Jaguar 
contract. Following speculation that all licensed production had 
been cancelled, it was decided to assemble 45 completely knocked down 
(CKD) units and assemble a third batch of 31 Jaguars with an 
estimated value to the UK of $290 million96.
With few exceptions, little of any great significance occurred for 
the IAF throughout the mid-1980s . Most of the key modernisation 
agreements had been settled, with or without an indigenous production 
element, and it only remained for the IAF to assimilate the new 
weapons systems in a reliable fashion and redress one of the worst 
accident rates in the world. The accident rate for the Chetak 
helicopter, produced under licence from France, was ten times the 
world average in 1985. Moreover, between 1977 and 1983 an air safety 
committee investigated 262 major and minor accidents including 31 
write-offs and the causes were attributed to pilot error, 
recklessness and a deficiency in trained technicians.97 Nor were 
these expressions of concern allayed when, in mid-1986, three Indian 
fighter aircraft crashed within 24 hours - two of the fighters were 
MiG-2Is, the third was not identified98.
96 MILAVNEWS [March 1983], p.15.
97 MILAVNEWS [October 1985], p.18.
98 MILAVNEWS [August 1986], p.14.
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Reports that India had shown interest in the Nimrod AEW.3 (advanced 
early warning) system in 1982, and again in 1986 following its 
rejection by the British Government, came to nothing, possibly on 
account of the sensitive equipment embodied in the system. Nor did 
plans to use an appropriate version of the mission's avionics in a 
less expensive airframe, such as the HS 748, which HAL was already 
producing."
In late-1983 speculation mounted as to the possible agreement between 
the Soviet Union and India over the supply of the new MiG-29 Fulcrum, 
complete with manufacturing rights100. The deal was finally 
announced in August 1984 and came as a great surprise to the West.
The MiG-29, a major top-line, state-of-the-art fighter was only just 
entering service with the Soviet Air Force and had yet to be issued 
to Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, the Soviets are habitually cautious 
about sensitive technology transfer to countries with links to the 
West.
Whilst the MiG-29 caused great interest in the West for primarily 
political reasons, indicating as it did the extent to which the 
Soviet Union was attempting to head off India's successful 
diversification programme, it was not until mid-1988 that the full 
significance of the deal became apparent. In the very much more 
relaxed atmosphere of the new detente the MiG-29 appeared at the 
Farnborough airshow and caused a sensation by outperforming the 
state-of-the-art Western systems particularly with regard to
99 MILAVNEWS [August 1982], p.13.
100 MILAVNEWS [November 1983], p.20.
manoeuverability101. Since the defection of a MiG-25 Foxbat pilot to 
Japan in September 1976, Western observers had been convinced of the 
retarded standards of Soviet aeronautic technology. Although the 
MiG-29 does not incorporate the type of 1fly-by-wire1 technology 
which is now incorporated in state-of-the-art Western systems, this 
omission proved not to be detrimental to either the horizontal or 
vertical performance modes of the aircraft. Thus, India's 
acquisition of 40/45 MiG-29s is now seen as a much more significant 
event than it was in 1984. However, the Soviet Union has withheld 
from the supply and co-production contract the sophisticated look 
down/shoot down radar and the new AA-X-10 medium range air-to-air 
missiles which are expected to comprise the Fulcrum1s primary 
armament when in Soviet Air Force service. Instead, the more dated 
avionics installed in the MiG-23 will be used, together with the less 
sophisticated air-to-air missiles which arm both the MiG-23s and the 
MiG-21sloz.
With the exception of reports that the IAF would procure the Soviet 
IL-76 Mainstays to satisfy the Advanced Early Warning (AEW) 
requirement and the Yak-28 Brewer E light bombers for Electronic 
Counter Measure (ECM) duties, little else was reported for the 
IAF103. Instead, attention focused upon the needs of the Fleet Air 
Arm, particularly following the appointment of Admiral Tahiliani as 
chief of naval staff in late-1984, himself an ex-naval aviator.
Also, considerable attention and resources were directed towards
101 See, for example, the several articles on the event in Aviation 
Week & Space Technology [12 September 1988].
102 MILAVNEWS [November 1984], p.14.
103 MILAVNEWS [April 1984], p 5.
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India's major indigenous project of the decade, the Light Combat 
Aircraft (LCA).
6.6 Procurement in Search of a Policy?
Over the 1980s India has engaged in the most significant conventional 
defence build-up in its history and, within the Third World, it has 
rivalled only the profligate expansion programmes of the OPEC Gulf 
states during the late-1970s. In 1987, for example, approximately 
20% of all the arms exported to Third World countries were sold to 
India104. Tinged with several hints of corruption and necessitating 
heady rises in defence expenditures to service increasing procurement 
debts, the modernisation programme proceeded apace without policy 
reviews since 1981 and, on occasion, it seemed, without a strong 
direction.
Over a five year period, 1982-1987, Indian defence expenditure rose 
by 50%. The 1987-88 defence budget alone increased by 23% from the 
previous year which had in turn increased by an unplanned 16%. 
However, $190 million was diverted from the defence budget in late- 
1987 to alleviate the chronic drought conditions experienced in many 
parts of the country, especially Rajasthan. With the exception of 
the period following the 1962 war, defence expenditure averaged 
approximately 3% of GNP over the 1960s and 1970s. It is now much 
more and closer to 5.5%los.
104 SIPRI Arms Trade Registers and Data Bank.
105 Gupta and Thakurta [February, 1989], p.43.
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Clearly, much of India's defence equipment was in urgent need of 
modernisation by the 1970s. The Soviet Union provided the only 
source of military Hardware during that decade due to chronic 
economic problems and foreign exchange shortages. When the Janata 
Government came to power it created the opportunity not only to 
preside over a significant modernisation programme but also to 
reverse the degree of dependency upon the Soviet Union. The re- 
election of Mrs Gandhi saw a continuation of the modernisation 
programme but she exploited the diversification policy to extract the 
maximum financial, technological and political advantage from a 
buyers' market on the one hand and a concerned Soviet Union on the 
other.
Politically, Mrs Gandhi and, later, Rajiv handled the process welL, 
witness the quality of front line equipment currently deployed by the 
Indian armed forces. However, it is by no means clear that India 
required the scale of modernisation for defence alone. Nor is it 
apparent that the choice of technology was particularly appropriate 
for anything beyond symbolism.
In the early 1980s India perceived three areas of threat to its 
security - Pakistan, China and a more nebulous threat from the Indian 
Ocean. In addition there were perceived problems stemming from tie 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the renewed and much resuscitated 
relationship between Pakistan and the US and, further afield, 
disconcerting developments in the Persian Gulf. However, whilst the 
net effect may have been to alter India's security environment, 
direct threats to the country's territorial integrity or off-shore 
resources are difficult to identify. Whilst the nature of the geo­
300
political environment may have changed, certain basic principles, 
such as those identified by Nehru, did not - India's size and geo­
political significance in a bi-polar world provided its own form of 
security.
Even with the US military and economic aid package, which over the 
decade amounted to less than India currently spends on defence each 
year, Pakistan posed little threat to India. Whilst there always 
existed the possibility of a lightning strike to increase territorial 
gains in Azad Kashmir, unprovoked action would certainly have 
jeopardised bilateral military and economic aid from the US and 
multilateral aid from elsewhere - Pakistan is unequivocally dependent 
upon the US. So too would it have likely tipped the balance in 
favour of those Congressmen who wished to penalise Pakistan for its 
nuclear weapon programme. With the Punjab well fortified for defence 
on both sides, Pakistan's only outlet for aggression lay in the 
Rajasthan desert - an unlikely option given India's overwhelming 3:1 
conventional superiority.
Nor was there any reason to suspect that China posed the type of 
threat which existed two decades earlier. Apart from a quantum 
increase in planning and vigilance to absorb another attack by China, 
India could rely upon the post-Mao internal upheavals and the massive 
four modernisations programme occupying all Chinese efforts into the 
foreseeable future. Although Sino-Indian relations did dip markedly 
in 1986 leading to fractious relations and border incidents, the 
tension was shortlived. Indeed, it is remarkable how, over the 1970s 
and 1980s, the threat from China became an increasingly diplomatic 
rather than a military problem for New Delhi to solve. Rajiv's
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successful visit to China in 1988 and successive rounds of talks over 
border issues reflect well the propensity on both sides to seek 
diplomatic solutions and avoid at all costs another conflict.
Even more tenuous were the perceived threats from the Indian Ocean.
IWhilst there did exist a major superpower build-up in the region 
following the departure of the British, the emphasis was upon 
strategic factors which turned largely on the Gulf War and the rise 
of Muslim fundamentalism. Pakistan's role in this process was of 
concern to India but the idea of a threat to off-shore oil resources 
or outright invasion or blockade from either the Rapid Deployment 
Force or the US Seventh Fleet was inconceivable. Indeed, the 
significance of Indian policy in this theatre lies in its vagueness.
At no point was the generalised threat perception followed through to 
its logical and specific conclusion.
Equally significant was the cavalier approach taken by India to 
defence posture overall. During a period when large capital ships 
were increasingly seen as vulnerable and expensive, the Government 
opted for a second aircraft carrier and announced plans to procure at 
least a third from indigenous sources. In the aftermath of the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the key lessons gleaned by Indian 
strategic planners did not centre upon the fortuitous circumstances I
I
under which the British task force managed to acquit itself, or the 
limitations and vulnerability revealed by large ships which did not 
benefit from, at the very least, anti-missile systems. In fact, 
defence opinion shapers were becoming seriously disenchanted with 
large ships of the line due to their high-value status as targets and 
their increasing vulnerability in the face of missile improvements.
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Instead, Indian policy makers were alerted to the importance of 
protecting extended coastlines which in turn justified the pursuit of 
naval power. At no point did the Indian Navy appear to define the 
operational context to justify not only two or more aircraft carriers 
but, in addition, the extremely expensive V/STOL airwing to accompany 
them. Having acquired for itself a high-value target, the Indian 
Navy has never indicated the specific military role that one or more 
aircraft carriers might play in the event of a war with Pakistan106.
Whilst the Indian Air Force may have required updating and 
modernisation, particularly in the wake of the US-Pakistan aid 
agreement, the steps taken were open to question in many instances. 
The procurement of both the Jaguar and the Mirage 2000 were offered a 
post hoc justification by the Pakistani acquisition of the F-16. 
Whether or not the Jaguar could successfully fulfil its main mission 
and destroy the Pakistani F-16 squadrons while still on the ground 
would depend wholly upon the political circumstances leading up to 
the attack. Or, put another way, it would have to be a pre-emptive, 
surprise attack. Assuming that the F-16s took off successfully, the 
Mirage 2000 would be entrusted with the task of interception.
However, given the numerous military and industrial targets 
throughout Northern and Central India within range for an F-16, the 
mix of strike routes would be too numerous for the Mirage to 
patrol107. Given the extremely high cost of the Mirage could the 
defence of India have been better served by a greater emphasis upon 
fixed air defences? Why did the Indian Government opt for a fighter
106 For an excellent critique of this aspect of Indian naval policy 
see Tellis [1987a].
107 Palit [30 October 1981].
that the French Air Force accepted with some reluctance, that the IAF 
was equally equivocal over, that had sold poorly on the international 
market and, furthermore, is a single-engined plane and thus extremely 
vulnerable in the environment of Northern India where it will most 
certainly be deployed?
Equally, no debate appears to have taken place about the overall 
trajectory of Indian defence. Whilst the political benefits of 
diversification are self-evident, how much are they counter-balanced 
by operational problems? For example, a squadron F-4 Phantoms 
require an inventory of 70,000 spare parts to be kept flying in 
wartime conditions10®. Each successive generation of military 
technology justifies its existence in part by offering greater 
performance capability and, in general, is a more complex system than 
its predecessor which inevitably means that greater spare part 
inventories are required. Moreover, fault diagnosis and maintenance 
are also becoming much more complex requiring sophisticated computers 
to trace faults (and spare parts) and these too must be well 
maintained109. Recent procurement by the Indian Air Force has 
increased the range of equipment to include French, British, Soviet 
and West German systems which must require immense logistical 
planning to design a chain which can only ever be as strong as its 
weakest link.
Also, no apparent debate appears to have taken place to consider the 
implications of the performance of major weapons systems in recent 
conflicts, such as over the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and the range
108 Albrecht and Kaldor [1979], p.7.
109 See, for example, Spinney's description of the maintenance 
requirements for the F-16, Spinney [1985].
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of engagements between Israel and its neighbours. Thus, during an 
era when the vulnerability of major weapons systems was increasing 
due to significant technical advances in missile technology, the 
Indian Government poured vast amounts of foreign exchange into the 
purchase of precisely the type of systems over which hung so many 
question marks.
Finally, and the subject of the next chapter, India's procurement 
policy through the 1980s can be questioned in relation to the time 
honoured policy of working towards self-sufficiency in the defence 
sector. For example, plans to produce under licence both the Jaguar 
and the Mirage were abandoned over time, leaving the aeronautics 
industry with nothing more than basic assembly of these systems from 
CKDs.
The speed and extravagance of the defence build-up, coupled with the 
continuing neglect of indigenisation, leads to the conclusion that 
political rather than military considerations were uppermost in the 
collective mind of the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, 
the final arbiter on procurement decisions. Without doubt the 
imported systems offered the country a quantum increase in defence 
capability and added to security to some degree. However, the 
efficacy of the modernisation programme is so dubious as to suggest 
that the symbols of power rather than the principles of defence were 




THE FAILURE OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
7.1 Indigenous Defence Production: The Commitment
The process of absorbing and assimilating technology is considered 
fundamental to the development process. Ordinarily, technology moves 
from North to South. Through a gamut of complicated mechanisms 
involving bilateral and multilateral agencies and institutions, the 
technologically advanced countries either sell, or transfer gratis, 
skills, production capability and capacity which in principle permit 
Third World countries to marry development needs to technology. 
Through these mechanisms Third World countries acquire the means of 
production on which to base agrarian and industrial development. In 
addition, the recipient countries may also enter into arrangements to 
import the managerial and administrative skills to organise and 
coordinate this process.
In the field of defence, the market is different in many ways, 
particularly with regard to restrictions on the nature and scale of 
technology which is transferred. However, the overall process is 
very much the same. If a country cannot produce for itself the 
systems and infrastructure considered essential for modern defence, 
it will be forced to look beyond its national boundaries for the
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relevant technology and expertise. Over the past fifteen years, 
attempts to develop an indigenous defence capability have proceeded 
apace in several Third World countries. These efforts have led to a 
significant debate over whether or not there exist negative effects 
for the development process.
Developing countries become involved in defence production for 
different reasons. The motivations tend to stem from a combination 
of political factors, existing and potential technological capability 
in both civilian and defence arej^ and economic considerations. The 
configuration of indigenous defence industrial bases depends very 
much upon national strategies for industrialisation, which provides 
an initial explanation for the marked differences between, for
example, the Brazilian and Indian defence industries. The former has
been geared to export promotion, the latter towards import 
substitution. First, there are those countries which see a defence 
industrial base as an essential part of an overall expression of 
regional dominance - India in South Asia, Brazil in Latin America 
and, to a lesser extent, Egypt in the Middle East. Here, it is the 
threat of restricted action and, ultimately, embargo which provides 
the primary political motivation for defence production. Prestige 
and status are also important. Just as it is difficult for a country 
to be considered a great or super power without nuclear weapons, so 
countries which aspire to regional hegemony cannot convincingly do so
without reducing their dependence upon external suppliers. The
disparity between Japan's economic and political/military power is an 
instructive example.
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Second, there are certain countries which are frequently or 
permanently ostracised by the international community, or parts of 
it, and as a consequence domestic production is often the only means 
of assuring a defence capability - there are limits to what can be 
predictably bought on the black market. Countries such as Israel and 
South Africa fit into this category, the latter in particular.
Third, some countries see economic advantages to be gained from 
encouraging defence production, which may interface with the previous 
two motivations or, as in the case of Singapore, it may simply be a 
means of generating export revenue1.
In the case of India there are strong economic and political reasons 
for the considerable all-round investment in defence production. 
Economically, India is weak in many ways. The rupee is a 'soft' 
currency and limited foreign exchange reserves have always been a 
constraint upon choice and source of technology, particularly in the 
1970s. The purchase of both defence technology and finished systems 
places a strain upon foreign exchange reserves. There is, therefore, 
a high opportunity cost to be considered. However, against this it 
has been argued that India's resource base is basically underutilised 
and there is little or no inherent opportunity cost in defence 
production and expenditure2.
Secondly, the combination of inflation (both within the defence 
industries and throughout the international economy) and the rate of 
technological change in the West has forced up the price of defence




systems making continued reliance upon exports a costly and 
undesirable condition. P) .i.marily in terms of foreign exchange 
savings, partial or complete self-sufficiency would be economically 
advantageous3.
Politically, the arguments in favour of India developing an 
indigenous defence base are as equally persuasive as the economic 
benefits. The need to become self-sufficient in defence production 
was first stated in 1926, well before independence, and was 
highlighted in the Karachi Resolution, a political manifesto 
outlining the future shape of the Indian economy. Thereafter, the 
Bombay Plan of 1944 and the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 
1956 laid the basis for the creation of heavy industries and high 
technology skills based on a system of state capitalism, a necessary 
prerequisite for an indigenous defence base.
From 1947 on there were few dissenting voices over the need for the 
country to develop an indigenous defence industry. Because 
indigenous production could save the country foreign exchange it was 
supported by those in favour of keeping defence expenditures low. It 
was also supported by those in favour of an industrial policy based 
upon import substitution, by those who did not want India to be bound 
by the ties of alignment and by those who saw India as a significant 
regional power.
3 The actual cost of local defence production may greatly exceed 
the cost of 'off-the-shelf1 import but this may be more than 
offset by foreign exchange savings, particularly during a period 
of declining terms of trade.
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The commitment to defence production increased when the Indian 
Government responded to first the US-Pakistan strategic relationship 
started in 1954 and, second, defeat against the Chinese in the 1952 
war. Until the mid-1950s, during a period when defence policy was 
evolving slowly, defence production was limited to small arms and 
ordnance. In fact, defence production was first started in 1801 when 
the East India Company established the Gun Carriage Agency outside 
Calcutta44. Partition left sixteen of the ordnance factories 
established by the British inside India which gave a base on which to 
build (Pakistan received none). In 1952 the Institute for Armament 
Studies was established at Kirki with the intention of familiarising 
officers with military science and technology. In 1954 a new 
ordnance factory was set up at Ambarnath and Bharat Electronics was 
established in the same year as a limited company in the public 
sector under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Between 1955 
and 1961 the ordnance factories were completely reorganised which 
thereafter permitted the absorption of foreign technology in the form 
of licensed production agreements5. The agreement to produce 
Shaktiman trucks under license from MAN (Maschinenfabrik Augsberg- 
Nurenberg AG) in late-1958 is a case in point. Also during the mid- 
1950s, soon after Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO, India entered 
into a licensed production deal with Britain to produce the Gnat and, 
furthermore, embarked on a programme to build its first indigenous 
jet fighter, the HF-24 Marut. However, Krishna Menon's attempts to 
expand the potential for indigenous defence production during the 
late-1950s actually amounted to very little. Apart from the 
animosity which Menon created for other reasons within the defence
4 Smith, C. and George [1985], p 356.
5 Kavic [1967], pp.128-129.
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community, India's small industrial base and the scarcity of 
resources, including foreign exchange, limited actual production6.
The 1964 defence plan which was drawn up after the defeat against 
China called for an increased emphasis upon indigenous production. 
After the 1965 war with Pakistan and the experience of embargo by 
Britain and the US the defence plan was realigned to run concurrently 
with the Five-Year Development Plan which required revision to cover 
the period 1966-71. A major objective was that by 1973-74 the 
country would be significantly less dependent upon arms imports. The 
ordnance factories performed reasonably well during the late-1960s, 
especially in the production of arms, ammunition and vehicles, but 
much less well in the clothing and general stores sections. In 
addition, the public sector undertakings began to grow in size and 
output, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) in particular.7
Successive Indian (ksvernments have fostered the idea that defence 
production has been reasonably successful over the years and that a 
slow but steady progress is being made towards self-sufficiency. In 
fact, this is not the case. In many instances the public sector 
undertakings have either not performed well or have been frustrated 
in their attempts to do so. Many of the claims that systems are 
'indigenous' are in fact misrepresentative as increasingly the term 
is being used to cover production which involves little more than 
assembly, where the local content is minimal. Although there have 
been some success stories the quest for self-sufficiency is far from 
fulfilled and the reasons for this are several.
6 Wulf [1986], p.127.
7 SIPRI [1971], p.742.
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7.2 Indigenous Production for the Army
A major area of emphasis for the domestic defence industry has been 
the production of tanks. In 1961, against strong competition from 
West Germany, the British firm Vickers-Armstrong agreed to supply 
India with the manufacturing capability to produce a modified 
Chieftain tank at the Avadi heavy-vehicle factory in Madras. The 
first tank, known as the Vijayanta, came off the production line in 
January 1965 and some three and a half years later 65 tanks had been 
received by the Army. However, although the indigenous content of 
the tank increased, reliance upon British design and know-how 
remained total and production delays during the late-1960s led to the 
order of 75 T-55 tanks from the Soviet Union.® Although the 
Vijayanta has experienced performance problems particularly with the 
Leyland L-60 engine9, nevertheless the Avadi factory has successfully 
produced over 1,000 units. In the mid-1980s it was decided upon to 
equip the Vijayanta with a new engine. At the time it was alleged 
that the Army Base Workshop in Delhi Cantonment was capable of 
uprating the engine for the period until a new indigenous main battle 
tank (MBT) was ready. However, under pressure from a consultancy 
firm, Usha Services and Consultants, which employs several ex-service 
officers, -the Government considered instead tenders from foreign 
defence contractors, including the engine designed by Rolls-Royce for 
the abandoned Shir II project.10
8 SIPRI [1971], p.743-744.
9 International Defense Review [April 1986], p.437.
10 Nayar [January, 1984], p.7.
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In the early-1970: '.he Indian Government decided that India's next
MBT would be designed and produced indigenously. Both inside and 
outside India, progress in the field of tank production has been 
applauded. It is widely held that Avadi is a capable company and 
that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is 
equally capable of effecting innovations, witness the development of 
a mine clearing device which is fitted to the front of some of the 
Vijayantas. On this basis, the R&D currently under way on the 
production of an indigenous MBT for deployment in the 1990s is 
regarded with optimism. However, on closer inspection, there appear 
to be a host of managerial and technological problems associated with 
this project.
Plans to develop the Chetak, now renamed the Arjun, the MBT for the
1990s, first began in 1970 and the programme was approved in 1972
following the issue of the General Staff Qualitative Requirements.
In May 1974 the government sanctioned Rs.15.5 crores for the initial
phase of the programme. Originally the programme envisaged that the
engine, transmission and drive would be imported. The DRDO was
charged with the task of developing the hull, turret, running gear
and gun. In 1976, when it became clear that attempts to acquire a
powerpack from abroad were unlikely to succeed, the Combat Vehicle
Research Establishment was entrusted with the task of indigenous
production. By 1982, it was apparent that little or no success had
been achieved,
"... sources hasten to point out that a specialised 
process called Alphinbonding technique, in which the 
cylinder should have been cast, has not been used.
Because of this, the present aluminium bonding used in 
the cylinder often gives way resulting in the 
establishment of communication between the inlet and
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exhaust ports which should never occur ... The poor 
casting, it is said, has resulted in a wastage of about 
Rs.5 lakh, as 50 cylinders had to be rejected. (Each 
cylinder costs nearly Rs.10,000) ...Certain uncalled for 
modifications attempted on the tank have also put the 
clock back on its development. Masking the valves, using 
compressors to pressurise single-cylinders, and ignoring 
the equilibrium condition have resulted in a wastage of 
time and money. It is now reported that top officials 
are toying with the idea of going in for the next 
advanced gas-turbine engine for the Chetak...The wrongly- 
designed camshaft in the transmission group of the engine 
was also a contributory factor to the engine1s low 
efficiency. The hydro-pneumatic suspension in the hull 
and turret were utter failures. Besides, the electrical 
system of the tank has not been fully implemented."11
In all other respects, the MBT is reasonably well on course. A new 
form of armour, Kanchan, has been developed by the Defence 
Metallurgical Research Laboratory at Hyderabad (and is reputed to 
rate with the famous Chobham armour produced by Britain), the gun by 
the Armament Research and Development Establishment and the controls 
and instrumentation by the Instrument Research Development 
Establishment at Dehra Dun.
Even if the problems over a suitable power pack for the MBT are 
resolved there is no guarantee that the project will succeed 
thereafter. Thus, until the MBT enters both production and service, 
India will license produce the Soviet T-72 or the T-80 as a stop-gap 
measure, but for how long this will be necessary remains to be seen.
At the time when the MBT is due to go into production, in the early 
1990s, the production plant in Madras will be at the point of 
stabilising production of the tanks produced under Soviet license.
iThe Avadi factory will not be capable of tooling up to produce both i 
tanks without massive investment, the estimated cost being Rs.200
11 Indian Express [29 June 1982].
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crore with the bulk of the investment required by the end of this 
decade,
"At present not much thought seems to have gone into the 
question of where the MBT will be produced, what sort of
investment will be needed to manufacture it and other 
related questions. Unless these questions are examined 
in depth and the necessary decisions taken in time, we 
may find that although the MBT project achieves success 
as a design and development effort, other considerations 
may prevent it from getting off the drawing board."12
In addition, there are other questions to consider, in particular 
whether or not the system will be acceptable to the Army and whether 
or not slow progress will render the tank obsolete whilst still on 
the production line.
By the late-1980s, few of the production problems had been solved and
more had emerged. Although a prototype has been produced, the
results of an examination by an expert committee was critical on nine 
specific points,
1) The turret and hull design are not suitable for smooth 
operations - the turret hits the driver when in an open up 
position. The driver cannot enter or exit the tank when the 
turret is facing forwards.
2) The fire control system is neither integrated nor fitted.
3) The loading rate of 15 seconds was unacceptably low.
4) The air defence gun has to be operated by the loader which 
means that when the the tank is attacked from the air the main 
armament remains inoperative.
12 Balachandran [6 December 1982].
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5) Only three ready rounds are in the turret area, as against 
the twelve rounds specified by the General Staff Qualitative 
Requirements.
6) The shape of the turret is a shell trap.
7) The width of the track has increased beyond the Army's
11specifications, further reducing the tank's mobility as it j
cannot now be transported on trains or indeed cross bridges in 
areas where it is likely to be deployed.
8) The seating positions etc are unsuitable.13 
Furthermore, very little progress was reported on the ongoing 
problems of finding a suitable engine. Of the six prototypes 
produced in 1987, all were fitted with MTU engines from West Germany. 
After agreeing to the import of 42 engines costing Rs.220 million, it 
appeared that the order had failed to specify the requirements 
necessary for successful operations in Indian climatic conditions and 
the overall cost of the tank has risen by a factor of nineteen14. By 
1988, however, the Arjun had apparently fulfilled the Army's mobility 
requirements but problems with the l,500hp indigenous engine were 
persisting, such that a l,400hp MTU engine had been imported for use
in the R&D process15. |
The shortfall engendered by the phasing out of the Vijayanta and the |
delay in producing the Arjun has forced India to rely upon licensed j
production of Soviet tanks. The T-72M (the most advanced version) is 
being produced at Avadi, costing $835,000 per unit, and with only 10%
13 Nigudker [November 1987], p.82. See also, Bobb (et al) [15 June 
1987], pp.52-53.
14 Nigudker [November 1987], p.82.
15 Mama [May 1988], p.578.
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local content, although it is understood that this figure will over 
time rise to 95%, In addition to experiencing problems with the MBT, 
the Combat Vehicle R&D Establishment (CVRDE) has also found it 
difficult to produce an infantry combat vehicle which has led to the 
licensed production of the Soviet BMP-1. However, CVRDE has been 
able to develop ambulance and command post variants of the BMP-1. 
Finally, a license to produce 200-300 amphibious tanks is being 
sought from either Sweden, West Germany or the US16.
Although many of India's future artillery requirements will be met by 
the Bofors 155mm field gun, which may also be produced under license, 
other artillery projects are led by the 2,300kg 105mm Indian Field 
Gun Mkll. Costing $1,000 million, production of the field gun is 
also behind schedule as by 1986 the Army had already formed several 
units to receive the guns. Ufae Armament R&D Establishment at Pune 
which is responsible for the field gun is also producing new infantry 
weapons to replace the aging Ishapore rifle. A variety of 
ammunition, propellants and explosives are being developed by the 
DRDO.17 However, a much more innovative process is the development 
of a sophisticated command, control and communication system (C3I), 
the Army radio engineering network (AREN). Development of this 
system has been underway for over seventeen years and appears to have 
been completed in 1988 at a cost of Rs.500 crore1®. It is alleged 
that a follow-on system, the Integrated Services Digital Network, has 
already started19*.
16 International Defense Review [April 1986], p.438.
17 International Defense Review [April 1986], pp.438-441.
18 Mama [March 1988], p.259.
19 Gupta [15 Novemeber 1985], p.58.
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Although some of the projects earmarked for the Army have been badly 
delayed, indigenous defence production in this quarter appears to 
have run much more smoothly than in other areas, such as aerospace, 
albeit with time and cost overruns. There are several possible 
reasons for this. First, the level of technology required by the 
Army may be easier for R&D establishments and the public sector 
enterprises to come to terms with and control than obtains in the 
aeronautics sector, for example. Second, the degree of indigenous 
content may be relatively small, witness the mere 10% involved in the 
production of the T-72M. Third, the Army could be a more compliant 
customer than the other two services and mind less accepting either 
Soviet-license or indigenous equipment.
Nevertheless, there are evident anomalies which suggest problems in
the procurement process which militate against the further
development of indigenous capability. Why have the ordnance
factories failed to develop beyond the 105mm gun? Why did India buy
Rs.10 crore worth of parachutes from South Korea and France when the
same are manufactured in Kanpur? Why were 1.4 million blankets
purchased from Australia in 1985 during a period when most Indian
woollen mills had export capacity? Why were 1,000 passive night
goggles imported when the indigenous variety could have overcome the
Army's objections by using a small imported component at a fraction
the cost of the whole imported item? Similarly, why were 3,000
pieces of illuminating ammunition for 81mm mortars imported when the
indigenous variety required only to have its fuse replaced by an
imported one?20 Why has the licensed production of Soviet equipirent
20 All these examples from Gupta and Chandran [15 April 1986], 
p.41.
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led to a cramping of indigenous capability, witness the agreement 
which l.os allowed the Soviet Union to take over many of India's Army 
Base Workshops to set up repair and manufacturing facilities for 
Soviet weaponry21? Could Indian technicians not have been trained 
for the task? Why has the decision been taken to procure a very 
large number of Soviet T-72 tanks if success with the indigenous MBT 
is on the horizon?
7.3 Indigenous Production for the Navy
Naval shipbuilding in India was retarded during the early stages by 
financial stringency, although a design laboratory was set up in 
Bombay soon after independence. However, it was not until 1955 that 
the Government paid any attention to naval construction which came in 
the form of local orders for inshore minesweepers and seaward patrol 
craft and other minor vessels22. In 1960 the Government acquired a 
major shipyard, Mazagon Docks Ltd in Bombay and the Garden Reach 
Workshop Ltd in Calcutta23. A more significant shipbuilding 
programme was eventually initiated in 1964 following an agreement 
with Britain which enabled India to construct the Leander class 
frigate at facilities constructed at Mazagon Docks. The first vessel 
was laid down in 1966 and completed in 1976. The sixth and final 
vessel, INS Vindhyagiri, was completed in 1980. The experience 
gained on the Leander programme facilitated the development of the
21 Bobb [31 August 1984], p.84.
22 Kavic [1967], p.135.
23 Wulf [1986], p.139.
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Godavari class frigate which, at 3,500 tons, is larger and better 
armed than its British counterpart. This programme consists of six 
frigates all of which are heavily armed for their tonnage24.
Although Mazagon dockyard built the hull and propulsion plant, the 
input from foreign designs is not clear. However, machinery, 
missiles and the fire control system have been imported. As a 
follow-on programme a new class of warship has recently been 
announced; 'Project 15' will design 5,000 ton frigates which will 
have an indigenous content of 85%25. However, as with other areas of * 
the Indian defence industry it has never been made clear how the
*
percentage of indigenous content is calculated2®. In addition, India 
is also anxious to acquire submarine technology and construction \
capability. To this end a deal was agreed with West Germany in j
December 1981 for two Type-209 submarines to be constructed at Kiel 
but with an option to build four additional vessels at Mazagon Docks. 
Construction of the required facilities began in January 1982 but 
have since been terminated by the Government due to West German 1
dealings with South Africa. 1
In addition to Mazagon Docks, other public sector companies are the |
Garden Reach, Praga and Goa shipyards. The Indian Navy also has a j
burgeoning shipbuilding capability. The 700-acre naval dockyard at I
I
Vishakhapatnam is the largest dry dock in Southwest Asia with a
i,'
24 International Defense Review [October 1986], p.1563.
25 Jane's Defence Weekly [5 December 1987].
26 For example, when the author visited a defence exhibition in
Delhi he was informed that an anti-tank missile on display was
80% indigenous. When the company representative was asked to
point out the foreign components from the knocked-down version
it appeared that at least half the components on display were 
imported.
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workforce of over 7,000 and the capacity to service fifty ships 
simultaneously. Although the Soviets, who constructed the facility, 
are keen to keep it within their orbit, some Rs.300 crores is being 
invested into the dockyard to permit the repair of ships and, 
eventually, submarines which are not of Soviet or East European 
design.27 Also, under construction near Karwar in Karnataka is a new 
naval base. Expected to cost around $1.5 billion and be operational 
by 1996, the base will cover 3650km, have 4.5km of berthing space and 
will involve the relocation of at least 30,000 local people. The 
base will be able to handle shipbuilding, maintenance and refitting 
facilities.28
Since the acquisition of a second aircraft carrier following the 
acceptance that a wider naval role is now called for, speculation is 
rising as to the future direction of procurement once the first 
aircraft carrier, Vikrant, is retired before the end of the century. 
Providing the naval mission is maintained, and there seems no 
likelihood that India's naval presence in the Indian Ocean will be 
reduced, an extra one or possibly two aircraft carriers will be 
required - the third to ensure continuity of presence given the 
amount of time these ships spend in dock. Recently, Admiral 
Tahiliani, Chief of Naval Staff, has stated that all future aircraft 
carriers for the Indian Navy will be produced indigenously. Reports 
quoting former Defence Minister Arun Singh suggest that the Navy has 
already carried out preliminary design studies on a replacement for
27 Defence Market Report [1985], p.9.
28 Jane's Defence Weekly [15 November 1986], p.1144.
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the Vikrant but that the door has also been left ajar for a foreign 
design29. A likely place for construction is the shipyard at Cochin.
The performance of the Mazagon Docks has not been spectacular. Part 
of this can be explained by the global recession in, and the
I
traditional low profitability of, shipbuilding. However, it has also j 
been the case that the inherent problems have been compounded by poor 
management, particularly during the period when N.K. Sawhney was the 
chairman and managing director when productivity, efficiency and 
orders plummeted. In the space of two years the number of ships 
brought in for repair dropped from 3,000 to 600 in the space of two 
to three years30. In contracts with the Indian Navy, these problems 
have been particularly damaging. In the case of ship construction 
for the Navy, prices are fixed on a cost plus basis giving 5% profit 
on the original estimates. Any escalation of cost has the effect of 
reducing an already low percentage of profit. Yet, in the absence of 
any suitable system for supervision, production planning, quality 
control and monitoring of costs, slippage is almost certain to occur.
On the non-military working of the dock the Estimates Committee found 
that,
"A detailed examination of an export order for six cargo 
vessels to a U.K. based shipping company during 1977 to 
1979 revealed several deficiencies affecting cost 
efficiency and profitability. There was delay ranging 
from 12-15 months from the due dates in the delivery of 
these vessels and the company suffered a heavy loss of 
Rs.554.26 lakhs as against the anticipated profit of *
Rs.84.72 lacks. The main factors responsible for this 
state of affairs were defective estimates, inadequacy of 
design capability, lack of proper production planning and 
control, inadequate supervision and deficiencies in 
quality control. Under-estimation of labour and 
materials resulted in a loss of about Rs.19 lakhs in one
29 International Defense Review [March 1987], p.359.
30 India Today [31 December 1986], p.68.
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vessel alone. Further, lack of data bank for designing 
of various types and sizes of cargo vessels resulted in 
errors in working drawings which caused rework resulting 
in delay in execution as well as excess consumption of 
labour and materials."31
In 1985-86, the situation was little better. Mazagon Docks accrued a 
loss of Rs.389.7 million and Garden Reach and Mishra Dhatu Nigam32 
also returned losses of Rs.78.9 million and Rs.49.9 million 
respectively33.
There are four main reasons for the apparent lacklustre performance
of the Indian naval construction programme. First, the Navy is a
junior, not a senior service. Even though naval commitments are
rising significantly, the emphasis upon indigenous production is of
barely more than two decades in duration. Whilst naval policy
continues to be geared to sea control and, furthermore, has developed
a blue water perspective there are limitations upon how much the
Government can commit to the naval programme given the competing
claims of the more powerful Army programmes and the more prestigious
aeronautics programmes. Inevitably, the naval construction yards
will suffer from a lack of follow-on orders. Using the occasion of
the launching of an inshore patrol vessel in 1985, the chairman of
Garden Reach stated pointedly,
"Orders in the pipeline are poor ... we keep reminding 
government of this issue."34
31 Committee on Public Undertakings [1983], p.18.
32 This public sector enterprise is located in Hyderabad and major
activities include gun barrel forgings, specialised metals and 
alloys for weapons systems and aerospace.
33 Mukherjee [20 June 1987].
34 Jane's Defence Weekly [20 July 1985].
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Second, the expense of setting up naval construction facilities 
should not e underestimated. The capital investments required for 
the basic infrastructure are very large and combine with low 
profitability to reduce the appeal of an across-the-board commitment, 
witness the ongoing debates in the West regarding the viability of 
building and deploying large capital ships. Third, advances in 
design and the attainment of technological change are not easy. 
Shipbuilding design is now more complex than ever and almost 
impossible to keep abreast of without, for example, Computer Aided 
Design facilities and India does not possess the required 
sophistication in other sectors to furnish such requests. Finally, 
the primary role of the Soviet Union as supplier of naval technology j
and weapons platforms has not provided the required impetus to the 5
i
-iprocess of indigenisation of defence production. As a rule, the *
Soviets are reluctant to transfer technology and assistance to permit '
the full absorption of know-how, although this policy has shown signs i
of change in recent years. This is certainly the case with the 
aeronautics industry - the Subramaniam Committee recommended that 
dependence upon the Soviet Union for licensed production should end 
at the earliest possible time to facilitate a less pedestrian rate of 
indigenisation. The committee also observed several deficiencies in 
the quality of the technical data and information offered by the 
Soviets35.
35 Subrahmaniam Committee [1968].
324
7.4 Indigenous Production for the Indian Air Force
The majority of aeronautic defence production in India rests with 
Hindustan Aeronatics Limited (HAL), the largest public sector 
enterprise which employs today approximately one-third of the defence 
sector employees, c.42,000 people. The history of HAL dates back to 
the 1940s when Hindustan Aircraft was set up to repair and overhaul 
foreign aircraft. Soon after independence the company began building 
light trainers under license before attempting the production of jet 
aircraft in the 'fifties. In the early 1960s Hindustan Aircraft 
began the licensed production of the Folland Gnat and the Rolls-Royce 
Orpheus jet engine. Simultaneously, research and development on the 
Marut and Kiran began, both aircraft were closely modelled on the 
Hawker Hunter and Hunting Jet Provost respectively36.
In 1964 Hindustan Aircraft merged with another Indian company, 
Aeronautics, to form HAL. Since that period there have been two 
major thrusts to the production work of the company with minimal 
linkage between the two. At the Nasik, Koraput and, to a lesser 
extent, the Lucknow factories HAL produces Soviet aircraft under 
license. At the other factories in Kanpur, Hyderabad and Bangalore 
the company produces the aircraft of several West European aerospace 
companies under license and, in addition, undertakes research and 
development into aircraft and aeronautics design and development.
The Bangalore complex is the main centre of research and development 
and the headquarters of the company.
36 Velupellai [8 November 1980], p.1179.
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One success story in HAL has been the production under license of the 
MiG-21 series - the MiG-21FL interceptor, the MiG-21M ground attack 
aircraft and the MiG-21bis. By tne time the production line was 
closed down in 1985 to make way for the production of the MiG-27M, 
some 500 units had been produced. In comparison with HAL's 
performance in other sectors, the progress on the MiG-21 has been 
relatively smooth. Production rates were consistently high and close 
to target and the IAF found the MiG-21 a dependable system. Part of 
the reason for the success can be explained by the fact that the MiG- 
21 is a relatively simple plane utilising Soviet technology of the 
1950s. In addition the Soviets agreed to a precise and even-handed 
process of technology transfer which took place in five stages. In 
the first stage all the aircraft were imported. In the second stage 
all the aircraft were tested in India. Third, all the equipment was 
assembled and tested in India and, fourth, sub-assembly was 
undertaken in India. Finally, attempts were made to reduce 
dependence upon raw materials. Eventually, only the designs, drawing 
and some of the more complicated materials were imported. This 
amounted to approximately 70% indigenisation in toolings and 
equipment with 20% of that proportion supplied by ancillary 
industries under sub-contracting agreements. However, production of 
the MiG-2Ibis proved more difficult. Selected in 1976 as a successor 
to the earlier MiGs tooling up for production started in 1977 with 
the objective of providing 150 examples before the line was due to be 
closed in 1984. However, it took until January 1983 for the first 
locally-assembled aircraft to complete its flight tests.37 Also, 
indigenous production of the MiG-21 series was an expensive venture 
for India. The cost of producing the MiG-21 in India was 193% more
37 MILAVNEWS \March 1983], p.15.
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than its imported cost, according to an estimate by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute38.
However, a particular problem in the MiG agreement with the Soviet 
Union has been the supply of raw materials. In this area the Soviets 
are frequently unwilling to supply raw materials in the small 
quantities which are often required. Nor are there alternative 
suppliers of these materials in the West. In addition, the materials 
are often extremely cheap which acts as a disincentive to 
indigenisation, the transfer to which is always expensive. HAL's 
attempts to nurture local industries have only been partially 
successful. Indian Aluminium Co. has been encouraged to take up the 
production of aluminium sheets which are required in large 
quantities; as yet there is no indigenous source for aluminium sheets 
of the required two meter width of sufficient quality. A factory has 
been set up in Hyderabad to produce approximately thirty types of 
materials required by HAL, including stainless steel and nickel 
alloys. The Soviet Union is actively assisting these developments. 
Another problem with the Soviets stems from those items which have a 
short life, such as adhesives and rubber items. It has been 
difficult to persuade the Soviets to export in the quantity and 
frequency required. Also, the Indian MiGs are used more frequently 
than their Soviet counterparts and as a result the demand for brake 
pads which require replacement after every 100 flights is much 
higher.
These problems are relatively minor when compared with the overall 
success of the venture. Still more positive is the future of Indo-
38 SIPRI [1971), Table 22.10, p.739.
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Soviet collaboration in the aeronautics field. In July 1983 Defence 
Minister R. Venkataraman visited Moscow and returned with a 
commitment regarding license production of the MiG-27 Flogger and 
manufacturing rights for the MiG-29 Fulcrum. To the surprise of some 
the offer was confirmed during the visit in March 1984 of a 70- 
strong, high level, Soviet defence team led by the former Defence 
Minister, Dimitri Ustinov. Some 300 units of both systems are 
expected to enter service with the IAF. Whilst the Soviet side of
HAL appears to have reached the expectations of all concerned, the
same cannot be said of the other HAL complexes for it is in these 
quarters where technological and managerial failures have been most 
consistent and damaging. In the early period, between 1940 and 1956, !
India's aeronautic capability was limited. The first license 1
agreement was for the production of the American Vultee Vengeance 
bomber. Between 1947 and 1950 about fifty British Percival Prentice j
basic flight trainers were assembled at Bangalore. This was followed
by the manufacture of Vampire jet aircraft and 150 DH-82 Tiger Moth j
primary trainers under an agreement with de Haviland of Canada.39 jj
jFollowing agreements struck in 1956, India started to produce the |
Gnat lightweight fighter powered by the Qrpheus-701 turbojet engine j
in 1959 and deliveries of the Gnat to the IAF commenced in 1963. The >!
,i
original idea came from Lord Mountbatten who suggested the j
Jj
possibility to Nehru after the Gnat had failed selection as a NATO 
fighter40.
Although the acquisition of the Gnat was widely held to be a good 
move for India, even though it had been rejected by NATO,
39 Thomas [1978], p.180.
40 Mullik [1972], p.125.
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nevertheless, negotiations with Folland were long and drawn out.
After a team of experts from the IAF and the MoD had inspected and
approved of an initial procurement of 50-100 units to be followed by
licensed production, negotiations became increasingly slower and more
complicated. At the same time a group of French intermediary
negotiators had approached the managing director of Folland to offer
their services for a payment of 2 \ % 'consideration money1 of which
1|% would be given to the Indian negotiating team. Basically, the
IAF had cooled towards the Gnat deal over the course of time
preferring instead the French Ouraqan. One year later the Gnat deal
had still not been signed as officers in the MoD had held up the
contract having been approached by a French firm which offered to
sell India the Ouraqan. Even after a strong intervention by Nehru
the contact was still not signed for another six months. Nehru was
disturbed by the suggestions of malpractice amongst senior IAF
officers, and confused as well,
"He [Nehru] said that it was surprising that whereas 
every country wanted to produce her own war material, in 
India even very senior officials and Ministers wanted to 
remain dependent on foreign countries and governments for 
military hardware and would not take any initiative for 
local production. These people did not understand that a 
country must not remain for ever dependent on another 
country for her military requirements as, in the event of 
a war breaking out, that country could stop supplies 
putting the receiving country in dire difficulties when 
her need was most acute.'1,41
However, this was not a problem unique to the procurement of the Gnat 
and has been a factor in aircraft procurement even up until to 
present.
41 Mullik [1972], pp.125-131.
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The Gnat was a great success for both HAL and the IAF. During the 
1965 war it performed extremely well due mainly to its mobility, its 
small size and its utility at the Forward Edge of the Battle Area. A 
major advantage for India with the Gnat was that Folland went into 
liquidation in the late-1960s. The RAF wanted the Gnat only for the 
Red Arrows, a non-combat display team. When Folland folded India was 
able to purchase most of the technology - the residual rights (80%) 
went to the IAF. Whilst the RAF kept the physical assets India 
received the rest including the design jigs and the test 
facilities42. This success led to the production of over 200 units 
allowing HAL to achieve economies of scale. Eventually 85% of the 
airframe and 60% of the engine were produced indigenously. However, 
against this success was the high accident rate of the Gnat due 
probably to the low-altitude problems with the longitudinal-control 
and hydraulic systems. These faults were rectified in the modified 
Gnat Mark I, the Ajeet, but not to the satisfaction of the IAF.43 
Production of the Ajeet has recently been discontinued, a decision 
which is less popular with civilian specialists than with the IAF - 
the Ajeet had a good reputation for combat performance and its low 
radar signature was increasingly valued. However, against this the 
IAF did not like the Ajeet1s relative lack of speed and its single 
engine.
HAL's major project in the 1960s was to produce indigenously a 
supersonic fighter, the HF-24 Marut. The project was conceived by 
Nehru and Menon as a means towards self-sufficiency. In this respect 
it was not dictated by military need and a qualitative assessment of
42 NagChaudhri, conversations with the author.
43 Graham [1984], p.171.
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Pakistan and Chinese capabilities. The project began in 1956 under 
the direction of an expatriate German, Kurt Tank, who was previously 
Focke-Wulf's war-time chief designer and responsible for the Kondor 
maritime bomber and the FW190 fighter44. The first stage of the 
project was to be the production of a supersonic fighter airframe to 
be followed in the second phase by the design and manufacture of an 
indigenous engine with a Mach capability. The aircraft was intended 
to satisfy the IAF's demand for a fighter-bomber. It was designed as 
a twin-engined aircraft with a 1.4/1.5 Mach speed capability.
Unfortunately, India's first attempt at joining the elite group of 
international aircraft producers did not proceed at all smoothly. 
There are four contributing reasons for the failure of the Marut. 
First, the Indian government failed to strike a suitable agreement 
for the engine. The first four HF-24 Mkl were handed over to the IAF 
in May 1964, an interim measure pending the production of three 
squadrons of the HF-24 MK IA which was to be powered by the Bristol 
Orpheus 703 Reheat engine produced by HAL under license45. However, 
in order to achieve supersonic speeds the Marut required a more 
powerful engine. India had hoped to purchase the Bristol Orpheus 12 
from Rolls-Royce which was under development. In the event the 
aircraft for which this engine was being built was rejected by NATO 
and work on the project was curtailed45. The Indian Government then 
asked Rolls-Royce to upgrade the Orpheus 703. When the company 
requested £1 million for the project Menon refused47. Unable as well
44 SIPRI [1971], p.735.
45 Kavic [1967], p.197-198.
46 Graham [1984], p.170.
47 D. Raghunandan, conversations with the author, (10 October 1984, 
Delhi).
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to provide the finance to see through the completion of the Orpheus 
12 project and without the contract provision to force the project to 
be completed, that door too became closed4®. There followed a number 
of frantic efforts to acquire a suitable engine. It has been 
suggested that Bristol Siddeley co-operated with the Indian 
Government on a scheme to modify the Orpheus 703 power plant by 
adding boosters from the Soviet VK-7 to achieve a substantial 
increase in thrust and a barely supersonic version of the HF-24 
designated the HF-24 Mk.IB49. Other attempts to acquire a suitable 
engine were from the Soviet Union (RD 9-F) and another from a German- 
Spanish-Egyptian engine (E-300) but both failed50. After the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war, the Indian Government considered collaboration with 
Egypt to produce a supersonic engine. The project failed largely 
because of the lack of interest on the part of the Egyptians51.
The second reason for failure lay in the design strategy. A 
fundamental tenet in aircraft design is that an airframe should 
always be designed around the engine and not vice versa. The 
decision to develop the Marut was a political one and, as such, the 
decision makers were relatively unconcerned with the technical 
problems. Furthermore, Kurt Tank was an aircraft designer not an 
engineer. Aircraft designers are trained in a systemic fashion and 
consider that a project is essentially the sum of its component 
parts. In the absence of strong direction from the MoD, problems of
48 Graham [1984], p.170.
49 Kavic [1967], p.204, fn #37.
50 Graham [1984], p.170.
51 NagChaudhri, conversations with the author, (15 October 1984).
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coordination and conception arose. Eventually, the problems in the 
design severely disadvantaged HAL's attempts to convince the IAF and 
the MoD that an acceptable system had been produced. There was a 
serious defect in the fuselage design which resulted in an 
unacceptable level of tail drag. In the 1970s HAL attempted to 
update the Orpheus engine without outside assistance by adding an 
afterburner. The developmental work was done by the Gas Turbine 
Research Establishment. However, a mistake was made in not adding to 
the afterburner a bypass to provide additional air for the required 
mass. The test plane exploded killing the test pilot.52
The third reason lay in the overall approach to the project. At no 
point is it possible to identify a well orchestrated attempt to weigh 
the views of the military, the politicians and industry. Instead, 
the progress was linear, as the project proceeded it passed from the 
hands of the politicians, to the military and finally to industry.
Or, put another way, the politicians defined the possibilities, the 
military defined the problem and industry was left to define the 
answer. The failure to acquire an appropriate engine was in part due 
to a series of unfortunate coincidences exacerbated by poor foresight 
and financial stringency. Yet it was also due to the Government's 
failure to sanction the development of an engine design team.
Valuable experience had been acquired on the Gnat project through 
reverse engineering but it was not utilised for the Marut. Unlike 
the Chinese, Brazilian and Israeli defence industries, for example, 
the Government had no confidence in HAL's reverse engineering 
capability and at no point was HAL's capability assessed. These
52 NagChaudhri and Raghunandan, conversations with the author (15, 
10 October 1984, Delhi).
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problems were compounded by the approach of the IAF to HAL's efforts. 
The IAF is well-trained at the operational level but insufficiently 
conscious of technology. In the case of the Marut the IAF did little
to assist with the design faults when they occurred.
In addition, the IAF have little confidence or interest in indigenous 
technology, which was made very evident early on when the outright 
purchase of the French Orpheus was preferred to the licensed 
production of the Gnat. In many instances the preference has been to
buy from abroad and, in all probability, the lack of faith in the HF-
24 project is linked to this characteristic.53
A final explanation for the failure of the project lies in the
leadership capabilities of Kurt Tank. Despite his confidence and
capabilities Tank was something of a failure in this project. He 
failed to gain the commitment of his design staff. Although he 
trained his designers well and gave them confidence in their
capabilities, he was rigid in his approach to design. The IAF had no
respect for his abilities and displayed little interest in 
coordinated work to solve the tail drag problem on the Marut. Tank,
himself, was more inclined to blame the lack of engine power rather
than the tail drag for the failure and when the time came to lobby
for more funds to rectify the aircraft's problems he 
procrastinated.54 Eventually, production of the HF-24 did commence
53 D. Raghunandan, conversations with the author, (10 October 1984, 
Delhi).
54 NagChaudhri, conversations with the author, (18 January 1984).
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but only 145 instead of a projected 214 aircraft were built and the 
Marut never flew at supersonic speed55.
Another failure for HAL in the 1960s came in the attempt to produce 
under license from Hawker-Siddeley the HS-748 transport plane. The 
aircraft performed badly which led to decreased demand and high unit 
costs and Indian Airlines refused to take up its promised order of 
180 units and accepted only seventeen. The IAF was forced to take up 
the remaining twenty-four planes which were produced before the 
production line was closed down. The project resulted in the loss of 
Rs.3.4 crores. However, against these failures must be set the 
limited success of the HTJ-16 Kiran Mark I and II, a jet engined 
trainer. Here the strategy was significantly different. Unlike the 
experience with the Marut, it was decided not to attempt to produce a 
state-of-the-art aircraft but instead to build upon past successes.56
Following the failure with the Marut, the fortunes of HAL changed 
significantly. Certainly resources continued to be invested in the 
industry and, indeed, its scale of operation increased. However, 
neither the MoD nor the IAF were prepared to entrust any major 
project to the company. By the 1980s over 700 engineers were 
employed in the design sector but the company's order books were 
lamentably empty. Many good employees left the company and a large 
proportion must have found jobs outside the country, thereby adding 
to the braindrain of the 1970s and 1980s.
55 Graham T. [1984], p.170.
56 Graham T. [1984], p.170.
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At one point during the 1970s it seemed as if HAL's helicopter 
division in Bangalore would be more fortunate than their counterparts 
in the aircraft divisions. The question and possibility of an 
indigenous helicopter first emerged in 1969. In September 1970 the 
Government concluded a ten year technology transfer agreement with 
the French firm, SNIAS, in relation to the development and production 
of an Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) for the 1980s. Naturally, the 
project was assigned to HAL and ten payments of $750,000 were made to 
SNIAS. Underpinning the collaboration agreement was the need to 
establish helicopter design and development facilities to ensure that 
the next generation of helicopters would be of Indian design and 
manufacture. A part of the role of the SNIAS technical advisor was 
to co-ordinate design concepts, undertake a training programme for 
designers and to prepare joint feasibility studies and project 
reports.57
Established in 1974, the helicopter division of HAL produced 
helicopters under license and by the mid-1980s had produced more than 
400 Chetaks (Alouette III) and Chetahs (Lama). However, although the 
agreement with SNIAS for the ALH was signed in September 1970, the 
project was not sanctioned until February 1976. Part of the reason 
for the delay was the 1971 war which led to financial constraints in 
the years after. Although design work was initiated, the 
construction of the relevant facilities was held back for six years. 
Moreover, even after the project was sanctioned, delays and changes 
continued to occur. In 1977 the entire concept of the project was 
changed. A revised Air Staff Requirement (ASR) issued in February 
1978 by Air Headquarters requested a radical change in configuration
57 Public Accounts Committee [1982], p.18.
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in the form of a twin-engined model. This design change alone cost
Rs.5,400,000 and delayed procurement by at least 15-18 months.
Moreover 54.5% of the French financial and technical assistance
remained unutilised and only two-thirds of the sixty hours of free
flying included in the contract was eventually taken up.5® In 1982
the Public Accounts Committee remarked that 'the project which was
initially expected to fructify in the early 1980s is still at the
drawing board159. Up until 1986 this remained the situation.
Although future work within the helicopter division will be related
to the ALH, its configuration is still uncertain,
"With a take-off weight given as 4,000kg (8,8001b) and a
capacity of 10-12 passengers, the ALH is no longer a
"light" (the original single-engined design had a maximum 
take-off weight of 2,50Gkg/5,5001b for the IAF and
3,000/6,600 for the Navy version). Choice of powerplant
is now stated to be two TM3333s or two PT6-35E/ls, which 
indicated that the Gem 43 is no longer in the running."50
In mid-1984 it was announced that a deal on technology transfer with
West Germany was imminent. A helicopter which was first proposed in
1970 may now enter service, possibly, in 1989® x .
The long drawn out, expensive and oscillating history of the ALH was 
mirrored in the instance of the HP-32, a single-piston engined basic 
trainer. Although this aircraft is far from the cutting edge of 
aeronautic technology, the time lags and delays in defining IAF 
requirements were extensive. Despite the fact that expertise from 
the HT-2, the existing trainer, was readily available within HAL it
58 Public Accounts Committee [1982], pp 19-21.
59 Public Accounts Committee [1982], p.31.
60 Mama [1984], p.151.
61 MILAVNEWS [July 1984].
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took two and a half years for the IAF to identify the required 
changes to the new system and its opei -ational requirements. It then 
took a further five and a half years f^r the Air
Headquarters/Department of Defence Production (DoDP) to conclude that 
the Revethi Mkll under development by the Directorate General of 
Civil Aviation (DGCA) would not meet the requirements of the Air 
Force. Although HAL produced a feasibility report in February 1969 
it was kept in cold storage until September 1974. Once again through 
fluctuating Air Staff Requirements and minimal co-ordination between 
the DoDP, Air Headquarters, DGCA and HAL, further delays occurred.62 
In May 1985 the first HP-32 came off the production line at the HAL 
Kanpur division, seven years after the first prototype flew.
In November 1967 the MoD appointed a committee under the chairmanship 
of C. Subramaniam, whose terms of reference were to assess Indian 
requirements in respect of aircraft and related equipment. In its 
report of the following year, the committee concentrated not just 
upon force levels but also upon the relationship between licensed and 
indigenous production. It is in this report that the inherent 
conflict between the two approaches to the acquisition of technology 
was made specific. The Committee stressed a number of points which 
retard the growth and self-sufficiency of an aeronautics industry 
which* as in the Indian case, is far from lacking in ability and 
enthusiasm. The Committee was extremely critical of the IAF for its 
unwillingness to consider technological needs in relation to threat 
perceptions, a point made by Blackett two decades earlier and equally 
unpopular then with the armed forces,
62 Public Accounts Committee [1982b].
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"The presentation by Air Headquarters did not include a 
statement of the tasks in terms of the threats faced by 
the country as determined by the Government and 
communicated to Air Headquarters. This is a basic 
requirement for any long terms plans within the country. 
When this task was taken up with the Ministry of Defence 
in December, 1968, they took the view that the assessment 
of requirements for the Air Force was outside the terms 
of reference of the Aeronautics Committee. The Ministry 
of Defence stated, that given the requirements of the Air 
Force over a period of ten years, the Aeronautics 
Committee should recommend measures for the planned 
development of the Aeronautics Industry, so that these 
requirements be met by manufacture within the country, in 
the shortest possible time and in the most economical 
manner."63
Although the Committee accepted the problem of threat assessment in 
principle, it was clearly offput by this apparent declaration of non­
cooperation on the part of the Air Force,
"The purpose of the critical assessment is to ensure that 
the requirements are reasonably spelt out and not likely 
to be changed easily; that they take account of 
resources; that they are moderated, to the extent 
feasible, by the technological capability of the country 
... Our defence posture, defence positions and defence 
priorities cannot be taken at present value even for the 
next decade. We have to deal with a changing situation. 
It is, therefore, important to recognise that the 
necessary exercises cannot be undertaken by any 
individual in any position. They have to be undertaken 
by organisations which have built up the necessary 
competence for the task. It is possible that the 
hesitation of the Ministry of Defence to explore the 
basis of the requirements arises from the handicap that 
none of the existing organisations has developed the 
competence to undertake the appropriate task."64
In its final recommendations the Committee castigated the Air Force 
for imposing upon HAL in 1966 Operational Requirements for a ground 
attack fighter which were unrealistic in relation to industrial 
capacity and affordable costs65. In relation to the role of the
63 Subramaniam Committee [1968], pp.62-63.
64 Subramaniam Committee [1968], pp.63-65.
65 Subramaniam Committee [1968], p.310.
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services in defining threats and requirements, the Committee 
recommended the creation of expertise in research institutions 
outside the defence establishment to assist with assessing the 
relative costs and claims of defence requirements - a form of defence 
policy research institute66.
There were two other significant recommendations contained in the
Committee's report. First, the Committee recognised that due to
production under license, the design teams at Bangalore had not
developed in step with production facilities; in 1968 the design team
at Bangalore employed a staff of 335, a mere 20% of the labour force
and a much smaller percentage than obtained in the West European and
North American defence industries. Moreover the Committee expressed
enormous reservations over the wisdom of production under license as
a means to technological self-sufficiency. On the issue of the
choice of ground attack aircraft for the latter half of the 1970s,
the Committee was unequivocal,
"One way would be to introduce a new ground attack 
aircraft through manufacture under license. We do not 
favour it. This would be yet another type of aircraft to 
the five types which would be in service during [the] 
1974-79 period. Secondly, such a decision would be based
on inadequate appreciation of the HF-24Mkl.R under
development or of the potential for further development 
in the HF-24 aircraft. It is our finding that licensed 
production inhibits indigenous development; in the 
present case it would completely extinguish development." 
(emphasis added) 67
In the event, however, this is virtually what happened. Starved of
major design projects for over fifteen years, by 1982 some 70% of
66 Subramaniam Committee [ 1968 ], p . 83.
67 Subramaniam Committee [1968], pp.67-68.
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production capacity at the Bangalore and Kanpur complexes had fallen 
idlees.
The second set of recommendations from the Committee concerned 
management and organisation, about which there was considerable 
criticism. At the wider level, the Committee echoed the criticism of 
an earlier report prepared by a team of Swedish defence experts that 
research institutes were excluded from the planning process, that 
scientific expertise was not properly utilised and that productivity 
was low,
"Thus it was stated that 7,500 manhours had been used to 
manufacture 18 tools for the HF-24 which is an average of 
about 400 hours per tool. The manufacturing time per 
tool for a corresponding type of aircraft in Sweden is 
about 40 hours per tool."€><3
Elsewhere, the Committee commented that "if research establishments
and the industry were involved in the formulation of weapons policy,
their inventive skill could make a real contribution"70 - a virtually
identical statement to the one made by Patrick Blackett (see p.165)
concerning defence science organisation. Equally important, the
Committee was critical of the way in which policy making was
executed. Its criticism of the Air Force has already been noted,
but, in addition, its denunciation also turned on the ad hoc nature
of decision making beyond the political level and the extreme
atomisation amongst the research, manufacturing and military sectors,
"The principal aircraft requirements relate to the Air 
Force. Hence, the relationship between the Air Force as 
the indentor and the industry is important; in fact, the 
success to meet the Air Force requirements by manufacture
68 Sapru [28 June 1982].
69 Subramaniam Committee [1968], p.183.
70 Subramaniam Committee [1968].
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within the country depends upon complete understanding 
and [a] good working relationship between them."71
An earlier committee under the chairmanship of J.R.D. Tata had 
recommended in 1963 both the centralisation and rationalisation in 
the aircraft industry to promote the orderly and co-ordinated 
development of aircraft, propulsion, armament including missiles, 
electronics, testing and evaluation. Although the recommendation was 
accepted in principle by the MoD, it was later rejected on the 
grounds that the ministry did not want aeronautics R&D to be 
entrusted to an authority outside the R&D organisation. The 
Subramaniam Committee reiterated Tata's recommendations by proposing 
a Requirement Policy Committee and better management practices.
The Subramaniam Committee report was never made available for wider 
comment and debate. However, it is fairly clear that the 
recommendations of the Committee plus those of previous committees 
and consultative bodies went relatively unheeded. Planning for 
aeronautic self-sufficiency remained atomised and all too dependent 
upon the requirements of the IAF which took little or no account of 
industrial capabilities and constraints.
7.5 The Light Combat Aircraft - Forward to the Past?
/
The long term fortunes of HAL were revived in the early 1980s after 
increased lobbying directly to the Prime Minister and her 
Secretariat. The result was a rise in the level of commitment to 
indigenous development and production in the defence sector. The
71 Subramaniam Committee [1968], p.303.
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most important was the proposed development of a Light Combat 
Aircraft (LCA), originally planned for production by 1994 with a 
prototype to be1 r ready by 1990.
In mid-1983 reports first appeared regarding the Indian Government's 
commitment to the development of an LCA to be powered by an 
indigenous engine72. British Aerospace emerged as the clear 
contender for the relatively limited collaboration envisaged by the 
decision-makers given the complexity and ambitious nature of the 
project; by late-1984 reports continued to suggest that British 
Aerospace would would be a partner to the project73. Much of this 
optimism stemmed from the companies' continued presence in the Indian 
defence industry based on the Jaguar DSPA licensed production 
agreement as opposed to the disappointment suffered by the French 
with the Mirage 2000. However, by early-1984 the Indian Government 
had invited foreign companies to prepare feasibility studies which 
would involve collaborative development even though all production 
and marketing was to take place in India. The technology required 
from abroad was considerable; composite material technology, cockpit 
displays and active controls with electronic sensing and 
signalling.74 The significance of the commitment to indigenous 
capacity was reflected in the budgetary arrangements. By 1990 the 
project was expected to have cost Rs.12-15 billion but only 10% of 
the development budget was allocated for foreign consultants75. The 
response both inside and outside India to such an ambitious project
72 MILAVNEWS fJune 1983], p.10.
73 MILAVNEWS [October 1984], p.19.
74 Wood [14 January 1984], p.13.
75 Mukherjee [16 March 1985], p.437.
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was mixed and before long the LCA became extremely controversial - 
experts questioned costs estimates, the aeronautic establishment’s 
ability to deliver and the level of indigenous content.
In mid-1985 the project was adversely affected by the unexpected
resignation of two of the key personnel within the Aeronautical
Development Agency (ADA), the apex body set up to oversee the design
and development of the LCA. The creation of the ADA itself had been
a significant step. In other areas of big science, such as space
research and nuclear energy, departments had been set up many years
before in an attempt to co-ordinate diverse activities in a
systematic manner and provide a recognised decision-making locus. In
the field of aeronautics a similar development did not occur which
severely handicapped linkages between the R&D establishments and
industry and the more general need for long-term planning and related
decision-making.
"The bureaucratic viewpoint was that in the absence of an 
aircraft development programme there was no need for 
technology development - a tragic error of judgment - 
which prevails even today. Any discussion on planning 
for LCA mission orientated R&D and technology development 
programmes and fall back positions invited sarcastic 
comments of planning for a fall back aircraft; any 
suggestions to plan for integration of R&D and the 
industry and referring to early committee recommendations 
were thought to be greed on the part of the people making 
such suggestions."76
The creation of the ADA should have been a step in the right 
direction and a means of channeling the country's R&D capabilities 
into a single project which involved 50 companies and over 600 work 
packages. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case and although 
the ADA was given the responsibility for setting up the LCA
76 Valluri [8 March 1986], p.12
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programme, the authority to ensure that its decisions were
implemented was lacking. The result was the resignation of two key
figures; S.R. Valluri, the Director c-J the National Aeronautics
Laboratory in Bangalore and the Director General of the ADA, and
India's chief aircraft designer and leader of the ADA design team,
Raj Mahindra. In addition, Valluri had been asked by V.S.
Arunachalam, Chief Scientific Advisor to the MoD, to remove Mahindra
from the ADA following allegations in Parliament relating to the
latter's citizenship and patriotism. Furthermore, Arunachalam seemed
keen to involve a number of younger designers in the project, which
Valluri considered an immense mistake. Aircraft design, he
maintained, is in essence a product of accumulated experience which
requires a person of experience at the top and a hierarchical
organisation and Mahindra was the only person in India who could
perform a similar role to, for example, that of Mikoyan in the
USSR77. Valluri's views on organisation received considerable
support. For example,
"Valluri1s views about organisational linkages between 
ADA and HAL were echoed by a HAL veteran who felt that 
the present organisational structure in the two was not 
conducive to design development. HAL is geared mainly to 
production, virtually a backyard workshop for the Air 
Force. Moreover, HAL's different wings reported to 
different departments: design and research to the DRDO 
and production to Defence production. "I would put HAL's 
design and development wing under ADA", he argued."73
Since then the development of the LCA has remained controversial.
The loss of Valluri and Mahindra was certainly significant and must 
have affected the quality of technical decision-making, particularly 
in relation to not only R&D but also technology transfer. Throughout
77 Valluri [8 March 1982], p.14.
78 Singh [31 January 1986], p.79.
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the mid- and late-1980s the LCA ran further and further into trouble 
as both the Government and industry prevaricated over the future 
direction of the project.
First and foremost it became unclear as to from which source the LCA 
engine would come and until the capabilities of the engine were 
decided upon, only limited progress could occur in other areas of 
design. It was hoped during the early part of the project to utilise 
the GTX engine under development at the Gas Turbine Research 
Establishment in Bangalore. The GTX is many, many years behind 
schedule and currently the main problems appear to be the production 
of an engine which can function very effectively in ambient 
temperatures of up to 45o, which is essential for any advanced 
aircraft deployed in Indian conditions. By 1984 only two out of the
ten demonstrators had been produced and the requirement to
demonstrate a thrust capability of 4,500kg and 6,600kg with 
afterburning had not materialised79. However, the scale of the task 
facing GTRE should not be underestimated and suggestions around 1987 
that the GTX-35 would be ready by 1992 were extremely optimistic80.
Although the HAL Chairman, Air Marshall M.S.D. Wollen, stated in mid- 
1985 that India possessed the means to develop the LCA with one or 
more collaborative partners, despite the submission of design studies
from British Aerospace, MBB, Dornier and Aerospatiale (some without
charge), it became clear that this would not be the case31. In late- 
1985 the ADA met in Bangalore to review the design and development of
79 MILAVNEWS [April, T984], p.6.
80 Salvy [December 1987], p.1611.
81 MILAVNEWS [August 1985], p.23.
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the LCA and finalise the air staff requirement, following which HAL 
could proceed to the definition stage32. It was probably during this 
meeting that the ADA decided that, first, an interim measure had to 
be taken given the continuing delay of the GTX project and, second, 
that collaboration was inevitable.
In addition to the said European producers who were anxious to gain a 
toe-hold in the LCA project given the prevailing slump in the 
international combat-aircraft market elsewhere, the United States 
also appeared as a contender for collaboration, due entirely to Rajiv 
Gandhi's unsolicited willingness to do business with the US and 
initiate a considerable thaw in Indo-US relations. During a visit to 
the US in January 1986 an agreement was reached over the export of 
the General Electric F404 engine and the Prime Minister's visit was 
swiftly followed by a flood of American technicians to India. Thus, 
Grumman, Lockheed and Northrop added themselves to the list of 
contenders for collaboration. Meanwhile, new costings for the 
project emerged for the LCA project which took expenditure from an 
estimated Rs.600 crores ($492.6 million at current exchange rates) to 
new estimates of Rs.1,500 ($1.23 billion)33934.
By mid-1986 the LCA project had started to take shape following the 
issue of an air staff requirement. The ADA had apparently decided 
upon a single-engined, single-seat aircraft with a maximum take-off
82 MILAVNEWS \October"1985], p.17
83 Henceforth costings for the LCA will be given in rupees only 
owing to severe devaluation during this period. In 1983 the 
exchange value of the rupee was approximately Rs.14:£1.00 but 
the value in recent years has dropped to Rs.25-27.
84 MILAVNEWS [January 1986] p.16.
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weight of about 9,000 kg. Primarily designed as a battlefield air 
superiority, with a secondary close support capability, it was to 
have a top speed of tfach 2. A decision on the interim power plant 
was between the GE F404RM12 and the Rolls-Royce Turbo Union RB.199 
Stage B, pending the successful development of the GTX. A prototype 
would fly by 1990 and the LCA would enter front-line service in the 
mid-1990s.
The political will on the part of the Government to pursue the 
programme prompted many inside and outside India to consider the 
likely success of the project. In particular consultants in the US 
started to evaluate the project and HAL's capability given the 
liklihood of American involvement and the results were far from 
positive. Dr Steven Bryen, Head of the Strategic Trade Directorate 
in the Pentagon considered the very basis of the project to be poorly 
conceived,
"If India wants to go, suffer, spend a lot of money, in 
billions of dollars, that is your problem ... But, there 
is a question about the economics of developing some of 
these products ... [there] are no guarantees [it will 
work] ... You are talking about inventing a new cadre of 
people to do that work ... there is not enough rationale 
[for the LCA] ... as it is [ultimately] an economic issue 
... because it starts to drag down where your talented 
people are going to spend their time, and I question 
those kinds of investments very closely."
More to the point, for an American analyst, he also questioned the
wisdom of US involvement in a project such as the LCA,
"The worse kind of project for us to get involved in is 
the one that fails, or, that gives opposition politicians 
a chance to stand up and say - you have been led up the 
garden path by the Americans."85
85 Karnad [24 February 1986].
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Another respected American defence analyst, Jacques Gansler, 
considered the timing of the LCA project to be misconceived. In a 
similar interview he argued that India had embarked upon an extremely 
ambitious project but one which would only embody technology soon to 
be superseded by the coming generation. Thus, for example, the LCA 
is expected to incorporate a 'cranked arrow1 configuration which 
calls for the leading edge of the wing to be angled with a resultant 
increase in lift for a given amount of power. However, the coming 
generation of fighter aircraft, notably the US Advanced Tactical 
Fighter, will incorporate vectored thrust technology which is much 
more advanced. So too will the composite materials used to build the 
ATF and its avionics be far in advance of those of the LCA.
Gansler's recommendation was for India to delay the project to enable 
a limited acquisition of the emerging technologies.se However, 
Gansler did not discuss whether or not India could access such an 
advanced level of technology, afford the costs or cope with and 
exploit such advancements. In all three instances the answer would 
probably be negative.
Negotiations over defence technology transfer with the US proceeded 
apace and were extended to cover not only LCA technology but also 
radar technology, anti-tank weaponry, night vision equipment, main 
battle tank fire control and transmission systems, ammunition and 
advanced materials37. A high point was reached in January 1987 when 
US Secretary for Defense, Caspar Weinberger, visited India to promise 
publicly all the technical support the country required for the
successful development of the LCA. At the same time, however,
86 Karnad [8 June 1986]. p.45.
87 Jane's Defence Weekly [8 November 1986], p 1089.
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reports started to appear regarding future French involvement in the 
project. In October 1987 it was reported that Dassault-Breguet had 
signed an agreement worth $100 million with the Indian Government to 
supply 30 engineers to work in Bangalore under the auspices of the 
ADA. Effectively, therefore, France had won the design contract. 
Furthermore, it also became evident that France wished for an even 
greater input into the project by seeking to turn the Government's 
head in the direction of the SNECMA M88 Mkll engine scheduled for use 
in the Rafale light combat aircraft.88 In addition, during the same 
time-frame an ADA team visited the Rolls-Royce Military Engine Group 
facilities in Bristol to view the Turbo-Union RB199 engine89.
Throughout 1987 interest in the LCA programme was overshadowed by the 
Bofors scandal and received much less media attention. However, by 
mid-1987 it seemed as though Saab had made a late bid to provide 
development assistance, probably on the grounds that the LCA would 
emerge as a close relation of the JAS39 light combat aircraft. 
Although Saab did not contribute a feasibility study in 198?, it had 
held previous talks with the Indian Government on co-operation as 
early as 1980-8190. During the same period it was announced that 
General Electric had in fact won the order for 10 F404 turbofans for 
the prototype phase of the project although this did not guarantee 
eventual incorporation at the production stage91.
88 Jane's Defence Weekly [31 October 1987], p.676.
89 Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly [27 October-2 Novemeber 1986],
p.3.
90 MILAVNEWS [May 1987], p.15.
91 MILAVNEWS [June 1987], p.14.
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Predictably enough, the project definition stage fell behind schedule 
by more than a year and serious consideration was given to the future 
of the programme. One reason for the delay was a failure to agree 
upon the optimum weight for the system which could in turn have been 
related to the delays encountered with the development of composite 
materials. Significantly, it was the Indian Air Force which was 
reported to be dissatisfied with progress and, furthermore, was 
actively considering abandoning the whole project in favour of joint 
development of the French Rafale. There would be several advantages 
for India in such a move. The GE F404 powers the Rafale prototype, 
which would not rule out an Indian version powered by the GTX-35, 
given that the engines are interchangeable. The multimode radar 
under development for the LCA could also be used in the Rafale. 
Finally, given the likelihood that the cost of the LCA would 
certainly spiral out of control with uncertain end results and 
timing, investment in the French system would be much safer and 
almost certainly cheaper92. Soon after it was reported that Dassault 
had succeeded in a bid to strike a 'company-company1 agreement with 
HAL over the marketing of the LCA. In effect, Dassault had managed 
to introduce the LCA into its product spectrum alongside other 
systems in production and proposed; the Mirage 2000 and 4000, the 
Rafale and the Franco-German Alpha jet.93 How much this represents 
the thin end of the wedge designed to assimilate finally the whole 
project remains to be seen.
During the same period a Letter of Offer and Acceptance was signed 
between the US Air Force and the Indian Defence Research and
92 De Briganti [29 August 1988].
93 Jane's Defence Weekly [17 September 1988].
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Development Organisation which allowed Indian technicians access to 
the four Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories which opened the 
way for collaboration and US industry participation in the project94. 
Also, during the same period, the Soviet Union started to display an 
interest in the ill-fated programme by offering New Delhi 
participation in a new single-engined combat aircraft, similar in 
capability to the US F-16, should the price tag for the LCA present 
further problems.
At the end of 1988 another peculiar twist was added to the LCA saga. 
In a bid to drive a wedge between New Delhi and both Washington and 
Paris, the Soviet Union offered to improve radically the MiG-21, the 
aircraft the LCA is destined to replace. On offer for the MiG-21 is 
the MiG-29 engine, new wings and a modern avionics system. Since 
MiG-21 production facilities already exist in India the retrofitting 
could be done at a comparatively low cost. If accepted India could 
slow down the pace of LCA development and therefore distribute the 
escalating costs over a wider period of time or it could cancel what 
is rapidly becoming the biggest white elephant in the history of 
Indian defence production.95 Furthermore, during a period when the 
country's foreign exchange reserves are depleting rapidly such an 
offer, if accepted, could also slow the import of other sophisticated 
aircraft and even provide India with a novel source of exports during 
a period when many countries are finding it extremely difficult to 
afford state-of-the-art military technology.
94 MILAVNEWS [October 1988], p.19.
95 Sharma [20 December 1988].
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The Indian Light Combat Aircraft is beginning to appear in a similar 
light to other major aeronautic projects attempted by India - 
chaotic, subject to flux, cost overruns and time delays. Above all 
it is possible that the Indian Air Force will eventually do what it 
appears to have done on numerous other occasions and effectively 
obstruct attempts at indigenisation in an attempt to ensure that 
foreign rather than indigenous systems prevail.
In the current climate the long- and short-term prospects for the 
Indian aeronautics industry look bleak. Fettered by bureaucratic 
infighting and rendered less capable than it really is by the 
unrealistic demands of the Air Force, deprived of an input into the 
decision making process and lacking the necessary political 
patronage, HAL is unlikely to develop its technological capabilities. 
In this milieu there is no opportunity to close the gap between 
present levels of capability and the increasing rate of technological 
change in the defence industries of the West. Given the way in which 
the technological needs for defence are defined, this is a 
prerequisite. The LCA project did to a certain extent reflect an 
understanding^ on the part of government that the opportunities for 
India to create a viable and credible aeronautic production 
capability based upon modern technologies were fast diminishing. If 
the Government had not proceeded with the LCA programme, the long 
term fortunes of HAL would have looked bleak indeed. However, sound 
decision-making, effective management and co-ordinated support were 
equally important and in this direction there are many questions.
Why were two of the most effective members of the ADA allowed to 
resign without attempts at reconciliation, particularly given the 
peculiarities of the industry and the need for experienced
35
leadership? Why were so many foreign technicians and consultants 
allowed onto the programme in such a ad hoc manner? No fewer than 
six countries made offers to India during the mid-1980s which led to 
confusion and prevarication and must surely have hindered progress, 
resolve and morale. Why was the IAF allowed to court Dassault for 
the Rafale given the apparent resolve on the -part of government to 
develop as much of an indigenous capacity as possible?
Equally relevant is the question as to why HAL was allowed to reach 
such a parlous state in the late-1970s? During a period of rapid 
technological change why did government allow the industry to exist 
without projects and without significant research and development? 
Therein lies the basis of the problems experienced over the course of 
the LCA programme. Under any circumstances it is both difficult and 
expensive for a country such as India to match the rate of 
technological change which obtains in the West, or the Soviet Union. 
Any attempt, therefore, to leap one generation at least by moving 
from the HF-24 to the LCA when the industry has languished and many 
of the best and the brightest have left is bound to be costly, time 
consuming and technically complex. Without effective management or 
government discipline over the role and input of all the relevant 
institutions, the type of failures and setbacks witnessed in recent 
years are probably inevitable.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DEFENCE DECISION MAKING IN INDIA: THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS
8.1 The Making of Conventional Defence Policy
The decision making process is, in essence, the course which any 
decision must run to become official policy. Before reaching this 
definitive stage, any potential policy change should be considered by 
all the relevant organisations to provide elected decision makers 
with sufficient information, data and advice to enable an informed 
and appropriate decision to be taken.
Unlike many other Third World countries, the process of decision 
making in the Indian defence sector is reasonably well-defined. 
Frequent descriptions appear in both official and unofficial 
published sources. Most appraisals of the process in India take one 
of two approaches to the issue. The first, adopted primarily by 
defence commentators and the Indian Government itself, places 
emphasis upon both the numerous stages in the process and the 
plethora of institutions which collectively shape policy. The 
intentions behind this exercise are two-fold. First, when published 
in Western technical journals, the purpose is to provide information 
for those outside the system who may have a professional interest in 
how the system works1. Both foreign and national bureaucratic and 
commercial interests will often need to know exactly how the decision 
making process functions, where the primary actors are located and 
how to understand fully a system through which they might have to
1 See, for example, Singh [1982].
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work in order to secure either a defence contract, or for more 
general commercial intelligence purposes. Second, it is a means of 
reiterating the constitutional and democratic nature of a decision 
making process which is rare amongst developing countries and an 
aspect of governance of which India is quite correctly very proud.
The second approach is that of (comparative) political scientists who 
seek to identify the role of the various decision makers and the 
organisations they represent. The value of this type of analysis 
comes from the stress upon the differing roles and perceptions of the 
individuals and institutions which formulate policy. However, this 
approach has concentrated primarily upon the workings of 
bureaucracies in the West, particularly the United States. A central 
purpose of these efforts in an Indian context is to underscore the 
country's continuing commitment to democracy and the role the 
legislature fulfils as an essential check and balance to the role of 
bureaucracy, which includes the armed forces. However, informative 
though these efforts may be, there is an underlying tendency to 
accept that, because these organisations exist, they are more or less 
key determinants in the policy making process and function in 
practice as they should, according to the constitution. In other 
words, it is assumed that, by virtue of constitutional arrangements, 
the complex and sophisticated process of decision making is 
essentially democratic. This does not take account of a key factor 
thus far alluded to but not yet fully described, namely the way in 
which important decisions are made in relation to the distribution of 
information and knowledge. If one or more of the key actors or 
institutions misunderstands, does not have access to the information 
required, or is uninterested in the information available to
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influence the policy making process, the ability to fulfil 
constitutional obligations will decline accordingly.
The responsibility for conventional defence in India, as established 
by constitutional fiat, is vested in the Union Government which is 
responsible for all aspects of defence and national security. This 
includes not only the prosecution of war, but also war preparedness 
and defence production.
The defence decision making process in India has changed considerably 
since 1947. Originally, the decision making structure was designed 
by Lord Ismay, who had previous experience in British defence 
decision making. He recommended the creation of a three cornered 
system comprising the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), the 
Defence Minister's Committee (DMC) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
(CSC) (see Figure 8.1). The logic behind this system was to provide 
equally weighted inputs from the Government (DCC), the bureaucracy 
(DMC) and the armed forces (CSC). These committees were assisted by 
smaller and more specialised committees, such as the Defence Science 
Advisory Committee. The DMC was by far the most important body and 
members of the other two key committees - the service chiefs, the 
Secretary of Defence and the Financial Advisor to the MoD - were in 
attendance at meetings.2 However, over time the formal decision 
making process was short-circuited and adhered to less and less. 
During the Nehru period decisions were taken on an ad hoc basis. 
Effectively, the DMC was bypassed, due primarily to the close working 
relationship between Menon and the Prime Minister (see Chapter 
Four)3.
2 Venkateswaran [1967], pp.89-96.
3 Thomas [1986], p.120.
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During the 1962 war it became evident that the established formal 
peacetime decision making process was inadequate for swift decision 
taking and wartime planning. This led to the creation of a series of 
emergency committees which met on a daily basis; the DMC became the 
Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) and the daily meetings were 
attended by several ministers (its composition changed over time). 
After the war it was decided that the daily meetings between the 
Defence Minister and the service chiefs should continue.
The starting point for defence decision making involves an 
appropriate definition and assessment of the actual and potential 
threat to India's security environment. This includes not only the 
country's borders and coastlines but also, and more recently, its 
airspace, island possessions and the country's off-shore facilities4 . 
Internal security issues will also be relevant in this context, 
particularly in relation to Sikh extremism in the Punjab and, to a 
lesser extent, terrorist activity in Tamil Nadu, for example. Since 
1962 the starting points for preliminary evaluation have been the 
Policy Planning and Review Committee (PPRC) and the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) (See Figure 8.2). Set up in 1966, the 
PPRC is primarily a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) committee, 
although a defence secretary was invited to join in 1969. The 
committee's remit is to examine India's foreign policy in relation to 
the international environment, giving due regard to politico- 
militaryand politico-economic considerations5. Prior to 1965, the 
JIC comprised the Joint Secretary of the MEA as Chairman,
4 One of the major lessons which Indian defence planners drew from 
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict was the importance of protecting 
island possessions.
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representatives of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Home Affairs and 
the Directors of Intelligence from the three services and was a 
subsidiary body of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In 1965, following 
the dismal performance of Indian intelligence in 1962, the JIC was 
reconstituted and brought into the Cabinet Secretariat where an 
Additional Secretary is now the chaire. The Committee meets as often 
as necessary, even daily during times of crisis, and produces for the 
Cabinet swift assessments of changing situations and likely 
developments. Up until 1971, the JIC reported directly to the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), where all the major decisions 
on defence were taken. In 1971, the Political Affairs Committee of 
the Cabinet (PACC) was constituted to take quick political decisions. 
Since that time, it has evolved into the major defence decision 
making committee within the Cabinet, whereas the DCC has fallen by 
the wayside. This limits the Government's ability to consider long 
term defence planning and there is some pressure from Parliament to 
see the Committee brought back7. The PACC is chaired by the Prime 
Minister and its usual members are the Ministers for Defence,
External Affairs, Home and Finance. It is, therefore, primarily the 
responsibility of the PACC to define defence policy in response to 
the assessments it receives from the JIC and the PPRC. Thereafter, 
the directives of the PACC must be both implemented and 
constitutionally legitimised - this is the point at which security 
problems are translated into defence plans.
The implementation of defence policy is undertaken by the MoD which 
is overseen by the Defence Minister. The important Committee here is 
the Defence Minister's Inter-Service Committee which deals with plans
6 Venkateswaran [1967], pp.363-364.
7 The Hindu [9 April 1986].
and papers on defence subjects which are not serious enough to be 
refered to the PACC. The Minister is assisted by junior colleagues 
who run the four major departments within the Ministry, namely the 
Departments of Defence, Defence Production, Supplies and Research and 
Development. The Defence Minister is served by two main committees, 
the Defence Minister's Committee and the Defence Minister's 
(Production and Supply) Committee. This latter body regulates the 
defence production effort and co-ordination with civilian industry. 
The Defence Research and Co-ordination Council directs and co­
ordinates scientific research in relation to defence. A further 
division of labour occurs at the third echelon of the decision making 
process involving bodies such as the Defence Electronics Committee 
and the Principal Supply Officers Committee.®
Between the PACC and the bodies which assess external threat, there 
is the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC). The CSC is a three person 
committee comprising the service chiefs and it is chaired by the 
member with the longest tenure. The CSC deals with inter-service 
issues. Via the morning meetings with the Defence Minister, through 
the Defence Minister's Inter-Service Committee, the service chiefs 
are able to discuss any issue pertaining to defence which allows the 
military to project problems to government directly. Depending upon 
the decision taken, the Defence Minister will delegate his junior 
colleagues to ensure that the decision is implemented. Departmental 
committees will then take up the process of implementation and will 
co-ordinate with all the necessary groups.
Each year the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces are 
scrutinised by the legislature, upon whom the responsibility rests
8 Chari [1980], p.133.
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regarding the future scale of defence operations and level of 
military expenditure. In principle, the legislature can demand that 
defence allocations are either raised or lowered, for example. Over 
the course of the annual debate in Parliament on the defence budget, 
almost two days in April are given over to the discussion of defence 
and war preparedness. The documents placed before Parliament by the 
MoD in the form of the Defence Estimates and the Annual Report 
together provide a relatively exhaustive overview of India's defence 
policy and posture, certainly much more than exists in other Third 
World countries. One noticeable omission amongst the information 
provided by the Government, however, is significant detail on where 
the Government stands at any given time on the nuclear weapon option.
In recent years there has been a strong lobby from within the armed 
forces to create a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), as practised by the 
British for four decades from the turn of the century through until 
independence9. It is currently argued that the armed forces are 
insufficiently integrated into the higher echelons of the decision 
making process. The purpose of such a post would be to bring a 
military person much closer to the final centre of decision making. 
The present arrangment, it has been argued, lacks an integrated 
approach to service requirements and involves the triplication of 
work because the same potential decision is examined by the military 
headquarters, the MoD and the latter's Financial Adviser. However, 
the potential role of the CDS differs considerably and ranges from an 
adviser to the Defence Minister, inter-service mission co-ordination, 
a link person between the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Minister 
and a primary role in wartime. Those in support of establishing such 
a post point to India's growing military posture and the arcane
9 Venkataswaran [25 May 1984].
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defence decision making process, Britain's success in the 
k  Falklands/Malvinas conflict due in part to joint staff planning,
better management practices and the elimination of inter-service 
rivalry as examples of the potential benefits.10
The CDS debate ebbs and flows and will no doubt emerge again, 
probably after the next general election. However, it is doubtful 
that any Indian Government would accede to the creation of a CDS 
post, even though opposition parties have frequently raised the issue 
during the annual defence debate. Yet there is no suggestion that 
the opposition is totally in favour of the post, and it may be the 
case that the CDS provides a debating point without much substance 
and may even be a filibuster.
Even if the CDS post made good bureaucratic and managerial sense, the 
Government would still be likely to refuse the change. Generally, 
those who argue against the post consider it worthless to add an 
additional decision making echelon in an already cumbersome decision 
making process. Furthermore, the creation of a post with such close 
access to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence could diminish 
significantly the role of the MoD and effectively shortcircuit rather 
than streamline the decision making process. Nor has the 
concentration of such power and prestige in one military officer been 
overlooked, particularly given the history of the Pakistan military's 
involvement in politics. In addition to the disputes over 
bureaucratic turf and management efficiency, another reason for the 
antagonism on the part of successive Governments may be the 
possibility that a CDS could reduce or complicate significantly the 
rent seeking activities of the major decision makers. Alternatively, 
10 Elkin and Ritezel [1984], p.1075, 1077, 1076-1079.
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the cake would have to divided into more sections. It is, therefore, 
somewhat unlikely that the system of defence decision making will 
change dramatically in the future.
One potential major change could be if the country opted to take the 
nuclear option. The changes here would be two-fold. First, the 
decision to begin the production of nuclear weapons would require a 
different set of institutional actors. Although India demonstrated 
its ability to explode a nuclear 'device1 in 1974, the transition 
from test to capability is a complicated one. Before developing a 
nuclear force capable of deterrence, the Government must be sure that 
the required amounts of unsafeguarded fissile materials are 
available. In addition, it must be equally clear that the missiles 
which India currently has under development and/or the nuclear 
capable aircraft, such as the Mirage 2000 and the Jaguar, can deliver 
nuclear weapons of Indian size and design. Thus, a new set of 
decision makers drawn from the nuclear energy and space research 
establishments would of necessity be drawn into the inner decision 
making circles. So too might the MEA be more prominent, given the 
need to assess the international reaction which would inevitably 
accompany the decision to go nuclear with regard to both relations 
with individual countries (particularly the Soviet Union which keeps 
a very close watch on India's nuclear aspirations due to its 
considerable commitment to nuclear non-proliferation as a member of 
the London Club) and the potential reaction of the United Nations.
It might, for example, be more worthwhile politically for the 
Government to maintain a policy of ambiguity rather than overt 
deterrence11.
11 I have discussed this aspect with regard to -the nuclear arms 
race in South Asia in Smith, C. [1987].
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Second, the excisions to produce, deploy and use nuclear weapons are 
essentially political choices. Although the armed forces would be 
consulted, it would be in a technical capacity alone on, for example, 
how to interface conventional and nuclear capabilities, targeting and 
delivery systems. Nevertheless, the key actors would be the members 
of the PACC, or perhaps a more select body which does not as yet 
exist, and the armed forces would have a much smaller input than in 
the conventional sphere. It is, perhaps, for this reason that the 
military is less enthusiastic about the nuclear option than might be 
expected. So too will the service chiefs have understood the 
enormous costs entailed in the development of a nuclear strike force. 
This would amount to a considerable loss of decision making capacity 
for the armed forces in relation to the disbursement of allocations.
8.2 Decision Making in Practice
The annual defence debate in Parliament is rarely if ever an
indication that the watchdog and determining role of the legislature
is being either adeguately undertaken or exploited. Defence debates
have been described as generating 'heat but never light'12.
Recently, this criticism may be considered a relatively mild one;
contemporary parliamentary debates tend to be extremely perfunctory
and rarely illuminating or directive. Moreover, they are
particularly badly attended,
"Incredible though it may seem but the sad, indeed 
shameful truth is that there were three long stretches 
during the three day discussion on defence - which apart 
from being a matter of life and death costs the country 
close to Rs.6000 crores - when there was not even a
12 Chari [1980], p.138.
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quorum in the House. At times the number of those 
present did not exceed 20".13
There are two explanations for this lackadaisical approach on the 
part of the legislature. The first relates to the lack of 
information made available to the upper and lower houses. In 
relation to other Third World countries and the Soviet bloc, the 
information made available in India is substantial. For example, the 
MoD frequently releases press releases when major new defence 
decisions are taken, such as over military exercises or the purchase
of a new defence system. Yet, it is still insufficient for an
informed debate. The Defence Estimates, for example, which form the 
basis for the annual defence debate in the Lok Sabha, are inadequate. 
Procurement costs are put under one budget head, euphemistically 
entitled 1 stores1. There is no indication as to how much foreign 
exchange will be utilised for defence in any given year, so it is 
difficult to estimate the full impact of defence expenditure upon the 
Indian economy in a given time frame. Crude estimates could be made 
from evaluating the sources available outside India, such as 
commercial intelligence reports and technical journals, but this is a 
time consuming and unsatisfactory exercise - the price paid for a
weapons system may amount to less than 50% of the total costs when
training, technical advice, spare parts and maintenance are 
included14. When questions are tabled in Parliament, which is not 
often, the Government frequently uses the excuse of 'national 
security' to avoid furnishing detailed information, even though on 
many occasions the information is publicly available outside and
13 Malhotra [7 April 1983].
14 Brzoska [1988].
sometimes inside India15. Although there is a public and media 
defence debate, officials rarely ir ^rvene on anything more than a 
superficial level. Aided and abetted by nearly four decades of 
sophisticated propoganda against Pakistan, officials often retreat 
behind a smokescreen of 'gathering war clouds', the 'imminent threat 
of war', 'border movements' and the 'work of foreign hands'. 
Typically, the media react in a very passive way and tend not to move 
beyond the emotion generated by either Pakistan or the United States, 
or both; the constant references to the appearance of the USS 
Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal in 1971 is a case in point. 
Consequently, parliamentarians are neither encouraged or cajoled by 
the press to debate key defence issues and military expenditure 
continues to be the exceptional holy cow.
The second explanation for the lack of Parliamentary clout on defence 
issues is the continuing hold of the Congress(I) party on Indian 
political affairs. With the exception of a two year period (1977- 
1980), either Congress or Congress(I) have held political power in 
India since 1947. This has had the effect of stifling debate and 
bestowing upon the Government a relatively free hand in the conduct 
of defence and other matters; internal security, space and nuclesr 
power, for example. Thus, together with the lack of parliamentary 
interest in defence, a situation has arisen whereby the Government 
has little compunction in pursuing policies without the need for 
legitimation, whatever the cost and impact.
In both the past and present, Nehru, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Ganchi
have taken up the defence portfolio which further stifles debate; few
15 In fact, some of the more zealous Indian MPs have claimed that 
state secrets relating to national security should not be 
reproduced in the Jane's reference series.
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Congress MPs would wish to challenge directly their party leader on 
such a sensitive issue. In addition, the continuing success of the 
Congress(I) party has severely damaged the fortunes of the political 
opposition parties. There is no nationally viable, single opposition 
party in India and the best that can be expected is a coalition of 
regional and factional interests. Even the Desai government of 1978- 
80 was a unsatisfactory coalition galvanised by a mutual distaste for 
Indira Gandhi's style of government. Consequently, there are few 
politicians outside the ruling party with experience of office. The 
non-existence of a strong opposition party has prevented the 
formation of a shadow cabinet16, which would of necessity include a 
consistent critique of Government policy in the form of an opposition 
defence spokesperson(s); the enforced learning process could only be 
of benefit to the prosecution of an alternative perspective, which 
would in turn create a defence debate where none exists at present. 
However, it need not be the case that all opposition parties would be 
in favour of restraint. In some cases, opposition parties consider 
that the Government is lagging behind on defence preparedness. 
Recently, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a leading right-wing 
opposition party, criticised the Prime Minister for an inappropriate 
response to the allegations regarding Pakistani developments in the 
nuclear field. Furthermore, the party adopted a resolution calling 
for the development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by India17.
It can be argued, therefore, that although a democratic system exists 
in India, it works imperfectly in the realm of defence. Primarily 
through the witholding of information, which is complemented by an 
advanced state of apathy on the part of politicians, the ability and
16 Chari [1980], p.140.
17 Journal of Defence and Diplomacy [October 1985].
interest of Parliament to direct and monitor developments and 
progress in defence policy is severely limited. In principle, the 
PACC should formulate policy which should then be widely debated in 
Parliament and beyond, assuming that the security issues at stake do 
not require an instant response, such as the threat of invasion or 
war. Information should be made more fully available and policy 
decisions defended at the formal committee level and in the debating 
chamber, as befits a democratic system. In practice, however, this 
appears not to be the case. Although the structures exist they are 
not utilised.
Equally important in the analysis of the decision making process is 
the degree to which the armed forces exercise influence upon the 
element of choice open to the bureaucracy and legislature. The 
earlier analysis of the definitive period between 1947 and 1962 
highlighted the inability of any individual or institution apart from 
the armed forces to define with authority the technological 
parameters of defence policy. Since the 1962 war, the decision 
making process has changed significantly. One result has been that 
the Cabinet is now better informed than hitherto and is able to make 
more informed judgements pertaining to procurement. Also, the MoD 
now has more expertise than in the Nehru era and is itself more 
capable of giving advice.
However, the ability to counter-balance the institutional pressure of 
the armed forces is still not in evidence. Nowhere in India is there 
a recognised body capable of understanding fully the demands of the 
armed forces. The Defence Minister with a tenure of limited length, 
which is dependent in any case upon wider political circumstances, is
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hard pressed to come to terms fully with the complex world of 
defence, subjected as it is to a rapid rate of technological change.
Much the same is true of the Government sponsored Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analysis, the official defence think-tank. 
Certainly, the existence of this institution has fostered a more 
sophisticated public debate where before there was virtually none. 
However, on taking up the post the director becomes a civil servant 
(the present incumbent is a retired IAF officer), there are often 
retired military personnel on the staff and, consequently, the 
institute is not particularly well recognised either inside or 
outside India as an impartial source. In addition, its intellectual 
standards are known to veer erratically from the excellent to the 
mundane. Whilst criticism of defence policy from within the IDSA is 
certainly tolerated, nevertheless, the institute has failed to build 
for itself a reputation which reflects the required degree of 
academic and political credibility that is necessary for a body such 
as this to impact upon the decision making rather than the opinion 
shaping process. Instead, IDSA is often seen as little more than a 
means of articulating Government defence policy both at home and 
abroad.
Another potential means of balance is to be found in the watchdog 
Parliamentary Committees. Based upon the annual report and 
recommendations of the Comptroller and Auditor General, various areas 
of public policy implementation, including defence, are rigorously 
examined. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examines autonomous 
defence public sector enterprises and the Estimates Committee 
scrutinises the efficiency of organisational aspects. The published 
reports of these committees are often revealing. Nevertheless, all
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the PAC reports and most of the Estimates Committee reports are ex 
post facto, although the Estimates Committee is able to consider 
departmental estimates before they are presented to Parliament18.
These are, therefore, committees without teeth. Considering the 
serious nature of some of the allegations and the supporting evidence 
gathered by the watchdog committees, it is remarkable how little 
effect these hearings have, in stark contrast to the very different 
model of the Congressional Hearings in the US, for example.
Equally, the expertise available to the legislature is not 
insufficiently impartial. Of particular importance is the fact that 
the JIC acts with a supporting staff drawn entirely from the I
military. The other body responsible for the assessment of threat, ]jthe PPRC, is serviced by the policy planning Division of the MEA I
I
which does not have a staff with a working knowledge of security |
I
affairs.18 Ergo, the assessments pertaining to threat are heavily, |
if not exclusively, influenced by the armed forces. jj
f\
i
When a pending problem requiring a decision has reached cabinet 
level, the PACC will request advice from both the service chiefs and 
the MoD. The service chiefs are in attendance at PACC meetings to 
provide advice if required. In addition, they are able to use the j
'morning meetings' to communicate with the Cabinet via the Defence 
Minister. Thus, although the military are not appointed to posts 
within the MoD, they do interject at several points in the policy 
making process at the highest possible level.
18 Chari [1980], p.139.
19 Chari [1980], p.143.
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Nevertheless, in a relatively mature democracy such as exists in 
India, the MoD should have reached a much higher level of competence 
and proficiency since the 1950s when the power of decision making 
rested with the service chiefs. Yet this does not appear to have 
happenened. Even though after 1962 the initiative for policy 
decisions was placed firmly with the MoD, the learning process 
remained insufficient, particularly on items requiring high 
expenditure. According to India's foremost defence bureaucracy 
analyst,
"Proposals really connected with fighting efficiency or 
build-up of defence potential get through amazingly 
quickly irrespective of cost. The cases that drag on are 
those with amorphous fighting value - like creating 
additional posts of military attaches abroad, upgradation 
of ranks of individual posts for officers, construction 
of swimming pools and other amenities, etc. In fact
Service HQs often buttress their proposals with stock
phrases like 'operational preparedness' and 'maintenance 
of morale' and confuse the already baffled defence 
officials.
Recruitment, training, preparation of operational plans, 
location of troops, etc., have been entirely with the 
Service HQs. It would thus require a lot of imagination 
to suggest that the Defence Ministry functions as a 
super-military headquarters. Indeed Defence Ministry 
officials have no competence to be super-military staff, 
nor are they required to be so.
... the Service HQs seem to have consciously or otherwise
a vested interest in keeping Defence Ministry officials 
in ignorance."20
In this overview of defence policy making, emphasis has been placed 
upon the ability of the military to influence the policy making 
process. The need to solicit the views and advice of the military in 
the defence of the state cannot be disputed. However, one 
observation must follow if the armed forces are the primary force in 
shaping decisions; the policy making process is at variance with the 
articles of the constitution, which place the main power of decision
20 Venkateswaran [25 May 1984].
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making in the hands of Parliament. In the absence of non-military 
expertise to counter-balance the views of the military, the 
legislature is severely disadvantaged. This brings into question the 
claims of many commentators regarding the democratic nature of the 
defence decision making process in India. However, it should be 
reiterated that this is not a problem unique to India. Nor can it be 
argued that this anomaly has occurred as a result of subversive 
activity on the part of the military, bureaucracy or Parliament. It 
is more the product of a failure, at a very early stage, to 
understand the degree to which the insufficient provision of 
information in a complex and sensitive area of decision making can 
seriously disadvantage the non-military decision makers.
Despite the evidence of a sophisticated machinery designed to 
facilitate a constitutional and rational decision making process in 
India, the system does not work well in the realm of defence. In one 
sense this is a universal problem - democracy at work is always a 
complex and dynamic mix of power, opportunism, bureaucratic politics 
and pressure. In the absence of an informed and open process 
politicians are prone to rely too much upon power and pressure and 
the merits of the system in principle become worthless. In a highly 
complex and sensitive area such as defence, with decisions involving 
large financial outlays with a commensurably long process of 
implementation over lengthy periods of time, policy deviations are 
probably inevitable. In the case of India and other countries whose 
policy processes have been carefully studied, there is a universal 
problem of a relative lack of accountability and orthodoxy. However, 
it is necessary to differentiate sharply between the inherent 
weakness of the system and its subversion.
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The weakness of the policy process in the case of India is the 
inability of the legislature to counter the bargaining position of 
the armed forces and to a lesser extent the MoD. Whilst checks and 
balances exist in principle, in practice they are virtually 
meaningless. For example, a Ministry of Finance officer has a desk 
in the MoD to ensure than defence allocations are requested and 
disbursed in such a way as to prevent harm to other areas of the 
Indian economy. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this 
post, which effectively gives the Ministry of Finance the power of 
veto over the Ministry of Defence when it comes to issues involving 
expenditure, is used in the way it could and should have been in 
recent years. There have been very few occaisions when the equipment 
required by the armed forces has not been forthcoming because of high 
costs.
Although there are evident problems in the structure of policy making 
which have never been fully addressed by the Indian Government, other 
aspects of Indian politics are also relevant. Towards the end of her 
life, Indira Gandhi came under increasing criticism for her 
autocratic style of government and her propensity to develop a 
presidential style of government. From the time of her re-election 
in 1980, the overall style of decision making changed dramatically, 
particularly in relation to defence. After a period of low activity 
in defence procurement, Mrs Gandhi's return to power was swiftly 
followed by an open season for procurement and defence modernisation. 
During the four year period, from 1980 until her death in October 
1984, the basis of decision making was taken further away from the 
legislature. A small coterie of advisers drawn from the Prime 
Minister's Secretariat and the so-called 'Kitchen Cabinet' (which 
took its name from the propensity of its members - the Defence,
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Finance and External Affairs Ministers and the Prime Minister to 
conduct their business at the Prime Minister's residence) became 
responsible for the framing of important policy and, to a lesser 
extent, the monitoring of policy implementation21. In the months 
before her death Indira Gandhi brought her son and heir apparent ani 
his trusted advisers increasingly into the policy process. When 
Rajiv Gandhi took power the style of decision making changed very 
little although there were enormous changes in the personnel involved 
and the distribution of power. Rajiv's first term of office has been 
confused with regard to decision making. Initially, he rejected most 
of the major advisers utilised by his Mother, people such as G. 
Parthasarathy and R.K. Dhawan. Instead, Rajiv surrounded himself 
with younger people who lacked political experience but nevertheless 
imbued the new Government with a new image based upon technological 
development, 'clean' government, efficiency and dynamism. However, 
the dynamic atmosphere and the loyalty of the new advisers did not 
last long. Racked by incessant infighting and frequent threats to 
the authority of the Prime Minister, Rajiv was forced into frequent 
cabinet reshuffles to prevent the establishment of independent power 
bases and, eventually, sacked several of his erstwhile closest and 
most trusted advisers, such as his cousin, Arun Nehru. For several 
months Gandhi operated with an apparently ineffectual team which was 
unable to raise the Government's performance. As the time for a 
general election drew nearer (elections must be held before December 
1989), Rajiv brought back many of his Mother's trusted advisers.
In this way the defence policy process in India has reverted back to 
what it was during the Nehru period. Major decisions which date from 
with the modernisation programme in 1980 were only partially debated
21 Sundar Rajan [January 1984], pp.48-54.
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within an increasingly apathetic legislature - Congress(I) MPs became 
hamstrung by the burgeoning employment of patronage. Rather than 
address themselves directly to the erosion of democracy, many chose 
instead to exploit the situation. Corruption and the abuse of power 
increased exponentially as Congress(I) MPs used their positions to 
amass the maximum wealth and power in the limited time available 
before the opportunities faded.
The prevailing style of decision making opened up a direct line of 
communication between the service chiefs and the Prime Minister via 
the Cabinet Secretariat and the 'Kitchen Cabinet1. The domestic 
political crises which punctuated Indira Gandhi's last few years of 
power were hidden behind the thick smokescreen of a continuing 
security crisis. For the armed forces it was a halcyon period during 
which the import of advanced military technology proceeded apace with 
unprecedented speed. In addition, the armed forces benefited from 
the increasing desire for India to become not just an undisputed 
regional power but also a global military power. Underpinned by a 
belief that India was not a weak state but one that had yet to pull 
the correct levers to realise its vast potential wealth and power, it 
set out to challenge the status quo of the non-proliferation regime, 
superpower influence in the Indian Ocean and the outright control of 
the sub-continent itself.
Within the legislature, the concept of India becoming a major 
regional power which required exponential rises in defence 
expenditure was far from unpopular. First, there is a widespread 
desire on the part of Indian elites for their country to be taken 
more seriously within the international system. Since 1980, India's 
improved economic position, the evident need to modernise at least
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some sections of the armed forces and the favourable terms to be 
found on the international arms market, provided an opportunity which 
many had been waiting for since the 1971 war with Pakistan. Thus, a 
Ministry of External Affairs official recently offered a Western 
diplomat the rather extended argument that one reason for the further 
development of a blue water navy lay in the present and future 
turmoil within Southern Africa22. K. Subrahmanyam, the recognised 
spokesman for the hawkish element of the Indian elite, has argued 
that India should have a seat on the United Nations' Security 
Council,
"One out of every six people in the world is Indian. In 
any democratic structure, India would have an effective 
say. But you in the West devised a world order in which 
the second largest country isn't even a permanent member 
of the Security Council. That's a big omission."23
A retired Indian Navy admiral has been even more blunt,
"The world has learned to live with US power, Soviet 
power, even Chinese power, and it will have to learn to 
live with Indian power."24
Second, the defence build-up is also popular amongst the Indian
middle classes, albeit at a level once removed from the concerns of
the Elites. Within India, the middle class, which numbers anything
from 100 to 200 million, and the private" sector, have provided the
economic dynamism which was evident in the early-1980s. On the one
hand, they provide a form of national cement as they have a
considerable vested interest in the Government keeping the country
together and preserving a single market. However, the liberalisation
programmes which gave India dynamism in the 1980s also begot regional
disparities and increasing class differences25. The middle classes
22 Munro [3 April 1989], p.12.
23 Munro [3 April 1989], pp.13-14.
24 Munro [3 April 1989], p.13.
25 Housego [ 28 April 1989].
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look to the ruling Congress(I) to maintain this cohesion. Increasing 
the strength of the Centre can achieve these ends to a degree but 
national unity, however cosmetic, cannot be achieved without a viable 
defence sector capable of providing external presence and internal 
security.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat curious that the Public Accounts 
Committee of the Cabinet should permit the profligate expansionism of 
the 1980s. However much the process is in accord with the 
Government's view of the need to acquire great power status and the 
respect of other major powers, particularly the United States, the 
political cost of economic failure brought on by an excessive 
expansion of the defence sector and depleted foreign exchange 
reserves could only be borne by the incumbent ruling party. To this 
writer's knowledge, few requests from the armed forces have been 
turned down in recent years, with the possible exception of the 
Tornado Multi Role Combat Aircraft. This begs the question as to 
what in addition the PACC members have to gain. Conceivably, the 
task of acquiring enhanced international prestige could well have 
been achieved more economically. Or, put another way, how rational 
is it fo:* a country to aspire to major power status and at the same 
time p::v relatively little attention until recently to the fortunes 
and performance of the domestic defence industry? Why does India 
import when it could produce indigenously? Why are such lavish 
procurement programmes pushed through without reservations when the 
end, major power status, could be achieved at less political cost?
One explanation for the total rather than the measured acquiescence 
of the PACC may lie in the increasing evidence that most major 
defence deals between the arms exporters from the West and Third
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World countries, including India, are acconpanied by sizeable 
commissions paid to the decision takers. The costs incurred are then 
added to the total amounts paid for the defence equipment and may 
inflate prices by up to 50 percent28.
Over the past few years the allegations of corrupt practice in 
defence deals involving India has been commonplace. Mrs Gandhi was 
alleged to have secured several million pounds in commission payments 
over the Jaguar DPSA deal27. In 1985 it was suggested that the 
Swedish firm Bofors had paid tens of millions of dollars in 
commissions to secure an order for 155mm field guns worth over $1.3 
billion, a scandal which rocked the Rajiv Gandhi Government. The 
influential Hindujah family was alleged to have received $500 million 
on behalf of unknown memebers of the Congress(I) party responsible 
for taking the relevant decisions28.
The motivating forces for corruption involving high ranking 
politicians are several. Increasingly in India, the benefits for the 
ruling party are personal and stem from the need for foreign exchange 
reserves which are held outside the country to cover luxery 
consumption, foreign health care, education and travel. However, a 
recognisable political function is fulfilled by the ruling party's 
access to such payments. In India, elections are particularly 
expensive and labour intensive. Bar the outright capturing of ballot 
boxes, it is extremely difficult for a ruling party to rig elections.
26 Adam Raphael has this to say about a recent British arms deals, 
"All have been shrouded in secrecy, all involve large commission 
payments, which have inflated the Tornado sales price by between 
30 and 50 percent, and moast involve barter arrangements with 
poor countries that cannot afford, and arguably do not need, 
such sophisticated weapons." Raphael [7 May 1989].
27 Confidential source, (Delhi, March 1983).
28 Gupte [November 1987].
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In order to be successful, large sums of money are required to fund 
the 'carpet bombing1 style of election campaigning which the Indian 
electorate requires - the media do not offer an adequate source of 
communication as yet because the voting public demands to see the 
people it will elect, either on posters or in the flesh. 
Traditionally, the Congress Party has looked to landowners all over 
the country and commercial interests in Bombay to provide the vast 
amounts of finance required to fund election campaigns. However, 
there are inevitable political costs involved, many of which may 
directly contradict manifestos. Thus, if the ruling party can use 
external contracts to enlarge its coffers, it will be less of a 
hostage to powerful domestic interst groups.
Once corruption enters the equation, the logic of India's defence 
build-up in recent years begins to appear more understandable. The 
armed forces push and lobby for advanced military technology, which 
is commonplace in most countries - in one sense that is the 
professional role of the amred forces, to ensure that the country is 
as adequately defended as possible. Self interest within the 
bureaucracy may endorse the military view of India's security 
problems. Increased allocations raise the relative status of the 
recipient departments, whether it be railways, education or defence. 
Also, senior representatives from the MoD and the MEA would possibly 
fall into the elite group which consider India to be a major power in 
the making.
In principle, bureaucratic self-interest should be counter-balanced 
by both the PACC in the first instance and, via the annual 
parliamentary debate at least, the Lok Sabha (lower house). This 
does not happen. The Lok Sabha is generally starved of useful
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information from which it might mount a more searching policy debate 
than exists at present and generally increase its ability tc assess 
the situation. Yet, at the same time, Indian politicians do not seem 
particularly interested in taking up the relevant issues, either due 
to apathy, an unwillingness to come close to criticising their 
patrons, or because they too endorse the pursuit of great power 
status. Finally, the PACC and its advisors may have more than 
political status to gain from granting the requests made by the armed 









The preceeding chapters have attempted to trace, analyse and 
understand the Indian defence sector since 1947. However the 
phenomenon is to be understood, it cannot be disputed that the 
process has been both extremely expensive and unwieldly; tying the 
threads together produces a result which seems chaotic, unplanned and 
particularly inappropriate.
First and foremost, India is an extremely poor country; amidst the 
population of at least 800 million people (which will likely reach 
the one billion level before the end of the century) at least 50% 
live below the poverty line1. Within this sector there exists 
desperate hardship. Homelessness, overcrowding, underemployment 
(very few people in India are unemployed), decaying infrastructure, 
illness and lack of sanitation are rife in the major cities, such as 
Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi. In the countryside, where 65% of the 
population still live, there is environmental destruction and decay, 
land shortage and maldistribution, poverty, helplessness and 
inadequate social justice. Millions of the rural poor have migrated 
to cities and continue to do so. Against this backdrop of social and 
economic malaise, the record of both the Union and State Governments 
is less than spectacular.
On the one hand the state has always professed to possess a 
qualitatively different level of concern for the poor and
1 40 % of the Indian population is below 14 years of age and
between 1971 and 1981 India's population rose by nearly 25%, 
Economic Intelligence Unit [1986], p.6.
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disadvantaged than other developing countries; the democratic 
socialism of Nehru and his colleagues, the founders of modern India, 
has ostensibly lived on throughout the decades. Both democratic and 
socialist structures still exist, witness, for example, the stress 
upon free elections, the parliamentarry process and planned 
development. On the other, however, the framework of democratic 
socialism has been largely abandoned in practice. After forty years 
of independence the country's achievements in certain arenas, such as 
big science, technology and industrial growth have been relatively 
impressive. Nevertheless, the progress and gain overall has been 
unevenly spread. Thus, for example, India's per capita public 
expenditure is a mere $8, only $1 more than Burma, one of the most 
retarded development states in the world, and $13 less than China2 .
In recent years the role of the state in development has been reduced 
due to the adoption of economic liberalisation policies. Even so, 
over the past two decades the state has shown a declining interest in 
the wider problems of underdevelopment.
India's development failures and the gradual devaluation of the 
democratic system are rooted in complex political processes which 
have many components. Centrism, mismanagement, corruption, inertia, 
power politics, the longevity of the Congress 'system' and 
intranational chauvinism have all played their parts3. Nor should 
the sheer magnitude of the problems facing successive Indian leaders 
be discounted. A full explanation of both are beyond the scope of 
this essay4 . Suffice to say, therefore, that the Indian political
2 Sivard [1987], Table III, p.48.As -
* 3 The concept of the Congress 'system'
4 For an excellent analysis of the political economy of the Indian
state see Rudolph and Rudolph [1987].
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system, though both complex and contradictory, is generally and 
increasingly failing to read the standards set by modern India's 
founding fathers.
Although the links between political decline and militarisation in 
the widest sense are rarely made, the defence sector in India 
connects in important ways to this process of degeneration. The 
exagerated activities of the defence sector are both an expression of 
and a distraction from political problems. In India, the national 
security threat has on countless occaisions been used to distract 
attention away from the country's internal political and 
developmental problems. Indeed, the timing of the nuclear test in 
1974 may well have been influenced by the domestic political problems 
faced by Mrs Gandhi at that time. The attention paid to the defence 
sector, particularly during the 1980s, also reflects the state's 
diminishing concern over finding lasting and meaningful solutions to 
the country's formidable development problems. This is not to 
suggest that defence expenditure is not required but it is the level 
of expenditure and the direction of procurement which raises concern. 
Indian leaders appear to feel that tremendous military strength and 
economic dynamism in some sectors can co-exist with extreme poverty 
and minimal underdevelopment - the obvious lessons currently being 
understood by the Soviet Union appear to have been missed in India. 
The pursuit of great power status effectively signals the inability 
and unwillingness of the state to prioritise sustainable 
development,. It seems that, to the state, resources are better 
spent and more urgently required in the defence sector than in other 
areas which might contribute to sustainable development. For 
example, defence allocations are three times higher than health 
allocations even though, for example, the country ranks with poverty-
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stricken Nepal regarding infant mortality rates and life expectancy 
at birth5.
Economically, the impact of increasing defence expenditures are 
difficult to assess. Defence allocations may reflect considerable 
opportunity costs, crowd out investment funds, dimish the scope for
^   s
welfare, create inflation, reduce foreign exchange reserves and 
affect adversely terms of trade, as has been the case with defence 
related trade with the Soviet Union. Obversely, given the 
impossibility of measuring security as a public good, or indeed, the 
pump-priming effect of increased activity in the defence sector, the 
precise economic impact of defence cannot be calculated. Nor is it 
possible to reach even the most tentative assessments in the absence 
of adequate data regarding foreign exchange outlays.
Nevertheless, despite the poverty of data and the complexity of 
analysis, the view that India’s current economic crisis has been 
vastly exacerbated by extravagent defence procurement cannot be 
dispelled. The extent of the current Government's fiscal crisis has 
only recently come to light. On the one hand, paradoxically, the 
Indian economy is booming. In recent months the economy seems to 
have moved to a higher growth path, leaving behind the traditional 
'Hindu rate of growth' (c.3%) of the 1960s and 1970s; in 1989 GDP may 
expand by a record 9% following an exceptional monsoon. The key to 
this dynamism lies in the expansion of manufacturing output and a 
general freeing up of the economy to prevent bottlenecks and ease the 
acquisition of credit. On the other, however, the Prime Minister has 
allowed Government finances to slide to a dangerous level and the 
country is facing a crisis which threatens what the World Bank
5 Sivard [1987], Table III, p.49.
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euphemistically labels 'fiscal collapse', i.e. bankruptcy, by the 
mid-1990s.e
Currently, India's economic problems focus specifically upon a 
burgeoning foreign exchange crisis - during fiscal year 1988-89 the 
country's foreign exchange reserves dropped by $1.16 billion, the 
greatest downturn this decade7 . Equally, India's domestic and 
foreign debts are rising dramatically. Although India is not 
traditionally seen as a heavily indebted country and remains 
creditworthy, external debt has reached Rs.80,000 crore, which is the 
fourth highest developing country foreign debt after Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico. The differing size of these countries' economies 
in relation to India's and the sharp devaluation of the rupee over 
the past two years confuses the picture. A much clearer perspective 
can be gained by considering debt service ratio, the loans and 
interest which a country repays as a percentage of foreign currency 
inflow: in India the burden has increased from 8.1% in 1981 to at 
least 26% in 1989.®
The majority of India's fiscal problems stem from the Government's 
trade liberalisation policies which have increased the country's 
foreign exchange expenditures. Yet the defence modernisation 
programme of the 1980s is also responsible for the fiscal 
predicament, although by exactly how much is very difficult to 
answer. One estimate has suggested that short-term and defence 
loans, categories usually omitted from the Indian Government's 
figures, together amount to Rs.3,000 crore, or 3.75% of the foreign
6 Housego [27 February 1989].
7 Housego [27 February 1989].
8 Thakurta [15 May 1989], pp.68-69.
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debt9 . Another puts the estimate somewhat higher at Rs.4,000 crore, 
or 5% of the external debt10. However, the total is probably much 
higher. For example, the cost of the 40 Mirage 2000 alone was at 
least Rs.1,500 crore (approximately $1 billion at early-1989 exchange 
rates)11. Add to this the $1.3 billion (Rs.1,950 crore) deal with 
Bofors, the £55 million paid for Hermes, the burgeoning foreign 
exchange outlays required for the LCA programme, a series of major 
deals with the Soviet Union, the base at Karwar and many other 
infrastructural improvements and the numerous servicing and training 
programmes which have been set up with foreign defence companies, and 
the foreign exchange outlays begin to seem extremely high. Or, put 
another way, the defence procurement budget in 1988-89 totalled 
Rs.3,173 crore and it was estimated that this element of the budget 
would have to rise to Rs.6,000 crore to continue'debt repayment and 
to furnish projected requirements12.
The scale of India's fiscal crisis may send this erstwhile 
independent country into the arms of the IMF, a move which the 
previous Government staunchly resisted through the early-1980s.
Rising defence allocations will have contributed considerably to this 
situation. Why, then, has the Government allowed itself to get into 
such a situation which has weakened the economy and may lead to the 
introduction of several IMF-backed austerity measures which will cost 
the incumbent Government dearly in votes during an election year?
9 Thakurta [15 May 1989], p.69.
10 Gupta and Thakurta [28 February 1989], p.43.
11 Gupta and Thakurta [28 February 1989], p.45.
12 Gupta and Thakurta [28 February 1989], p.43.
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First and foremost, it would be untenable to suggest that the 
expenditure on defence is wholly wasteful. India does have a number 
of security considerations which require recurrent defence 
expenditures (see Chapter Three). These range from the immediate 
security threats posed by Pakistan and China, to the more distant 
threat of continuing trouble in the Middle East and the superpower 
build-up in the Indian Ocean.
However, whilst accepting the country's need for defence, the policy 
process since 1947 has been haphazard. At the outset, Nehru appeared 
to attempt to construct a security policy which relied upon the 
foreign policy process and non-involvement in Cold War politics.
These were the principal means of ensuring that India avoided the 
need to request foreign military aid, as other Third World countries 
were doing at that time, and, in addition, forestalled the 
requirement for high defence expenditures which would directly 
compete with resources for development and affect as well the 
Congress Party's chances of political survival.
Nevertheless, Nehru appeared not to follow through with his broad 
policy objectives. Whilst he did take steps to provide the MoD with 
policy guidelines which started with the commissioned work of Patrick 
Blackett, nothing became of the latter's recommendations for a cost- 
benefit approach to the defence sector. Nehru appeared to accept the 
need for what would be called in modern parlance an alternative 
defence policy based upon low expenditure and commensurately low 
expectations. However, although actual defence expenditures remained 
low, activity within the defence sector was considerable.
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First, a great deal of defence procurement was covered by the 
' sterling balances1 which obviated the need to expend valuable 
foreign exchange and kept the size of the defence budget within 
acceptable political and fiscal limits. At that time, Britain was 
the major arms supplier to the Indian sub-continent. Second, the 
armed forces paid little to Nehru's declared policy on defence, 
although it is by no means clear that he was sincere in his oft- 
stated desire to place defence in a junior position to other national 
concerns. The service chiefs made no effort to assist the MoD with 
the implementation of either the guidelines suggested by Blackett or 
the defence policy adopted by the Cabinet in 1949. To a certain 
extent there was a fit between the Blackett recommendations and the 
policy guidelines adopted in 1949. Both envisaged a low key defence 
policy which prioritised the ground-based defence of North West India 
given the prevailing threat from Pakistan and the unresolved dispute 
over Azad Kashmir. Equally, the policy was designed to place 
considerable reliance upon diplomatic efforts to ensure that any 
future war between India and Pakistan would be resolved at the 
conference table rather than the battlefield.
These and other initiatives were designed to underpin two aspects of 
defence policy. First, to ensure that the defence sector expenditure 
would not spiral out of control which would result in greater 
influence for the armed forces. Second, it was intended to make a 
visible link between defence and foreign policy. However, the policy 
guidelines were poorly implemented. Whilst defence expenditure 
remained low, the armed forces managed to ensure that their favoured 
missions, such as long-range bombing, were adopted. In the case of 
the IAF, this resulted in the procurement of advanced long-range 
bombers in the form of the Canberra. The Navy, however, was less
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fortunate and did not receive a great deal of new equipment, with the 
notable exception of an aircraft carrier. Nevertheless, the Navy did 
manage to persuade the Government to accept the need in principle for 
a blue, not a brown water strategy. The latter would have been more 
appropriate for India at that time. Thus, once the need for a blue 
water strategy had been adopted it was only a matter of time before a 
major naval build-up ensued, once foreign exchange reserves had 
increased sufficiently - inevitably technology followed the 
identification of key missions otherwise, by definition, India was 
inadequately defended.
Consequently, between 1947 and 1962, the Nehru Government pursued two 
contradictory defence polices. The first, which was intended to 
reflect restraint, was ignored and was largely for the consumption of 
the Indian public and the international community. The second 
projected India as a major or significant power in the making. This 
was the hidden agenda of the Indian elites during this and subsequent 
periods. They believed that once independence had been achieved, 
India was destined to become a politically significant and militarily 
strong nation. In reality, there was no suggestion that the elites 
wished their country to remain dependent upon major powers for 
defence or, indeed, military equipment. In time, India would develop 
economically which would facilitate military and political 
aggrandisement. During the period 1947-62 decision makers allowed 
the armed forces to prepare the foundations for such a defence 
posture, which did not preclude either the production of nuclear 
weapons or the procurement of advanced conventional military 
technology.
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The 1962 war with China ended in ignominious defeat for India.
Though relatively well equippped overall, the armed forces were not 
well prepared for defence against China, leadership and decision 
making was at fault and the overall performance of the defence forces 
was extremely poor. In the aftermath of the conflict, the Government 
reacted decisively by increasing defence expenditures, raising 
procurement and devoting more resources and attention to indigenous 
defence production. However, at no point did the Indian Government 
appear to consider a defence review to assess why the country fared 
so badly in 1962 and, furthermore, to find a fit between defence 
requirements and defence expenditures. Instead, a series of 
technological fixes were applied to the defence sector which raised 
both procurement and expenditure but did not essentially change the 
configuration of the prevailing defence posture.
The essential point to be gleaned from this early period is that 
Nehru allowed a situation to develop between 1947 and 1962 which 
placed the defence sector on a certain trajectory which would 
inevitably have resulted in a large scale defence build-up. Thus, 
although the 1962 war was important in many ways it was not the 
catalytic event which cast India away from a defence posture based 
upon restraint and into a reactive defence build-up designed to 
defend the country better on all fronts. To a large extent the 
required dynamism was already present well before the Sino-Indian 
war. The defence policy adopted in 1964 was more a definite 
expression, qualification and reiteration of what had been in motion 
since the late-1940s; essentially it was more of the same but with a 
considerable added impetus brought on by defeat and national 
humiliation.
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Throughout the late-1960s India steadily increased its defence 
capability. The new defence plan adopted in 1964 called for 
considerable across-the-board increases although the Army received 
many of the new resources made available and the Navy much less.
This was a consequence of the failure in 1962 and the agreed 
culpability of the Army. In addition, the Indian Government 
endeavoured to consolidate links with the Soviet Union in a bid to 
acquire defence equipment at concessional prices with payment in 
rupees.
In 1965 India fought its second war with Pakistan. India had little 
difficulty in asserting its undoubted military superiority. It was, 
however, a short-lived and fruitless conflict from which neither side 
gained much. One salutary lesson learned by India during the 
conflict was the deleterious impact of the arms embargo placed on 
both sides by Britain and the United States. The embargo was not 
lifted for several years and for both practical and political reasons 
India was pushed further towards the Soviet Union.
The combination of increasing domestic political problems and 
economic stagnation coupled with ongoing difficulties with the Soviet 
Union, primarily over the latter's relationship with China, prevented 
India from continuing its defence modernisation programme. 
Nevertheless, enough had been achieved on both the organisational and 
procurement fronts to permit Indira Gandhi to mount a devastating 
attack on Pakistan in 1971, which resulted in the partition of the 
latter and the creation of Bangladesh.
With fewer external, regional problems to confront and mounting 
political and economic problems, Mrs Gandhi paid relatively little
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attention to regional and security issues over the 1970s. The hasty 
conclusion of a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with the Soviet 
Union in 1971 paved the way for a smoother flow of Soviet defence 
equipment once the Kremlin had resolved its own problems over whether 
to side with India or Pakistan. Certainly, the consolidated 
relationship with the Soviet Union juxtaposed with the inability to 
purchase from other major arms suppliers amounted to a burgeoning 
level of dependency upon the Soviet Union. However, despite India's 
prominent role in the Non-Aligned Movement, dependency upon the 
Soviet Union was not considered to be as much a contradiction as 
would have been a similar relationship with the United States.
In 1977 Mrs Gandhi lost power to the Janata coalition. The election 
of Moraji Desai coincided with an upturn in the Indian economy and 
increased foreign exchange reserves: in 1974-75 reserves hovered 
between Rs.500 and Rs.1,000 crore but by 1977-78 they had risen to 
well over Rs.4,500 crore13. The improved economic situation 
permitted the new Government to embark upon a defence modernisation 
programme. By the late-1970s much of the defence equipment imported 
during the 1950s was undoubtedly in need of modernisation or outright 
replacement, the IAF in particular had for some years been lobbying 
for such a programme. The Janata Government tentatively pushed the 
programme forward and, although few deals were announced during the 
Party's short period in office, substantial moves were made to assess 
the implications of an across-the-board modernisation programme.
In 1980 Mrs Gandhi was re-elected and soon after the defence 
modernisation programme acquired new dynamism and a more focused 
direction. This was in part because the new Prime Minister was less
13 Thomas [1982], p.113, Appendix I, Table A.
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equivocal and more confident over her view of defence and foreign 
policy - by contrast the Janata Government lacked both vision and 
conviction. Mrs Gandhi, however, returned to 1 Safdarjang Road with 
a vision of tranforming India into a major power by capitalising upon 
the strategic advantage gained in 1971 once the country had the 
foreign exchange resources to afford a defence build-up.
Throughout the 1980s the defence modernisation programme proceeded 
apace and, arguably, went out of control. Following the 
assassination of Mrs Gandhi her son, Rajiv, pursued a similar policy 
on defence. Whilst other developing countries, including OPEC 
members, back-pedaled as their inventories became saturated, the 
Indian Government forged ahead. What followed was a defence 
modernisation programme of immense proportions which clearly went 
beyond the need to respond to external events, such as the renewed 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan, the latter's 
nuclear ambitions and the problems associated with the new Cold War, 
increased conflict in the Middle East and the superpower build-up in 
the Indian Ocean. The nature of the defence build-up spanned the 
procurement of a second aircraft carrier and extremely advanced 
aircraft, tanks and artillery. Coupled with bold external 
initiatives such as the veiled but recurring threat to bomb 
Pakistan's nuclear facilities, aggressive military training 
operations, the intervention in Sri Lanka, operations around the 
Siachin glacier, renewed talk of nuclear weapons and the operation to 
prevent a coup in the Maldives, India served unequivocal notice upon 
the rest of the world that it intended to be taken seriously as a 
military power, and not just in South Asia.
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By 1988 the defence sector was in disarray. Although defence 
expenditure rose to Rs.13,000 crore in 1988-89 from Rs.3,604 in 1981, 
the defence sector suddenly faced a major resource lacuna. The bold 
plans to realise the Army 2000 plan under which the Army would grow 
to 45 divisions with increased mechanisation has come to a halt. The 
sophisticated aircraft and ships purchased in recent years are under­
armed and operational tanks are in short supply. The MoD does not 
have the money to service old contracts and has asked both western 
suppliers and the Soviet Union to defer payments. New procurement 
plans which could have resulted in an additional aircraft carrier, an 
advanced jet trainer and a large new helicopter force have been 
shelved and will probably be abandoned.14
The disjuncture has in part been caused by the rapid fall of the 
rupee and the foreign exchange crisis discussed above. Nevertheless, 
the defence crisis should not have happened in India, a developing 
country renowned for its cautious bureaucracy and developed decision 
making process. The recent collapse in the defence sector begs 
numerous questions. Why, when defence procurement decisions can be 
vetoed by the Finance Officer in the MoD, was a more cautious policy 
not adopted considering the obvious trend towards domestic and 
external debt, currency devaluation and foreign exchange depletion? 
Why has the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet allowed such a 
situation to develop, especially in an election year? Why have the 
armed forces and the MoD apparently planned so badly - in the 1988-89 
defence budget the combined capital outlay for the armed forces 
actually declined, yet, the projected requirements were almost double 
the value of the resources put aside for modernisation and 
acquisitions? Why has the desire for great power status prevailed
14 Gupta and Thakurta [28 February 1989], p.43.
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over the country's pressing development needs, of which the 1987-88 
drought provided such a stark reminder. Why has the country 
apprently failed so badly in its bid to become more self-sufficient 
in the direction of indigenous production? In brief, why has India 
consistently failed to cut its defence coat to suit its economic 
cloth?
The first and possible most important reason for the current 
situation relates to the formative period between 1947 and 1962. 
During this period Nehru permitted the armed forces to acquire an 
increasing grip upon the decision shaping process - effectively the 
MoD was both too poorly equipped and marginalised within the decision 
making process to offer the necessary counter-balance. Even so, it 
is far from certain that key bureaucrats would have countered the 
demands of the armed forces on the one hand and the acquiescence of 
the political elites on the other.
Once the broad policy framework had been established, so were the key 
missions for the armed services. These were ambitious and inevitably 
required expression through the acquisition of the relevant 
technology for their fulfilment, such as long-range bombers and an 
aircraft carrier. Thus, the evolution of defence policy was largely 
unrestrained during the formative period. Although the armed forces 
were restrained to a degree, witness the delayed growth of the Navy, 
they were not checked.
Second, the political and bureacratic dlites have long held an agenda 
the realisation of which will cast India as a major power on the 
world scene. There is a fundamental belief in the country's 
greatness and destiny. The attainment of great power status was
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significantly slowed during the late-1960s and 1970s due to resource 
constraints. In 1980, the twin heads of steam which had built up in 
favour of across-the-board modernisation and the achievement of the 
necessary steps towards great power status were realised.
The complementary agendas of both the armed forces and the political 
Elites explains both the failure of the indigenous defence industry 
and the ad hoc nature of defence procurement. First, although the 
domestic defence industry has always been capable to a degree of 
providing defence equipment for all three services it has not 
recieved sufficient political and bureaucratic support. Thus, the 
armed forces demanded the most advanced equipment available and have 
traditionally accepted indigenous defence equipment with reluctance 
and under duress. The evidence available from, for example, Public 
Accounts Committee reports, indicates how difficult the armed forces 
have been as a customer and how little support the public sector 
defence companies have received from the institutions and committees, 
such as the MoD and PACC, which should have counter-balanced and 
rationalised the individual requests and overall approach of the 
armed forces. Thus, the indigenous defence industry required but did 
not receive the most pronounced protection and nurturence, 
particularly given the rate of military technological change which 
obtains in developed countries and competes with indigenous defence 
industries through the international arms trade.
The failure to introduce balance and rationality into the procurement 
process was due to the complimentary desire on the part of 
bureaucrats and politicians to see India develop as a major military 
power, but only in part. Over the years there have been no attempts 
to nurture an independent body capable of countering the demands of
the armed forces at a technical level. Thus, the armed forces have 
been allowed to exploit the technological momentum and acquire 
follow-on systems without recourse to cost-benefit oi ^utility 
analyses - new systems are considered necessary and urgent, 
therefore, because the military feel them to be so. Furthermore, the 
potential for rent-seeking should not be ignored. Whilst it is 
impossible to calibrate the extent to which defence procurement is 
decided by commissions, such practice is known to exist. This may 
lead to uneccesary or ill-conceived procurement. For example, the 
IAF was rumoured to be unhappy with the Mirage 2000 primarily because 
it had sold poorly on the international market and was powered by a 
single engine, whereas the IAF required a twin engined plane. It was 
the Government which persuaded the IAF to accept the plane, not the 
other way around15. Corruption and rent seeking not only provides 
another explanation for the ad hoc nature of decsion making and 
procurement. It also explains why the procurement process was 
allowed to reach such chaotic proportions and finally collapse during 
an election year; the need for rents is particularly great prior to 
an election and more so if the ruling party senses the possibility of 
defeat at the polls.
15 Confidential conversation with the author, (Delhi November
1983).
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1986/7: Rs 2,927.9 bn ($228.98 bn) 
1987/8: Rs 3,292.41 bn ($253.88 bn) 
1985/6: 5-9% 1986/7: 4.4#
1986: 8 .7# 1987: 8.8#
1985: $36.7bn 1986: $41,lbn
1987/8: Rs 125.12bn ($9.65bn)
1988/9: Rs 130.00bn ($9.89bn)










Terms of service: voluntary.
RESERVES: (obligation to age 60) Army 200,000. Territorial Army 




HQ: 5 Regional Comd (= Fd Army), 10 Corps. 2 armd div (2/3 armed, 1 
SP arty ( SP fd, 1 med regt) bde).
I mech div (3 mech (4/56 mech bn, 3 armd regt), 1 arty bde).
20 inf div (2-5 inf, 1 sarty bde; some have armd regt).
II mtn div (3-4 bde, 1 or more arty regt).
17 indep bde: 8 armd, 7 inf, i mtn,, 1 AB/cdo.




46 tk regt (bn).
17 mech, 329 inf bn.
9 AB/cdo bn.
164 arty regt (bn): 1 hy, 5 MRL, 50 med (incl 5 SP), 69 fd (incl 3 
SP), 39 mtn.
29 AA arty regt; perhaps 10 SAM gp (3~5 bty each).
7 sqn, 25 fit, Air Observation.







MBT: 3.150 (E 500 in reserve): some 800 T-55.
650 T-72, 1,700 Vijayanta,
LIGHT TANKS: 100 PT-76
MICV: 700 BMP-1, some Sarath (BMP-2).
APC: 400 0T-62/-64, 50 BTR-60.
TOWED ARTY: some 2,165: 75mm/76 mm: 900 75/24 mtn, 215 Yug M-48; 
88mm: 1,000 25-pdr (retiring); 100mm: I85 M-1944; 105mm: some 800 
(incl) M-56 pack), some 30 IFG Mk II; 130mm: 550 M-46; l40mm: 150 
5»5“in (retiring); 155mm: 30 FH-77B.
SP ARTY: 105mm: 80 Abbot\ 130mm: 50 mod M-46.
MRL: 122mm: 80 BM-21.
MORTARS: 120mm: 1,000; 160mm: 200.
ATGW: SS-11 B-l, Milan, AT-3 Sagger.
RCL: 106mm: 1,000+ M-40.
AD GUNS 2,7450: 23mm: 140 ZU 23-2, 75 ZSU-23-4 SP; 40mm: 1,245 
L40/60, 790 L40/70; 94mm: 500 3*7“in.
SAM: 26 SA-6, 620 SA-7, 20 SA-8A, SA-9, 25 Tigercat launchers.
HELICOPTERS: 99 Chetak (some with 4 AS-11), 60 Cheetah.
DEPLOYMENT:
North - 1 Corps with 2 inf, 1 mtn div; 1 mtn, 1 indep inf, i indep 
arty bde. 1 Corps with 4 inf div; 2 indep armd, 1 indep inf, 2 
indep arty bde.
West - 1 Corps with 1 armd, 1 mech div; 1 Corps with 2 inf div; 1 
Corps with 4 inf div.
Central - 1 Corps with 1 armd, 2 inf div, plus 3 indep div (2 if, 1 
mtn).
East - 3 Corps each with 3 mtn div.
South - 1 Corps with 4 div.
NAVY: 52,000, incl naval air force.
PRINCIPAL COMMANDS:
WESTERN; BASES: Bombay (HQ), Goa, Lakshadweep (Laccadive Is) Karwar 
(under constructio).
EASTERN; BASES: Visakhapatnam (HQ), Calcutta, Port Blair (Andaman 
Is).
SOUTHERN (training); Cochin (HQ).
NAVAL AIR: HQ, Goa.
SUBMARINE: HQ, Visakhapatnam.
SUBMARINES: 14:
SSGN: 1 Chakra (Sov Charlie-1) with SS-N-7 Starbright USGW; plus 
533mm TT. (presence of USGW not confirmed).
SS: 13
3 Sindhughosh (Sov Kilo) with 533mm TT.
2 Shishumar (FRG T-209/1500) with 533mm TT.
8 Kursura (Sov Foxtrot) with 533mm TT.
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS: 31:
CARRIERS: 2: "V” class (CW) (UK light fleet), (1 in refit). AC: 8 
Sea Harrier attack, 8 Sea King ASN7ASUW (Sea Eagle ASM). 
DESTROYERS: 5 Bajput (Sov Kashin) DDG with 2 x 2  SA-N— 1 Goa SAM; 
plus 4 SS-N-2 Styx SSM, 5 x 533mm TT, 2 x ASW RL, 1 Ka-25 or 27 
hel (0THT).
FRIGATES: 24:
3 Godavari with 2 x Sea King hel, 2 x 3  ASTT; plus 4 x SS-N-2 
Styx SSM.
6 Hilgiri (UK Leander) with 2 x 3  ASTT, 1 x 3  Limbo ASW mor, 4
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with 1 Chetak thel, 2 with 1 Sea King, plus 2 x 115mm guns.
2 Talwar (UK Whitby) with 1 x Chetak hel, 2 x SS-N-2C Styx SSM.
8 Kamorta (Sov Petya) with 4 ASW RL, 3 x 533mm TT.
2 Khufcrf (ASUW) with 4 SS-N-2C, hel deck,
2 Beas (UK Leopard), 1 Kistna (UK Black Swan), all trg.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 32:
CORVETTES: 5
3 Vijay Durg (Sov Nanuchka II) with 4 x SS-N-2B Styx.
2 Veer (Sov Tarantul) with 4 x SS-N-2C.
MISSILE CRAFT: 13 Vidyut (osa) with 4 x SS-N-2.
PATROL, INSHORE: 14:
12 SDB Mk 2/3, 2 Osa PFI.
MINE WARFARE: 17:
MINELAYERS: None, but Kamorta FF and Pondicherry MSO have 
minelaying capability.
MINE COUNTERMEASURES: 17:
9 Pondicherry (Sov Katya) MSO.
2 Bulsar (UK 'Ham') MSI.
6 Mahi (Sov Yevgeny) MSK.
AMPHIBIOUS: 10:
1 Magar LST, capacity about 12tk, 200 tps.
9 Ghorpad (Sov Polnocny C) LSM, capacity 6 tk, 140 tps.
Plus craft: 8 Vasco da Gama LCU.
SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS: 18:
2 Deepak AOR, 1 spt tkr, 1 Amba (Sov Ugr) sub spt. ltpt, 2 ocean 
tugs, 5 AGHS, 5 AGOR, 1 trg.
NAVAL AIR FORCE: (2,000);
28 cbt ac, 53 armd hel.
ATTACK: 1 sqn with 8 Sea Harriers FRS Mk-51,
2 T-60 trg (more being delivered).
ASW: 1 Ac sqn with 10 Alizi 1050 (land-based); 5 bel sqn with 5 Ka-25 
Hormone A (in Bajput DDG, Ka-27 to replace), 18 Ka-27, 30 Sea King 
Mk 42 a/B, 10 Chetak (for frigates).
MR: 2 sqn: 3 11*38, 5 Tu-l42M Bear F.
COMMUNICATIONS: 1 sqn with 10 BN-2 Islander, Do-228.
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 6 Sea King Mk 42A/C.
TRAINING: 2 sqn: 6 HJt-l6, ac; 2 Chetak, 4 Hughes 300 hel.
AIR FORCE: 115,000;
714 cbt c (plus 9 in store), 12 armed hel.
5 Air Commands.
BOMBERS: 1 It bbr sqn with 10 Canberra.
FGA: 25 sqn:
5 with 90 MiG-23 BN/UM;
7 with 90 MiG-21 MF/U;
4 with 72 Jaguar IS;
4 with 72 MiG-27;
4 with 80 Ajeet;
1 with 20 Marut,
FIGHTERS: 13 sqn:
2 with 40 MiG-29;
2 with 40 Mirage 2000 (36 -H, 4 -TH; 9 more in store); 
2 with 45 MiG-23MF/UM;
402
7 with 150 MiG-21/FL/bis/U.
Air Defence Ground Environment System.
RECCE: 3 sqn:
1 with 8 Canberra PR-57;
1 with 6 MiG-25R, 2 MiG-25U;
1 with 4 HS-748.
TRANSPORT:
AIRCRAFT: 11 sqn:
5 with 70 An-32 Sujlej;
2 with 20 an-12B;
1 with 10 DHC-3;
1 with 15 DHC-4;
2 with 16 HS-748, 12 11-76 Gajraj;
HELICOPTERS: 6 sqn with 80 Mi-8/-17, 2 Mi-26hy tpt, E 12 Mi-25. 
VIP: 1 HQ sqn with 2 Boeing 737.
7 HS-748.
LIAISON: fit and det: 16 HS-748f C-47- 
TRAINING:
20 Canberra T-4/-13/-67, 20 Hunter T-66, 5 Jaguar IB, 60 HT-2, 120
Kiran, some 20 HPT-32 (replacing HT-2), 44 TS-11 (being replaced
with Kiran II), 27 HS-748 ac; 20 Chetak hel.
AAM: R-23R/T Apex, R-60 Aphid, R-550 Magic, AA-2 Atoll.
ASM: AS-30; AS-11B (ATGW), AS-7 Kerri/ (with MiG-27).
SAM: 30 bn: 280 Divina V75SM/VK (SA-2), SA-3.
FORCES ABROAD:
SRI LANKA: Some 53.000; Army: 50,000: 4 inf div HQ. Plus naval, air, 
and Central Reserve Police Force.
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PARA-MILITARY:
NATIONAL SECURITY GUARDS: 3,000 (to be 5,000): anti-terrorism 
contingency deployment force. Comprises elements of the Armed 
Forces, CRPF, Border Guard.
CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF): 90,000; Reserves: 250,000; 83 
bn, internal security duties and army first-line reserves.
BORDER SECURITY FORCE: 90,00; some 95 bn (to add 49 bn by 1991), 
small armas, some It arty, tpt/liaison air spt.
ASSAM RIFLES: 40,000.
LADAKH SCOUTS: 5,000.
INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE: 14,000.
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE: 8,000.
CENTRL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE: 55,000.
DEFENCE SECURITY FORCE: 30,000.
RAILWAY PROTECTION FORCES: 70,000.
ROVINCIAL ARMED CONSTANBULARY: 250,000
COASTGUARD: 2,500
FRIGATES: 1 Kuthar (UK Type 14).
PATROL CRAFT: 29:
4 Vikram PCO, 2 Tara Bai PCI, 8 Hajhans PFI, 7 JIJA Bai PCA 8<. 
AVIATION: 3 air sqn with 2 Do-228, 2 Fokker F-27, 5 BN-2 Islander
ac, 4 Chetak hel.






GDP 1985/6: Rs 539.54 bn ($33-45 bn)
1986/7: Rs 602.19 bn ($32.08 bn) 
growth 1985/6: 7-52 1986/7 : 7 .7%
Inflation: 1986: 3-52 1987: 4.72
Debt: 1986: $15-2 bn 1987: $16.6 bn
Def bdgt 1987/8: Rs 44.26 bn ($2.53 bn)
1988/9: Rs 48.32 bn ($2.74 bn)*





Men: 6,624,000 5,364,000 7,143.000




Terms of Service: voluntary.
RESERVES 513.000; Army 500,000: obligation to ages 45 (men) or 50 







14 indep armd bde.
8 indep inf. bde.
8 arty bde/bde equivalents.
3 AA arty bde.
6 armed recce regt.
1 special services group (3bn).
Avn: 1 ac, 4 hel sqn; indep observation fit.
EQUIPMENT:
MBT: 1,600: 450 M-47/-48 (incl A5), 51 T-54/ -55, some 1,100 Type - 
59.
LIGHT TANKS: Type-63.
APC: 800 M-113, Type-531 reported.
TOWED ARTY: 100mm: Type-59; 105mm: 200 M-101 50 M-56 pack; 122mm: 100 
Type 54-1; 130mm: Type- 59-1/M46; l40mm: 5*5in; 155mm: M-49, 60 M- 
114, 95 M-198.
SP ARTY: 105mm: 12 M-7; 155mm: 64 M-109A2; 203mm: 40 M-110A2.
MRL: 122mm: BM-21.
MORTARS: 107mm, 120mm.
ATGW: Cobra, 224 TON (incl 24 on M-901 SP).
RL: 89mm: M-20 3*5-in.
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RCL: 75mm: Type-52, 106mm: M-40A.




SAM: 100 Stinger, 144 RBS-70.
AVIATION:
AIRCRAFT:
LIAISON: 2 Turbo Commander, Queen Air% 1 Cessna 421, 55 Mashshaq. 
OBSERVATION: 40 )-lE, 50 Mashshaq.
HELICOPTERS: 20 AH-IS (with TOW), 16 Mi-8, 35 SA-330, 23 Alouette
III, 13 Bell 47.
NAVY: 16,000 (incl Naval Air).
BASE: Karachi (Fleet HQ).
SUBMARINES: 6:
2 Hashmat (Fr Agosta) with 533mm TT (F-17 HWT), Harpoon USGW 
4 Hangor (Fr Daphne) with 533mm TT (L-5 HWT),
Plus 3 SX-404 SSI SF insertion craft.
DESTROYERS: 8:
1 Babur (UK Devonshire) with 2 x 2  115mm guns; plus 1 Alouette hel. 
6 Alamgir (US Gearing) (ASW) with 1 x 8  ASROC; plus 2 x 2  127mm 
guns, 2 with 2 x 3 Harpoon SSM.
1 Badr (UK Battle) with 2 x 2  115mm guns; plus 4 x 533mm TT, 1 x 3  
ASW mor (assigned to Maritime Safety Agency).
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 29:
MISSILE CRAFT: 8
4 Ch Huangfeng with 4 x CSS-N-2 (HY-2) SSM.
4 CH Hoku< with 2 x CSS-N-2.
TORPEDO CRAFT: 4 Ch Huchuan PHT with 2 x 533 mm TT.
PATROL: 17:
COASTAL: 4 Baluchistan (CH Hainan) PFC with 4 x ASW RL.
INSHORE: 13:
12 Queeta (ch Shanghai) PFI (4 with Maritime Safety Agency).
1 Rajshahi PCL.
MINE WARFARE: 3:
3 Mahmood (US-MSC 268) MSC.
SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS: 4:
1 Nasr (Ch Fuqing), 1 Dacca AOR, 1 survey, 1 ocean tug.
NAVAL AIR:
2 cbt ac, 9 armed hel.
ASW/MR: 1 sqn with 3 Atlantic (operated by Air Force; AM-39 ASM). 
ASW/SAR: 2 hel sqn: 1 with 6 Westland Sea King (5 ASW with AM-39* 1 
SAR), 4 SA-316B (ASW).




338 cbt ac, no armed hel.
FGA: 8 sqn:
1 with 16 Mirage IIIEP (some with AM-39 ASM), 3 H I  DP (trg);
4 with 62 Mirage 5 (58 -5PA/PA2, 4 - 5DPA/DPA2);
3 with 41 Q-5.
FIGHTERS: 11 sqn:
9 with 170 J-6/JJ-6;
2 with some 39 F-16 (31 -A, 8 -B).
RECCE: 1 sqn with 13 Mirage IIIRP.
TRANSPORT: 2 sqn:
1 with 13 C-130 (5 -B, 8 -E), 1 L-100;
1 with 1 Falcon 20, 2 F-27-200
(1 with Navy), 2 Beech (1 Super King Air, 1 Bonanza).
SAR: 1 hel sqn with 2 HH-43B, 4 Alouette III.
UTILITY: 1 hel sqn with 4 SA-321.
TRAINING: 1 sqn with 20 T-33A, 4 Ch Mig-15UTI; other ac incl 2 M.rage 
5DPA2, 3 Mirage IIIDP, 2 J-6, 35 Cessna T-37C, 45 JJ-5. 12 CJ-6, 24 
Reims Cessna FTB-337, 20 Mashshaq.
AD: 7 SAM bty:
6 with 6 Crotale;
1 with 6 CSA- 1 (SA-2).




NATIONAL GUARD: 75,000; incl Mujahid Force; Janbaz Force: National 
Cadet corps; Women Guards.
FRONTIER CORPS: 65,000 45 UR-416 APC.
PAKISTAN RANGERS: 15,000
NORTHERN LIGHT INFANTRY: 7,000 some 6 bn;
COAST GUARD: 2,000
* Excl proceeds of 1987 Defence Tax.
*#Excl. Afghan refugees.
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNMMMM 
Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 19B- 
1989, (London, Autumn 1988).
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